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the consequences of state failure and terrorist sanctuaries, which is the prevailing explanation in 
extant literature. Post 9/11 United States counterterrorism policy has focused on the role of the 
state in providing safe haven or sanctuary to transnational terrorist organizations.  However, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that both weak and strong states host terrorist sanctuaries. Thus, no 
clear explanation for why transnational terrorist sanctuaries are in some weak and strong states 
but not present in others currently exists. Second, this dissertation seeks to fill this gap by 
adopting Migdal’s (1988) state-society interaction approach to explain the presence of terrorist 
sanctuaries.  This dissertation hypothesizes that the role of society’s structure and societal 
strongmen’s interactions with the state are an important determinant in whether or not 
transnational terrorist organizations will seek to establish safe haven within a given territory.  
Sageman’s (2008) hub and node approach on the operational capacities of transnational terrorist 
sanctuary networks helps to explain differences in types of sanctuaries.  Using a newly 
constructed dataset on terrorist sanctuaries for quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis 
through case studies, this dissertation intends to show that the presence of terrorist sanctuaries in 
both weak and strong states can be understood through four state-society interaction typologies.  
The implications of this study are relevant for policymakers seeking to understand and counter 
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Introduction Chapter 1 - 
 1.1 The Question 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks forced policymakers and a number of scholars 
in the United States to re-think their counterterrorism strategies by focusing their efforts on 
terrorist sanctuaries.  The policy that has developed from these efforts to counter terrorism is 
termed “denial of sanctuary” (Miko 2004; U.S., Department of State 2005).  Furthermore, the 
killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 in an urban area of Abbottabad, Pakistan, raised a 
number of questions for policymakers, the media, and the public with regard to previous 
generalizations on terrorist sanctuaries.  The details that have emerged regarding Osama bin 
Laden’s whereabouts and his ability to “hide in plain sight” (LaFranchi 2011) shed light on an 
important misconception in the study on terrorist sanctuaries that has existed for over a decade.  
In other words, terrorist sanctuaries exist beyond mountains, caves, and the fortified training 
grounds of late 1990s Afghanistan. Transnational terrorist sanctuaries are also present in 
developed urban areas and these sanctuaries support key organizational functions such as 
financing and logistics (Patrick 2011). 
The purpose of this dissertation is to explain the incidence of transnational terrorist 
sanctuaries.  Terrorist sanctuaries are physical locations that terrorists use to coordinate planning 
and training in order to pursue the goals of the organization (Kittner 2007). The theoretical 
debate on terrorist sanctuaries has generally focused on the idea that failed or weak states are 
closely associated with the presence of transnational terrorist sanctuaries.  For decades, 
prominent scholars studying political movements have contended that there is an inherent 
opportunity in states with weak institutional structures that make them vulnerable to domestic 
security problems such as civil wars and social revolutions (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1996).  Building 
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on this logic, others began to argue that terrorist groups also seek these environments for safe 
haven (Rotberg 2002, 2003, 2004; Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002; Hamre and Sullivan 2002; Rice 
2003; Piazza 2008; Rice, Graff, and Pascual 2010).   
In practice, the specific public goods the modern state is expected to facilitate include 
political order and security, access to healthcare, transportation, education, and the regulation of 
economic activity so that markets can be accessed (Chauvet and Collier 2008; see also Evans 
1995).  Thus, strong states provide political order by organizing the delivery or accessibility of 
public goods, particularly security.  Strong states are able to penetrate and extract resources from 
their societies without predation or high levels of corruption and also provide necessary 
infrastructure such as roads and communications networks to sustain productive activities. In 
contrast, a common cause of state failure is over-extraction to the point of predation without the 
use of funds benefiting society as a whole (Bates 2008).1 Weak states often fail to provide 
political order and do not have the institutional capacity to build or maintain the infrastructure 
needed to carry out the tasks expected of the modern state (Rotberg 2004).   
In the post-Cold War era, scholars have frequently asserted that these “weak and failing 
states have arguably become the single-most important problem for international order” 
(Fukayama 2004, 92). Political and economic aspects associated with weak bureaucratic 
structures in the “least governed, most lawless places in the world…areas that combine rugged 
terrain, weak governance, with room to hide or receive supplies due to low population densities” 
are assumed to be most attractive for terrorist groups (Jenkins, Zelikow, and May 2004; Graff 
2010, 53).  This post-9/11 assumption is often based on the “nightmares of Sudan and 
Afghanistan” (Schanzer 2005, 26).  However, Afghanistan and Sudan did not become terrorist 
                                                 
1 Kleptocratic regimes such as Mobutu’s Zaire or any type of wide scale corruption often lead to state failure as the 
resources are not benefiting society as a whole (Bates 2008a, 2008b; Kisangani 2000).   
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sanctuaries due to state weakness or failure but rather state sponsorship.  Al Qaeda did not 
operate in the outer territorial boundaries of these countries but in or near major cities (Ezrow 
and Frantz 2013, 214). 
The political and economic characteristics of state failure certainly paint a bleak picture, 
which suggests well-organized terrorist organizations can thrive in disorganized, weak states 
(Alexander 2002).  Thus, the idea of failed states serving as transnational terrorist sanctuaries 
seems viable, but the extant literature has yet to address these disconfirming cases. By focusing 
solely on a handful of failed states to explain safe havens, other complex networks in non-failed 
states are missed (Newman 2007).  As a few scholars acknowledge, terrorists often find refuge 
and operate within stable states such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and Canada (Innes 2007, 
2009; Bale 2007; Newman 2007; Pillar 2009; Patrick 2011). Moreover, military campaigns 
during the “War on Terror” and continued counterterrorism missions across the globe have 
forced terrorist organizations to broaden and diffuse areas of operation, often into territories 
where the state is strong (Vittori 2005, 2011; Khalil 2010). 
 1.2 The Argument 
Terrorist sanctuaries or safe havens for transnational organizations are a critical element 
for the survivability of a group (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002; Arkedis 2009; Vittori 2011; 
Gaibulloev and Sandler 2013, 2014). However, systematic analysis on the choices terrorist 
organizations make in basing their operations remains “virtually non-existent” (Gaibulloev 
2015). Mixed findings in extant literature are the result of scholars’ emphasis on state capacity 
and a failure to consider local conditions (see Campana and Ducol 2011; Young and Findley 
2011; Nemeth, Mauselin, and Stapley 2014).  Thus, little careful thought has been given to the 
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role of society in explaining transnational terrorist sanctuaries.  This is a major omission in the 
literature that this dissertation intends to fill.   
The argument here is that state centric approaches to understanding terrorist sanctuaries 
are flawed because in the absence of state control, social actors typically hold the governing 
authority. Given the diversity of state capabilities and the complexity of societies, the state 
should be viewed as a social actor, albeit a powerful one, at the “apex of a web, rather than the 
top of a pyramid” (Migdal 1988, 4).  In fact, the state may be weakened due to the governing 
strength of societal “strongmen” or “power brokers” challenging the authority of the state 
(Migdal 1988; Kimmerling and Migdal 2003; Marten 2012). Due to the loose application and the 
connotation of the terms “strongmen” or “warlords,” societal actors are often assumed to be self-
serving, corrupt, violent criminals (Ahram and King 2012) and dismissed in the analysis of 
terrorist sanctuaries.  In reality, local leaders have a great deal of legitimacy. 
For decades, scholars of statecraft and state leaders have acknowledged the existence of 
“protostates” controlled by strongmen, able to provide security and govern areas ungovernable 
by the state (Reno 1998, 2003; Ahram and King 2012; Marten 2012), but the terrorist sanctuary 
literature has failed to address these factors (see Campana and Ducol 2011; Felbab-Brown 2007).   
Thus, how societal actors react to terrorist organizations within a given territory is an important 
consideration that is overlooked in existing literature.  A lack of state capacity alone is not 
sufficient to allow a terrorist organization to establish sanctuary.  Since a number of failed states 
do not harbor transnational terrorist sanctuaries this is an indication that the structure of society, 
weak or strong, also matters.  Therefore, the purpose of this study is to explain the presence of 
transnational terrorist sanctuaries by considering the interaction between state and society. 
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 1.3 Scope and Significance of the Study 
In the past decade, a proliferation of speeches by policymakers and studies by scholars 
have established a link between failed states and terrorist sanctuaries (Rice 2003; Miko 2004; 
Jenkins, Zelikow, and May 2004; Hagel 2004; Rotberg, 2002, 2004).  The result has been the 
implementation of counterterrorism policies intended to alleviate the conditions that countries 
assumed to harbor terrorists experience, such as poor governance and poverty (Krasner and 
Pascual 2005; Rice, Graff, and Pascual 2010).  In its policy recommendations, The 9/11 
Commission Report specified six regions, many of which contain the overwhelming number of 
failed states, as well as “European cities with expatriate Muslim communities” as the most at risk 
of becoming terrorist sanctuaries (Miko 2004).  Due to the inconsistencies in the extant literature 
on state failure and terrorist sanctuaries and the national security policy implications for 
understanding sanctuaries, this study is significant for a number of reasons.  
First, this dissertation argues that the role of society is also critical.  An important missing 
element in the study of terrorist sanctuaries is the role of societal actors, which are independent 
of state actors, in choosing whether or not to actively or passively work alongside terrorist 
organizations.  This study thus distinguishes strong societies from weak societies. Briefly stated, 
a strong society refers to a setting which social control remains embedded in social organizations 
apart from the state (Migdal 1988, 137).  In states where societal groups have challenged or 
achieved predominance over the state’s ability to enact and enforce policy, power lies not in one 
societal leader but the sum of societal leaders or “strongmen,” fragmenting the distribution of 
power within state boundaries (138).  Therefore, this fragmentation leads scholars to label the 
particular state’s capacity as “weak.”   
Second, this dissertation will elaborate on the concept of terrorist sanctuary and 
differentiate types of sanctuaries.  Third, it will identify and explain the factors that make some 
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areas more or less likely to become a sanctuary for terrorist organizations.  Terrorist sanctuaries 
were analyzed prior to the September 11th attacks but the lethality and sophistication of the 
attacks drew attention to the necessary role stable operational terrorist bases play in planning 
complex, successful attacks (Arkedis 2009).  Thus, the study of the organizational structure of 
terrorist organizations is a critical element in the study of terrorist sanctuaries.  
Consistent with much of the terrorism literature, this study acknowledges clear 
differences between domestic and transnational terrorism and excludes domestic terrorist 
sanctuaries.2 Domestic terrorism, while more prevalent, is considered to have different motives, 
targets, and organizational structure (Sandler 2014).3  Combined large N studies of domestic and 
transnational terrorism are more difficult to generalize, since domestic terrorism tends to be 
unique to specific separatist grievances in a single country, whereas the transnational movements 
of left-wing groups in the 1970s and 1980s and the right-wing and religious fundamentalist 
movements beginning in the 1980s and 1990s are dominated by common grievances (Sandler 
2014, 264; Rapoport 2004; Hoffman 2006).4  Mixed findings in extant literature on sanctuaries 
                                                 
2 Sandler (2014) provides an extensive analysis of the differences between domestic and transnational terrorism and 
reasons to distinguish between the two. Notably, counterterrorism policies for domestic and transnational terrorism 
have different costs in countering a groups safe havens; governments are able to address potential domestic targets 
for effectively (Enders and Sandler 2012); the causes of each type of terrorism may differ (Piazza 2011; Savun and 
Phillips 2009); they display different dynamic responses (Enders, Sandler, and Gailbulloev 2011); and the impact on 
macroeconomic consequences and economic sectors may differ (Gailbulloev and Sandler 2008, 2011; Enders and 
Sandler 2012; Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003) (Sandler 2014, 263-265). 
 
3 Separating the two, Nemeth, Mauselin, and Stapley (2014) focus on domestic terror “hot spot” analysis. 
 
4Left wing terrorism is driven by Communist ideologies (Marxist and/or Maoist) and idealist goals.  They tend to 
target elites or authority figures and are typically revolutionary and anti-authoritarian (Cronin 2002; Hoffman 2006).  
Religious terrorism in this context refers to the Islamic-based jihadist movement.  The religious terrorist movement 
has broad aims for destroying the prevailing international system and is considered to be more violent in their 
methods toward civilians and authority figures (Cronin 2002; Morgan 2004; Hoffman 2006; Sageman 2004, 2008). 
 In addition to the two major terrorist movements, left wing and religious, a limited number of right wing terrorist 
groups organized to form a similar transnational Neo-Nazi movement.  The US based Hammerskin Nation (in 
addition to the affiliate Aryan Nations) is considered one of the most organized groups, with cells in Canada and 
throughout Europe with clear global aims. However, the transnational organization of this movement ended around 
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indicates a need to limit the scope of this study to avoid an incorrect generalization (see Patrick 
2006).  
The transnational network utilized by al Qaeda to recruit, plan, finance, and carry out the 
9/11 attacks has led to a proliferation of studies on biographical traits of terrorists (Sageman 
2004; Jones 2012), motives and aspirations of transnational terrorist organizations (Abrahms 
2006; Jones and Libicki 2008), the life span of terror groups (Cronin 2006; Jones and Libicki 
2008), and the targets of terrorist incidents (Li 2005; Piazza 2008).5  Terrorist sanctuaries have 
been considered one of the most important aspects of effectively countering terrorist threats over 
the past two decades, but the existing research has not employed systematic analyses of the 
organizational structure and bases of operations. This study does not seek to explain the location 
of terrorist attacks, but rather the location of terrorist bases of operation (Gaibulloev 2015; see 
Piazza 2008, Tikusis 2009; Coggins 2014; Hendrix and Young 2014).  An important 
consideration is that some form of sanctuary is needed, at least temporarily, to carry out specific 
duties for a successful attack (Pillar 2009; see also Patrick 2011).  However, a stable planning 
sanctuary is important for organizational cohesion and the effectiveness of the group. 
Unlike extant literature on sanctuaries, this dissertation will go beyond small N case 
studies and combine both quantitative and qualitative methods.6  Although many terrorism 
scholars over the past decade are moving toward quantitative approaches as data becomes 
available (Sandler 2014; see also Silke 2001, Ross 2004), the terrorist sanctuary literature 
                                                                                                                                                             
2001, with independent domestic cells remaining active throughout the West. Right wing terrorist organizations tend 
to target minorities or immigrants, whom are perceived as a threat to the traditional culture (Cronin 2002). 
 
5 These examples are a very small sample of the vast literature on each of these topics.  
 
6 This strategy is referred to as the Q2 method. 
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generally relies on single case study or qualitative approaches highlighting anecdotal evidence 
from Sudan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.  
Although the case study approach can contribute to data collection, particularly when 
resources are limited (Lijphart 1971) and when data collection is difficult and dangerous 
(Dempsey 2006), it has a number of weaknesses that limit its ability to offer generalizations.  
While these can provide insight, the “logical looseness makes it all too easy to draw conclusions 
in accord with the investigators’ predilections” (Achen and Snidal 1989, 169).  Each 
methodology contributes differently to gaining knowledge and complements one another well in 
theory evaluation (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Mahoney and Goertz 2006).   
Since the number of cases and new information on terrorist sanctuaries has increased 
over the past decade, researchers should turn to a more systematic analysis of terrorist 
sanctuaries using large N quantitative methods in addition to multiple case studies. Therefore, 
this study aims to provide a more nuanced explanation that will reconcile the existing competing 
views on the study of transnational terrorist sanctuaries by using both methodologies.  The 
combination of these methods has a number of advantages. 
Based on the number of case studies in the field, many terrorist sanctuary researchers 
hold tightly to the belief that sanctuaries are unique in many ways, thus, cannot be studied 
systematically (see Newman 2007).7  As King, Keohane, and Verba note “All phenomena, all 
events, are in some sense unique,” but the goal of social science research is to carefully study 
complex or “unique” phenomenon in order to observe generalizations and simplify the 
complexities (42-43).  Evaluating terrorism theories through quantitative methods as data 
                                                 
7 Regarding methodology Newman (2007) states that “it is difficult to analyze the subject with a rigorous 
methodology” and “it is particularly difficult to generate propositions about this relationship which have general 
explanatory relevance” (464). 
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become available has led to closer examinations of logical consistency and generalization of the 
theories.  
As the strengths of quantitative research lie in the scope, generalizability, replication, and 
a less biased approach to case selection (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994), quantitative 
methodology is critical to theory evaluation on terrorist sanctuaries.  However, while quantitative 
designs facilitate precision in theory evaluation, the weakness can be in accuracy, as social 
science researchers are forced to rely on proxies to capture phenomenon (King, Keohane, Verba 
1994, 44; Migdal 1988). Nonetheless, quantitative research remains a critical aspect of theory 
evaluation.  Thus, using both of these methods will produce a more complete explanation and 
review of this theory. 
 1.4 Plan for the Dissertation 
           This dissertation consists of nine additional chapters.  The next two chapters provide a 
review of the literature on terrorist sanctuaries and develop a new theoretical argument on why 
some areas are more or less likely to be used as bases of operations. Chapter 4 uses a time series 
cross-sectional design of 151 countries from 1970-2012 to explain whether or not there is a 
statistically significant relationship between state capacity (strong or weak) and terrorist 
sanctuaries, on the one hand, and between sanctuaries and societal capacity (strong or weak) on 
the other.  The statistical results indicate that there is a strong relationship between the presence 
of terrorist sanctuaries in weak states with strong societies and terrorist sanctuaries in strong 
states with weak societies.  Chapter 5 will introduce the qualitative methodologies of structured, 
focused comparison and process tracing through “critical antecedents” and “critical junctures” 
(Slater and Simmons 2010). This will shed light on nuances in the relationship between terrorist 
sanctuaries and state-society interactions. Chapters 6 through 9 further analyze the results of the 
10 
 
model in chapter 4 by evaluating cases that include the United States, Germany, Iraq, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.  Finally, Chapter 10 will provide concluding thoughts on the 





















Literature Review Chapter 2 - 
 2.1 Conceptual Issues: Terrorism and Terrorist Sanctuaries 
To understand the role of sanctuaries requires an explanation of what is meant by the 
term terrorism, as a more general phenomenon. Throughout the past few centuries, the use of 
terrorism has grown and adapted to various actors.8 Hoffman (2006) notes that the year 1968 
marked the beginning of international terrorism and in subsequent decades numerous issues 
emerged relating to the internationalization of terrorism such as state sponsorship, narco-
terrorism, and the religious movement most often attributed to al Qaeda (16-17, 127).  All of 
these changes have contributed to the discrepancies in defining terrorism (Lacquer 1999; Schmid 
and Jongman 1988).   
The difficulty in reaching a consensus on how terrorism should be understood is typically 
based on two broad disagreements.  The first encompasses the idea that “one man’s terrorist is 
another man’s freedom fighter” (Hoffman 2006, 16).  The second is the role of the state, and 
whether or not states should be included in how terrorism is conceptualized (Schmid and 
Jongman 1988; Laqueur 1999; Hoffman 2006).  These issues, in turn, affect how terrorist 
sanctuaries are understood.9  Many recent scholars have tended to exclude actions by the state in 
                                                 
8 The term is tied historically to the Jacobins during the French Revolution and later described the “People’s Will” in 
Russia in the late 19th Century, introducing “propaganda by deed.”  Terrorism continued to be used to describe 
revolutionary actors’ tactics until the 1930s, when the term was expanded to explain Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, 
and the Soviet Union under Stalin (Hoffman 1998, 4-6; Hoffman 2006, 14).  In these contexts tied to the rise of 
nationalism, anarchism, and revolutionary socialism, terrorism describes “the systematic inducement of fear and 
anxiety to control and direct a civilian population” (Crenshaw 1981, 380).  After WWII, the rise of 
nationalist/separatist struggles popularized the idea of “freedom fighters” (who used violence/terrorist tactics) in 
such cases as Algeria and Israel.  However, Yasser Arafat described the difference between terrorism and freedom 
fighters lying in “just cause” for the incidents.  The 1960s and 1970s ushered in a new era of revolutionary 
terrorism, often describing Marxist-based groups (Hoffman 1998, 4-6; Hoffman 2006, 14-17). 
 
9 Schmid and Jongman identify 22 components from over 100 different definitions of terrorism (1988, 2005 5-6).   
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defining terrorism to differentiate state actions from the actions of non-state actors (Sandler 
2014; see also Krueger 2007).10  For example, Hoffman (2006) defines terrorism as: 
“political in aims and motives, violent or threatens violence, designed to have far reaching 
psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target, conducted either by an 
organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose 
members wear no uniform or identifying insignia) or by individuals or a small collection of 
individuals directly influenced, motivated, or inspired by the ideological aims or example of 
some existent terrorist movement and/or its leaders, and perpetrated by a subnational group or 
non-state entity (40).” 
 
Hoffman’s (2006) definition is the widely used conceptualization of terrorism by scholars 
studying terrorist sanctuaries (Moki 2007, 114; see also Kittner 2007).11  While state sponsorship 
is an important element for understanding some sanctuaries, terrorism is understood as an act 
carried out by non-state actors (Sandler 2014; Gaibulloev 2015; Byman 2005).  Following 
Kittner’s (2007) definition of terrorism, a terrorist sanctuary is thus a geographic area that 
possesses a number of characteristics for terrorist organizations such as fundraising through 
diversified means, a communications/logistics network, operational space for combat training, 
                                                 
10 Using state actions in the definition of terrorism is controversial within extant literature.  Falk (2002) criticizes the 
recent trend toward removing state actions from the definition of terror as the term is traditionally tied to state 
actions.  Others argue that including actions by the state can confuse the study of terrorism from other acts of 
violence.  As Cronin (2002) points out, “when state force is used internationally, it is considered an act of war, when 
it is used domestically it is called various things…states can terrorize but they cannot by definition be terrorists” (33; 
see also Lacquer 1999).  Furthermore, states can also “sponsor” terrorist organizations, and many have done so in 
the past (notably Iran and Syria) by providing access to weapons, safe haven, or providing money, either actively or 
passively (Byman 2005) but states cannot be terrorists.  More suitable terms to explain state violence may be acts of 
war, repression, genocide, or politicide depending on the act being described.  For example, actions by the Soviet 
Union under Stalin may be more correctly characterized as politicide rather than terrorism, while Hitler’s actions 
would be more correctly characterized as genocide rather than terrorism.  Furthermore, others argue that the killing 
of non-combatant civilians by the state should be termed “democide” (Rummel 1994) or “the state killing of 
unarmed civilians not involved in conflict” which includes genocide, politicide, and mass murder (see Kisangani and 
Nafziger 2007; see also Harff 2005). 
 
11 Gaibulloev (2015) uses a more simplistic version of this definition from Enders and Sandler (2012) defining 
terrorism as “the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political 
or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims” (4). The 
difference here is the “individual” in Enders and Sandler (2012).  This dissertation focuses on small or large groups 
of individuals, not an individual or lone actor. 
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ability to travel relatively easily, and access to weapons components and fraudulent documents 
(Kittner 2007, 308; see also U.S. Department of State 2006-2014).12   
Kittner’s (2007) definition is adopted for a number of reasons.  It does not stress the 
safety component as a critical factor for terrorist sanctuaries that is often emphasized due to the 
meaning of the word “sanctuary” (see Innes 2007).  By doing so it excludes the inherent bias that 
sanctuaries are usually found in remote areas.  This definition also draws attention to the 
importance of prospects for terrorist financing in establishing sanctuary, which is overlooked in 
other definitions (Sageman 2004, 2008; Dempsey 2006; U.S. State Department, 2006-2014).  
Kittner’s (2007) definition is relevant to the explanation of different operational characteristics of 
sanctuaries as it illustrates the fact that more established sanctuaries or bases, such as those in 
Sudan in the 1990s, Afghanistan until 2001, and Yemen since 2001, are truly rare events because 
these are examples in which most or all activities associated with terrorist sanctuaries were or are 
present. In this context, terrorists are viewed as rational actors (Crenshaw 1990; Enders and 
Sandler 1993, 2012) who strategically choose bases of operations to maximize capabilities 
(Gaibulloev 2015). 
Extant literature on failed states also accepts the idea that terrorist organizations 
intentionally seek out specific territories that offer the necessary operational and financial 
resources (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002; Gaibulloev 2015).  However, before reviewing the 
literature on the failed state-terrorist sanctuary nexus, an explanation of what constitutes a failed 
state and what is expected of the modern state is necessary.   
                                                 
12 The United States State Department uses a similar definition for annual “Country Reports” of “Terrorist Safe 
Havens” by defining them as “ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed physical areas where terrorists are able 
to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security because of 




Many scholars continue to follow Max Weber’s “ideal type” definition of the state having 
the “monopoly on the use of force,” at least as a starting point (Bates 2008b; Piazza 2008; P. 
Miller 2013).13  Migdal (1988) expands on this general idea, defining the state as “an 
organization, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state’s leadership 
(executive authority) that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for 
all the people as well as the parameters of rule- making for other social organizations in a given 
territory, using force if necessary to have its way” (19).14  Accordingly, state “capabilities 
include the capacities to: (1) penetrate society, (2) regulate social relationships, (3) extract 
resources, and (4) appropriate or use resources in determined ways ”  (Migdal 1988, 4). 
The capacity of the state is determined by a range of factors.  Rice and Patrick (2008) 
categorize state capacity indicators as “security,” “political,” “economic,” and “social welfare.”15  
With these measures, state sustainability are considered on a continuum along which states can 
be loosely categorized (Lambach 2004; see also Patrick 2011).  Very weak or failed states do not 
have the institutional capacity to provide the infrastructural needs to carry out these tasks.  
Therefore, in the most extreme cases of state failure and state collapse there is an absence of the 
delivery and accessibility of public goods that characterize strong states (Rotberg 2004; Zartman 
1995).  
                                                 
13 Paul Miller (2013) provides an excellent review of the historical conceptualization of statecraft. 
 
14 Migdal (2001) further simplifies this definition to explain that the state has both an “image” of the legitimate 
controlling force in a given territory but also is bound to “practices,” or how the state’s agencies function in practice 
(15-16; see also White (2013, 5). 
 
15 A number of databases focused on operationalizing state failure exist.  Quantitative studies tend to use World 
Bank Development Indicators or The Political Instability Task Force data (Goldstein, Bates, Epstein, Gurr, Lustik, 
Marshall, Ulfelder, and Woodward 2010), while journalistic or policy reports often cite the State Fragility Index by 
The Fund for Peace. However, Goldstein, et al. (2010) indicators are focused on civil war, which are increasingly 
disputed in the literature as being the best proxy for capturing state failure. The State Fragility Index has more 
comprehensive indicators but data are only available since 2005. 
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State failure has traditionally been considered a humanitarian concern.16  Walt (2002) 
contends that failed states have become a “breeding grounds of instability, mass migration, and 
murder” (Rotberg 2002, 128; see also Dorff 2002, Gelb 1994).  In recent years, failed states have 
been viewed as a serious international security threat or “reservoirs and exporters of terror” 
(Rotberg 2002, 127) as they are “incapable of projecting power and asserting authority within 
their own borders, leaving their territories governmentally empty” (Mentan 2004, xi).  These 
assumptions regarding the consequences of state failure have dominated much of the existing 
literature on terrorist sanctuaries.  
 2.2 Literature Review: Terrorist Sanctuaries 
Over the past decade, scholars and policymakers have argued that failed states are more 
likely to host terrorist organizations, be the target of terrorist attacks, and have their citizens join 
and carry out terrorist attacks (see Rotberg 2002, 2004; Piazza 2008; Gaibulloev 2015).  The 
literature on state failure and terrorist sanctuaries generally accepts the idea that terrorist 
organizations need a geographic space to carry out planning and training as well as fundraising 
for operations, which are expensive.17 A truck or hotel bombing can cost in the tens of thousands 
of dollars (Prober 2005).  Thus, a terrorist base matters for the groups’ survivability (see 
Gaibulloev and Sandler 2013, 2014) but the choices terrorist organizations make when 
determining a base of operations is unknown (Gaibulloev 2015). State sponsorship of terrorism 
has traditionally been a key aspect of terrorist organization success and longevity, but because 
direct state sponsorship of terrorism is thought to be on the decline (Pillar 2001; Byman 2005; 
                                                 
16 The literature on state failure is extensive.  Since Helman and Ratner (1992) first coined the term “failed states,” 
the article has been cited nearly 600 times. 
 
17 Brachman and Forrest (2007) argue that “virtual camps” or the use of the Internet may replace many of the 
operational needs of groups.  Arkedis (2009) rebukes this argument. 
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Abrahms 2006) terrorist organizations must adapt to new challenges.  Scholars studying state 
failure’s relationship to terrorism, therefore, point to both economic and political components of 
failed states as being conducive to terrorist organizations. 
Although leaders in many weak or failing state regimes, notably Sudan and Afghanistan, 
have actively or passively sponsored transnational terrorist organizations (see Byman 2005), the 
conventional wisdom is that terrorist organizations do not require any government consent in 
order to establish a sanctuary (Arsenault and Bacon 2015; Newman 2007, Schanzer 2005; see 
also Patrick 2011, Korteweg 2008). Thus, the consequences of state weakness or failure are 
assumed to provide many opportunities to terrorist organizations, such as a “home” for training, 
arms depots, communications facilities, pursuit of business interests, potential recruits, de facto 
control over certain areas, passport acquisition, and weapon purchases. Because failed states still 
possess outward signs of sovereignty in the ability to issue passports and purchase weapons, they 
facilitate an environment to fulfill terrorist organizational needs (Krasner and Pascual 2005; 
Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002; Kittner 2007; see also Korteweg 2008).   
 2.2.1 State Failure and Terrorism 
State failure’s “governance gaps” range from security, political, social welfare, to 
economic (Patrick 2011, 90).  Thus, a host of variables are considered to be associated with the 
presence of terrorist sanctuaries. A key argument in extant literature is based on the idea that 
terrorist sanctuaries are common in states that have experienced a previous or ongoing civil war18 
(Gaibulloev 2015; see also Newman 2007), which disrupts the security apparatus, leading the 
state to no longer control its own territory. Examples include Lebanon, Bosnia, Sudan, and 
Afghanistan (Alexander 2002; Dorff 2005; Hamre and Sullivan 2002; Kohlman 2004; Newman 
                                                 
18 Others have found a relationship between terrorist incidents and civil conflict (Piazza 2008; Hendrix and Young 
2014; Coggins 2014).   
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2007).  Furthermore, a legacy of violence is conducive to accessibility to weapons (Kittner 
2007).  An ongoing conflict leads to porous borders in the absence of state territorial control, 
allowing terrorists or criminal networks to move in and out undetected.  Furthermore, the 
geographic features common in many conflict prone areas, such as mountainous terrain, are 
difficult for the state to penetrate and is considered to play a role in the presence of terrorist bases 
(Kittner 2007; see also Fearon and Laitin 2003).  Gaibulloev (2015) found mountainous terrain 
to be a statistically significant factor for a terrorist organizations’ base choice. 
Gaibulloev (2015) used civil conflict measures as a proxy for state failure and the 
findings suggest there is a statistical relationship between civil conflict and the presence of 
terrorist bases. While security weaknesses are considered to be conducive to terrorist mobility, 
the relationship between state failure, civil war, and terrorism is one that should be studied with 
caution.  As Coggins (2014) notes, using civil war as an indicator for state failure to explain 
domestic or nationalist/separatist terrorism presents an endogeneity problem as the line is often 
blurred between insurgencies and terrorist groups.  Thus, a control variable is more appropriate 
than using civil conflict as a proxy for state weakness (Coggins 2014).  Insurgencies, or 
breakaway factions of them, may employ terrorism for broader military goals (Bloom 2004; 
Findley and Young 2012; Coggins 2014). 
Extant literature also relies on the idea that weak or failed states often pose regional 
security threats due to the diffusion of conflicts and illicit economic systems that result from the 
state’s inability to regulate its economic activities19 and porous borders creating “bad 
                                                 
19 Somewhat related to the general issue of trade, Gaibulloev (2015) did not find statistical support for trade 
openness as a factor for terrorist organizations’ base location choice.   
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neighborhoods” (Muhula 2007, 46).  Gaibulloev (2015) found that terrorist bases are more 
common in specific geographic regions, depending on the ideology of the group.20   
A state that is no longer able to control its resources or economic activity tends to provide 
financing opportunities for terrorist organizations through smuggling and illicit economic 
activity (Felbab-Brown 2007, Kittner 2007, Peters 2009).  Felbab-Brown (2007, 152) points out 
that numerous non-state actors, including terrorist organizations, have become involved in the 
drug trade, smuggling, maritime fraud schemes, and precious gems.  These groups have 
penetrated illicit economies, particularly in remote, isolated areas, and use long-established 
smuggling routes to gain access to weapons and raise funds.   
A number of resource rich failed African states have become a terrorist financing concern 
(Bertocchi and Guerzoni 2012; Menkhaus 2013).  Dempsey (2006) links the consequences of 
civil wars in the African weak states of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia to terrorism, as these 
wars allowed al Qaeda to form relationships with criminal organizations. For example, some 
journalists and non-governmental organizations suggest that the illicit ivory trade21 and the gold, 
emerald, and diamond trade throughout Africa and the Middle East has provided financing 
opportunities because these goods are easily concealed, hold their value, and groups can avoid 
counterterrorism banking regulations (Farah 2004; Passas and Jones 2006).   
The inability of many African governments to regulate the poaching of elephants is an 
example of an inherent weakness in the state’s ability to penetrate society in order to enforce the 
                                                 
20 Terrorist bases were found to be statistically significant in Sub-Saharan Africa, North America, East Asia, Latin 
America, South Asia, and Europe and Central Asia.  However, this model included all types of terrorist 
organizations, including nationalist/separatist, domestic, and transnational.  Europe and Central Asia remained 
statistically significant (.01) as did North America and Sub Saharan Africa (.10) for groups that conducted at least 
one transnational attack. 
 
21 The illicit ivory sale has been linked with more evidence to the Janjaweed in Sudan and Lord’s Resistance Army 
operating in the Great Lakes region of Africa. 
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rule of law. Thus, the illegal sale of ivory has commonly been connected to the al Qaeda-linked 
Somali terrorist group al Shabaab.  However, subsequent research has questioned the strength of 
this link as it relies on very little evidence and originates from a single source, a non-profit 
wildlife preservation organization (McConnell 2014).   
Former Liberian warlord and president Charles Taylor is also cited as dealing in “blood 
diamonds” with Hezbollah during the 1980s, giving sanctuary to al Qaeda operatives responsible 
for the embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, and selling diamonds to al Qaeda through 
collaboration with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone (Campbell 2004, 186-
188; Dempsey 2006, Farah 2004).   Palmer (2007) notes that al Qaeda’s diamond purchases are 
estimated to be $30-50 million.  However, al Qaeda’s involvement in the diamond trade may not 
be as widespread as reported by journalists and scholars.  Passas and Jones (2006) argue such 
estimates are likely overstated because any involvement in money laundering through the 
diamond trade would be minimal due to the strict control Charles Taylor and criminal smuggling 
affiliates have on the illegal diamond trade.  Al Qaeda-diamond linkages are based on 
assumptions mentioned in a Canadian intelligence report and evidence collected from Western 
journalists. Lebanese criminal and terrorist elements linked to Hezbollah have stronger ties to the 
diamond trade throughout Africa, but any possible linkages to al Qaeda are unlikely a substantial 
financial source for the group (Passas and Jones 2006). 
Lootable resources, or those easily stolen, smuggled, and concealed, have been used to 
finance rebellions and terrorist groups in the past.  The mujahedeen and Taliban used emeralds 
found in Afghanistan to help fund the war against the Soviets.  The underground emerald gem 
trade continued through al Qaeda affiliates in East Africa after the Taliban took power (Zill 
2001).  Al Qaeda also reportedly participated in the tanzanite trade by purchasing from 
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fundamentalist Muslims involved in mining in Tanzania and smuggled the gems through Kenya 
in order to sell in Dubai and Hong Kong (Farah 2004, 63-65). 
Terrorist organizations are adept in diversifying financing through complex smuggling 
operations.  For example, the honey trade in Yemen has been known to aid other criminal 
activities, such as drug smuggling, because customs agents do not typically search messy barrels 
of honey and the smell of honey masks other substances (Kittner 2007). Other financing 
opportunities include the heroin trade in Afghanistan (Peters 2009), petty theft and fraud, Islamic 
charities, and the hawala banking system (Vittori 2005, 2011; Clunan 2006; Wright 2006).   
However, the financial opportunities in weak states can also complement opportunities in 
strong states. Islamic charities that have financed fundamentalist terror campaigns have been 
particularly common in the United States due to lax regulations on the banking sector and money 
remitters.  Thus, lax money remittance regulations in the United States pairs well with the 
virtually untraceable hawala banking system throughout the Middle East and South Asia (Clunan 
2006; see also Gunaratna 2002; Wright 2006). Due to the prevalence of drug use throughout 
parts of Europe,22 Islamic terror cells have used illegal drug trafficking of hashish and ecstasy to 
self-finance terror operations, such as the 2003 Casablanca attacks and 2004 Madrid train 
bombing (Peters 2009).23  Informal or underground economies can exist everywhere, but they are 
                                                 
22 Bucerius (2013) notes the legalization of drugs in the Netherlands presents a trafficking issue for others in the 
region.  Because immigrant Muslim men in Germany feeling they are left out of the formal economy due to 
discrimination, trafficking drugs acts as a form of employment. As criminal enterprises and terrorist organizations 
sometimes join forces (Patrick 2011; Shelley 2014), this presents a counter-terrorist financing concern. 
 
23 The opium or heroin trade has been known to be the leading finance source for the Taliban for many years, which 
is thought to extend to al Qaeda’s financing network.  Because 90% of the world’s heroin originates in Afghanistan, 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates estimated that the Taliban receives $60-80 million annually from the trade (Patrick 
2011, 150), which may exceed the narcotics revenue of the FARC (Peters 2009, 14).  However, soon after 9/11 the 
U.S. intelligence community acknowledged that Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda affiliates were involved in the 
financing and facilitation of heroin-trafficking activities.  While top al Qaeda leadership has spoken out against the 
use of narcotics, Osama bin Laden viewed it as a way to “weaken the West” (Peters 2009, 15). The prevalence of 
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much more extensive in weak states where the state is unable to regulate social and economic 
activity, penetrate society, and extract resources (taxes) for redistribution through public goods. 
Following the logic concerning the relationship between domestic grievances and 
terrorism, scholars have asserted that poverty also plays a role (von Hippel 2002; Gurr 2006; 
Abadie 2006; Rice, Graff, and Pascual 2010; Gassebner and Luechinger 2011).  However, the 
focus on poverty in the broad terrorism literature is disputed because the relationship between 
terrorists and poverty is not supported when evaluating the fundamentalist Islamic movement, as 
many terrorists are not natives of poor states (Sageman 2004; Simons and Tucker 2007) but 
instead are often educated members of the middle class (Laqueur 1999; Krueger 2007; Sageman 
2004).  This is particularly true for al Qaeda’s central command and the individuals chosen to 
carry out the most sophisticated attacks (Sageman 2004).    
The general failed state-terrorism link rests on this poverty assumption, promoting the 
idea that foreign aid and education can seek to alleviate the conditions which cause individuals to 
turn to terrorism (Krueger 2007, 50-51; Krueger and Maleckova 2003) when the opposite may be 
true (Krueger and Laitin 2008).   Coggins (2014) adds that poverty may be related to domestic 
terrorism more than transnational because individuals faced with extreme poverty would likely 
focus their efforts on immediate survival strategies, rather than a transnational ideological 
movement.  
One important aspect of this argument is the relationship societal actors may forge with 
terrorist organizations seeking sanctuary. The vast financial resources transnational terrorist 
organizations can procure, allow them to purchase loyalty. As one Yemeni tribal leader notes “If 
                                                                                                                                                             
drug use throughout parts of Europe allows small groups of radical fundamentalists to finance operations easily as 
well as plan and carry out attacks in urban areas. 
22 
 
a terrorist comes to my area, the thing that binds me to him is not ideology, it’s need” (Kittner 
2007, 313).24  
In cases of state failure, the state is ineffective or incapable of providing services such as 
education and healthcare.  Terrorist organizations have an opportunity to gain support by acting 
as a private provider of basic needs for the local population and operate as a protostate (Berman 
2009; Shapiro and Siegal 2007). These activities are most often associated with groups like 
Hezbollah, Hamas, and al Qaeda but the model was first developed by the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt to fulfill demand for services not provided by the government (Berman 2009, 124; 
Byman 2011).  Berman (2009) notes that groups such as Hamas, al Sadr’s Mahdi Army in Iraq, 
and Hezbollah have operated a range of services such as hospitals, schools, drug treatment 
centers, garbage collection, and provided access to water (6-7). Due to the lack of infrastructure 
in Sudan, bin Laden reportedly built medical clinics, schools, and donated to charitable 
organizations, and created the “Help Africa People” charity, illustrating an opportunity to win 
over the local population in states where the government cannot or would not provide these basic 
services (Vittori 2005, 2011; Martin 2011, 247).  To summarize President Bush’s 2002 New York 
Times op-ed “Securing Freedom’s Triumphs,” “poverty does not make poor people into 
terrorists, yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to 
terrorist networks” (cited in Davis 2007, 18).   
Similar to domestic level grievance arguments is that an absence of democratic norms 
creates an environment conducive to terrorist organizations to penetrate and exploit. The lack of 
democracy is thought to be a contributing factor to corruption opportunities (Bates 2008a, 
                                                 
24 Kittner (2007) asserts that Al Qaeda acts as a customer of the fraudulent document crime industry in Yemen, 
allowing terrorists to acquire birth certificates and passports.  Similarly the “tri-border area” (TBA) in South 
America (Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil) allows transnational terrorist groups and crime syndicates to work 
together for financial, rather than ideological, reasons. 
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2008b) and democratic states are considered more adept in responding to discontent and 
accommodating dissident activity more effectively (Rotberg 2004).  Poor governance, human 
rights abuses, and corrupt practices may lead to fanaticism and terrorism and these are less 
common in democracies (Gunaratna 2002).   
However, the democracy continuum ranges significantly and transitioning democracies 
are at a higher risk of failure because they are not yet legitimate, not yet effective, but unable to 
forcefully counter dissent without sacrificing democratic principles (Etsy, et al 1998).25 The 
constraints placed on the state’s ability to counter terrorism in democracies, specifically civil 
liberties such as freedom of speech, association, and the press, allow terrorist organizations to 
operate freely in many respects (Wilkinson 1986; Hoffman 2006). This point lends support to the 
arguments that challenge the failed state-terrorist sanctuary proposition. 
 2.2.2 Strong States and Terrorism 
Two key arguments challenging the post-9/11 literature on terrorist sanctuaries have 
emerged in recent years.  The first points out that terrorist groups have emerged from strong, 
stable states like France, the United Kingdom, Germany, or Canada.  The second notes that there 
can be “constraints and opportunities in ungoverned spaces” (Menkhaus 2007, 67; Newman 
2007; Simons and Tucker 2007).  While some scholars have noted that terrorist organizations do 
not seem to prefer some failed states, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, negative cases 
have not been explained (Arsenault and Bacon 2015). Patrick (2011) acknowledges that 
constraints for terrorist groups in failed states has been ignored in much of the literature arguing 
that “weaker is not always better.” While anarchical zones may provide certain benefits, they do 
                                                 
25 Relevant to the failed state-terrorist sanctuary discussion, Etsy, et al (1998) found that both consolidated 
democracies and autocracies are less likely to fail, while consolidating democracies are most at risk of failing.  
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not allow terrorist organizations the range of needed capabilities. Briefly stated, “The idea of a 
‘safe haven’ in a truly failed state is a bit of an oxymoron” (Patrick 2011, 94).  
Supporting this general idea, Bapat (2007) finds that groups may seek stronger states as 
bases because they provide security against retaliation from the target state of the attack.  
Moreover, Pillar (2009) and Innes (2009) argue that 9/11 was only partially planned in 
Afghanistan because key logistical and financial planning and support, including passport 
acquisition, occurred in Germany with final preparation in flight schools in the United States.  
Indeed several countries were used as transit points and planning for the 9/11 attack (Gunaratna 
2002), but the most critical planning and training took place from the headquarters in 
Afghanistan.  The would-be hijackers learned hand to hand combat skills, information on 
Western culture and the English language, and could be thoroughly vetted and trained to be 
“proficient under pressure” (Arkedis 2009).  Thus, the “permanent” or more stable sanctuary in 
Afghanistan provided the tools for the “temporary” sanctuary in the United States.  Arkedis 
(2009) further contends that those groups relying only on “temporary” sanctuaries for the entire 
planning process will only be able to achieve attacks on a much smaller scale (see also Khalil 
2010).  Furthermore, the attacks planned in “temporary” sanctuaries, such as the “Toronto 18”, 
are more likely to be uncovered because they lack the resources and training available in more 
established, fully operational sanctuaries.  These smaller groups are often forced to turn to 
international contacts through the Internet which alert law enforcement (Sageman 2004, 2008).   
To this end, organizational structures of transnational groups are a critical aspect of 
inquiry in the study of terrorist sanctuaries. With the unfettered al Qaeda sanctuary disrupted in 
Afghanistan and military actions against transnational sanctuaries in Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq and 
portions of Africa, these “smaller” or more “temporary” sanctuaries become particularly 
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important to understand.  By studying these groups emerging and training in strong states, two 
separate types of terrorist groups seem to emerge.   
Khalil (2010) believes some are full-fledged members of a group (such as al Qaeda) who 
have plotted with top or regional leadership, while others are just “entrepreneurial jihadists” who 
organize themselves after meeting through Muslim student organizations or other social groups.  
They may rely on al Qaeda’s central leadership or affiliates for weapons, training, and 
ideological guidance, but they may never actually be full-fledged members of al Qaeda.  This 
latter group tends to come from Europe, Australia, Canada, and the United States (Khalil 2010).   
 2.2.3 Capacities of Terrorist Sanctuaries 
While all terrorist sanctuaries are considered dangerous, separating their operational and 
organizational capacities allows for a systematic study of transnational terrorist sanctuaries. To 
reconcile views on “temporary” or “smaller” versus “permanent,” “well established,” or “larger” 
sanctuaries, Sageman (2004, 2008) advocates for a “hubs and nodes” approach (see also 
Dempsey 2006).  “Hubs are organizational units that provide overall direction, guidance, 
funding, ideological support, and leadership throughout the world.  Nodes are small groups of 
individuals who operate in isolation from communities and from one another.”  (Dempsey 2006, 
v, Sageman 2004, 137-158).  Duncker (2007) suggests that nodes are cohesive, implement the 
hub’s plans, and can benefit financially from the hubs (65). However, as law enforcement has 
become more efficient in tracking terrorist networks, many nodes may only be gaining general 
inspiration from a large transnational organization and splintering into smaller regional 
organizations.  This has been a trend within al Qaeda’s organization over the past decade as 
regional franchises have replaced the top-down organizational structure (see Crenshaw 2015).  
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Anecdotal evidence from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen supports the idea that failed states 
have tended to serve as permanent training facilities, which can provide funding, facilitate arms 
transfers, and provide consistent ideological guidance for smaller groups around the world. Hubs 
are of a particular security concern because they can facilitate cooperation among groups. 
Terrorist organizations with different goals may choose to come together and share resources and 
training facilities (Hoffman 2006; Gaibulloev et al 2013).26  While the Afghanistan experience 
from 1996 to 2001 certainly supports the idea of cooperation among actors,27 it is also important 
to acknowledge competition exists among terrorist groups (see Caruso and Schneider 2013; 
Nemeth 2014).28  
In light of transnational terrorist groups’ operational structure being akin to a multi-national 
corporation (Vittori 2005, 2011; Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002), the “hubs” and “nodes” approach 
                                                 
26 Left-wing groups in Latin America sometimes formed umbrella organizations.  Thus, each individual organization 
would remain unique, but a council would be used to negotiate with governments or pool resources. In 1987 several 
groups in Colombia formed the Simon Bolivar Coordinating Board made up of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC), April 19 Movement (M-19), National Liberation Army (ELN), Popular Liberation Army (EPL), 
Workers' Revolutionary Party (PRT) and the Quintin Lame Command (START 2008). 
 
27 Fundamentalist organizations prescribing to a radical Islamist ideology have sought safe haven in Afghanistan 
since 1984.  The Afghan-Soviet war initially inspired many individuals and groups, which would turn to global jihad 
after the war, but the height of this activity was 1996-2001. Al Qaeda was invited to Afghanistan by Hizb-I Islami 
Gulbuddin when al Qaeda was expelled from Sudan in 1996.  Osama bin Laden invited more groups needing safe 
haven.  At the height of terrorist hubs in Afghanistan, and some nodes, the following groups had bases in 
Afghanistan. In total the following operated in Afghanistan prior to the U.S. led invasion: Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), 
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, Tunisian Combatant, Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, Islamic Movement 
Uzbekistan, Egyptian Islamic Jihad or Al Jihad, Al Qaeda, Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin.  Osama bin Laden invited 
many of these groups into Afghanistan to unify the movement and some like Al Jihad formally disbanded to join Al 
Qaeda.  Others, like the Eastern Turkistan Movement and IMU pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden (Crenshaw 
2015; START 2008). Since the U.S. invasion, the organizations have splintered or split between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.  Afghanistan still contains at least eight different terrorist groups, but the safety aspect has been 
seriously compromised, leading to a drastic reduction of hubs but a rise in nodes in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(START 2008; Crenshaw 2015).  
 
28 Osama bin Laden was a strategic thinker, always seeking to bring the disjointed individual cells following Islamic 
jihad principles into the fold of Al Qaeda.  By this process he was able to eliminate potential rivals and those 
threatening the message through ill-planned targeting. He neutralized a potential rival in Zarqawi.  Bin Laden 
disagreed with Zarqawi on his targeting, tactics, and hatred of Shiites. Abu al-Zarqawi’s Tawhid and Jihad group 
officially joined Al Qaeda in 2006 after a negotiation process that began in 1999 between Osama bin Laden and 
Zarqawi, providing him money and allowing Zarqawi a top leadership spot in Al Qaeda (Crenshaw 2015). 
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serves well in describing recent trends toward the diffusion of sanctuaries and the rise of 
“associated free agents” and “entrepreneurial jihadists” (see Khalil 2010).  Based on this 
approach, the expectation is that both weak and strong states encounter challenges to protecting 
their borders from terrorist organizations. This view helps understand both environments as 
terrorist sanctuaries because they allow for face-to-face interaction and planning, but separates 
the roles and the potential threat that each causes for systematic analysis. 
 2.2.4 A Critical Overview of Extant Literature 
The final theoretical issue largely overlooked in existing literature is the idea that in the 
absence of state control, the structure of societies matter. While absent quantitative analysis, 
Patrick (2011) and Campana and Ducol (2011) theorize that the general idea of failed states 
serving as terrorist sanctuaries may not stand up to a large scale analysis (see also Coggins 
2014).  In fact, some African countries that fit the Western conceptualized failed state model “are 
far from signaling a slide into chaos.” Instead, when states retreat from providing public goods, 
non-state actors have filled the void in the management of security and public services (Meagher 
2011, 1074). 
Weak or failed states may not have an “ungoverned” issue, but rather an “alternatively 
governed” issue that must be addressed in order to gain a more thorough understanding of 
terrorist sanctuaries. As the state failure-terrorist sanctuary literature notes, terrorist organizations 
have forged working relationships with local actors to establish sanctuary (Campana and Ducol 
2011; Kittner 2007).  However, this should not be assumed for all cases.  For example, 
transnational fundamentalist Islamic movements have not gained significant ground in the 
Balkans because Muslims in the region tend to practice a different “brand” of Islam, with more 
secular leanings (Patrick 2011, 81; see also Kohlmann 2004). Thus, the assumption that societal 
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actors will work with terrorist organizations based on al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Pakistan’s 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) could be “the exception that proves the rule” 
(Patrick 2001, 82).   
As the above review suggests, the literature on state failure and terrorism produces a 
number of mixed findings. This may largely be the result of the field of study being relatively 
new (Young and Findley 2011). In the only quantitative study to date focusing on terrorist base 
“location choice” and state failure, Gaibulloev (2015) does find support for the failed state- base 
location relationship between 1970 and 2006.29  However, the operationalization of state failure, 
based on civil conflict, has been disputed in the broad terrorism literature.30   
Findley and Young (2012) find that the relationship between civil war and terrorist 
activity may be due to the difficulty in differentiating between domestic terrorism and 
insurgency in the context of civil war.  Insurgent group splintering and subsequent competition 
between factions may encourage groups to turn to terrorist tactics (Bloom 2004).  Moreover, 
Coggins (2014) argues that when researchers use civil war data to operationalize “state failure” 
and also include nationalist/separatist terrorist group activity in the dependent variable, a clear 
issue arises because “revolutionary wars” and “ethnic wars” are “fought using a guerilla strategy 
                                                 
29 Gaibulloev (2015) uses Jones and Libicki (2008), which is based on Terrorist Organization Profiles (START 
2008), to construct data. Jones and Libicki (2008) focuses on determining the lifespan of the organization. Absent of 
a careful review of each of these 525 groups, the “bases” listed in both Jones and Libicki (2008) and START (2008) 
contain a number of issues, including missing “bases” and including some that are not actually “bases” but rather 
experienced an attack.  START’s (2008) strength lies in the qualitative profile data of the organization, group 
motives, and connections to other groups.  By carefully reviewing each START (2008) profile, one can find a 
number of inconsistencies that remain in portions of Jones and Libicki (2008).  Examples include duplicate groups 
listed under different names, incorrect designations of aims/ goals/ideologies, size, and the inaccuracy of the “base 
of operations.” For example, the al Qaeda profile in START (2008) designates 42 countries as al Qaeda bases.  Al 
Qaeda tends to be very selective in its location choices and the countries listed are not supported with 
documentation. Al Qaeda’s membership in 2011 remained between 200-1000 (Crenshaw 2015). Thus, “second tier” 
groups re-listed with membership closer to 100,000 (Crenshaw 2015) would again present duplicated bases. 
 
30 Gaibulloev (2015) overlooks some of the terrorist sanctuary literature, instead focusing on the terrorist incident 
literature.  A notable gap exists in the review as Coggins (2014) is not addressed.  Gaibulloev (2015) follows Piazza 
(2008) which uses the failed state-terrorism model to study terrorist incidents. Coggins (2014) critiques this model. 
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wherein terrorism is an essential tool of war fighting” (6).  Nationalist/separatist ideologies 
would gain from locating inside or close to its target, while al Qaeda is not ideologically 
confined.  Thus, base “choice” would pertain to transnational groups more than 
nationalist/separatist groups (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002).   
Gaibulloev (2015) uses four measures from the Political Instability Task Force dataset 
(Marshall et al 2009), three relating to civil war and adverse regime change to capture state 
failure,31 in addition to other indicators of development such as trade openness, GDP per capita, 
and government expenditures.32  The results indicate the strongest support for state failure when 
nationalist/separatist groups are included.33  Gaibulloev (2015) serves as a starting point for 
quantitative analysis on the failed state-terrorist sanctuary literature, but more attention should be 
paid to conceptualizing the issues being analyzed.  In short, nationalist/separatist terrorist 
organizations’ decision making with regard to sanctuary is quite different than transnational 
organizations. 
Overall, an important weakness of extant research on terrorist sanctuaries is to emphasize 
the state’s role at the expense of society at large.  While there are a number of characteristics that 
make certain states more or less attractive, how societies react to terrorist activities is also critical 
to the establishment of sanctuaries (see Patrick 2011).  Specifically, the level of support can 
                                                 
31 It should be noted that Gaibulloev (2015) does not address Coggins (2014) or Findley and Young (2012), which 
discuss the problem that arises when studying civil war and terrorism. 
 
32 Trade openness and government expenditure variables are not supported in the terrorist sanctuary literature, but 
are more commonly associated with terrorist attack literature. Gaibulloev (2015) uses government expenditures as a 
measure of the state’s capability to counter terrorism. However, a country’s military expenditures would have little 
impact on terrorist sanctuaries in democracies, as democracies do not tend to use military force domestically to 
counter homeland security threats. Gaibulloev (2015) does not specify organizational capacities of the bases, such as 
a “hub” or “node” or the duration of the terrorist base as stated, as there is no time component to the dataset. Thus, 
this analysis focuses on the first entry year of the organization. 
 
33 State failure remains significant in Models 3 and 4 in Gaibulloev (2015), which focus on groups that carried out at 
least one transnational attack.  However, groups that perpetrate at least one attack outside its base would still include 
many nationalist/separatist groups. An example of this is the Irish Republican Army (START 2013). 
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determine the type of sanctuary, hub or node, to be established. The existing theoretical 
framework fails to acknowledge that societies can operate with a great deal of autonomy.  Thus, 
the distinction between hubs and nodes help link state to society.  The next chapter develops this 

















Theoretical Development Chapter 3 - 
 3.1 State-Society Interactions and Sanctuaries 
Extant literature suggests that both strong and weak states tend to act as sanctuaries to 
terrorist organizations.   Furthermore, the literature on the relationship between state failure and 
terrorist sanctuaries discounts the complexity of the various types of state failure, which may be 
a result of traditional societal actors challenging the legitimacy of centralized state power 
(Marten 2012; P. Miller 2013).  Given the complexity of local conditions on the ground in many 
weak states, to understand how or why states are weak or have failed, and the powerful social 
actors in control of their environment, deserves much more attention. In short, scholars do not 
explain why weak or failing states such as Burkina Faso or Democratic Republic of Congo have 
not become “reservoirs and exporters of terror,”34 while Nigeria and Iraq have hosted terrorist 
sanctuaries to the extent that the groups actually vie for power over physical territory.   
The argument here is that state-society interactions provide the best way to understand 
terrorist sanctuaries.  Society is left out of analyses where it should be a central focus in areas 
that state control is secondary to societal control, such as in Somalia or Chechnya (Campana and 
Ducol 2011).35  Including societal actors in a theoretical framework sheds light on this neglected 
aspect of power relations and offers a more complete analysis of the presence of terrorist 
sanctuaries. Migdal (1988) notes,  
Our analytic lenses have conditioned us to view all modern societies in ways attuned to 
their centralization of power, rather than in ways suited to weblike structures.  We 
examine politics in the capital city to see who precisely holds the reins of power; which 
                                                 
34 Rotberg (2002, 127). 
 
35 Campana and Ducol (2011) note that Chechnya is unique in that the Sufi congregations have played a central role 
in challenging the state; although Berman (2009) notes that the role of Sufi sheiks have been successfully challenged 
by rival Wahhabi religious leaders from Saudi Arabia (176) (see also Patrick 2014).  This situation illustrates the 
ability of traditional societal leaders to be removed from power and replaced by more fundamentalist social forces. 
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social class dominates, or who authoritatively allocates values.  We have a penchant for 
seeking out where the ballgame is being played, but our lenses and predilections may 
have misled us. There may be no one ballgame, no single manager of power…many 
ballgames may be played simultaneously (38-39).   
 
While state-society interactions in many areas of the developing world illustrate the 
consolidated power of alternative societal structures, to some extent this occurs in nearly every 
society. This dissertation adopts Migdal’s (1988) “state in society” approach to understand why 
terrorist organizations find sanctuary within some borders and not others.  Migdal’s classic work 
does not address the topic of terrorism or terrorist sanctuaries, but does provide a useful 
framework for filling an important gap that exists in the literature on terrorist sanctuaries.  By 
adopting this approach to understanding traditional power structures and state capacity within 
societies, researchers can evaluate terrorist sanctuaries beyond the state-centric model, which has 
produced mixed findings. Migdal’s works stress the importance of many of the same state tasks 
as structural theorists but view the state as a social actor, albeit a powerful one. The relationship 
between the state and society does not exist “in a zero-sum equation, with clear winners and 
losers” but is a process of “constant social reinvention” with the state having key responsibilities 
for the population.  There must be a process of reconciliation between state and society, which in 
turn promotes the state’s legitimacy (White and Migdal 2013, 5; Midgal 2001, 15-16).   
The view of “society” in this context encompasses the idea of “civil society,” but is less 
restrictive than what some civil society scholars conceptualize (see Chazan 1992). The expansive 
literature analyzing civil society in developing (weak) states sheds light on the role societal 
actors’ play in a range of interactions between state and society (Malena and Heinrich 2007).   
The idea of “civil society” typically focuses on formal civic organizations within society, ranging 
from labor unions and churches to PTAs and Boy Scouts (Putnam 1995, 2000).  However, 
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analyzing “civil society” through formal organizations discounts the level of engagement many 
societies experience, particularly those outside Western democracies.  Moreover, the idea that 
civil society should be “civil” in its behavior or specifically democratic and focused on 
promoting the common good for the rest of society does not allow for an inclusive study of the 
state-society interactions that occur in many non-Western states (Malena and Heinrich 2007). 
Thus, a society can be understood as “the arena, outside the family, outside the government, and 
the market, where people associate to advance their (political) interests” (Malena and Heinrich 
2007, 340-341).   
All non-totalitarian societies organize into a range of formal and informal groupings to 
advance political interests that can challenge the authority of the state (Malena and Heinrich 
2007).  In both democracies and autocracies, social groupings outside the state’s authority exist 
that seek political rule-making authority. The argument presented here is that individuals often 
possess a number of attributes that fit into several societal groupings (class, skin color, gender, 
religion, nationality, profession).  Each identity category tends to organize in society and 
advance political interests to varying degrees, but societal groupings along ethnic and religious 
cleavages have extensive political activation power (see Clark, Golder, and Golder 2013, 632-
638). In short, in polities throughout the globe there is a constant struggle between state leaders 
and competing social organizations for power (Migdal 1988). 
A critical element of a strong society lies in both the territorial landscape and the 
historical political landscape.  Throughout the history of the modern state, regimes have sought 
to counter local control through a variety of methods, including force (Tilly 1985).  The colonial 
experience of many societies strengthened the legitimacy of societal strongmen, making it much 
more difficult for post-colonial independent states to establish legitimacy.   
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During the Cold War era, which coincided with the independence of many now weak or 
failing states, state leaders attempted to exert authority through military and financial support 
from former colonial powers and the competing superpowers.  The failure to gain legitimacy 
through bureaucratic efficiency and providing goods and services to the population resulted in 
“quasi states” or “phantom states,” a state in name only through global recognition (Jackson 
1990; Gros 1996; Reno 1998).  These state rulers delayed statecraft during the Cold War in 
exchange for following a patronage strategy of outsourcing state institutions to loyal local power 
brokers or “societal strongmen” (Migdal 1988).  The post-Cold War era experienced a significant 
increase in civil wars and autocratic regime collapses in “quasi” or “phantom” states 
(Stanislawski 2008).  The anarchy of civil war tended to evolve into weak or failed states with 
strong societies. 
 Migdal (1988) raises a number of points that are of interest to scholars studying state 
failure because even if the state fails in its task of providing security and political goods, anarchy 
cannot be assumed for all cases.  The failure of the state “does not mean that people are not being 
governed; they most certainly are” (39).  Alternate societal structures take hold, often through 
long-standing clan or religious ties, and provide a sense of order in the absence of state authority 
(see also Ahram and King 2011). Therefore, societal structures must be examined in detail to 
determine whether or not the strongmen, in the absence of state authority, are accepting or 
rejecting the presence of a terrorist sanctuary (Campana and Ducol 2011; Patrick 2011).  
 The theory proposed here argues that the state and society can possess a variety of 
relationships as they shape and mold one another.  State-society interactions are not static and 
can be altered over time (Migdal 1988). Furthermore, this proposed theory contends that terrorist 
sanctuaries are typically not present or are denied in polities where both the state and society are 
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either strong or weak.  For the study of terrorist sanctuaries, societal actors play an important role 
in whether or not terrorist organizations may establish sanctuaries in areas under societal control.  
It should not be assumed that strongmen would sympathize with transnational terrorist 
organizations or be willing to share de facto control over an area.  To the contrary, societal actors 
have sought to delegitimize alternate sources of power and terrorist organizations would need to 
negotiate with societal strongmen in order to establish sanctuary (see Patrick 2011). 
 Figure 3.1 below provides the rationale of the argument.  The four-cell matrix illustrates 
four types of state-society interaction environments that can possibly host terrorist sanctuaries. 
To understand sanctuaries within this state-society framework also examines a distinction 
between types of sanctuaries in the aforementioned hubs and nodes approach (Sageman 2004).  
The hubs and nodes approach uses a social network analysis to explain how a few terrorist 
network hubs around the world form relationships with dozens of nodes that share similar 
ideologies.  These hubs are considered the “architects” of the global network (Sageman 2004, 
137).  While this network analysis is most often attributed to the global jihadist religious 
movement36 beginning in the late 1980s, the same hubs and nodes analysis can be used to 
describe the right-wing pan-Aryan movement of the 1980s and 1990s, and the left-wing 
communist movements from the 1960s until the early 1990s.37 
Networks are not static and evolve over time, as these main transnational movements 
illustrate.  The transnational left-wing movements beginning in the 1960s derived funding, 
                                                 
36 Sageman (2004) is speaking specifically about the global Salafi jihad movement in his analysis of hubs and nodes. 
 
37 Other transnational ideological movements such as the environmental/animal rights movements and the 
racist/right wing movement are organized more as loosely affiliated nodes or even lone wolves self-financing and 
acting on behalf of a global movement. For example, the Animal Liberation Front and Hammerskin Nation follow 
collective ideologies with other nodes throughout the world.  Specifically, the ALF’s movement dictates acceptable 
targets and the ideology of the group through written resources available online without a clear command structure 
(Anti-Defamation League 2011; START 2008). 
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weapons, training, safe haven, and ideological inspiration from a few key geographic locations 
(hubs), while dozens of nodes, with a variety of relationships to the hubs, operated throughout 
the world inspired by communist ideology. For example, state sponsors of left-wing terrorism 
such as Cuba, the Soviet Union, and China possessed a variety of relationships with major left-
wing terrorist organizations throughout the world, which provided direct assistance to smaller 
left-wing nodes.38  After state sponsorship from Cuba and the Soviet Union waned in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the left-wing movement quickly dispersed into a series of loosely 
affiliated nodes with only a few left-wing movements able to self-finance and procure weapons39 
(see START 2008; Byman 2005).  
The network of the global jihadist religious movement began with a few inspired nodes in 
the Maghreb, Arabian Peninsula, and South and Central Asia before being organized into a 
transnational movement by Osama bin Laden into al Qaeda.  Osama bin Laden established hubs 
in Sudan and Afghanistan, while forming ties to some existing groups throughout the world.  The 
relationships that central al Qaeda formed with nodes were carefully selected and varied based 
on the operational capabilities of the geographic location and competition with other terrorist or 
societal strongmen.  While some nodes are directly funded and trained by al Qaeda, others 
                                                 
38 Notable examples of left-wing hubs are Che Guevara’s Bolivian movement the National Liberation Army, which 
was founded for the intention of providing ideological guidance to smaller groups around the world for the intention 
of a global communist social revolution.  The secular socialist movement Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) and Action Directe provided similar assistance to smaller groups throughout Europe. PLFP 
received funding and support from a number of secular Middle Eastern states, allowing PFLP to forge bonds and 
invite groups like Germany’s Baader Meinhof to share training grounds (START, 2013). 
 
39 East Germany directly sponsored the Red Army Faction throughout the 1980s, providing safe haven (housing and 




primarily derived ideological inspiration from Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda affiliates 
(Sageman 2004; Menkhaus 2007; Patrick 2011; Crenshaw 2015).40   
Hubs are vulnerable to counter-terrorism because communication goes through them, 
allowing intelligence authorities to trace activities.  However, the ideological consistency, 
personal bonds, training, and funding that hubs facilitate promote the group’s lethality, 
effectiveness, and longevity (Sageman 2004; Arkedis 2009).  After the death of Osama bin 
Laden in 2011, al Qaeda’s Central Core remained in Pakistan but the global ideological 
movement has re-organized through regional node clusters, forming new regional hubs and 
strengthening others.  The growing strength of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Islamic 
State (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria are notable examples of the religious ideological movement’s 
evolution in recent years (see Crenshaw 2015). 
The hubs and nodes approach to understanding terrorist sanctuaries offers a more 
comprehensive analysis of how terrorist organizations network and possess a variety of 
relationships to the transnational ideological movements.  This view helps understand both 
scenarios (hubs and nodes) as terrorist sanctuaries, because they allow for face-to-face 
interaction and planning, while separating the roles and potential threat that each causes.   
 
 
                                                 
40 It is commonly noted that al Qaeda has cells dozens of countries but al Qaeda’s relationship to these inspired 
nodes varies and have changed over time.  Some religious inspired nodes only follow similar ideologies and are not 
direct al Qaeda cells, but are nodes to the wider religious movement.  Osama bin Laden consciously decided to 
establish a node in Kenya in the 1990s, rather than affiliate with like-minded Somali groups, due to difficulty 
establishing security in Somalia’s anarchy.  Al Qaeda sought to combine some of these existing movements, such as 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al Tawhid and Jihad, while opting to limit relationships with others, such as those in 
Somalia.  Osama bin Laden convinced al-Zarqawi to join the al Qaeda movement, offering a leadership position in 
the Central Staff for doing so.  Tawhid and Jihad was subsequently referred to as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Al Qaeda 
Central is also less affiliated with groups in Yemen since 2009, as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and 
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have separate organizational structures (see Menkhaus 2007; Crenshaw 
2015; START 2013). 
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Figure 3.1 State-Society Interactions and Terrorist Sanctuaries 
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 3.1.1 Strong State, Strong Society: Polyarchical Polity 
Cell 1 provides a setting in which both the state and society are strong. The term adopted 
for this cell is contested polyarchical polity, defined as a polity in which power is vested in 
multiple groups, with high levels of competition at the sub-national (society) and national level 
(state) (Dahl 1971, 13).41  Both the state and society are strong, but this form of state-society 
interactions is considered rare and not typically maintained for an extended period.42  Strong 
democratic states are able to achieve some type of predominance through accommodation 
between leaders and other powerful organizations in society, which are reflected through 
compliance of forces, participation in the organization of the population, or the acceptance of the 
state’s rules and social control as legitimate (Migdal 1988).  Strong states are willing and able to 
                                                 
41 Dahl (1971, 13) specifies 4 typologies of polyarchy based on the level of competition.  The argument here is that 
the United States after 9/11 fits a cell of competition labeled “I: Fully Liberalized Competitive Regimes.” 
 
42 In his original work Migdal (1988) argues that this relationship is highly unlikely, therefore, does not include a 
cell for “strong state, strong society.”  However, more recent policies and actions by the United States in the post-
9/11 era have changed the possibility for this interaction or relationship.  In email correspondence between Joel 
Migdal and myself, Migdal noted that the U.S. was “traditionally a weak state and strong society. But there is no 
doubt that the state has gotten much stronger, especially since 9/11.”  Alexander (2006) provides additional detail on 
the differences between counter-terrorism strategies before and after 9/11. 
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penetrate society in order to counter terrorist organizations as all terrorist organizations are 
considered a threat to the legitimacy of the state. Strong states are also more capable of 
formulating and pursuing rules or policies not reflective of social groups (Evans, Rueschemeyer, 
and Skocpol 1985, 7-9).    
In strong states with strong societies, collective societal groups play a role in determining 
the acceptable level of penetration in society.  Specific to counterterrorism actions by the state, 
societal groups may pressure the state to pursue terrorist organizations more if the group or 
movement is considered a threat to society’s way of life or status quo. For example, a strong 
Western, democratic, capitalist society which largely identifies as Christian would collectively 
view a fundamentalist Islamic movement as a threat.  Thus, society would likely encourage and 
allow the state to pursue policies to eliminate the threat.  However, a strong society in South or 
Central Asia or the Middle East may view the same group as merely a nuisance or choose to 
passively or actively support the group.  Therefore, strong societies determine the will and 
capacity of states to penetrate society and eliminate terrorist organizations. If both the state and 
society view a terrorist organization or movement as a threat to the status quo, a terrorist 
organization would be vigilantly pursued by all actors, making it extremely difficult to establish 
sanctuary.  
An example of a strong state-strong society is the United States after 9/11. Throughout 
much of history, the United States has only maintained limited strength vis-a-vis the strength of 
society.  This does not refer to the strength of the state in the international arena, but the strength 
of the state in the domestic arena or its specific territory (see Krasner 1999).  A history of 
democratic institutions and capitalism provides a foundation for societal strength.  Paul Miller 
(2013) notes, “Democracy and capitalism actually encourage and depend on conflict and 
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competition to work; indeed, peaceful conflict is usually seen as a healthy sign in a democracy” 
(31).  However American society differs in several ways from other mature democracies due to a 
number of polarizing cross-currents (see Lipset 1996).   
First, the United States has a significantly higher rate of gender inequality43, which is 
considered an indicator of other forms of societal fraction (Malena and Heinrich 2007).  Second, 
the United States has higher rates of ethnic and religious polarization than many other stable 
democracies (Alesina, et al. 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005).  
Third, the attitudes of American society toward capitalism and limiting the government’s reach 
differs from societies that accept the European style welfare state (Alesina, Glaeser, and 
Sacerdote 2006). 
While the state is relatively strong in its ability to extract resources from society (taxes) 
and enforce many laws, it is weaker in its ability to enact policies and regulate social 
relationships across society as a result of the guarantee of civil liberties and the strength of 
societal actors.  The existence of big business (Chibber 2003; Clunan 2006; Gilens and Page 
2014), the power of religious groups/leaders, numerous ethnic groups, strong special interest 
organizations (Putnam 1995), in addition to an overarching anti-statist ideology (Lipset 1996), 
the legitimacy of the state’s rule making power is challenged in many respects. In the U.S., the 
state could best be understood as weak vis-à-vis society prior to September 11, 2001.  However, 
post-9/11 legislation rapidly increased the state’s power in the realm of security. The first 
hypothesis follows this explanation of Cell 1’s state-society interactions: 
H1:  Terrorist sanctuaries are less likely in strong states with strong societies (polyarchical). 
                                                 
43 United Nations Gender Inequality Index 2005-2013. 
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 3.1.2 Strong State, Weak Society: Pyramidal Polity 
Cell 2 represents a strong state with a weak society.  Pyramidal polities exist where states 
have achieved predominance over societal groups and a pyramidal power structure is in place.  
Strong states are those that are able to resist private pressure and change private behavior and 
social structures in intended ways.  The struggle to “penetrate society” not only refers to the 
ability to provide social order for resource extraction (natural resources and/or taxes) but the 
ability to generally get the population to do what the state wants them to do (Migdal 1988, 285).   
A variety of political structures can achieve this end through repression or through a 
democratic reconciliation process. Breaking the bonds of social control and gaining state strength 
should ideally evolve through a reconciliation process between the state and society, one which 
produces the delivery of public goods (Migdal 1988). Democracies and autocracies can achieve 
predominance vis-à-vis society through different pathways. When faced with domestic 
opposition to the state’s authority, leaders often resort to breaking the strength of society and 
traditional power structures through violence (Tilly 1985).  While such measures may allow 
leaders to penetrate society and coerce behavior, this perceived power of a consolidating state is 
fragile and hinged on the regime’s survival. In fact, the perceived power through violence is 
conceived as “despotic power” rather than institutional power (Mann 1984).  Consolidated or 
strong democracies usually gain legitimacy through the democratic process and the effectiveness 
in delivering goods and services to the population (see Goldstone 2008).44   
Weak societies are those that are more compliant and participatory in the state’s 
demands.  While a strong society consistently challenges policies enacted by the state, a weak 
                                                 
44 Transitioning democracies or anocracies, on the other hand, are expected to be effective in providing resources 
but often lose legitimacy when they are unable to do so.  Thus, democracy is not sufficient for the state to gain 




society has accepted the state as the legitimate force and complies more often with the state’s 
policies (Migdal 1988).  Strong states with weak societies do not allow polarizing cross-currents 
to dominate the political landscape, as strong societies do.  For over a century, comparative 
theorists have noted the vast differences between the strong, contentious American society from 
those in Europe and Canada. Many strong European social welfare states, such as the United 
Kingdom, Germany, and France, have considerable penetrative and extractive capacity.  The 
state’s rule-making authority is challenged far less than in the U.S. because most other 
democratic societies find a level of statism acceptable (Lipset 1996, 32-34). 
As noted in Cell 1, strong societies challenge the state’s policies on numerous fronts, 
particularly against state reach into citizens’ lives.  In contrast, strong democratic states with 
weak societies appear more in general agreement regarding the vision and policy-making in the 
country.  Strong states have also built the infrastructure needed to penetrate and extract from 
society, therefore, this coupled with general acceptance from society allows policy 
implementation by the state to be achieved more efficiently. The clear deviation from this 
seemingly peaceful pyramidal organizational structure appears when a group or organization 
emerges that challenges the established compliance of the majority of society.   
An example of a strong, mature democratic state and weak society is Israel.  The 
founding of the Israeli state is an important case study in statecraft because for decades prior to 
the formation of the state, and through the assistance of British authorities, leaders in the Jewish 
Agency such as Ben-Gurion sought to create institutions that could withstand domestic 
challenges.  Despite consistent challenges to the authority of the state from fragments of the 
population, Israel remains high in state capacity indicators (Migdal 1988, 142-171).   Migdal 
specifies Israel as a clear case in which the state’s ability to “change its population’s daily habits 
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and to preempt and delegitimize contending social organizations from exercising autonomous 
social control has placed it among a handful of strong states” (Migdal 1988, 143). In these cases, 
the state holds enough power and penetration capabilities that no extensive terrorist sanctuary 
may be formed.  However, smaller terrorist nodes may operate under the protection of 
democratic norms or civil liberties and the rule of law.   
While opponents of the Israeli state living within the territory may feel obliged to assist 
small terrorist cells, Israeli citizens also understand the extensive penetration capabilities of the 
state and the consequences such action would bring through the rule of law.  In terms of security, 
Israeli bureaucratic structures include an extensive human intelligence sector, and advanced 
infrastructure and technology (such as the separation wall to protect against suicide attacks and 
the Iron Dome to protect against shelling).  This coupled with the weakening societal strength of 
some Palestinian factions inside Israel after the death of Yassar Arafat, has provided additional 
strength to the Israeli state’s authority (Byman 2011).45   
In an authoritarian state, infrastructure is built around the regime’s security, which 
separates authoritarian states from democracies. Thus, a leadership succession or liberalizing 
reform tends to initiate state weakness or failure if societal actors, such as religious figures or 
elites, do not support the change. Authoritarian regimes are often successful in quelling domestic 
dissent among the population through harsh measures and even expelling terrorist groups that 
challenge the authority of the state (Goldstone 2008, 291).  Indeed, regime survival depends on 
expelling threats. However, violent state actions can have a chilling effect on future prospects for 
state legitimacy, depending on society’s perceptions or attitudes toward the targets (P. Miller 
                                                 
45 Although Israel has boasted a success rate of 80% in stopping terrorist plots, the magnitude of attempts in the past 




2012; Dambrauskas 2012).   Authoritarian regimes can remain in power for a very long time and 
maintain domestic legitimacy if they continue facilitating the delivery of public goods, 
specifically security (Goldstone 2008).46  However, any decline in public goods which can 
originate from the loss of foreign aid/support or global economic shocks may be too much for the 
regime to sustain.   
In Uzbekistan, the Karimov regime’s brutal response to the al Qaeda affiliated terrorist 
group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is an example in which the state has largely been 
successful in eliminating a transnational terrorist sanctuary by pushing the organization to 
neighboring countries (Dambrauskas 2012). While Uzbekistan ranks poorly on civil liberties, 
human rights, state fragility, and traditional development indicators (Freedom House 2014) the 
state can be viewed as strong in its ability to penetrate society and provide security against the 
IMU or al Qaeda affiliated terror threats. Dambrauskas (2012) notes that the Uzbek people 
appear to be supportive of the state’s counterterrorism policies, while also content with the 
current socio-economic status. This support and the “compliant and obedient character of the 
Uzbek nation,” however, should be considered fragile in the face of a Karimov regime overreach 
(63).  Karimov’s consolidated autocracy at this time has rejected a fully operational terrorist hub 
and vigorously challenges the potential for established nodes as well.47   
Domestic discontent without an outlet for peaceful political activity allows an entrance 
for transnational terror groups. The link between domestic-level grievances and transnational 
terrorist movements may become interconnected in the event that a domestic insurgency or 
domestic terrorist group forms a relationship with a transnational terrorist group.  The political 
                                                 
46 Paul Miller (2013) refers to this as a “stopgap gesture,” or an attempt to retain legitimacy (24). 
 
47 Steinberg (2013) notes that the German government’s relationship with the authoritarian Karimov regime has 
provided a source of recruitment for the IMU among German immigrants. 
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situation in Mali since 2012 and the relationship formed between al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) and the Tuareg insurgency illustrates that terrorist groups show a willingness 
to work alongside other groups to achieve similar aims (Kittner 2007; see also Kisangani 2012).   
Russia’s actions in the Caucasus region are also representative of the difficulty states 
have in achieving legitimacy after using force to counter domestic discontent and group 
grievances.  Chechnya’s history of traditional power structures and alternative governance 
represents an area where the state attempts to challenge societal strongmen (Campana and Ducol 
2011; Marten 2012).  Thus, within Russia, Chechnya acts as a “state within a state” (Pelczynska-
Nalecz, Strachota, and Falkowski 2008).  The tradition of societal challenges against the Russian 
state in Chechnya, together with the rise of Islamic terrorism, has culminated in the fear that 
separatist and transnational terror groups will join forces (Bhattacharji 2010).48   
Over the past decade, the Russian state has developed a form of indirect rule in Chechnya 
to gain some structured authority in the region.  After fighting brutal wars against insurgent and 
terrorist elements in the 1990s and early 2000s, Prime Minister Putin selected and groomed 
Ramzan Kadyrov to be the strongman of Chechnya (Marten 2012).  Kadyrov’s family has deep 
roots in Chechen separatist struggles. Ramzan’s father, Akhmad Kadyrov, was a former warlord 
during the First Chechen War from 1994 to 1996 and later the recognized President of Chechnya.  
The Kadyrov family gained favor with the Russian state during the Second Chechen War in 
1999, when Akhmad Kadyrov aligned with the Russian state against the separatist terror group 
                                                 
48 Vladimir Putin has consistently asserted that the two are connected.  Some historical evidence supports this. One 
report connects al Qaeda to Chechen rebels during the Soviet-Afghan War, while another connects Zacharias 
Moussaoui to al Qaeda recruitment in Chechnya.  Neither of these indicate an al Qaeda safe haven “hub” in 
Chechnya. The connection may be the result of an attempt by the Russian state to garner international sympathy, 
rather than criticism, for the methods used against the Chechen rebels (Bhattacharji 2010). The more likely scenario 
is that separatist Chechen groups have moved toward religious based arguments that resemble those of al Qaeda’s 
ideology (see Stone 2013). However, separatist groups in Chechnya remained distinct from the transnational 
ideological movement until the late 1990s, at which point the lines slowly blurred. Since 2009, the Caucasus 




the International Islamic Peacekeeping Brigade (Bhattacharji 2010; Marten 2012). Akhmad was 
assassinated in May 2004 by Chechen Islamic militants, an offshoot of the Chechen resistance 
movement inspired by Wahhabi thought.  Thus, Putin can assume that Ramzan Kadyrov’s focus 
as designated strongman will be to eliminate challenges from separatists and rising Islamic 
extremism from the Caucasus Emirate movement, while conceding some Islamic based political 
reforms and autonomy in Chechnya. However, Ramzan Kadyrov serves at the pleasure of the 
Russian state, with the majority of Chechnya’s budget directly allocated from Moscow. In turn, 
Ramzan serves as the loyal eyes in Chechnya for the state (Marten 2012).   
Despite some separatist movements gaining inspiration from the jihadist movement, it is 
highly unlikely that a terrorist hub could be established in this region due to the Russian state’s 
penetration capabilities.  Terrorist nodes are much more likely where separatist groups and like-
minded transnational terror groups form a relationship.   
As previously mentioned, states can achieve predominance through democratic 
reconciliation or through authoritarian measures.  A general threat of terrorism exists in all 
societies to varying degrees based on local conditions. In weak societies, a portion of the 
population will not agree with the vision of the state’s role over society.  However, in strong 
states with weak societies the state’s predominance over the population and institutional and 
infrastructural power to penetrate the specified territory supports the ability of the state to 
minimize or eliminate terrorist sanctuaries within its borders. The second hypothesis follows:  




 3.1.3 Weak State, Strong Society: Diffused Polity 
Cell 3 represents a weak state with a strong society. This cell represents an environment 
in which the state is unable to effectively penetrate and extract resources from society to carry 
out the functions of the state in providing public goods.  As previously mentioned, the United 
States has often lacked the capacity to change society’s behavior as a result of Constitutional 
protections and a concerted rejection of state authority from organized social actors.  In contrast 
to many of the weakest or failing states across the globe, the United States has maintained the 
infrastructural ability to penetrate society but has varied in the ability to extract resources and 
regulate behavior.   
Weak states often lack infrastructural or institutional power and the ability to regulate 
social behavior due to societal strongmen who challenge the rule-making power of the state 
(Migdal 1988). State managers in weak states have been unable to reach rural populations, 
making it difficult to change the population’s behavior and beliefs to gain the needed legitimacy 
(Migdal 1988, 6).  In weak states with strong societies, often dominated by clan structures or 
religious groups, the state lacks the capacity to supplant the control of these social organizations 
(Migdal 1988, 28-35).  Many new or developing states in the post-colonial independence era 
have encountered governance constraints because the territories they are expected to govern vary 
considerably from established communal boundaries (Ahram and King 2011).  
Societal strongmen in diffused polities often hold de facto control over portions of 
territory and the sum of power is spread throughout the societal groups and the state. Strongmen 
may include clan, family, religious leaders, elites in the population (Migdal 1988) or “warlords” 
(Reno 1999). In many cases, these are individuals who “control small pieces of territory using a 
combination of force and patronage” (Marten 2012, 3). These warlords or strongmen may 
operate “para-states,” which are of particular concern for counter-terrorism efforts (see 
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Stanislawski 2008).  Societal actors in para-states carry out many of the basic functions of a 
state.  Strongmen often provide security from rival social groups through organized militias as 
well as the facilitation of goods and services but fail to meet the threshold of international legal 
recognition or sovereignty (Krasner 1999). Warlords or strongmen, however, differ from 
transnational terrorists in their historical role and legitimacy within society and should not be 
viewed interchangeably with terrorists (Ahram and King 2011; Marten 2012).  
Diffused societies are most common in post-conflict societies, which are recovering from 
a history of violence and infrastructural disarray.  The colonial legacy also plays a role in 
understanding the existing power structures and interactions between state and society.  Similar 
to the Ottoman Empire’s rule in many territories (Marten 2012), British colonial administrators 
in Africa and Asia did not intend to monopolize power, but rather carefully selected traditional 
clan or tribal leaders over the intelligentsia (Migdal 1988). The Ottomans and British used the 
system of indirect rule, in which traditional power structures in the respective societies governed 
localities, while colonial administrators collected taxes and oversaw the external affairs of the 
state. The use of indirect rule solidified societal power structures that remain today. In some 
cases, where no tribal chiefs existed the colonial powers created them (Khapoya 1994; Marten 
2012).   
Many of the present-day examples of weak states with strong societies have a history of 
colonial governance, which has contributed to the strength of society and rejection of the state in 
the post-independence period. Strongmen in post-conflict societies who have not acceded to the 
state include religious or clan leaders, who usually control portions of the population and 
territory.   These strongmen may emerge after civil conflict with a consolidation on local power. 
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Moreover, the “Arab Spring” that swept through North Africa causing regime collapses 
and state failure are also representative of these problems.  Authoritarian regimes weaken society 
through force so when the regime’s grip is limited, a traditional strong society can quickly re-
emerge.  The al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) linked terror group Ansar al-Sharia, 
responsible for the Benghazi consulate attack (Kirkpatrick 2012), grew during the Libyan civil 
war and became active in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt in the days following President Morsi’s 
removal from office (Amara 2013; Kingsley 2013).  These examples are of particular concern for 
the study of terrorist sanctuaries, as transnational terrorist organizations have sought to exploit 
widespread societal grievances through rebel or domestic terror groups.   
Examples of weak states with strong societies have ranged from Kenya, Yemen, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Iraq, where a weak state exists, allowing for a traditionally strong 
society to maintain power and deny legitimacy to the state.   In diffused societies, the state 
cannot consistently penetrate society to expel terrorist groups but the state has maintained some 
type of infrastructure, albeit poor.   The weak existing infrastructure, such as operational airports 
or communications networks with poor security measures, provides a sufficient logistical support 
network for a terrorist organization (Patrick 2011).   
Societal strongmen have sometimes allowed terrorist organizations to operate within their 
area of control if they determine it is a better “strategy for survival”49 than working alongside the 
state or international actors to receive goods the state is not currently providing, such as 
employment opportunities, education, jobs, or health care services. The “Sunni Awakening” in 
Iraq illustrates the different options available to societal groups when faced with the decision to 
work alongside a transnational terrorist group or the state.  Between 2007 and 2010 the United 
                                                 
49 Migdal (1988) argues that individuals formulate “strategies of survival” in order to facilitate basic needs to be 
met. This links individuals to the “sphere of group identity and collective action” (27). 
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States facilitated a coalition between the Iraqi state and nearly 95,000 Iraqis organized by 
societal tribal leaders in a unified challenge to al Qaeda’s presence in Iraq (Biddle, Friedman, 
and Shapiro 2012). However, as state-society interactions between the Iraqi state and the 
Awakening have changed since 2010, society has re-evaluated its survival strategy. 
It is particularly important to understand the power dynamics within these areas and the 
relationship societal strongmen have with a terrorist organization in physically “contested” 
spaces.  Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is a clear example of successful 
societal rejection of state authority and de facto territorial and social control by tribal leaders that 
have aligned with transnational terrorist groups (Arsenault and Bacon 2015).  Therefore, if 
societal strongmen allow terrorist organizations to have sanctuaries, which should not be 
assumed for all cases, they are provided enough space for extensive operational capabilities such 
as hands-on training in combat and bomb making.  This cell represents the most likely presence 
of a terrorist sanctuary hub.  Hypothesis 3 follows: 
H3:   Weak or failed states with strong societies (diffused) are most likely to be terrorist 
sanctuary hubs. 
 3.1.4 Weak State, Weak Society: Anarchical Polity 
Cell 4 represents an anarchical environment, where neither the state nor society are able 
to sustain control.  This cell provides cases of state-society interactions during full-scale civil 
war or when a power vacuum exists (see Kisangani 2012). Examples of a weak state with a weak 
society are Somalia (1991-2005), particularly after the collapse of the Barre regime prior to the 
formation of a government in Mogadishu or the Democratic Republic of Congo beginning in 
1996 with the first Congo war that deposed Mobutu Sese Seko.  Anarchical societies are more 
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likely to be problematic and competitive for transnational terrorist organizations, thus terrorist 
sanctuaries are less likely.   
With regards to state failure and transnational terrorist sanctuaries, Patrick (2011) notes 
that, “weaker is not better” because “where anarchy prevails, terrorist organizations must spend 
precious resources, energy, and time ensuring their own protection- or obtaining it from others. 
The security of the group itself becomes questionable when the threat of outside intervention is 
compounded by additional logistical challenges” (93).  Anecdotal evidence from al Qaeda’s 
sanctuary choices supports this claim.  Osama bin Laden did not seek sanctuary in Afghanistan 
until after the Taliban gained power after a brutal and widespread civil war throughout the early 
1990s.  In the case of weak state-strong society interactions (Cell 3) moving to anarchical in a 
large-scale civil war, terrorist groups should be expected to seek operational sanctuary in another 
territory but may facilitate the flow of fighters to the civil war if it pertains to the organization’s 
goals.   
In short, anarchy goes beyond the societal “diffusion” discussed in Cell 3.  As is the case 
in Cell 1, a weak state-weak society interaction or anarchical polity is not typically maintained 
for a long period of time or may occur sporadically in the same territory (Migdal 1988; P. Miller 
2013). In these cases, either the state or societal strongmen eventually assume more authority.  
Post-conflict societies tend to subsequently emerge as weak states with strong societies (Cell 3) 
as the civil war has produced fractionalization and polarization.  
Present-day Somalia is a clear example of an anarchy moving to diffusion as societal 
strongmen consolidate power against the state; however, Somalia was not a transnational 
terrorist sanctuary prior to 2005 and its current relationship to transnational terror groups is not 
as clear as many assume. While Somalia was a seemingly perfect fit for the general “failed state-
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terrorist sanctuary” proposition, Somalia was a stateless anarchy without adequate infrastructure, 
which presented too many challenges to terrorist organizations.  Al Qaeda “tested the waters” in 
Somalia and conducted a few training operations with jihadi militants in the early 1990s, but 
ultimately decided to form a node in neighboring Kenya instead.  At least one of the training 
operations in Somalia took place indoors to avoid detection, indicating that the potential presence 
of international actors conducting surveillance and intelligence gathering, posed too great of a 
threat for a “safe haven” (Menkhaus 2007, 73-77).  Al Qaeda operative Abu Belal’s prospective 
report on Somalia to al Qaeda leadership stated, “As you know the jihad [in Somalia] started 
without planning or coordination…each member of the movement is fanatically attached to his 
tribe…There is no true desire in the leadership…There is lack of secrecy in the movement in 
managerial and military issues….Leave it, it is rotten Tribalism” (Menkhaus 2007, 67). 
While the current al Shabaab movement is ideologically tied to al Qaeda as a node, al 
Shabaab has struggled to maintain stable operational capabilities in Somalia. Terrorist groups in 
Somalia continue to face threats from U.S. drone strikes and African militaries, which have 
vigilantly pursued them. In recent years the Somali government, with tremendous support from 
the Kenyan military where Islamic terrorists have also maintained sanctuary (Patrick 2011), has 
gained more control in territories previously held by al Shabaab (Masters 2014). Due to the 
legacy of conflict and collapse, Somalia’s state infrastructure and institutions remain 
considerably weaker than many of the other states described in Cell 3. Therefore, al Shabaab has 
continued to seek refuge and capabilities in neighboring Kenya (Patrick 2011). 
 Terrorist organizations would not be able to benefit in cases of anarchy because the 
necessary logistics, travel, and communications networks are not in order and security for the 
organization would be difficult to maintain. The organization’s existence and safety are 
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constantly at risk, due to the competition for power between numerous groups. Anarchical 
societies are not beneficial for terrorist organizations and terrorist sanctuaries are considered 
unlikely.  Hypothesis 4 follows:  




















Quantitative Methods Chapter 4 - 
This chapter uses a quantitative approach to test the above hypotheses.  A critical 
advantage of quantitative analysis is that it “allows the opportunity to evaluate the quality of 
inferences that are drawn from the available evidence in a broader, more readily replicated 
framework than do non-quantitative analyses” (Bueno de Mesquita 1985).  Furthermore, 
quantitative methods use regression analyses to detect correlation between variables and the 
broad scope maximizes statistical leverage and generalization (Mahoney and Goertz 2006).  This 
chapter proceeds as follows.  Section one develops the research design.  Section two is on 
statistical analysis and a discussion of the findings.  A summary of results follows. 
 4.1 Research Design and Methodology 
This dissertation uses a cross-sectional time series design of 151 countries from 1970 to 
2012.  The unit of analysis is state year. The time period of this sample is based on data 
availability for a number of countries. The list of countries can be found in Appendix A. Aside 
from data availability, this time frame was selected based on the beginning of the 
internationalization of terrorism in 1968 (Hoffman 2006).   The available dataset was extended 
through 2012 to include terrorist organizations since 2006. 
 4.1.1 Operational definitions 
This research analyzes terrorist organizations’ sanctuary locations.  The dependent variable is the 
presence of a terrorist sanctuary.  The independent variable is state-society interactions, 





 a. Dependent variable 
As previously defined, terrorist sanctuaries are specific geographic locations that terrorist 
organizations use to carry out planning and logistics (Kittner 2007). The operational definition of 
terrorist sanctuary involves all locations in which terrorist organizations base their planning 
operations. Current data on terrorism focus on the location of terrorist attacks, which is an 
inadequate proxy for the study of terrorist sanctuaries, as it overlooks the planning phase of the 
attack.  Sageman (2004, 2008) notes that if attacks take place where terrorist organizations have 
established intricate training, financing, or communications networks the local populations 
would be alienated.   
As transnational terrorist organizations differ in their operational capacities, terrorist 
sanctuaries are divided into two groups:  hubs and nodes.  Hubs provide ideological guidance 
and facilitate financing, training, and planning for the goals of the broader organization or 
movement. Nodes are smaller cells that receive direction from the hubs in the form of ideological 
guidance, training, or planning.  The individuals in nodes either self-finance operations or 
receive financial support from hubs (Sageman 2004; Dempsey 2006; Duncker 2007). 
The dichotomous variable sanctuary scores 1 to indicate the presence of a hub or a node 
in a given year and is otherwise coded 0.  Two additional dichotomous variables hub and node 
were created to indicate whether the base was either a “hub” (coded 1) or “node” (coded 1) for a 
transnational movement in a given year and is otherwise coded 0.  
The dataset for the dependent variable was drawn from five sources. First, Terrorism 
Organization Profiles from the Terrorism Knowledge Base provide information on 800 terrorist 
organizations that have participated in terrorist activity from the late 1960s to 2008 (START 
2008).  The profiles in this database contain detailed narratives on bases of operations, goals of 
the organization, and suspected allied terrorist groups.  This allows a determination of the groups 
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goals being “domestic,” “international,” or “transnational.”50  This dissertation focuses 
specifically on groups whose ideology is influenced by a transnational ideological movement.  
Furthermore, the detailed descriptions of the organizations provide information on the role of the 
bases, allowing a determination of hubs and nodes.51  
Second, Jones and Libicki (2008) provide a list of 526 terrorist groups, drawn from the 
aforementioned Terrorism Knowledge Base (START 2008), but also include ideologies as well 
as starting and end dates for the group.  The narrowed list of organizations from Jones and 
Libicki (2008) excludes a number of groups that did not carry out more than one attack. The 
purpose of this procedure is to reduce the number of groups that are included multiple times in 
the database.  As some groups operate under several names or aliases, the Terrorist Organization 
Profiles commonly note when a group was likely the same as another in the database, allowing 
for elimination of duplicate listings. 
                                                 
50 Following an adaptation of Alexander (2006), which separates these three types: Domestic terrorist groups have 
goals specific to the state in which they operate.  This is particularly common with nationalist/separatist struggles. 
Groups with international ties but a specific domestic goal in one area are considered international.  Transnational 
groups in this analysis encompasses any organization whose goals tie to a larger ideological movement, more 
specific to the left-wing movements beginning in the 1960s and the Islamic based religious movement beginning in 
the 1980s (73-80).  For example, a group simply described as “leftist” in the TOPs profile was often not as dedicated 
to the wider left-wing movement as those whose propaganda and writings were heavily influenced by Marxist or 
Maoist thought, deemed “Communist/Socialist.”  Similarly, a number of groups have emerged over the last decade, 
specifically in Iraq, which TOPs profiles deemed “Religious” when in fact the goals were clearly nationalist, without 
a clear religious based agenda. Careful attention was given to these groups to determine which had wider aims 
attributed to the transnational global jihad movement and those fighting coalition forces for nationalist aims. 
 
51 The Terrorism Knowledge Base was produced through funding from the United States Department of Justice and 
Department of Homeland Security.  Data collection for this project ended in 2008 and is currently maintained by 
The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Terrorist group profiles 
are linked to the START database, allowing researchers to access terrorist attacks carried out by the specific 
organization. The Terrorism Knowledge Base indicates “Bases of Operations,” but through careful analysis this list 
is often not exhaustive, or includes countries as bases that are not completely supported by the report. Therefore, 
each base of operations was checked against other open source data, when available. 
 Terrorist Organization Profiles can be accessed through the START website: http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/ 
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The Terrorism Knowledge Base ended in 2008 so a number of alternate sources were 
used to cross-check and update data on bases of operations through 2012.52 The constructed 
dataset for this dissertation follows similar coding procedures as Jones and Libicki (2008) to 
eliminate organizations duplicated in the START (2008) database.  This dataset also 
differentiates between operational capabilities in each of the locations.   
A third source used to collect and update existing data on terrorist sanctuaries is the 
ongoing Mapping Militancy Project at Stanford University (Crenshaw 2015).  This project 
currently contains narratives on 112 organizations, which are updated as information becomes 
available. The current focus of the Mapping Militancy Project investigates the most recent 
groups emerging throughout the world and how they relate to previous or existing groups.53 This 
database contains narratives with updated information on many of the organizations in the 
Terrorist Organization Profiles (START 2008), information on new or splinter groups since 
2008, as well as documentation for those listed in START (2008) to determine the current status 
and locations of each group (Crenshaw 2015).54  
Fourth, the United States Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism from 2004 
to 2013 provides country-level accounts of terrorist activity.55  Finally, the Terrorism Research 
                                                 
52 In addition to the Mapping Militancy Project (Crenshaw 2015), U.S. Department of State Country Reports on 
Terrorism, and the Terrorism Research Analysis Consortium (TRAC) mentioned below, Council on Foreign 
Relations Backgrounder reports and the United States National Counterterrorism Center reports (NCTC) were used 
for additional information on terrorist organizations. NCTC group profiles can be accessed at 
http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups.html 
 
53 For example, the Mapping Militancy Project provides documentation regarding the groups that eventually merged 
into the Islamic State (ISIS). 
 
54 The Mapping Militancy Project is funded through a joint National Science Foundation and Department of Defense 
Minerva initiative. The Mapping Militancy Profiles (Martha Crenshaw, Principal Investigator) can be found at 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups 
 
55 The Department of State produced summaries of terrorism prior to 2004, but since 2004 the information and detail 
on each country significantly increased. In recent years, this has expanded to terrorist financing. These reports can 
be accessed at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/ 
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Analysis Consortium (TRAC) open-source data was used to validate additional information on 
each organization from 2008 to 2012.56  
After evaluating these five sources, 141 terrorist groups were determined to be connected 
to a transnational ideological terrorist movement between 1970 and 2012.  The operational 
capacity of these groups, their position within the transnational movement, bases of operations, 
and years of operation in the specific capacity was then determined to be either a hub (major 
ideological, logistical, funding, training base for the movement) or a node (cell that received 
ideological, logistical, funding, weapons, and/or training from a hub) for the operational time 
frame. 
 b. Independent variables.  
State Capacity.  State capacity is a multi-faceted phenomenon (Hendrix 2010; Kocher 
2010; Hendrix and Young 2014). This dissertation focuses on the capacity of the state in the 
domestic arena or the bureaucratic apparatus of the state and its capabilities, not the outcomes of 
the state’s policies.  Deviating from the traditional measurements of state strength or weakness 
used in extant quantitative terrorism literature (Piazza 2008; Gaibulloev 2015; Coggins 2014), 
the independent variable used here is based on Relative Political Capacity (RPC) indicators 
(Kugler and Tammen 2012).57  Migdal (1988) notes that Relative Political Capacity measures 
introduced in Organski and Kugler (1978) expand upon the traditional state capacity concept of 
                                                 
56 TRAC profiles can be accessed through http://www.trackingterrorism.org/about 
 
57 The Relative Political Capacity index draws from four sources:  World Bank Development Indicators, National 
Accounts Estimates of Main Aggregates by United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD), Global Indicator Database 
(UNSD), and Government Finance Statistics by the International Monetary Fund. 
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actual tax extraction by operationalizing several measures of the state’s ability to mobilize and 
extract resources relative to its expected extraction (Migdal 1988, 283).58  
Three indicators of Relative Political Extraction (RPE) are used from Kugler and 
Tammen (2012).59  RPE data are available for 156 countries from 1970-2011. By using these 
measures, the nature of state capacity in this dissertation is measured as the ability of the state to 
penetrate and ultimately “see” what is happening within its territory (see Hendrix and Young 
2014).   
RPE indexes account for the differences between developing and developed countries in 
extractive capabilities.  Gaibulloev (2015) found GDP to be a statistically significant determinant 
of terrorist base choice, but traditional measurements such as GDP favor developed societies and 
do not measure the ability of the state to penetrate society (Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson 
2007).   
The Relative Political Extraction (RPE) measurements “approximate the ability of 
governments to appropriate portions of the national output to advance public goals” (Kugler and 
Tammen 2012).  The RPE Agri-Mining model specifies the extractive capacity in mining and 
agriculture sectors in developing societies, while RPE GDP is specific to relative political 
extractive capabilities of developed societies.  
The RPE Agri-Mining variable for mining and agriculture is the tax ratio regressed on 
time, mining revenue as a percentage of GDP, agriculture revenues as a percentage of GDP, 
exports as a percentage of GDP, on an OECD dummy, and an inclusion dummy.  For developed 
                                                 
58 When Kugler and Domke (1986) initially used RPC, it focused on industrialized states (Migdal 1988, 283).  
Subsequent versions of RPC data include measures that seek to operationalize capacity in developing states. 
 
59 The five indicators are Relative Political Extraction Agriculture/Mining, Relative Political Extraction GDP, 
Relative Political Extraction GDP/OECD), Relative Political Reach Work, and Relative Political Reach 
Economically Active Population.  Two additional composite models on Relative Political Allocation (how public 
expenditures are prioritized in the national budget) are measured, but data for RPA are limited. 
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societies, the model RPE GDP is similar but tax ratio is regressed on time, mining, exports, and 
GDP per capita (2005 constant US dollars), an OECD dummy, and an inclusion dummy.  RPE 
GDP OECD is calculated using RPE GDP (Model 2) with the adjusted OECD data (Kugler and 
Tammen 2012). The models for Relative Political Extraction can be found in Appendix B. 
An average composite score of these three measures was created to capture state capacity.  
Using the mean of the RPE composite score, a dichotomous variable Strong State was created for 
those states above the mean, and otherwise coded 0. The dichotomous variable Weak State 
represents those below the mean, and otherwise coded 0.   
Societal Strength.  Societal strength is the second independent variable. While societal 
cleavages or the strength of civil society is widely known to be a difficult concept to 
operationalize, the literature on civil societies allows some specific variables to emerge.  
Powerful actors ascend from the business or economic sector in many societies, but ethnic and 
religious cleavages are considered critical aspects of societal organization (see Kisangani 2000). 
Ethnic and religious groups have strong political activation or mobilization power (see Clark, 
Golder, and Golder 2013). Every society has “comingled multiple sets of beliefs and memories,” 
but strong societies have higher rates of fractionalization (Migdal 1988, 38).   
Measures of societies in developed countries, such as political parties or membership in 
civic organizations, are exclusive to the most developed countries (Malena and Heinrich 2007).  
Thus, these social organizations do not lend themselves to empirical analysis across all societies, 
while ethnic and religious fractionalization exists across all societies to varying degrees.  Other 
causes of tension within a society, such as gender inequality or income inequality may add 
another layer of reinforcing friction to multiple existing cross-currents, but data availability and 
reliability on these potential sources of societal strength do not lend themselves to this analysis 
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of a range of societies.60  Furthermore, class cleavages may be related to fractionalization along 
ethnic and religious lines.  
The focus on societal strength here is the effects of societal organization that developed 
and developing societies experience through religious and ethnic cleavages.  While ethnic 
polarization data may be useful in this context, data from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) 
are more limited in availability than fractionalization indexes.61 Fractionalization is sufficient in 
this context as it indicates societal organization but does not assume “distance” between ethnic 
and religious groups as polarization indexes do.62 Data from Fearon and Laitin (2003) and 
Alesina, et al. (2003) are used to capture fractionalization through the combination of ethnic and 
religious indexes.  The fractionalization mean was used to create two dichotomous variables 
Strong Society for fractionalization above the mean and Weak Society for those below the mean. 
State-Society Interactions.  Four interaction variables were created by multiplying Strong 
and Weak State by Strong and Weak Society to test the four state-society interactions presented 
                                                 
60 Data on income inequality through the Gini indexes are unreliable due to significant amounts of missing data 
across time.  The collection of income inequality data in developing societies uses a variety of mixed measurements 
and in many countries if any data exists it is only for one or two years.  Fearon and Laitin (2003) attempted to use 
Gini data in their analysis of fractionalization and civil war, but found the missing data to be too extensive for 
analysis. 
 
61 Polarization was introduced in Esteban and Ray (1994). Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) argue that 
polarization data captures a level of friction by measuring the “distance” between groups beyond that used in Fearon 
and Laitin (2003).  Alesina, et al (2003) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) are both popular fractionalization indexes. 
Alesina, et al (2003) note that their data are statistically very similar to Fearon and Laitin (2003), thus using both 
indexes maximizes data. 
 
62 Alesina, et al. (2003) note, “Holding the ``distance'' between groups constant, polarization is typically maximized 
when there are two groups of equal size, whereas fractionalization increases when there are many small groups. 
Additionally, the degree of polarization should increase as the ``distance'' between groups increases. When it comes 
to ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups, however, the concept of distance is hard to capture with simple measures, 
so that researchers have implicitly assumed that the distance between groups is constant across group pairs. Whether 
societal conflict is the result of fractionalization or polarization is largely an unresolved question in theory. The 
discussion of whether a country with many relatively small groups is more or less stable than one with only two 
equally sized groups is an old one, and goes back at least to Madison in the Federalist Papers of 1788 (nos 10 and 
11, see Hamilton et al., 1911)” (177-179). 
62 
 
in Chapter 3.  The variables are as follows Strong State x Strong Society, Strong State x Weak 
Society, Weak State x Strong Society, Weak State x Weak Society. 
 c. Control variables 
Extant literature specifies several variables that may be important for the presence or 
absence of terrorist sanctuaries in specific locations.  They include state sponsorship of terrorism, 
civil conflict, level of democracy, and geographical features. 
State Sponsorship.  The presence of some terrorist sanctuaries are dependent upon the 
willingness of states to allow the terrorist organizations to operate within their borders (Byman 
2005). State sponsors of terrorism may provide ideological guidance, financial and logistical 
support, and arms supplies (Byman 2005, 55-58).  A dichotomous variable scored 1 for state 
sponsorship and otherwise 0 was created using data from Byman (2005) and information from 
Terrorist Organization Profiles (START 2008).63  As Byman (2005) notes, several factors 
relating to the War on Terror have led states to use state sponsorship less.  While Iran and Syria 
remain committed to sponsoring specific groups through 2012, other state sponsors of 
transnational terrorism, such as Iraq and Libya, ceased sponsoring terrorist organizations.  Thus, 
no new state sponsors of terrorism are known to exist that were not included in Byman (2005). 
Civil Conflict.  Extant literature has indicated a relationship between civil war and 
terrorist sanctuaries as civil wars are conducive to mobility across porous borders and access to 
weapons or other criminal enterprises (Rotberg 2004; Newman 2007; Kittner 2007; Gaibulloev 
2015).  The dichotomous variable Civil War is coded 1 using PRIO’s Armed Conflict Dataset for 
conflicts over the 1,000 battle death threshold (Themner and Wallensteen 2014) and otherwise 0. 
                                                 
63 Byman’s (2005) analysis spends less time focusing on left-wing state sponsors of terrorism.  Cuba is included as 
acting as a safe haven for terrorists until 1992, as well as ideological/logistical, financial, and arms support provided 
by the Soviet Union and China to certain left-wing groups until the late 1980s.  Terrorist Organization Profiles 
provide detailed accounts of state sponsorship when it is suspected or known. 
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Polity. Terrorist sanctuaries have been established in a variety of polities. Extant 
literature on the relationship between terrorist bases and democracy has produced mixed 
findings. While democracies are considered better at addressing potential grievances from 
society, democracies also face certain limitations in counterterrorism due to the protection of 
civil liberties (see Wilkinson 1986; Rotberg 2004; Hoffman 2006; Gaibulloev and Sandler 2013; 
Gaibulloev 2015).  Following Gaibulloev (2015), polity is used to measure the degree of 
democracy. Polity is based on the variable Polity2 in the “Polity IV” dataset.  The Polity variable 
ranges from -10 (complete autocracy) to 10 (complete democracy) (Marshall and Gurr 2010).  
Extant literature usually redefines this variable to measure from 1 to 21, with 1 indicating 
complete autocracy (-10) and 21 indicating complete democracy (+10).64 
Geography. Aspects of geographic landscape are considered to play a role in a specific 
territory being more or less attractive for a terror organization to use as sanctuary.  Following 
Gaibulloev (2015) the log of population and population density are included. These variables are 
from World Bank (2012).65  While large populations allow terrorists to blend into society, other 
scholars argue that terrorist operational needs require mountainous terrain with low population 
density (Jenkins, Zelikow, and May 2004; Graff 2010).  Data on mountains as a share of total 
landscape from Fearon and Laitin (2003) are used for variable percent of mountainous territory 
to account for a geographic constraint to state penetration (see Fearon and Laitin 2003; Nemeth, 
                                                 
64 The Polity IV measure (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2010) calculates the democracy score minus the autocracy 
score, along which polity is on a continuum. An alternative measure of democracy is the Cheibub, Gandhi, and 
Vreeland (2010) measure of democracy-dictatorship (DD). This measure is a dichotomous variable in that countries 
are either a democracy or dictatorship, which limits the variation in regime type. Another measure sometimes used 
to measure democracy is Freedom House’s annual measure of Freedom in the World, which captures political and 
civil rights. However, this measure is not technically a measure of democracy.  Perhaps the most problematic aspect 
of Freedom House Freedom in the World scores is that disaggregated data and the coding procedures are not made 
available to the public so researchers cannot evaluate why countries were given particular scores for each of the 
measures (see Clark, Golder, and Golder 2013). 
 
65 Population density is generated using data on population and area (World Bank 2012). 
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Mauselin, and Stapley 2014).  Following Gaibulloev (2015) two additional geographic controls 
are included: tropics and landlocked country.66 Dichotomous variables on landlocked and tropics 
are developed from the CIA World Factbook. Mountainous terrain and tropics are considered 
more conducive to terrorist sanctuaries.  Five control dummy variables for regions follow Fearon 
and Laitin (2003), where North Africa and the Middle East are the reference category. 
Table 4.1 provides the mean, standard deviation, and range for each of the variables used 
in this chapter.   
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Hubs 6072 .0975 .2967 0 1 
Nodes 6072 .2745 .4463 0 1 
Sanctuary 6072 .3164        .4651 0 1 
Strong State 5612 .4704 .4992 0 1 
Weak State 5612 .5296 .4992 0 1 
Strong Society 5918 .4974 .5001 0 1 
Weak Society 5918 .5026 .5000 0 1 
State Sponsorship 5918 .0374    .1897   0 1 
Polity 5918 11.889     7.369 1 21 
Civil War    5918 .0431     .2031 0 1 
(log) Population 5918 16.067     1.520 11.68906   21.01901 
(log) Population Density 5918 3.883   1.708 .1085981   16.51642 
Mountain 6072 17.255     21.692 0 94.3 
Landlock 6072 .2021      .4016 0 1 
Tropic 6072 .3241     .4681 0 1 
Western 6072 .1416    .3487 0 1 
Eastern European 6072 .1125     .3159 0 1 
Latin America 6072 .1629     .3693   0 1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 6072 .2939     .4556 0 1 
Asia 6072 .1488    .3559 0 1 
                                                 
66 Gaibulloev (2015) uses elevation, while this study uses percent mountainous terrain (Fearon and Laitin 2003).   
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 4.2 Analysis of the Statistical Results 
Before analyzing the statistical results, an assessment of the influence of multicollinearity 
is performed using variance factor inflation (VIF).  Multicollinearity is a concern when the VIF 
composite score for the model is above 10.  The VIF scores for each of the models indicate that 
multicollinearity is not an issue in these estimates.67 A Hausman test revealed that simultaneity 
may be present, thus, variables were lagged to address endogeneity concerns (Gujarati 2003). 
This dissertation employs a time series cross sectional (TSCS) design of 151 countries 
from 1970-2012 using logistic regression generated on Stata 13 to test the four hypotheses 
presented in Chapter 3 because the dependent variables Sanctuary, Hubs, and Nodes are binary, 
or dichotomous variables.  Therefore, a logit model is appropriate. All six models in Tables 4.2 
and 4.3 have significant chi-squares, which suggests the models fit the data well.  The Wald chi-
square are reported in each table.  Logit model coefficients are in terms of odds ratios.  Odds 
ratios were transformed in the following analysis (Gujarati 2003, 596).68 
Model 1 corresponds to the first hypothesis that strong states with strong societies 
(polyarchical polities) are less likely to host terrorist sanctuaries. In this model, the direction of 
the strong state coefficient (main effect) indicates strong states are less likely to host terrorist 
sanctuaries, while strong societies are more likely to have sanctuaries. However, neither of these 
variables are statistically significant.  The interaction effect for strong states and strong societies 
seems to support the first hypothesis that this interaction is less likely to host terrorist 
sanctuaries. The interaction term is statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficient for 
                                                 
67 The highest VIF composite score of 2.07 suggests that multicollinearity is not an issue in these estimates. 
 
68 Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, coefficients are in terms of odds ratios.  For example, the 
coefficient of “strong state” in model 2 is -.8273.  It is transformed with the e the exponent of Eurler’s number (e = 
2.71828183), e-.8273, which is 1/e.8273 or 0.437.   
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Strong State x Strong Society Interaction is -.7837, which indicates a .457 reduction in the rate of 
terrorist sanctuaries, holding all other variables constant.  
Model 2 lends support to previous findings in extant literature that strong state capacity 
may decrease the prevalence of terrorist sanctuaries.  In Model 2, Strong State in the absence of a 
weak society, is less likely to host terrorist sanctuaries and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  The coefficient -.8273 for Strong State, which indicates a .437 decrease in the odds of a 
terrorist sanctuary, holding all other variables constant. The variable Weak Society is negative 
but not statistically significant. However, the interaction effect of Strong State x Weak Society 
Interaction (pyramidal polity) is statistically significant at the 5% level, which indicates this 
interaction is more likely to host terrorist sanctuaries.  The coefficient is .7837, which increases 
the odds of a sanctuary by a factor of 2.189 in the pyramidal interaction, holding all other 
variables constant.    
Table 4.2 Logit Regressions for Presence of Terrorist Sanctuaries, 1970-2012 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Strong State -.0436   
(.2402)     
-.8273***   
(.2362)     
  
Weak State   .0436   
(.2402)      
.8273***  
(.2362)      
Strong Society .8881   
(1.0368)     
 .1049    
(1.0384)      
 
Weak Society  -.8881 
(1.0368)    
  -.1044   
(1.0384)     
Strong State x Strong Society  -.7837**   
(.3359)     
   
Strong State x Weak Society  .7837** 
(.3359)      
  
Weak State x Strong Society   .7839**    
(.3359)      
 
Weak State x Weak Society    -.7837**    
(.3359)     
State Sponsor 1.4561***  
(.3931)   
1.4561***   
(.3931)      
1.4561***    
(.3931)      
1.4561***   
(.3931)      
Polity -.0696***  
(.0165)   
-.0696***   
(.0165)    
-.0696***   
(.0165)    
-.0696***   
(.0165)    
Civil War .5829**  
(.2619)     
.5829**  
(.2619)      
.5829**   
(.2619)      
.5829**  
(.2619)      
Population 3.7386***    
(.3582)   
3.7386***    
(.3582)    
3.7386***    
(.3582)     
3.7386***    
(.3582)     
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Population Density .037563    
(.2811)     
.037563    
(.2811)    
.037563    
(.2811)      
.037563    
(.2811)      
Area -6.4107*** 
 (2.4107)    
-6.4107***    
(2.4107)     
-6.4107***    
(2.4107)    
-6.4107***    
(2.4107)    
% Mountainous Terrain .0388*    
(.0227)     
.0388*   
(.0227)      
.0388*    
(.0227)      
.0388*    
(.0227)      
Landlock  -.5443    
(1.2424)   
-.5443    
(1.2424)    
-.5443   
(1.2424)     
-.5443   
(1.2424)     
Tropic -.1236    
(1.2613)     
-.1236    
(1.2613)     
-.1236  
(1.2613) 
-.1236   
(1.2613) 
Western -.7001    
(1.5946)     
-.7001    
(1.5946)     
-.7001   
(1.5946)     
-.7001   
(1.5946)     
Eastern Europe -3.9108**   
(1.6949)    
-3.9108**   
(1.6949)   
-3.9108**   
(1.6949)    
-3.9108**   
(1.6949)    
Latin America 1.7699    
(1.8285) 
1.7699    
(1.8285)      
1.7699   
(1.8285)      
1.7699   
(1.8285)      
Sub-Saharan Africa -7.1596***    
(1.6995)     
-7.1596***    
(1.6995)    
-7.1596***    
(1.6995)     
-7.1596***  
(1.6995)     
Asia -5.2294***    
(1.9682)  
-5.2294***    
(1.9682) 
-5.2294*** 
(1.9682)     
-5.2294*** 
(1.9682)     
constant -60.5732*** 
5.1588       
-59.6852***   
(5.0928)    
-60.6167***   
(5.1473)    
-60.5124***   
(5.0799) 
Wald Chi Square 282.91*** 282.91*** 282.91*** 282.91*** 
N 5435 5435 5435 5435 
Statistical significance is indicated at the following levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. One tailed test. Standard 
Errors are in parentheses. 
 
The third model presents the case of weak state and strong society (diffused polity). The 
variables weak state and strong society are positive but not statistically significant.  Thus, weak 
states in the absence of strong societies are not more likely to host sanctuaries, but the interaction 
effect for Weak State x Strong Society is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level.  The 
coefficient is .7837, which increases the likelihood of terrorist sanctuaries by 2.18969 in diffused 
polities, holding all other variables constant.  Model 3 lends support to the third hypothesis that 
diffused polities are more likely to host terrorist sanctuaries.  
Model 4 tests the fourth hypothesis.  This model shows that weak states are more likely 
to host terrorist sanctuaries and is statistically significant at the 1% level with a coefficient of 
.8273.  Therefore, state weakness, when weak societies are not present, increases the odds of 
                                                 
69 Or a 118% increase in the likelihood of a terrorist sanctuary. 
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having a sanctuary by 2.287. The variable weak society in the absence of weak state capacity is 
not statistically significant.  However, the interaction effect of Weak State x Weak Society 
(anarchical polity) is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficient for the 
interaction term is -.7837, which suggests a .457 decline in the presence of terrorist sanctuaries in 
anarchical polities, holding all other variables constant. This supports hypothesis 4 that weak 
states and weak societies are unlikely to have terrorist sanctuaries. 
The analysis of control variables in Table 4.2 are generally consistent with extant 
literature.  State sponsorship, civil wars, and population are all highly statistically significant and 
consistent with extant literature.  The findings here support that democratic institutions limit the 
presence of terrorist sanctuaries.  The percentage of mountainous terrain is positive and 
statistically significant.  However, neither tropical nor landlocked countries are statistically 
significant in these four models.  Latin America is the only positive regional variable but is not 
statistically significant. The Western region is negative but is not significant.  Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe are negative and statistically significant, thus, terrorist 
sanctuaries are less common in these regions.   
Table 4.3 provides two additional models to assess the importance of hubs and nodes. 
Model 5 tests the hypothesis that strong states with weak societies are more likely to host 
terrorist sanctuary nodes.  In this model, the variable Strong State indicates that strong state 
capacity in the absence of societal weakness are less likely to host terrorist sanctuaries at the 5% 
level.  The coefficient is -.5745 which indicates that the presence of nodes decreases by .563 
with stronger state capacity.  The variable weak society is not statistically significant. Model 5 
tests the Strong State x Weak Society Interaction with only nodes in the dependent variable. This 
interaction is statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient for the strong state and 
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weak society interaction is 1.043, which increases the odds of a node by a factor of 2.837 in 
strong states with weak societies. The finding supports hypothesis 2 that strong states and weak 
societies are more likely to host terrorist sanctuary nodes.   
The final model, Model 6 uses hubs as the dependent variable to test hypothesis 3 that 
weak states with strong societies are more likely to host terrorist sanctuary hubs. In Model 6 the 
variables weak state, strong society, and the Weak State x Strong Society Interaction all indicate 
a positive relationship but none is statistically significant.  This finding rejects the hypothesis 
that weak states and strong societies are more likely to be terrorist sanctuary hubs; although, 
Model 3 in Table 4.1 indicates support for the likely presence of terrorist sanctuaries, when both 
hubs and nodes are combined, for the weak state and strong society interaction.  
Table 4.3 provides a different picture of control variables. Model 5 describes terrorist 
sanctuary nodes.  According to this model, civil war and population are critical in explaining 
terrorist nodes.  More specifically Latin American countries seem to be more conducive to 
terrorist nodes than other regions across the globe, while sub-Saharan Africa and Asia are 
negative and highly statistically significant.  Model 6 illustrates some differences between hubs 
and the previous five models.  Most surprisingly, the finding for Polity is positive and significant 
(1%) in Model 6.  Population density is also negative and highly statistically significant (1%), 
which would support the view that terrorist organizations may seek areas that are less densely 
populated to establish training facilities and avoid detection. Similarly, the percent of 






Table 4.3 Logit Regressions for Presence of Nodes and Hubs, 1970-2012 
Variable Model 5 (Nodes) Model 6 (Hubs) 
Strong State -.5745**   
(.2329)     
 
Weak State  .3229    
(.3355)      
Strong Society  .6595    
(1.2643)      
Weak Society -.5462    
(1.0609)     
 
Strong State x Weak Society Interaction 1.0428***    
(.3232)      
 
Weak State x Strong Society Interaction  .5655   
(.5217)      
State Sponsor .5424 
(.3999)      
5.7184***   
(.7572)      
Polity -.0435***    
(.0165)     
.0572***    
(.0203)      
Civil War .4798**     
(.2443)      
.5469**    
(.2658)      
Population 3.7420***   
(.3808)      
1.3976***  
(.4980)      
Population Density .2461    
(.2945)      
-1.5047***   
(.5411)     
Area -6.1307**    
(2.6007)     
-1.0507    
(2.5107)        
% Mountainous Terrain .0223   
(.0223)      
.0642**    
(.0273)      
Landlock -.3801   
(1.2395)     
-1.8931    
(1.7781)     
Tropic -.6575   
(1.2827)     
1.6560     
(1.7246)      
Western -.07480    
(1.6873)     
-3.7969**   
(1.6371)     
Eastern Europe -2.3614    
(1.7434)     
-7.8112**   
(3.6832)     
Latin America 3.3513*    
(1.9369)     
-4.7439**   
(2.3238)     
Sub-Saharan Africa -5.0711***   
(1.7812)     
-7.7086***   
(2.5366)     
Asia -4.6714**    
2.0459     
-4.6111**   
(2.1163)     
constant -62.7803*** -23.8513*** 
Wald Chi Square 254.09*** 100.32*** 
 
N 5435 5435 
Statistical significance is indicated at the following levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 




 4.3 Discussion of Findings 
The findings detailed above lend support to extant literature that state strength can limit 
the presence of terrorist sanctuaries, while weak states are more vulnerable to hosting terrorist 
sanctuaries (Hamre and Sullivan 2002; Newman 2007; Gaibulloev 2015).  However, state 
capacity variables are not statistically significant in all models. A robustness check on societal 
strength was conducted for alternative model specification. Following Migdal (1988), two 
dichotomous variables were created to indicate former British colony (strong society) and non-
British colony (weak society)70 but the societal strength results were not significant either. 
Therefore, societal strength or weakness and state strength and weakness do not explain the 
presence of terrorist sanctuaries as well as the interaction results.  The statistically significant 
findings in the interaction models provide a better understanding of the presence or absence of 
terrorist sanctuaries than state-centric explanations. 
The findings support for each of the hypotheses pertaining to state-society interactions 
and the presence of terrorist sanctuaries, but hypothesis 3 is only partly supported.  The findings 
in Model 6 in Table 4.3 did not provide support for the hypothesis that weak states with strong 
societies are more likely to be terrorist sanctuary hubs, but Model 3 in Table 4.2 indicates that 
weak states with strong societies are more likely to host terrorist sanctuaries, generally.  
Control variables provide a number of interesting findings. First, state sponsorship is 
consistent with extant literature that terrorist sanctuaries are often related to direct state 
sponsorship (Byman 2005; Ezrow and Frantz 2013).  State sponsorship is significant in all 
models except the nodes model and is strongest in the hubs model. Ezrow and Frantz (2013) 
                                                 
70 The British use of indirect rule strengthened societal strongmen and solidified the traditional structure of society 
during the colonial period.  Many of the strongest societies that continue to reject centralized state power are former 
British colonies (Migdal 1988).  This differs from the French use of direct rule, which typically focused on 
centralized power while minimizing the role of societal actors (Khapoya 1990). 
72 
 
argue that sanctuaries may not be a state failure issue but rather a state sponsorship issue.  States 
often choose to sponsor terrorist organizations to augment foreign policy goals, or strength in the 
international arena.   However, state sponsorship has been on the decline due to increased 
international pressure (Pillar 2001; Byman 2005).  The War on Terror has also weakened 
terrorist organizations’ ability to maintain major terrorist hubs.  The finding that state 
sponsorship is an important factor for hubs, but nodes are explained by other factors illustrates 
the importance of separating hubs and nodes in evaluating sanctuaries. 
The presence of Civil War in each of these models is statistically significant.  This is 
consistent with extant terrorism literature (Rotberg 2002, 2004; Newman 2007; Piazza 2008). 
This is a particularly important finding given that nationalist-separatist groups not affiliated with 
a global transnational movement were not included in this analysis.   
The findings for the variable Polity are particularly interesting given the general belief 
that democracy alleviates some of the root causes of terrorism.71  Higher level of democracy are 
less likely to be sanctuaries generally, but are more likely to host terrorist hubs. Democracies are 
vulnerable to terrorist hubs, as hubs provide ideological guidance for transnational terrorist 
movements.  Democracies allow open political speech and assembly in addition to fewer 
restrictions on religious practices, media, and press.  This finding highlights the importance of 
understanding that mature autocracies face very few restraints in challenging the establishment 
of terrorist hubs, but are continually challenged by nodes.   
                                                 
71 Several studies have indicated that democracies often experience terrorist attacks relative to autocracies (see 
Aksoy and Carter 2014). However, terrorist attacks do not correspond to the presence of sanctuaries in many 
democracies. For example, Germany experienced no incidents of terrorist attacks from the fundamentalist Islamic 
movement, until March 2, 2011 when a Kosovar Muslim attacked American troops in Frankfurt, despite al Qaeda 
and Islamic Movement Uzbekistan operating in the country for over a decade prior to 2011 (Steinberg 2013).  
Similarly, the incidence of terrorist attacks in the U.S. is minimal compared to its extensive use as a sanctuary. 
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Higher populations increase the likelihood of terrorist sanctuaries.  This is consistent with 
the findings in Gaibulloev (2015).  Terrorist organizations may seek higher populated countries 
that offer more opportunity for recruits (Gaibulloev 2015), or higher populations may allow 
organizations to blend in easier.  
Moreover, consistent with the finding in Gaibulloev (2015) the geographic control 
variable for percent Mountainous Terrain has strong statistical significance in the hub model but 
mountainous terrain is also associated with the presence of all sanctuaries. Mountainous terrain 
has facilitated the establishment of terrorist sanctuaries, most notably in northern Iraq and the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. Other geographic determinants, landlocked or tropical 
countries were not statistically significant in these models, consistent with findings in Gaibulloev 
(2015).   
A number of other findings in the analysis of regional control variables are pertinent to a 
greater understanding of terrorist sanctuaries.  The regional findings have potential for future 
research.  Some of the regions with very weak states, such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, are 
less often the host of terrorist sanctuaries (hubs and nodes). This finding lends support to the 
argument in this dissertation that not all weak states are considered attractive transnational 
terrorist sanctuaries.  Furthermore, these regional findings on Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia 
indicate the link between poverty and terrorism may be overstated.  Many countries in sub-
Saharan Africa and Asia have high rates of poverty, which is assumed to contribute to the 
presence of terrorist sanctuaries (von Hippel 2002; Rotberg 2002; 2004; Davis 2007; Rice, Graff, 
and Pascual 2010). The highly significant negative finding for Sub-Saharan Africa is particularly 
important, given the amount of extant failed state-terrorism literature that has debated the extent 
to which terrorist organizations operate in sub-Saharan Africa (Rotberg 2002, 2004; Farah 2004; 
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Dempsey 2006; Menkhaus 2007; Passas and Jones 2006; Davis 2007; Bertocchi and Guerzoni 
2012; Menkhaus 2013).    
Extant literature on the relationship between state weakness and terrorist sanctuaries has 
struggled to reach a consensus regarding how state strength should be analyzed for large N 
studies.  Only recently has Relative Political Capacity been applied to the field of terrorism (see 
Hendrix 2014), but it offers a strong measure of state capacity for future analyses. These findings 
lend support to the argument presented in this dissertation that state-society interactions provide 
a better explanation for the presence of terrorist sanctuaries than state capacity alone.  However, 
the role of societies and how they interact with the state in accepting or rejecting terrorist 














Qualitative Methods Chapter 5 - 
Chapter 3 developed a new theory that presented four typologies of state-society 
interactions to understand types of terrorist sanctuaries.  The statistical results presented in 
Chapter 4 support the idea that both state capacity and society’s strength affect the likelihood of 
terrorist sanctuaries. Societal strength suggests that strong societies within weak states can 
accommodate terrorist organizations.  However, quantitative analysis does not explain the 
complex reasons or causal mechanisms of societal acceptance or rejection of a specific terrorist 
movement. 
While quantitative design may “produce precision, it does not necessarily encourage 
accuracy” (King, Keohane, Verba 1994, 44) as researchers in many social science fields are 
forced to rely on proxies to capture a given social phenomenon. Thus, employing both 
methodologies is complementary to theory evaluation given the strengths and weaknesses of 
both approaches (King, Keohane, Verba 1994; Schmid and Jongman 1988; Silke 2001).   
Qualitative methodologies are particularly useful in explaining concepts difficult to 
operationalize for systematic analysis. In short, “good description [of complex events] depends 
in part on good explanation,” thus, qualitative analysis complements quantitative research (King, 
Keohane, Verba 1994, 44-45).  This point is pertinent to the theory developed in this dissertation 
on terrorist sanctuaries because it evaluates a dynamic interaction between state and society.  
Specific historical events influence and shift the balance of power, which can be explained in 
greater depth through comparative case study analysis.  
Qualitative approaches are also particularly useful in the early stages of theory 
development and testing as they allow general insight and analysis of deviant cases (Collier 
1993; Lijphart 1971; Gerring 2007).  The study of terrorism has benefited from case studies as 
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valuable biographical information has been collected through interviews (Stern 2003; Sageman 
2004, 2008) particularly where data collection is difficult and dangerous (Dempsey 2006). Case 
studies on terrorist group organizational structure, financing, and training bases have also 
contributed to a greater understanding of group behavior (Kohlmann 2004; Bergen 2006; Byman 
2005; Farah 2004; Gunaratna 2002; Hoffman 2006; Kittner 2007).  Although these studies 
provide valuable insights and information, Ross (2004) notes, many of these preliminary studies 
are done by journalists who do not typically follow guidelines of social science research.   
Many of the criticisms of terrorism research referenced in Ross (2004) were previously 
true for the broad terrorism literature, but they remain accurate for the subset of studies that 
focus on terrorist bases or sanctuaries. Failure to use comparative case models has been a 
drawback to progress in the study of terrorist sanctuaries, which has ultimately led to an 
overgeneralization based on anecdotal evidence, without rigorous hypothesis testing.72  In the 
literature on terrorist sanctuaries, a confirmatory case study approach is most common and 
scholars have neglected to closely examine nonconforming cases (see Mahoney and Goertz 
2006) where terrorist sanctuaries do not exist in failed states or where terrorist sanctuaries exist 
in strong states.  Some have noted negative cases that do not fit the failed state-terrorist sanctuary 
model but do not closely examine cases that lie outside the proposed explanation (see Arsenault 
and Bacon 2015).   
Mixed findings indicate a need for a structured comparative analysis of state-society 
interactions. Qualitative methods allow a careful study of micro-level analysis that cannot be 
captured using quantitative indicators.  For example, a strong, developed state may possess a 
contentious relationship with a small segment of society that is not uncovered through state-level 
                                                 
72 George and Bennett (2005) note that single observation research designs “are at great risk of indeterminacy in the 
face of more than one possible explanation and they lead to incorrect inference if there is measurement error” (32). 
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quantitative indicators. Even in a full democracy, if a portion of society feels left out of the 
political process, the alienated portion of society may be inclined to support terrorist movements 
(see Li 2005; Aksoy and Carter 2014). On the other hand, a state determined to be weak based on 
development indicators may not possess terrorist sanctuaries if there are micro-level explanations 
for society’s satisfaction with the status quo. 
 A closer look at societal interactions is also critical as state-level terrorist support has 
changed. Considerable attention has been paid to the influence of active and passive state 
sponsorship on terrorist organizations’ longevity and effectiveness (Byman 2005).  State 
sponsorship has declined over the past decade but terrorist movements are thriving, thus, a 
thorough analysis of how societies can provide active and passive support is critical.  Gurr 
(1998) notes that more research needs to be done on why the larger societal groups that provide 
passive support to terrorist movements stop giving it but this has not been the focus of terrorism 
research over the past decade.  Thus, a comparative analysis of the state and society can unearth 
the various reasons that terrorist organizations may receive support (active or passive) or 
rejection from society. 
This chapter details the comparative analysis used to examine determinants of state-
society interactions and the presence of terrorist sanctuaries and will proceed as follows. This 
chapter explains the usefulness of the cross-case and within case comparisons in theory 
evaluation through two qualitative approaches: structured, focused comparison and process 
tracing. First is an explanation of the structured, focused comparison research design. Second, 
this chapter details the use of process tracing through the typological theory presented in Chapter 
3, followed by an explanation of the use of critical antecedents and critical junctures (Slater and 
Simmons 2010).  Finally, the case selection process is explained. 
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 5.1 Qualitative Research Design 
 5.1.1 Structured, Focused Comparison 
Qualitative analysis has many benefits in gaining insight into complex issues.  However, 
terrorism scholars must also be aware that strong qualitative analysis moves beyond description 
and a loose framework.  While descriptive narratives provide insights, structured, focused 
comparative studies contribute to better theory development (George and McKeown 1985; 
George and Bennett 2005).   
A structured, focused research design is structured in the sense that the researcher asks 
general questions of each of the cases that reflect the research objectives.  This structure guides 
the research and standardizes the data collection, which enables making systematic comparisons 
of the findings possible (George and Bennett 2005). According to George and Bennett (2005, 
68), the method is focused because it deals only with certain aspects of the cases examined. 
However, this focus is undertaken after a rich historical and cultural background of the case is 
established, which informs the study (King, Keohane, Verba 1994, 43).  
The advantage of structured, focused comparison over other methods is the ability to 
standardize the study, which fosters validity and reliability while allowing variables to be 
assessed across cases (George and Bennett 2005).   Furthermore, as stated by George and 
Bennett (2005, 245), “An important advantage of typological theorizing is that it can move 
beyond earlier debates between structural centered or agent centered theories by including within 
a single typological framework hypotheses on mechanisms leading from agents to structures and 
those leading from structures to agents. This allows the theorist to address questions of how 
different kinds of agents (individuals, organizations, or states, depending on the level of analysis) 
behave in and change various types of structures.”  
79 
 
 As the theory developed in Chapter 3 explains, the complex nature of state-society 
relations has an impact on whether or not a terrorist organization can establish sanctuary.  The 
four-cell typology differentiates between the types of sanctuaries that may be present. 
Furthermore, the basis for these types focuses on state-society interactions.  According to the 
theoretical argument, state behavior can often be explained through strengths and weaknesses in 
carrying out specific tasks.  Evaluating society is a much more complex process that requires a 
deep historical understanding of the processes by which a specific society is organized.  Thus, a 
thorough understanding of how the state molds society and how society shapes state behavior 
can provide a better understanding of terrorist sanctuaries.  As George and Bennett (2005, 238) 
note, “Typologies can characterize variants of a given phenomenon in terms of conjunctions of 
variables, such as types of social unrest that may or may not lead to revolutions.  In their most 
complex form, typologies can include conjunctions of multidimensional independent variables 
together with types of a multidimensional dependent variable.”73 
 While the complexity of this typology is established, using structured, focused 
comparison does allow cases to be evaluated in a systematic way.  The development of 
transnational terror movements does not exist in a vacuum, therefore, specific themes and 
questions will be presented for each of the cases.  This analysis focuses on transnational terror 
movements, thus the existence of left-wing, right-wing, and religious terrorist movements within 
each of these countries will be analyzed with particular interest to the following questions: 
How does state background, its institutional structure, and capacity shape the presence of 
terrorist sanctuaries?  
 
                                                 
73 George and Bennett provide the example of military interventions as well stating, “A typology might include 
types of military interventions that vary by regional context, domestic politics on the target state, scale, scope, goals, 
and instruments employed” (238). 
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How does the traditional societal structure wield influence and shape the presence of terrorist 
sanctuaries? 
 
Both the political and economic situation within a country shape its identity and the way 
the state interacts with society.  State capacity in the political and economic sphere defines its 
reach into society. Varying political systems can repress societal interaction or facilitate political 
activity. Similarly, the economic system and its variations can determine the role the state has in 
the lives of its people.   
 The colonial experience molded various societies through centralizing or decentralizing 
authority and often created or exacerbated ethnic and religious fractionalization. As the literature 
review and theoretical development point out, a number of issues may lead to friction within 
society and between the state and society.  These may include formal organizations such as 
interest groups, ethnic, religious, or class polarization.  Migdal (1988) suggests that while ethnic, 
religious, and linguistic fractionalization appear to contribute to the strength of societies and 
challenges to state authority, “such statistics have severe limitations.  For instance, they 
camouflage the tremendous differences among societies themselves.  Moreover, they do not 
show how such fragmentation relates to actual social control” (37).  
Cooperation and conflict among societal groups also requires a thorough analysis as 
alliances among societal groups are critical to understanding the strength of society and its power 
in challenging the state.  Of particular concern to this study is the nature of society’s passive or 
active support of a terrorist organization operating within its space, if such support exists.  Extant 
literature suggests that terrorist organizations forging bonds with societal strongmen or gaining a 
broad base of support are of great concern to state leaders because it allows the organization to 
acquire a range of operational capabilities. 
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These questions asked of each of the cases are not mutually exclusive.  Rather, evaluating 
these will allow the multidimensional aspects of these explanatory themes and their connections 
to one another to be uncovered.  The next section describes the second method, historical process 
tracing. 
 5.1.2 Process Tracing 
 In both qualitative and quantitative approaches, identifying the potential causes of an 
outcome is critical to explaining the complexity of the phenomenon being studied. A strength of 
process-tracing is that it allows both within-case but also comparison across cases. For the cases 
selected in this study, both of these attributes of process-tracing are possible, which can uncover 
unforeseen variables that a less structured narrative may not. However, uncovering causal 
mechanisms through process-tracing dictates the analysis be rooted in a rich historical narrative 
of the case studied, which can shed light on the multiple interactions that typically occur in 
explaining a particular outcome (George and Bennett 2005). 
For typological theories, process tracing is a critical element in providing a “check on 
whether the explanations developed from typological comparisons are spurious” (George and 
Bennett 2005, 254).  Furthermore, this allows for a closer look at deviant cases and the variables 
that may be omitted in previous research.  Particularly important for this study, “the combination 
of a typological theory and process-tracing can incorporate and help identify interaction effects.  
If a researcher has deductively outlined the type of interactions he or she expects in a type of 
case, process tracing can test for their presence” (George and Bennett 2005, 255).  In addition, 
for process-tracing to be most effective it is critical to not only look for events preceding an 
outcome that connect the two, but to explain how the two are connected (George and McKeown 
1985).   
82 
 
Process tracing can also be a unique tool for discovering whether the phenomenon being 
studied is characterized by equifinality74 as process tracing encourages the researcher to be 
cognizant of equifinality. Case studies using process-tracing in conjunction with large N 
statistical analysis are important as statistical analysis can overlook the possibility of equifinality 
“and settle for a statement of a probabilistic finding regarding only one causal path at work” 
(George and Bennett 2005, 215). 
The use of process tracing in this study is supported by staging the historical context of 
the presence or absence of terrorist sanctuaries.  Throughout each of the cases, specific 
transnational terrorist movements are isolated for investigation. The analysis of the specific 
questions asked of each case as they relate to the typologies are examines through historical 
process tracing.  This allows the exploration of multiple possible explanations for the presence or 
absence of terrorist sanctuaries.   
 The above explanation of process-tracing and qualitative approach stresses the 
importance of understanding how a complex series of events often precedes another dramatic 
event that alters the status quo.  The focus of this study is to explain the presence of terrorist 
sanctuaries.  As Slater and Simmons (2010) point out, social science researchers “increasingly 
realize that our biggest ‘why’ questions cannot be adequately answered without careful attention 
to the question of ‘when’” (886-887).  The theory proposed in this dissertation stresses that 
transnational terrorist sanctuaries do not appear at random, but rather through a decision process 
based on the environment within society in addition to the state’s capacity and limitations.   
Many social science researchers focus on a specific event or “critical juncture” and less so on the 
process leading up to that critical juncture.  Critical junctures are defined as, “periods in history 
                                                 
74 Equifinality is also referred to as “multiple convergence” by some scholars (George and Bennett 2005, 215). 
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when the presence or absence of a specified causal force pushes multiple cases onto divergent 
long-term pathways, or pushes a single case onto a new political trajectory that diverges 
significantly from the old” (Slater and Simmons 2010, 888).  
In short, Slater and Simmons (2010) specify a systematic process for historical regress.  
Slater and Simmons (2010) place importance on the historical context or possible causal chain of 
events leading up to the critical juncture through “critical antecedents.”  Figure 5.1 illustrates this 
process. Critical antecedents are defined as, “factors or conditions that combine with causal 
forces during a critical juncture to produce long-term divergence in outcomes” (889).  
Conditioning causes can also precede critical antecedents in predisposing cases to diverge in a 
particular way. 
Figure 5.1 Critical Antecedents and Critical Junctures 
 
                                                         
 
 
The critical antecedent and critical juncture framework does not demand the researcher 
specify each particular event as important but rather indicate the significance through the level of 
explanation given to an event in order to explain the outcome of interest, terrorist sanctuaries.  
The emphasis placed on particular events as important or influential, conditioning causes, critical 
antecedents, and ultimately a critical juncture is the primary focus.  Through a historical context, 
indicating that an event occurred that may be indirectly related to a critical juncture is also 
important, but the emphasis should be limited.  Thus, the use of critical antecedents and critical 
junctures adds structure to traditional historical process tracing. 
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 5.2 Case Selection 
Case selection is a key attribute to any research design meant to formulate or test a 
theory.  The case selection influences the reliability of the theory being presented and its ability 
to generalize beyond the case(s) selected (see Geddes 1990).  Thus, careful attention must be 
paid to avoiding bias in selecting cases.  For reliability and generalizability, cases should not be 
selected for the purpose of confirming a theory.  Strong case selections and research designs are 
often the result of some preliminary knowledge of cases, but this must be limited so that bias 
does not completely overtake the process of selecting cases (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; 
George and Bennett 2005).   
Since this dissertation seeks to explain the presence of terrorist sanctuaries, the case 
selection is informed by the dependent variable.  As noted in Chapter 2, the literature on terrorist 
sanctuaries has generally focused on analyzing those cases that apply to the failed state-terrorism 
relationship.  Significant attention has been paid to Sudan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, 
specifically. While important, this focus overlooks types of terrorist sanctuaries that can exist 
and the range of state capacity where sanctuaries exist. Furthermore, these cases represent 
significantly different geographic areas, including the United States, Europe, the Middle East, 
and Africa.  
The failed state-terrorism literature is considered relatively new (Young and Findley 
2011) and has not explained cases that deviate from this idea. Thus, a retrospective research 
design with cases is appropriate in order to evaluate the “empirical plausibility of the causal 
inference” (King, Keohane, Verba 1994, 141).  Selecting cases with variation can illuminate 
causal paths that lead to outcomes and provide opportunities for exploration in subsequent 
studies (George and Bennett 2005, 23).   
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 The number of cases selected for this study relies on the dependent variable presence of 
terrorist sanctuaries, and the two types of sanctuaries (hubs and nodes), according to the typology 
presented in Chapter 3. The four countries selected for this study are the United States, Germany, 
Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). They provide substantial variation between 
one another as well as allow for within-case analysis for the selected time frame 1960-2014.  
This time frame is selected based on the beginning of transnational terrorism. This period also 
extends the time frame of the quantitative analysis (1970-2012) presented in Chapter 4 due to 
additional data availability for qualitative analysis. Additionally, historical process tracing does 
require background information preceding the 1960-2014 time frame if it is pertinent to 
explaining the presence or absence of terrorist sanctuaries. 
 The four countries selected present both positive and negative experiences with the 
presence of terrorist sanctuaries.  However, these four cases do not represent “extreme cases” 
that have been extensively discussed in the literature on failed states and terrorist sanctuaries.  
Choosing only extreme cases, which would include Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen in this 
study, limits the ability to generalize findings which has been a pitfall to the study of sanctuaries. 
In fact, “selecting extreme cases on the dependent variable leads the analyst to focus on cases 
that, in predictable ways, produce biased estimates of causal effects” (Collier and Mahoney 
1996, 59).  Instead, to produce variation, these cases were selected with background knowledge 
of some presence of the dependent variable, terrorist sanctuaries (Collier and Mahoney 1996).  
The variation in histories, location, population size, ethnic and religious heterogeneity, and 
political and economic development allow a thorough review of state-society interactions in 
terrorist sanctuaries. The time frame also allows sufficient variation to explore each of the 
temporal trends in transnational terrorism from the left-wing movements of the 1960s and 1980s 
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to the religious terrorism movements of the 1980s through 2014.  Some societies also 
experienced a rise in right-wing terrorism during the latter time frame. Taken together, this 
represents a most different system design.   
The positive cases, those that have hosted terrorist organizations, are presented in the 
United States, Germany, and Iraq.  The Democratic Republic of Congo is the negative case after 
1965. The United States and Iraq also present within-case analysis, which highlights the shift 
from a qualified negative case in Iraq to a positive one, and a positive case in the United States 
transitioning to a qualified negative one after 2001. Therefore, this case selection moves beyond 
the limited studies in the field and presents a sample of varying experiences with regard to 
terrorist sanctuaries. 
 5.2.1 United States 
A variety of terrorist organizations have operated in the United States since 1968 with the 
ability to organize, plan, finance, and train.  Most notably, the United States played a role in 
providing sanctuary for planning al Qaeda’s 9/11 attack.  The 9/11 hijackers not only used U.S. 
soil as a staging ground for the attack, but exploited security gaps for more than a year prior to 
achieve the necessary flight training.  Prior to the 9/11 hijackers, the United States acted as a 
sanctuary for fundamentalist Islamic terrorist groups in various capacities since the 1980s (see 
Gunaratna 2002). Furthermore, the U.S. hosted the hub for the global right-wing pan Aryan 
terrorist movement throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The United States represents a case in 
which terrorist organizations use civil liberties within a democratic society to conduct necessary 
planning and financing. The Weather Underground left-wing communist terror group also 
operated in the United States for nearly a decade (Sprinzak 1998).  The United States does not fit 
the failed state-terrorist sanctuary model but has consistently provided sanctuary to right-wing, 
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left-wing, and religious transnational terror groups.  However, since 9/11 the U.S. has 
experienced little activity associated with terrorist sanctuaries, which marks a dramatic shift from 
the previous four decades.   
In light of the dramatic shift from several established terrorist sanctuaries within the 
United States prior to 9/11 to a qualified sanctuary,75 the United States presents an important 
case for review.  A careful analysis of this process prior to 9/11 and the subsequent elimination 
of those posing a threat to the U.S. homeland presents both a positive case (prior to 9/11) and a 
qualified negative case after 9/11. 
 5.2.2 Germany 
Following the September 11th terror attacks Germany received a great deal of attention 
for hosting the al Qaeda node, the “Hamburg Cell,” which conducted planning for the attacks in 
the United States.  Operating under the protection of civil liberties, the Hamburg Cell was able to 
acquire credentials to enter the U.S. through an unsuspecting transit point (Gunaratna 2002).  
However, Germany’s relationship to transnational terrorist movements did not begin with the 
Hamburg Cell.  During the left-wing movement of the 1960s and 1970s, the Baader-Meinhof 
Gang or Red Army Faction gained notoriety throughout the world. Baader-Meinhof’s 
relationship to other like-minded groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP) were also made clear through a spectacular airline hijacking (Hoffman 2006; Alexander 
2006).   
In the years since 9/11 Germany has increasingly countered terrorist sanctuaries within its 
borders.  However, the presence of terrorist sanctuaries attracts less media attention outside of 
                                                 
75 Two groups “Animal Liberation Front” and “Earth Liberation Front” are commonly referred to as one group or 
ideological movement “ALF/ELF” (see Stewart 2010).  The movement relies on lone actors to carry out inspired 
attacks.  The ALF and ELF has not been directly attributed to deaths (START 2013), but instead targets inanimate 
objects such as research facilities (Hoffman 2006). 
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Germany as the array of organizations in operation do not conduct attacks there.  Germany 
presents a positive terrorist sanctuary case as it has traditionally provided sanctuary to left-wing 
and right-wing terror groups, but has also dramatically shifted toward hosting as many as three 
distinct religious-inspired terrorist organizations at a given time from 2001 to 2014. 
 5.2.3 Iraq 
Iraq’s relationship to terrorist organizations has been a source of contention since the 
U.S. led intervention in 2003.  While Iraq was consistently labeled a state sponsor of terrorism 
for Palestinian separatist groups, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and Mujahedeen-e-Khalq 
(MEK) prior to the U.S. led invasion, its relationship to transnational movements is less clear.  
Although each had Marxist leaning views, PKK and MEK represent nationalist/separatist groups 
first and foremost, targeting Turkey and Iran.  Saddam Hussein had the power to decide what 
groups to support and reject, thus used these groups as a form of foreign policy to destabilize 
neighbors (Byman 2005).   
Until 2001, Iraq illustrates a negative case for the presence of transnational terrorist 
sanctuaries.  A domestic group with a fundamentalist Islamic beliefs began to form throughout 
the 1990s, which ultimately led to the formation of a small node in northern Iraq with ties to the 
wider transnational terrorist movement.  This group subsequently provided sanctuary for the 
group that became al Qaeda Iraq (AQI) in 2004.  Therefore, Iraq’s relationship with transnational 
terrorism both before and after the fall of Saddam Hussein provides a within case analysis of the 
presence and absence of a transnational terrorist sanctuary. 
 5.2.4 Democratic Republic of Congo 
The Democratic Republic of Congo presents a negative case for transnational terrorist 
sanctuaries.  The absence of a terrorist sanctuary in one of the most failed states in the world has 
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been casually mentioned in the literature but there has been no clear analysis on why this case 
differs from other failed states (see Arsenault and Bacon 2015).  Mahoney and Goertz (2004) 
note that negative cases should be selected based on the “possibility principle.” In short, the 
outcome being studied here, terrorist sanctuaries, must be possible.  For the negative case to be 
relevant to a research design, some independent variables being studied must be present, known 
as the “rule of inclusion.”  Meanwhile, the “rule of exclusion” states that “cases are irrelevant if 
their value on any eliminatory independent variable predicts the non-occurrence of the outcome 
of interest” (658). 
The reason the Democratic Republic of Congo is particularly useful negative case is the 
presence of nearly every explanatory variable mentioned in the terrorist sanctuary literature: 
geographic constraints, a weak state, corruption, transitioning democracy, history of civil war, 
ethnic fractionalization, poverty, informal economy, and lootable precious gems.  Therefore, an 
in-depth analysis at the Democratic Republic of Congo’s state-society interactions is critical. 
 To be clear, since 2005, Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has been known 
to operate in portions of Central African Republic, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, since being pushed to the borders of Uganda.  Joseph Kony does not proscribe to any 
transnational movement or have any base of support.  His goal is to overthrow the Ugandan 
government in order to implement rule based on a fundamentalist version of Christianity.  
Kony’s organization, similar to a cult, is not based on voluntary membership, but a small group 
of loyal individuals who kidnap children and force them into militancy under the threat of death.  
The LRA uses the geographic constraint of dense jungles to evade capture and primarily operates 
in the Central African Republic (U.S., Department of State 2012). 
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In the following four chapters, each of these cases will be examined through process-
tracing using “critical antecedents” and “critical junctures” (Slater and Simmons 2010) in order 
to answer the questions specified above regarding state-society interactions.  The next chapters 




The United States Chapter 6 - 
 6.1 Introduction 
 Less than 12 hours after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States 
President George W. Bush declared, “We will make no distinction between those who 
committed these acts and those who harbor them… Our country is strong. A great people have 
been moved to defend a great nation” (cited in Rhem 2001).  The 9/11 attacks shocked the 
American people and illustrated that the global superpower’s homeland security was vulnerable. 
In reality, the intelligence community was aware of a significant terrorist threat on U.S. soil that 
likely involved an airline hijacking, but the U.S. security apparatus was restricted in its ability to 
effectively counter the threat. These domestic limitations placed upon the state originated 
through the country’s founding philosophy and are entrenched in the relationship between the 
state and society.   
The basis for a strong society in the United States is similar to other strong societies 
throughout the world that challenge the authority of the centralized state.  The nationalist 
rebellion that led to the American Revolution rejected the legitimacy and authority of Britain’s 
King George III. The basis of the rebellion was a rejection of predatory taxation that challenged 
colonial society’s status quo.  The Declaration of Independence in July 1776 articulated the 
beliefs of societal strongmen in colonial America, who ranged from merchants to religious 
leaders.  The Declaration served to promote principles that united the colonists against the 
British monarchy, which attempted to rule the American colony without the consent of society.  
In essence, the Declaration of Independence created a national identity not based on a territory, 
heritage, shared language or ethnicity, but on a political doctrine (Diamond 1981).  
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The concept of personal liberty and the limited role of the state in society were later 
enunciated in the United States Constitution through the federalist system and the Bill of Rights. 
In short, the founding documents of the United States institutionalized the belief that legitimate 
government should be constrained by society and exists to secure the public good and private 
rights of individuals.  Thus, the strength of the state is determined by the majority’s perception of 
its needs in order to protect life, liberty, and opportunity (Diamond 1981).  This principle stresses 
the role of the state and society in shaping one another. 
The strength of the United States as a powerful actor in international affairs is distinct 
from its power within American society.  Society has traditionally rejected the authority of the 
state’s rule-making capacity in a variety of contexts (see Lipset 1996). Although the state’s 
capacity to regulate many social behaviors is relatively weak vis-à-vis society, it has maintained 
the physical infrastructure to penetrate and extract from society in order to collect taxes and 
facilitate the delivery of public goods.  
The state’s inherent domestic security weakness is illustrated by the number of terrorist 
organizations that have maintained sanctuaries on U.S. soil. The United States represents a 
society in which nearly every type of terrorist organization existed in varying capacities during 
the 20th century, but were swiftly expelled in the months following the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks.  The state’s role in society has been altered over time through domestic and 
global forces, but state-society interactions shifted dramatically in the post 9/11 era because the 
state gained penetrative capacity through the consent of the people. 
The United States has a long history of domestic terrorism since the Civil War, but the 
U.S. has also hosted a variety of transnational terrorist movements ranging from the Weather 
Underground left-wing communist nodes from 1969 until 1977, a hub for the right-wing 
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transnational Neo-Nazi movement from 1993 until 1999, a hub for the Pakistani based Jammat ul 
Fuqara Islamic movement beginning in 1980, as well as fundraising and recruitment nodes for 
Hezbollah and al Qaeda at different points between 1985 and 2002.  The presence of each of 
these movements and their respective longevity in the United States can be explained through the 
power of the state to expel these groups, derived from the societal attitudes toward the respective 
movement’s ideology.   
The following analysis will provide the process by which each of these transnational 
terrorist movements established and maintained a presence in the United States.  First, this 
chapter explains the history of state-society interactions in the U.S.  Second is a review of the 
ideological basis and ultimate rejection of left-wing terror nodes.  The third section focuses on 
the historical roots of right-wing terrorism in the United States, which allowed the rise of an 
organized transnational movement.  Finally, this chapter will trace the process through which 
fundamentalist Islamic ideology was established in the U.S. and the subsequent sustained effort 
by the state and society to reject it.  A summary and brief discussion follow. 
 6.2 State-Society Interactions in the United States 
The British colonial experience provided the foundation for state-society interactions in 
the United States. Much like other British colonies, societal actors consolidated power to reject 
colonial authority.  The strong society in the United States did not disappear after the American 
Revolution, but rather institutionalized its strength through the Constitution.  American society 
has played a pivotal role in constantly interacting with the state to formulate policies that reflect 
the will of the people. American society’s multicultural image differs from many mature 
democracies in the extent of polarizing cross-currents and attitudes toward the state’s authority.  
These cross currents include high levels of gender inequality relative to other mature 
94 
 
democracies but is most pronounced in the ethnic and religious divisions within American 
society (United Nations Index 2006-2012; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). 
In all societies,76 the arena outside the state organizes into collective ethnic, religious, 
political and economic groups based on the history and legacy of the state and society (see 
Malena and Heinrich 2007). Similar to other strong societies, the often contentious relationship 
between state and society in the U.S. was determined in the early stages of the formation of the 
state through a legacy of power struggles and mistrust of centralized authority.  However, the 
United States stands apart from other strong societies in today’s “failed states” in its ability to 
evolve from revolution and independence to a legitimate representative polity in a relatively 
short amount of time (Lipset 1996).  
Societal “strongmen” in the U.S. include business leaders, civil liberties groups, religious 
leaders, and a variety of powerful special interest groups that possess significant authority and a 
direct impact on the policies pursued by the state, which include counter-terrorism policies. 
Gilens and Page (2014) find support for the idea that business and economic interests in the 
United States have a significant impact on policy-making, much more than individual citizens or 
even many interest groups, although business interests often overlap with the interests of other 
societal groups.  Powerful social actors do not rise to prominence without a base of support.  
Instead, they represent the beliefs of major portions of the population.  
Drawing from Alexis de Tocqueville’s writings, Lipset (1996)77 provides an analysis of 
the many reasons American society differs from other democracies in its ability to consistently 
challenge the rule making authority of the state while maintaining a stable democracy and 
                                                 
76 Malena and Heinrich (2007) note that all non-totalitarian societies organize into groupings. 
 
77 The term “American Exceptionalism” draws from Tocqueville’s writings and is not intended to mean that 
America is “better” or has a “superior culture” (as it is sometimes assumed).  Rather, exceptionalism here means 
“qualitatively different from all other countries,” specifically European polities (Lipset 1996, 18). 
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considerable strength in the international arena. Despite numerous cleavages, a collective 
identity remains in American society that Lipset (1996) calls “The American Creed.” The 
collective belief system is based on “liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and 
laissez-faire” (19).  These ideas comprise the “political religion”78 of the United States and guide 
the decision-making process for what society accepts and rejects from the state. 
Americans generally believe that the state has legitimacy to make and enforce laws, so 
long as the laws represent and protect this general philosophy.  Societal actors, notably special 
interest groups and business elites, challenge the state’s authority in order to preserve civil 
liberties and the status quo.  While social actors in capitalist democracies in Europe, Canada, and 
Japan, also influence law and policy-making, the state-society interactions place “greater 
emphasis on obedience to political authority and deference to superiors” (Lipset 1996, 19).  In 
contrast, the Constitutional governing structure in the U.S. is much more decentralized and 
facilitates stronger challenges to state authority (Lipset 1996, 18-21).79 Also unique to the United 
States is the clear rejection of re-distribution social policies common throughout Europe.  This 
rejection is based on the general belief that the American system is fair and open so “if someone 
is poor it is his or her own fault” while Europeans tend to feel that welfare recipients are 
                                                 
78 Political religion is the idea elucidated in Lincoln’s Lyceum address on January 27, 1838 stating in part, “I know 
the American People are much attached to their Government;--I know they would suffer much for its sake;--I know 
they would endure evils long and patiently, before they would ever think of exchanging it for another. Yet, 
notwithstanding all this, if the laws be continually despised and disregarded, if their rights to be secure in their 
persons and property, are held by no better tenure than the caprice of a mob, the alienation of their affections from 
the Government is the natural consequence; and to that, sooner or later, it must come.  Let every American, every 
lover of liberty, every well wisher to his posterity, swear by the blood of the Revolution, never to violate in the least 
particular, the laws of the country; and never to tolerate their violation by others…let every man remember that to 
violate the law, is to trample on the blood of his father, and to tear the character of his own, and his children's 
liberty…And, in short, let it become the political religion of the nation.”  Summarized in part from Abraham 
Lincoln’s Speech “The perpetuation of our political institutions" given at the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, 
Illinois, January 27, 1838. Retrieved from http://www.constitution.org/lincoln/lyceum.htm 
 
79 Tocqueville’s writings note that American society is much more decentralized that what he experienced in France 
and other European societies commenting that “he had never given much thought to what centralization in French 
meant since as a Frenchman, he did what came naturally” (Lipset 1996, 18; see also Pierson 1969). 
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“unfortunate” (Alesina, Glaeser, Sacerdote 2006, 165). Alesina, Glaeser, Sacerdote (2006) 
further argue that the rejection of re-distribution policies in the United States appears to be linked 
to racial tensions within society and the over-representation of ethnic minorities among the poor.  
Americans do engage in the private provision of welfare to a greater extent than Europeans 
through charitable donations and volunteering, thus, society does not reject the idea of charity 
but rejects the authority of the state to carry out redistribution policies.   
In short, American society generally believes that democracy and capitalism provide an 
environment in which individuals can and should determine their own destiny.80  The state’s role 
in society, therefore, is determined by its ability to facilitate market access and the protection of 
basic rights and security for society.  A comparison of European democracies to the United 
States highlights “monumental differences in the history and geography of the two regions, such 
as the Civil War and the open frontier in the United States during the 19th century, which 
contributed to create a different climate and different attitudes toward the relationship between 
the individual and the state” (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2006, 165).  
  In the decades leading up to the Civil War, the abolitionist movement increasingly gained 
momentum, creating a cleavage between the North and South.  Abolitionist thought spread 
through individuals, religious leaders, and churches in the North.  This social force and the 
passage of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law (Foner 2015) sparked the rise of public lynchings that 
were widely accepted in the South as a legitimate form of rebellion against those seeking to 
challenge the status quo. The South’s view of slavery as an economic good, protected through 
                                                 
80 Lipset (1996) argues that Americans are faced with a dilemma when it comes to race and gender inequality and 
individualism.  Based on Gallup polling, the debate over affirmative action in the 1990s illustrates that Americans 
when faced with one or the other, will choose individualism over egalitarianism.  In short, while affirmative action 
policies may be needed to produce egalitarianism after a century of racial or gender discriminatory policies, 
Americans largely disagree with affirmative action policies, not on the grounds of favoring discrimination, but on 
the preference for individualism. 
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states’ rights in the Constitution, conflicted with the federal government’s Constitutional right to 
grant legal citizenship and the afforded protections of citizenship. The Confederacy’s rebellion 
against this shift in the status quo continued well after the end of the American Civil War and 
Reconstruction. The resistance movement against racial integration in the South was organized 
through the formation of the Ku Klux Klan81 in Pulaski, Tennessee in June 1866 (M. Miller 
2013), a domestic terrorist organization that remains a part of American society today. 
The open frontier in the West is also central to state-society relations in the United States. 
Mountains, deserts, and forests are notable geographic constraints for state penetration, but this 
also relates to the formation of social groupings and vigilante justice bands that governed 
society.  Comparable to the “warlords” in the developing world that exist today, vigilante justice 
in the West provided law and order in the absence of a state governing authority.  The ideal of 
the American West, rejecting authority and taking matters into one’s own hands, still exists in 
American society today. In fact, this image has deep societal roots solidified through the 
popularity of “Westerns” on radio, television, in movies, and books since about 1900 (Wright 
2001).  Most recently, this vigilante justice has appeared in American society due to the porous 
southern border, illegal immigration, and drug smuggling where right-wing militia groups from 
across the United States collected in August 2014 to patrol Arizona’s Sonoran Desert.  However, 
many Arizonians are not accepting of the right-wing militia movements and encourage the U.S. 
Customs and Border Patrol, not vigilante justice groups, to increase a presence on the border to 
establish security (Wasu 2014). 
                                                 
81 The Ku Klux Klan’s name is derived from the Greek word “kuklos,” meaning group, circle, or band. A judicial 
official in Pulaski, Tennessee named Thomas Jones organized the secret group with five Confederate veterans and 
the help of the editor of the local newspaper. The Reconstruction Act being debated in 1966 (passed the following 
year) forced states in the South to organize state and local governments with constitutions “consented to by both 
races” so Jones’s organization sought to organize white Southerners against the “black threat to their political 
hierarchy being imposed from Washington” (M. Miller 2013, 150-151). 
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The state is not powerless, but derives its authority from society to carry out these 
intended tasks of facilitating the delivery of public goods.   Since its formation, state authorities 
have frequently exerted authority to counter any perceived domestic threats to state legitimacy.  
The targets of state authority, beginning with Native Americans, have traditionally been the 
marginalized groups that did not hold any significant rule-making authority and perceived as 
threats to the status quo by powerful societal actors (M. Miller 2013).  Simply put, societal actors 
do not always reject state authority in society but instead have the power to determine how the 
state should pursue policies that support the wishes of societal actors.   
As the examples of the American West and the Civil War in the South point out, right-
wing ideology has a historical basis in American society.  In contrast, the left-wing communist 
movement in the 1970s and the Islamic jihadist movement after 9/11, sparked a concerted effort 
by society to reject these ideologies because there is not a significant base of support for these 
beliefs. Societal groups pressure the state to pursue terrorist organizations if the group or 
movement is considered a threat to society’s way of life or status quo. 
In the years leading up to the September 11th attacks, actors throughout the U.S. 
government knew the homeland was facing an imminent attack.  However, efforts to implement 
meaningful counterterrorism policies were rejected by societal groups and Congress. Through 
the end of the 1990s, the U.S. government supported international efforts to counter terrorist 
financing and increase intelligence sharing among allies, but the state lacked the capacity to 
implement comprehensive domestic policy changes (Clunan 2006).  In response to the 
coordinated August 7, 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the USS Cole 
bombing of the coast of Yemen on October 12, 2000, the U.S. government increased weapons of 
mass destruction terrorist attack response planning for first responders (Alexander 2006) and 
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continued to take a hard line stance against terrorism abroad (Pillar 2001).82 However, the state 
failed to implement domestic counter-terrorism policies that expanded upon the 1996 Anti-
Terrorism Act put in place after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing (Alexander 2006).   
In fact, mechanisms to counter terrorist financing were forcefully rejected by financial 
interests, the Americans for Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and subsequently Congress in 1999.  
On December 7, 1998, the Treasury Department and financial regulators from the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) proposed “Know Your Customer” laws requiring banks 
to verify the owner of an account, the sources of funds flowing through the account, and better 
regulations for the “informal financial sector” of money remitters. The law determined that 
financial institutions should profile customers and determine “normal” financial activity and 
report suspicious activity to an Internal Revenue Service database that could be accessed by 
multiple federal agencies (National Center for Policy Analysis 1999).  A few months after the 
proposed regulation, the FDIC website received 70,000 mostly negative comments from business 
interests, privacy advocates, and the general public.  These groups understood the purpose of the 
law was to target criminal activity, individuals overwhelmingly acknowledged that the law 
would help law enforcement counter criminal activity83, but these concerned citizens still 
rejected the proposal for various reasons (National Center for Policy Analysis 1999). The role of 
the Internal Revenue Service in the law’s implementation was likely a strong motivator for 
collective action from the general public.  The IRS is consistently ranked one of the most 
                                                 
82 1996 and 1998 Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act passed as part of the National Defense 
Authorization (Alexander 2006). 
 
83 Only 5% believed that the law would have not have an effect on countering crime.  The reasons individuals 
rejected the law were mostly based on general privacy concerns, with some explicitly stating they did not want the 
federal government to have access to the information (National Center for Policy Analysis 1999).  
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disliked U.S. government agencies.  As Sloan (2013) succinctly states, “Hating the IRS is an 
American pastime that transcends political affiliation.” 
The banking sector was specifically outraged by the consequences of the proposed law as 
it would impose costs on businesses, have an adverse effect on business, and violate privacy. The 
Know Your Customer (KYC) regulations created such dissent that the regulations were not 
implemented and Congress even considered loosening restrictions already in place on wire 
transfers. A firestorm of proposed legislation introduced various ways to dismantle existing 
banking regulations84 and some sought to ban financial regulators from attempting to implement 
similar regulations in the future (National Center for Policy Analysis 1999; Clunan 2006).85  As 
Clunan notes, “The banking industry successfully defeated Treasury’s initial attempts to specify 
exactly what information must be collected on wire transfers.  This essentially eliminated the 
creation of standardized records, significantly impairing the efficiency and speed with which law 
enforcement could access such information” (2006, 586). 
In response to the growing awareness that the U.S. was at risk of a terrorist attack, the 
Clinton administration and members of Congress organized two independent commissions in 
1999 to study the terrorist threat and potential responses. In the year leading up to the September 
11th attacks, the Rudman-Hart and Bremer Commissions released reports that emphasized a 
significant threat to the U.S. homeland from terrorist organizations abroad (Alexander 2006).   
                                                 
84 Proposed wire transfer and bank privacy legislation, 106th Congress, is available at: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/?&Db=d106&querybd=@FIELD%28FLD001+@4%28Financial+institutions %29%29 
 
85 HR 575 proposed on February 4, 1999 bill summarized the dissent from Congress. “Know Your Customer 
Regulations Termination Act prohibits certain proposed "know your customer" regulations published in the Federal 
Register on December 7, 1998, by the Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation from being 
published in final form. Terminates any such regulation that has become effective before enactment of this Act. 




The Bremer Commission report generally sounded an alarm on the threat of transnational 
terrorism and the need for increased funding and coordination between agencies.  The Rudman-
Hart Commission report attracted more scrutiny for its specific recommendation to form a 
“Homeland Security Agency,” as a separate cabinet-level agency that would focus on counter-
terrorism threats inside the United States. Furthermore, the new proposed agency would include 
a redesign of the National Guard with U.S. based troops used to combat threats to the homeland 
(Alexander 2006).  The National Guard rejected this proposal on the grounds that it would 
redefine the mission of the organization and members of the Senate Judiciary Committee added 
that the proposal likely violated domestic legal constraints.  Moreover, the Judiciary Committee 
noted the difficulty in convincing the American people that national security restructuring was in 
the best interest of the country (U.S. Congress, 2001). 
Senators Rudman and Hart’s testimony in a Judiciary Committee hearing on April 3, 
2001 stressed the extreme decentralization of the United States’ national security apparatus and 
the threat this weakness posed. In the transcript of this hearing Senator Dianne Feinstein also 
cites two previous Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that illustrate known 
problems in the intelligence structure, such as the failure of federal, state, and local agencies to 
agree on a chain of command in the event of a terrorist attack.  Furthermore, the second GAO 
report found that comparing the U.S. structure with Israel, France, Germany, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom, only the United States did not have an established hierarchy of control in the 
event of terrorist attacks.  In contrast to other Western democracies, counter-terrorism efforts 
were spread out over at least 45 U.S. agencies that lacked coordination in preventing or 
responding to an attack (U.S. Congress 2001).   
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Senator Feinstein acknowledged the need for stronger organization in the security 
apparatus, but articulated a number of concerns regarding the proposed Homeland Security 
Agency.  Specifically, changes proposed by the Rudman-Hart Commission likely violated the 
1876 Posse Comitatus Act that rejects the use of military for domestic peacekeeping.86  Feinstein 
also noted that even the name of the proposed Homeland Security agency “has a certain Third 
Reich tinge to it”87 (U.S. Congress 2001, 16). The following exchange from the April 2001 
hearing indicates a defined friction in state-society interactions with regard to domestic security: 
Senator Feinstein: My big concern is that I’ve had a really hard time getting the American people to take 
terrorism seriously.  Our national identity is not protectionist.  It’s to be open: everybody visits, 
everybody comes, everybody goes, and nobody wants to worry about whether documents are counterfeit-
proof.  We also get into this in other areas with green cards and things, there’s a horror where people are 
worried about national identification cards.  So I think there’s a fine line that this agency would have to 
tread to avoid giving goose-bumps to the American people. 
 
Senator Hart: We had the same problem throughout the Cold War, at the beginning and throughout, and 
that was the division in this country, as to how big the threat was, how real it was. You know, I suppose it 
divided us in a way, all the way up to the fall of the wall.  There was resistance in creating a Department 
of Defense at all, and certainly a resistance to creating a permanent intelligence agency.  People resisted 
that on civil liberties grounds and so forth.  I think that struggle, that tension in American society 
continued throughout the--- 
 
Senator Feinstein: But the American people don’t have the ability to have a classified briefing on terrorist 
cells in this country, and once you’ve had that briefing, you can’t really discuss it with them, either.  
Therefore, how you can get national support for a homeland security agency is of great interest to me. 
 
Senator Hart: There’s only one person that can do that, and that’s the commander in chief, the President 
of the United States.   
 
Senator Rudman: There’s no question in my mind that you focus in on an extraordinarily difficult subject 
for anyone in public office, and that is, how do you convince the American people that the year 2001 is 
very different than the years past, that there are people who cannot assault us in a conventional military 
way, and that they would like to find a way that was asymmetrical, nonconventional, to hurt us.  Some 
people who are experts in the field, academics and others, have said to us you will never have people 
understand it until it happens.  That’s a horrible thought…..We are talking about a major blow against a 
major American city, and we think this government ought to look at it very closely (U.S. Senate 2001, 
21). 
                                                 
86 Senator Feinstein adds that “curiously enough” the Posse Comitatus Act was passed in the wake of a highly 
contested national election, referencing the recent 2000 Presidential election, and likely indicating that the American 
people may find this suspicious (14). 
 
87 The Senator subsequently notes, “I wonder what kind of criticism will come from that kind of analysis” (14). 
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Senator Feinstein’s observation of the American people’s attitudes toward the role of the 
state in regulating private behavior accurately summarizes the tradition of state-society 
interactions in the United States.  Despite mounting evidence that the U.S. homeland was at risk 
of an attack, the state was unable to implement policies to centralize the intelligence agencies 
and address these concerns.  This dialogue also illustrates that the state prior to 9/11 was 
considerably weaker than other developed Western democracies in its ability to get society to 
acquiesce centralized power to the state.  In short, the state was aware that its power in this realm 
could not overcome societal dissent and that an extraordinary terrorist attack would likely be the 
only event that could shift this balance.   
States need authority to be fully effective in delivering public goods because ineffective 
states become illegitimate states in the minds of its people.  Despite the extraordinary 
decentralization of the security apparatus in the United States, law enforcement efforts did 
manage to come somewhat close to uncovering the 9/11 terrorist plot.  The United States prior to 
9/11 illustrates how a weak state security apparatus and a strong society presents an opening for 
terrorist hubs and nodes within its borders (see Alexander 2006).   
State-society interactions have been transformed since the September 11, 2001 terror 
attacks and transnational terrorist groups have largely been eradicated from the U.S.  However, 
the United States caught many of the preceding “waves” of transnational terrorism that did not 
generate the same strong reaction from society experienced after 9/11.  In fact, the United States 
still possesses one of the oldest domestic terror groups, the KKK which was founded for a 
specific purpose, place, and time.  The KKK does not have international “emulators” and is not 
considered part of a global movement (Rapoport 2004, 47) but it does highlight American 
society’s tolerance for certain types of violence.  The extent of KKK’s influence and longevity 
104 
 
after Reconstruction relates to how the state and society interpreted the subsequent right-wing 
global ideological wave of the late 20th century, but in itself, the KKK’s ideology was not 
adapted to create a transnational movement.   
Rapoport (2004) describes the global waves of terrorism in the 20th century as those 
influenced by anarchists, anticolonial struggles88, left-wing communist ideology, and right-
wing/religious ideologies. Unlike European counterparts, the U.S. did not experience a notable 
anarchist “wave”89 but anarchist beliefs appear in various forms through right-wing terrorism 
(START 2008). Right-wing beliefs (fundamentalist Christian patriotism and neo-Nazi 
movements) further coincide and overlap with those of the fundamentalist Islamic religious 
movement that began in the 1980s. Therefore, the U.S. experience with transnational terrorism 
began with the left-wing ideological movement of the 1960s and 1970s (Rapoport 2004; 
Hoffman 2006).  
 6.3 The State in Society: Left-wing Terrorist Nodes 
American society has traditionally accepted the expansion of corporate power, aside from 
the left-wing movement of the 1960s and 1970s and the short-lived 2011 “Occupy Wall Street” 
movement.90  In both of these instances, the state security apparatus infiltrated the organizations 
and challenged the ability to operate (Cunningham 2004; Moynihan 2014).  American society 
has largely rejected the re-distribution policies of the European style welfare state in favor of 
                                                 
88 The U.S. experienced a nationalist anticolonial wave from the Puerto Rican independence movement in the 1960s 
(START 2008) that was interwoven among the other domestic social movements of the 1960s.   
 
89 Anarchist beliefs have influenced subsequent waves of transnational terrorism in the 20th century, such as left-
wing movements in Greece, Germany, and Italy. 
 
90 The Occupy Wall Street Movement peaked between September and November 2011. 
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supporting laissez faire economic policies.91  Movements or policies deemed too state-centric are 
heavily contested by society generally, but by business or corporate interests specifically.  As a 
consequence, the transnational left-wing communist movement of the 1960s and 1970s achieved 
limited support in the United States.  The base of support was mainly in the context of the 
unpopular Vietnam War, as the anti-war movement and left-wing movement intermixed.  
Both the Socialist and Communist movements in the United States began in the early 20th 
century as political parties.  The Socialist Party in the United States grew from the labor 
movement led by Eugene Debs, the party’s most notable leader. Debs gained political popularity 
in Indiana and the industrial northeast through his organization of labor strikes.  On the national 
stage, he gained a following through a series of Presidential campaigns from 1900-1920.92  In 
1920, while in prison for sedition, he received 915,000 votes (or 3%), the most of any previous 
attempts by Debs.  However, he died in 1924, three years after being released from prison.  
Despite subsequent success in the labor rights movement, the Socialist Party was never able to 
maintain or grow its base without the personal appeal of Debs (Britannica 2014).  
The Communist Party in the United States was founded in 1919 in the midst of 
weakening Socialist Party power to champion the progressive causes of the labor rights 
movement and gender and racial inequality. The communist movement never gained enough 
popularity that it could selectively choose members to unite the dozens of splinter organizations 
that were collectively referred to as Communist Party-USA. Even during the Depression, the 
Communist Party was preoccupied with retaining its members, so as an organization it was 
                                                 
91 Most recently, the Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission (2010) ruling established a Constitutional 
protection for corporate interests in American politics as the decision established that “political speech is 
indispensable to a democracy, which is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation” (Cornell Law 
2010). 
 




unable to withstand the post-World War II era (Klehr 1978; 1984).   Although still in existence, 
membership of Communist Party-USA peaked in 1948 at 80,000 dwindling to less than 3,000 by 
1971 (Churchill and Vander Wall 2002).  
The existence of the Communist Party was controversial enough that it sparked Senator 
Joseph McCarthy’s 1950 campaign against the suspected communists, which was carried on by 
the FBI’s Director J. Edgar Hoover after McCarthy was censured by the Senate on December 2, 
1954 for overstepping his Senatorial authority (Butler and Wolff 1995).  In the context of the 
Cold War, Hoover pursued any group perceived as socialist or communist leaning, which 
included the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam anti-war movement under the counter-
intelligence program known as “COINTELPRO” (Churchill and Vander Wall 2002).   
COINTELPRO under Hoover, who served as FBI Director until 1971, began surveillance 
through wiretapping, infiltration, and instigating distrust among Communist Party-USA 
members in 1956.  The same strategy was followed to challenge the Puerto Rican independence 
movement in 1960, the Socialist Party in 1961, the Civil Rights Movement in 1963, the KKK or 
White Hate Groups in 1964, the Black Panthers or Black Nationalist Hate Groups in 1968, and 
the “New Left” and Vietnam anti-war movement in 1968.  The New Left COINTELPRO 
program was extensive, as it was a large student organization that combined elements of 
socialism, black nationalist groups, and the anti-war movement (Church and Vander Wall 2002; 
Stone 2002; Cunningham 2004).  
COINTELPRO is thought to have been organized and carried out by Director Hoover 
without the consent of the President or Attorney General, but the Church Committee 
investigation in 1975 (U.S. Senate 1976) reveals a near unprecedented level of overreach by the 
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state93 (see Stone 2004; Churchill and Vander Wall 2002).  To be clear, while the state’s reach 
into society attempted to disrupt various social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, the influence 
of the communist ideology in American society was inflated by both the state and the terrorist 
group that emerged from it. 
The only prominent terrorist group associated with the transnational left-wing movement 
in the United States was Weather Underground, a radical, violent offshoot of the anti-war 
movement Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). SDS was founded on the campus of the 
University of Michigan in May 1960 by student activists Al Haber and Tom Hayden94 to 
promote social democracy and non-violent protest in support of the Civil Rights Movement 
(Stone 2004, 434; Cunningham 2004), rather than to pursue communist revolutionary goals 
(Sprinzak 1998; START 2008).   
Students for a Democratic Society held its first conference in June 1962 in Port Huron, 
Michigan, where the group outlined its “Statement” or principles for participatory democracy, 
which quickly expanded the group from a University of Michigan campus organization to a 
social movement (Davis 1997). The “New Left” movement was a mixture of the various social 
movements but explicitly distanced itself from the “Old Left” Socialist and Communist political 
parties. Most of the New Left wished to shift from the idea of revolution to evolution within the 
U.S. political system.  However, a radical faction of the New Left did not believe that the Old 
                                                 
93 In 1975 Congressman Don Edwards stated, “Regardless of the unattractiveness or noisy militancy of some private 
citizens or organizations, the Constitution does not permit federal interference with their activities except through 
the criminal justice system, armed with its ancient safeguards. There are no exceptions. No federal agency, the CIA, 
the IRS, or the FBI, can be at the same time policeman, prosecutor, judge and jury. That is what constitutionally 
guaranteed due process is all about. It may sometimes be disorderly and unsatisfactory to some, but it is the essence 
of freedom...I suggest that the philosophy supporting COINTELPRO is the subversive notion that any public 
official, the President or a policeman, possesses a kind of inherent power to set aside the Constitution whenever he 
thinks the public interest, or "national security" warrants it. That notion is postulate of tyranny” (Churchill and 
Vander Wall 2002, x). 
 
94 Tom Hayden later accompanied actress Jane Fonda, another anti-war political activist, on her 1972 Hanoi, North 
Vietnam trip.  The two were married the following year. 
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Left pursued communist goals enough.  Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) was popular 
among middle-class college-aged Americans, boasting a rapid growth from 10,000 in 1965 to 
80,000 in 1968.  SDS was not a violent communist movement, but rather a peaceful leftist, anti-
racist, anti-war movement that promoted political goals closer to the European welfare state 
(Stone 2004: see also Sprinzak 1998).  In fact, the Weather Underground terrorist group 
splintered from SDS because the Weathermen disagreed with its peaceful protest philosophy. 
The group within SDS calling itself the “Action Faction” began its campaign through a 
leftist ideological essay published in the June 1969 SDS Conference newsletter that referenced 
the Bob Dylan lyric, “You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.”95  The 
June 1969 SDS conference in Chicago marked a turning point in the extremist Action Faction 
within Students for a Democratic Society.  The Action Faction or “Weathermen” sought to 
redefine the ideology of SDS from an anti-war college campus protest movement to using 
violence to achieve communist revolutionary goals.  SDS splintered and dissolved months of the 
June 1969 conference over this disagreement (START 2008). Weathermen co-founder Mark 
Rudd (2008) acknowledges that it only took a few individuals with a terrorist mindset to end the 
popular SDS movement,  
“To my eternal shame, I was part of the leadership of Weatherman which scuttled SDS, the 
largest radical student organization in the country, in 1969, at the height of the war.  A small 
group of less than ten people made this suicidal decision believing that with SDS dead we would 
be free to build an underground guerilla army, organized into focos around the country.  Each 
foco, through its exemplary armed actions, propaganda, and contacts with the above-ground 
mass movement, would attract recruits to expand the incipient revolutionary army’s military 
capabilities, Ever Onward to Victory (Hasta la Victoria Siempre)! 
 
From October 8-11, 1969, in conjunction with the anniversary of Che Guevara’s death, 
the Weathermen attempted to spark the communist revolution by kicking off the “Days of Rage” 
                                                 
95 The lyric is in Bob Dylan’s song “Subterranean Homesick Blues” (Columbia Records, 1965). 
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in Chicago with the widespread destruction of private property.  The Days of Rage were rejected 
“en masse” by SDS, but did manage to draw communist radicals, Black Panthers, and anyone 
else who wanted to “fight the pigs” (Rudd 2008).  In late 1969 the group decided to go 
“underground” to plan terrorist attacks, while the “Prairie Fire Organizing Committee” remained 
openly active in society for recruitment and propaganda. Between 1969 and 1970 the 
Weathermen became increasingly violent.  It espoused a clear communist revolutionary message 
and Weathermen leaders Bernardine Dorne and Mark Rudd met with Cuban and North 
Vietnamese representatives (START 2008; Sprinzak 1998; Rudd 2008). As the following table 
illustrates, the group’s activity peaked in the first 15 months of existence (START 2013).  
Chicago, the hometown of founding Weatherman Bill Ayers, served as the primary node for the 
group from 1969-1970, with other nodes in New York and Berkeley, California.  
Table 6.1 Weather Underground Nodes and Activity 
Known Operational Nodes 
  
Chicago (1969-1970); New York 
(1970-75, 1975-81)96; San Francisco, 
Berkeley (1970-80, not active after 
1975)97 
Attacks Attack Target Cities 
 
 
1970 21 New York, Detroit, Washington, Chicago, Philadelphia, 
Santa Barbara, Berkeley, Cambridge 
1971 12 Washington, San Francisco, Sacramento, Albany, New 
York, Boston, Los Angeles 
1972 1 Washington 
1973 3 New York 
1974 3 San Francisco, Pittsburgh, San Leandro 
1975 5 Oakland, Washington, New York, Salt Lake City 
Source: START (2013) 
A series of events led to the demise of the Weather Underground organization and 
ultimately left-wing terrorism in the United States. First, three Weathermen were killed while 
assembling a bomb in Greenwich Village, New York on March 6, 1970.  The bomb that 
                                                 
96 1975-1980 a few members operated as Weathermen splinter organization named May 19th Communist Order. 
 
97 Ayers and Dorne emerged from hiding in the San Francisco area in 1980. 
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detonated was intended for a local Army base social event (Green and Siegal 2002). This was 
considered an embarrassing misstep which led the FBI to vigorously pursue the group (Sprinzak 
1998). Second, in late March 1970 after the Greenwich Village bombing, law enforcement 
uncovered the Chicago node’s stockpile of weapons.  This began the decline of the 
organization’s capabilities (START 2008). In July 1970, thirteen Weathermen were indicted on 
federal charges of conspiring to engage in acts of terrorism (Green and Siegal 2002).   
Little is known about the activities of the group other than the location of their attacks 
after 1970, which correspond to the general areas members were hiding.  Three of the most 
prominent leaders Bernardine Dohrne, Bill Ayers, and Kathy Boudin went into hiding in San 
Francisco but Boudin later appeared in New York. The dispersed Weathermen nodes were likely 
located in the San Francisco and Berkeley areas with a node in New York that remained active 
and attempted to revive the movement (Green and Siegal 2002; START 2013).   
The group’s activity rapidly declined between 1971-1972 as a result of the FBI manhunt 
(Green and Siegal 2002) and the end of any existing passive societal support derived from the 
antiwar movement.  The 1971-1973 time frame corresponds to the drawdown of U.S. forces and 
the signed ceasefire ending the Vietnam War.  The group was assumed to have ceased operations 
in October 1977 (Sprinzak 1998), when co-founder Mark Rudd and member Cathy Wilkerson re-
emerged from hiding.  Co-founder Bill Ayers and Weathermen spokesperson Bernardine Dohrne 
re-emerged in 1980.  Of these, only Wilkerson served prison time and the others received 
probation.  The Weathermen never officially ended the organization, but the unofficial end is 
considered October 20, 1981 when the last remaining leader, Kathy Boudin, was arrested for 
participating in an armed robbery of a Brink’s truck in Nanuet, New York with members of the 
Black Liberation Army (Green and Siegal 2002; START 2013). 
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 When the Weathermen went into hiding, some of the New York affiliated Weathermen 
formed an operational alliance with the Black Liberation Army from 1976-1985 calling itself the 
Revolutionary Armed Task Force (RATF) under the front name “May 19th Communist Order.” 
The RATF had specific domestic aims as it focused on anti-racism and anti-imperialism, arguing 
that the United States was a racist country dominated by military-industrial goals (START 2013; 
START 2008).  The Black Liberation Army did not espouse the same global communist goals as 
the Weathermen, but the coalition carried out fourteen bank robberies and bombings in New 
York and Washington, D.C. (START 2013).  From 1980 to 1985 nearly all members of the 
Black Liberation Army were arrested and convicted of bank robberies and bombings, effectively 
ending any potential revival of the left-wing movement (START 2008; START 2013; Jones and 
Libicki 2008).  
The far left in American society failed to produce a cohesive movement.  From the very 
early years of the Socialist Workers’ Party and Communist Party, there were disagreements over 
ideology and opinions of Stalin’s Soviet Union which fractured the movement (Klehr 1978; 
1984).  The New Left then separated itself from the Socialist Party after forming SDS.  The New 
Left splintered further when the Weathermen formed the violent communist revolutionary 
movement with goals beyond the reforms proposed by SDS (Lipset 1996).   
The FBI’s overreach into the legal activity of leftist movements during this time are well-
documented, but the impact the state had on disrupting the non-violent and violent factions of the 
movement is not the sole reason that the transnational left-wing communist movement ultimately 
failed in the United States.  At its peak of activity in 1970, the Weathermen and subsequent 
faction of the May 19 Communist Order only had few dozen core members and possibly a few 
hundred sympathizers (Jones and Libicki 2008; Sprinzak 1998).  After the Greenwich Village 
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explosion and the elimination of the Chicago node in 1970, the Weathermen had very few 
remaining members from 1971 to 1975 (START 2013).  
Members of the Weathermen mistook the SDS movement as more leftist than it actually 
was and believed that American society was ripe for social revolution, when actually society was 
“unmoved and hostile” by the Weathermen’s actions (Sprinzak 1998). Had the movement been 
popular within society, or had any broad base of support beyond the public’s dissatisfaction with 
the Vietnam War, it would have perhaps survived throughout the 1970s and 1980s as other left 
wing communist movements did throughout the world. As Sprinzak (1998) succinctly explains,  
As a terror underground the Weatherman was a failure.  It did not succeed, as the Red 
Army Faction did in West Germany, to shock an entire country.  It was unable, as the 
Italian Red Brigades were able, to hold up a modern society at gun point.  It never 
recruited more than four hundred followers, and most of the time its inexperienced 
leaders and recruits worried not about the revolution but about their hideouts, survival 
logistics, and internal group relations.  Although the organization was responsible for 
dozens of bombings in 1970…its greatest damage was self-inflicted when three leaders of 
the organization blew themselves up in a New York townhouse while manufacturing a 
bomb (77). 
 
The Weathermen maintained left-wing nodes in the U.S. for approximately ten years, but 
for at least seven of these the group was in hiding, had no broad base of support, and carried out 
sporadic attacks (Sprinzak 1998; START 2008; Jones and Libicki 2008).  When the Vietnam 
War ended, American society continued rejecting communism as an ideology but also refocused 
efforts toward rejecting the state’s authority.  
Business and religious societal actors, with a strong base in American society, generally 
supported the U.S. government in the Cold War ideological struggle because communism was 
considered a threat to the American way of life in virtually every way.  While the state played a 
role in framing the Cold War debate as a clear and present threat to the American society, the 
state and society each rejected the communist ideology. The state’s role was to arrest the few 
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dozen violent Weathermen who made up the core of the terrorist movement. In short, the 
communist movement was rejected by American society not because the state forced society do 
so, but because it was not in line with American values.  Although the Weathermen’s communist 
message had little impact on American society, the wider New Left movement did manage to 
shape the public discourse on the government’s role in domestic surveillance of political 
dissidents. The legacy of distrust toward the state by society was maintained throughout the Cold 
War.   
The American people learned of the federal government’s intrusive COINTELPRO 
domestic surveillance activities between 1975 and 1976, in the immediate aftermath of the 
Watergate scandal (U.S. Senate 1976).  The Watergate scandal became public between 1973 and 
1975, but the fallout remains important for state-society interactions.  President Nixon’s role in 
Watergate is considered a pivotal moment in societal disillusionment toward the executive 
branch and federal government, which was again reinforced by the Reagan administration’s Iran-
Contra scandal in November 1986 (Brody and Shapiro 1989).   
The legacy of the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s and the global Cold War 
gave rise to an era in which powerful social actors rejected domestic state intervention in a 
number of ways, while the strength of the state in international affairs gained importance. 
Corporate business interests and large segments of society viewed a resolute anti-communist 
position as the only acceptable one for society to maintain its identity. Furthermore, because a 
tenant of communism rejects the role of religion in society (Marty 1999; Kirby 2003), powerful 
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religious actors also viewed the spread of communism throughout the world as a threat to the 
“Christian nation”98 (Kruse 2015; Lipset 1996).   
The mass appeal of evangelical Christianity was evident from the first days of the Cold 
War through the personal likeability of evangelist Billy Graham, but the strength of religious 
actors in American society grew and reached an all-time high in the 1980s.99  Through 
televangelism, Christianity took a sharp evangelical turn.  The rise of Pat Robertson’s Christian 
Broadcast Network in 1977, followed soon after by Jim Bakker’s PTL network, and Jerry 
Falwell’s 1979 “Moral Majority” organization formed the New Christian Right movement. 
These religious figures became inextricably linked with American political issues.  President 
Reagan chose the 1983 annual conference of the National Association of Evangelicals to deliver 
his “evil empire” speech (Hadden 1993).  The Christian Right movement had an enormous 
following in American society after the New Left movement waned.  However, like many 
political movements, Christian fundamentalism and anti-statism took on a life of its own 
throughout the 1980s with the rise of violent ideologies far from the mainstream. 
 6.4 The State in Society: Right-wing Terrorism 
Right-wing terrorism is inspired by a combination of forces that include firm anti-
government views, racism, and fundamentalist religious ideology.  These beliefs are typically not 
                                                 
98 Kruse (2015) argues that big business and business interest groups like the Chamber of Commerce joined forces 
with Christian leaders to shape this identity. By convincing powerful religious societal leaders such as Billy Graham 
to incorporate the Christian following with capitalist thought, business interests and powerful religious figures 
promoted the implementation of “In God we Trust” as the country’s motto and “One Nation under God” in the 
Pledge.  By doing so, the construct of a “Christian nation” was formed.  Polling suggests that the majority of 
Americans have believed the country is a Christian nation as late as 2007. Kruse (2015) also notes that this 
capitalist-Christian campaign began in the 1930s after the Depression. Tocqueville noted in the early 1900s, and 
data strongly supports, the U.S. has traditionally been the “most religious country in Christendom” but historically 
this attribute of society existed outside the state’s reach (Lipset 1996). 
 




isolated but instead combine and overlap to inspire various brands of right-wing terrorist groups. 
In many cases, these three forces are virtually indistinguishable (Hoffman 2006).  Anti-
government and Christian based extremism refers to groups who move far beyond criticism of 
the federal government or espousing religious beliefs to a full rejection of the state’s legitimacy 
through the use of violence.   
The right-wing anti-government movement in the United States typically consists of 
resisting taxation but also encompasses Christian patriotism (Hoffman 2006).  Right-wing 
extremist movements derive anti-government sentiment from the belief that the U.S. government 
is an extremely powerful force and involved in complex global conspiracies. The domestic 
spying by the FBI in the 1960s and 1970s contributed to these beliefs. Many right-wing terrorists 
believe they are not accountable to the federal government’s laws but rather God’s laws, thus, 
killing agents of government, or anyone perceived as the enemy, is justified (Hoffman 2006).   
The white supremacist or “neo Nazi” inspired movement seeks racial purification that 
encompasses the belief that white Anglo Saxons and not Jews are the real chosen people 
(Hoffman 2006).  White supremacists also derive their hatred for the government from its role in 
promoting racial equality for non-whites. The anti-government and white supremacy movement 
converge on the general belief that Jews control the U.S. government and seek to control the 
world through a planned takeover of the media and financial sector.  Moreover, in the U.S. right-
wing extremist groups have a Christian fundamentalist basis for racially based beliefs (Hoffman 
2006).  All variations of these right-wing terrorist groups have appeared throughout history in the 
United States and received varying levels of active and passive support from society. The 
sustained membership and longevity of some of the most prominent right-wing terrorist groups 
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indicates high societal tolerance for right-wing violence when compared to the left-wing 
movement (see Cigler and Joslyn 2002). 
The start date of the transnational “religious wave” of terrorism is often attributed to 
Islamic fundamentalism which began with the 1979 revolution in Iran and gained momentum 
during the 1979-1989 Soviet-Afghan war.  However, extremist Christian fundamentalism also 
flourished in the United States at the same time (Rapoport 2004, 62) through a number of 
domestic right-wing terror groups and the transnational pan Aryan terrorist movement.  Islamic 
fundamentalism, particularly during the Soviet-Afghan war, and Christian fundamentalism 
intermingled through their shared hate for the Soviet Union and of Jews.   
In the United States, right-wing terrorist ideologies grew out of a long history of violent 
race relations that has also been supported by evangelical Christian justifications for slavery.  
The Biblical roots of the moral justification for slavery and subsequent treatment of black 
Americans are traced to the Old Testament story of Noah and his son Ham in the book of 
Genesis (Fredrickson 2002; Haynes 2002).  In the most basic interpretation, Ham is said to have 
seen his father’s nakedness, which led Noah to curse Ham’s son Canaan and his descendants to 
be “servant of servants” (Nave and Nave, KJV Genesis 9:22-9:27). Over centuries of 
interpretation, Canaan’s descendants became attached to black Africa, thus, supporting the 
notion that blacks were cursed to slavery (Fredrickson 2002; Haynes 2002).100  This general 
explanation for black plight has existed for centuries in evangelical Christian circles throughout 
the U.S.   
                                                 
100 The idea that black Africans are cursed appeared in new form after the January 12, 2010 earthquake in Haiti, 
where the vast majority of the population are black African descendants of the slave trade.  American evangelical 
Christian leader Pat Robertson argued on his popular 700 Club broadcast that the earthquake, which killed over 
200,000 people, was a result of a pact Haitians made directly with the devil in exchange for independence from 
France (Smith 2010).   
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The basis for right-wing terrorism in the United States began when the KKK was formed 
after the Civil War in response to the post-Civil War Reconstruction threat to political and 
economic white supremacy in the South.  Black integration in the South ultimately failed during 
Reconstruction (Rapoport 2004) and the status quo was maintained. The United States Supreme 
Court then played a crucial role in the establishment and maintenance of Jim Crow laws that 
provided a system of segregation and discrimination.  Jim Crow kept blacks from gaining equal 
status in the U.S. through the “separate but equal” doctrine upheld in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).  
The Plessy v. Ferguson ruling “not only perpetuated the white supremacist beliefs of the time, 
but also made it possible for states to make and enforce Jim Crow laws with impunity” (Tafari 
2002).  Jim Crow and black discrimination had an enormous base of support in the United States, 
but was concentrated in the South. In 1920, the KKK had over a million followers (Palmer 
2012). The system of Jim Crow continued for nearly 60 years until the Supreme Court ruled in 
four cases known collectively as Brown v. Board of Education (1954) that "'separate but equal' 
has no place in America's public schools because separate is inherently unequal. Jim Crow was 
suddenly at odds with the law of the country, and openly threatened white supremacy. Though 
the legality of Jim Crow in education had been defeated, blacks continued to struggle for equal 
rights in its wake” (Tafari 2002).   
Jim Crow laws were dismantled after the 1954 Supreme Court ruling and over the next 
decade the Civil Rights Movement led by Martin Luther King, Jr. continued the dialogue on 
black discrimination in the South.  Throughout the 1960s, the KKK firebombed a number of 
black churches in the South, notably the September 15, 1963 bombing of the 16th Street Baptist 
Church in Birmingham, Alabama, which killed four young black girls and injured dozens more 
churchgoers.  This attack garnered significant attention from the American public and became a 
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symbol of KKK violence (Carlisle 2005).  During the 1960s, the leaders in the college-aged New 
Left SDS supported the Civil Rights Movement to form a wider base of societal support.  Federal 
law enforcement did little to stop the KKK until the 1964 landmark civil rights legislation, the 
same year the FBI initiated COINTELPRO- White Hate.  The White Hate program was pursued 
with less vigor than the other COINTELPRO programs, but nonetheless was the first attempt to 
challenge the KKK and like-minded groups (Cunningham 2004).   
The treatment of African Americans until the 1964 and 1965 Civil Rights and Voting 
Rights Acts illustrates how the state facilitated the wishes of strong societal actors in quelling 
racial equality through both policies and force.  This environment enabled the rise of right-wing 
racially based terrorism to grow from 1866 until at least 1964, largely unobstructed by the state.  
The 1964 Civil Right legislation included a provision that made targeting a person based on race 
a federal crime but only if the person was conducting a federally protected activity, such as 
attending school, patronizing a business, serving on a jury, or voting (U.S. Department of Justice, 
2015).  
By 1964 a majority of American society rejected widespread violations of civil rights by 
domestic terror groups like the Ku Klux Klan, while a portion of social actors in the South 
maintained strong ideological support.  This allowed violent terrorist groups to operate much 
longer than they would have if rejected by society.  For the white majority, particularly in the 
South, “perceptions of danger and threat produced a crisis situation.”  The policies and force 
used by the federal government and right-wing domestic terror groups toward blacks “may well 
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have felt like a constitutional dictatorship, complete with majority citizen support” (M. Miller 
2013, 161-162).101   
When the black minority gained Constitutional protections during the dismantling of Jim 
Crow laws after 1954, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, right- wing 
terrorism in the United States expanded to counter this threat to the status quo.  Society was 
shifting and leaving white supremacists behind. A Gallup poll in 1964 found 58% of Americans 
supported the Civil Rights legislation.  Only one year later in 1965, Gallup found 76% 
Americans supported the 1965 Voting Rights Act (Kohut 2015).  The societal acceptance of the 
KKK waned in the late 1960s as institutionalized discrimination was no longer legal, but the 
KKK maintained its stronghold for decades in the South.  The KKK’s main challenges came 
from dwindling societal support and competing with new right-wing extremist groups for 
members. 
In 1961, the American Nazi Party was founded by George Lincoln Rockwell in 
Arlington, Virginia.  Rockwell was an East Coast educated, middle class, former U.S. Naval 
officer, who was forced out of the Navy in 1960 for his political views.  Rockwell sought a 
revival of Nazism worldwide, which is distinct from KKK goals.  Rockwell and his German 
mentor Bruno Ludtke determined that for Nazism to be revived in the 1960s, it would require a 
religious base. Rockwell did not personally embrace Christianity and described himself as 
agnostic (Simonelli 1999).  His first writings were anti-Christian, but when he determined the 
strategic value of religion for recruitment, Rockwell altered his rhetoric to expand the American 
Nazi Party’s base of support in the U.S. and Europe. In the 1960s Rockwell merged the 
                                                 
101 Specific examples of state’s overreach in the United States involve those societal groups left out of the political 
process, specifically the brutal policies against Native Americans and African Americans. Miller (2013) notes that 




American Nazi Party beliefs with the growing Christian Identity movement that had some 
followers within the KKK, although the KKK’s traditional religious inspiration was evangelical 
Christianity (Simonelli 1999).  
Christian Identity is an offshoot of the British-Israelite movement that originated in Great 
Britain in the mid-19th century but peaked in Europe in the 1920s with about 5,000 followers. In 
the late 19th century the Christian Identity began to emerge in the U.S. and created new 
fundamentalist interpretations of the origins of non-whites, with a particular emphasis on the 
origin of Jews. It argues that Europeans were biologically descended from the Old Testament 
ancient Israelites known as the "Lost Tribes" which were scattered by invasions of Hittites, 
Assyrians, and Babylonians. The Lost Tribes then made their way to Europe, and from there 
became the modern European nations. Christian Identity also argues that blacks are a sub-human 
species of “mud people” who predate Adam and Eve, and Jews are a spawn of the devil 
(Juergensmeyer 2003; Wakin 2004; Anti-Defamation League 2005; Hoffman 2006).  
In the United States, Christian Identity appeared in force during the 1940s, adding to the 
already fundamentalist interpretations of Christianity that inspired slavery and the KKK 
(Juergensmeyer 2003).  Throughout the latter half of the 20th Century, the movement thrived in 
the United States with an estimated 25,000-50,000 followers spread through nearly every state 
(Wakin 2004; Anti-Defamation League 2005; Hoffman 2006). This ideology placed domestic 
right-wing terrorism in the U.S. on a global trajectory. 
Before Rockwell was murdered by a disgruntled follower on August 25, 1967, the link 
between his newly renamed “National Socialist White People’s Party” and the obscure Christian 
Identity sect was formalized through his relationship with Christian Identity minister Richard 
Girnt Butler (Simonelli 1999).  The American Nazi Party, National Socialist White People’s 
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Party, and its various splinter parties have continued as legal political parties that have promoted 
neo-Nazi ideology around the world since Rockwell’s death in 1967 (Atkins 2011).102   
Richard Girnt Butler was an aeronautics engineer who sought to create a homeland for 
white supremacists in the northwest United States.  Butler’s inspiration for white supremacy 
began while working in India with the Royal Indian Air Force in the late 1930s.  He was 
impressed by the caste system in India noting, “As you went up the hierarchy, the lighter they 
got. It all got me to thinking, and when I came home from overseas, I had a feeling that we, the 
white race, were losing the war" (Wakin 2004).   
Butler returned to California in 1941, where he got married, and served in the U.S. Army 
Air Corps as a military mechanics instructor after Pearl Harbor.  He was enamored by Hitler and 
the German military and became fixated on a global communist Jewish conspiracy of world 
domination.  He followed Senator Joseph McCarthy’s communist investigations closely and 
stopped attending his Presbyterian Church in Montebello, California because it was too 
accepting of different races and he believed the preacher was a communist (Wakin 2004; 
Southern Poverty Law Center 2004).   
In 1961, Butler found a white supremacist church home in Los Angeles at the Church of 
Jesus Christ Christian, led by former Methodist preacher and KKK organizer Wesley Swift. 
Swift was an ideological leader of Christian Identity since the 1940s, which influenced most 
right-wing extremism.  Swift’s primary message argued that “whites are the true Israelites and 
                                                 
102 Gary “Gerard” Lauck is one of the most notorious disseminators of Nazi propaganda throughout Europe through 
his National Socialist German Workers’ Party-Overseas organization.  Nazi memorabilia and propaganda is banned 
in Germany and many countries in Europe, but Lauck has been protected by the first amendment rights afforded to 
him in the United States. Although Lauck lived in Chicago during the 1980s and early 1990s he used Lincoln, 
Nebraska to mail his written propaganda and Nazi memorabilia.  Lauck was eventually caught in Denmark in March 
1995 and sentenced to serve four years in prison in Germany.  Upon his release in March 1999, he returned to 
Chicago, where he uses the Internet to promote neo-Nazi beliefs (Atkins 2011). 
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Jews are descended directly from a mating of Eve and the devil” (Juergensmeyer 2003; Southern 
Poverty Law Center 2004).103   
In 1962 Pastor Wesley Swift also formed the anti-Semitic “Christian Defense League” 
and Richard Butler served as director of the organization. Between 1962 and 1965, Richard 
Butler also became an ordained Christian Identity minister through a correspondence course 
from the American Institute of Theology (Southern Poverty Law Center 2004). Following 
Swift’s death in 1970 and Butler’s retirement from Lockheed Martin in 1973104, Butler 
determined that Idaho was the beacon of hope for the white race.  He purchased a 20 acre 
property and farmhouse in Hayden Lake, Idaho and established the Church of Jesus Christ 
Christian on his property. In 1977, he formed the Aryan Nations, the violent wing of his 
Christian Identity church, which formally established a white supremacist hub in Hayden Lake, 
Idaho (Wakin 2004). 
Aside from Aryan Nations, some members of the KKK and white supremacist groups 
like Hammerskin Nation became followers of Christian Identity thought. Broadly speaking, 
Christian Identity “found a welcome home in extreme anti-government activism, notably the tax 
protest movement, the sovereign citizen movement (descended from Gale's Posse Comitatus), 
and the militia movement” (Anti-Defamation League 2005; Hoffman 2006).   
Christian Identity beliefs adapted to a uniquely American anti-government fervor.  Right-
wing extremist beliefs of Jewish conspiracies of New World Order tied to the media and U.S. 
government, coupled with the growing racist fervor in the aftermath of civil rights, affirmative 
                                                 
103 Other Christian Identity leaders argue that Jews are aliens from outer space (Juergensmeyer 2003). 
 
104 Throughout the 1960s Butler worked for Lockheed Martin, where the forced hiring of minorities tied to a federal 




action policies, and the anti-abortion zeal following the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision, provided a 
number of issues for recruitment (Anti-Defamation League 2005).   
Aryan Nations distributed racist literature, held gatherings, and recruited neo-Nazis from 
prisons (Wakin 2004).  The Hayden Lake, Idaho hub “served for decades as a haven for ex-
convicts, racist skinheads and various other anti-Semites and professional racists, many of whom 
committed major crimes” (Southern Poverty Law Center 2004). Aryan Nations expanded upon 
the KKK’s anti-black and anti-Catholic beliefs with neo-Nazi principles and global goals, but 
Aryan Nations invited the KKK to participate in its activities. “In its heyday in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, neo-Nazis, racist skinheads, Klansmen and other white nationalists convened 
regularly at the group’s Idaho compound for its annual world congresses” (Southern Poverty 
Law Center 2015).  The dozens of right-wing domestic terrorist nodes that operated in the United 
States throughout the second half of the 20th century were able to coalesce and radicalize at the 
Hayden Lake, Idaho hub, where a blend of anti-government, racist, anti-Semitic extremists could 
plan armed robberies and violent attacks on Jews, Catholics, gays, and all non-whites. 
Richard Butler’s Aryan Nations served as an umbrella organization for white 
supremacist, anti-government, militia-survivalist beliefs, much like Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) did for the various Palestinian groups.  Butler’s primary goal was 
the establishment of an Aryan controlled territory on U.S. soil, but he also disseminated 
propaganda globally and formed relationships with leaders in the underground German neo-Nazi 
movement who visited the Idaho hub.  
The Idaho hub allowed groups to come together as early as 1983 to plot the overthrow of 
the U.S. government (Hoffman 2006) through the plan outlined in the 1978 book The Turner 
Diaries (Juergensmeyer 2003). The book was written by Physics professor and American Nazi 
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Party propagandist William Pierce.105 It gained popularity through the gun show circuit and 
inspired underground peddlers like Timothy McVeigh (Juergensmeyer 2003).  In The Turner 
Diaries, a white supremacist revolution commences in 1991 by assassinating Jews, public 
officials, and poisoning the water supply with cyanide.  According to the book, whites would 
prevail by 1993 and eventually take control of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and subsequently attack 
the Soviet Union and Israel.  As they prepared for this war, Jews, non-whites, gays, abortion 
doctors, government authorities higher than the county level, entities like the Federal Reserve, 
the IRS, and United Nations provided specific terrorist targets for the movement (Hoffman 
2006). 
The United States government has varied in its regulatory power to counter right-wing 
terrorism, but has exerted force against openly hostile right-wing domestic groups.  Between 
1983 and 1985 federal agents arrested several members of an Aryan Nations faction called “The 
Order,” for violent attacks they followed as part of their 200 page blueprint for the apocalyptic 
race war. In April 1984, federal agents also raided a Christian Patriot node in Mountain Home, 
Arkansas to find 30 gallons of cyanide they planned to use to poison the Chicago and 
Washington, D.C. water supply (Hoffman 2006).  
Aside from undercover agents attending the Hayden Lake annual world congresses, 
federal authorities did not penetrate the Hayden Lake, Idaho hub.  The compound was fenced 
with security and armed guards, including a two-story watchtower (Southern Poverty Law 
Center 2015b).106  At the July 1986 world congress secessionist plans were announced for a five-
state Aryan Nation in the Pacific Northwest and Kootenai County, Idaho would serve as the 
                                                 
105 William Pierce held a PhD in Physics from the University of Colorado, taught for a time at Oregon State 
University.   
 
106 The compound was bombed in 1980, which prompted the extreme security measures. The bombing was assumed 
to have been carried out by the Jewish Defense League, a Jewish terrorist group that targeted anti-Semites. 
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provisional capitol (Wright 2007). The state’s weakness in countering violent extremist beliefs 
became evident in 1987, when Richard Butler and fifteen conspirators were acquitted of federal 
sedition charges for their detailed plan to overthrow the U.S. government (Hoffman 2006; 
Southern Poverty Law Center 2015b). Therefore, in 1992 and 1993 federal authorities attempted 
to address two other perceived security threats from right-wing extremist groups with force.  The 
fallout from the decision to use force further weakened the state’s ability to penetrate society and 
shaped state-society relations for the next eight years.   
First, the Ruby Ridge standoff between federal agents and a small white supremacist, 
anti-government separatist node in Boundary County, Idaho (adjoined to Kootenai, County, 
home to Butler’s Aryan Nations compound) began on August 21, 1992.  Mountainous, rural 
Boundary County, Idaho had become the center of right-wing extremism since the early 1980s 
because of the neighboring ideological hub at Hayden Lake (Wright 2007).  
The owner of the Ruby Ridge property, Randy Weaver, attended the 1986 and 1987 
congress and later became a target of an ATF investigation after he unknowingly met an 
undercover federal agent at the 1989 Aryan Nation world congress, where he purchased sawed-
off shotguns.  Based on a U.S. Marshals and ATF investigation of Weaver over the next year, a 
warrant for Weaver’s arrest was obtained in February 1991.  Federal agents spent an additional 
18 months planning his arrest that was expected to turn violent (Wright 2007). The Ruby Ridge 
standoff ended the following day on August 22, 1992 with ATF agents storming Randy 
Weaver’s family cabin.  Snipers also shot three of the family members, killing two, including 
Weaver’s wife (U.S., Department of Justice 1997).   
The Ruby Ridge standoff initially garnered less attention from the American public, until 
a second, much more dramatic government showdown unfolded on television months later. The 
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Waco, Texas standoff between the ATF and FBI against an apocalyptic Christian-based cult 
began on February 28, 1993 and ended on April 19, 1993 with the Branch Davidians cult burning 
the complex on live television, killing all the young children and adults living inside.  
The government’s actions at Ruby Ridge and Waco involved First and Second 
Amendment privacy rights that deeply concerned American society. The government argued that 
the Waco raid was a result of child abuse allegations, but many Americans believed it was 
related to the extensive stockpiling of weapons. Throughout the 1990s, public opinion shifted 
away from supporting the government actions in Waco (CBS 1999).107  Mark Potok, Director of 
the Southern Poverty Law Center noted, "Ruby Ridge was the opening shot of a new era of anti-
government hatred not seen since the Civil War” (Gerianios 2012).  The government’s criticism 
from mainstream society beginning in Ruby Ridge and accelerating after Waco forced the 
Clinton Administration’s Justice Department to cautiously pursue right-wing groups throughout 
the 1990s (Kane and Wall 2005). 
In 1993 the U.S. based pan-Aryan hub’s reach expanded through the transnational 
organization Hammerskin Nation (Reynolds 1999; Ross 2015).  Although Hammerskin Nation 
was considered the most elite white supremacist group in the U.S., very little is known about its 
founding leadership (Atkins 2011; Ross 2015). It shared members with Aryan Nations, but 
membership in Hammerskin Nation superseded all others (Reynolds 1999).  Much like Aryan 
Nations, the group emerged in the U.S. to promote anti-Semitism and reject American society’s 
acceptance of civil rights for African Americans and multi-culturalism. Jimmy Matchette 
summarizes the perceived crisis writing, "Being a Hammerskin is the distinct feeling of being set 
                                                 
107 In 1993, 70% of the people approved of the raid, but by 1999 that number dropped to 38% with 43% 
disapproving of the raid. Six years after Waco, 62% of Americans reported they believed there was a government 
cover-up in the investigation, while only 25% were willing to affirmatively state they did not believe there was a 
cover-up (CBS News, 1999).     
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apart from the entire planet…And of knowing we will conquer & overcome all obstacles to 
achieve our goals and accomplish our great work, knowing that if we fail, all is lost forever and 
the west will perish" (Anti-Defamation League 2002).   
Hammerskin Nation was inspired by the British neo-Nazi rock scene and formed its first 
known node in Chicago in 1986 called “Romantic Violence” (Southern Poverty Law Center 
2006), but the official Hammerskin organization acknowledges its founding by a small group of 
neo-Nazi skinheads in Dallas during the summer of 1988 (Southern Poverty Law Center 2015c). 
The Dallas node became known as the Confederate Hammerskins.  The Confederate 
Hammerskins gained notoriety in August 1988 when group members Sean Tarrant, Jon Jordan, 
Michael Lawrence, Christopher Greer, and Daniel Wood chased and beat blacks and Hispanics 
to deter them from entering Robert E. Lee Park in Dallas.  In October 1988 the same group 
vandalized a Jewish temple and community center in Dallas (Anti-Defamation League 2002).   
By the 1990s, Hammerskin Nation organized affiliated nodes in cities throughout the 
U.S., Canada, the UK, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand, Czech 
Republic, Poland, Serbia, and Germany (see START 2008; Anti-Defamation League 2002; 
Reynolds 1999).  Much like the other right-wing groups Hammerskin Nation targeted minorities, 
gays, and “anti-racists” (Reynolds 1999). 
Table 6.2 Hammerskin Nation Nodes 
Regional Groupings Nodes 
Confederate Hammerskins Dallas, Texas (founding group and National Headquarters); other nodes in 
Huntsville, Alabama; Kentucky; Georgia; Nashville, Tennessee; Orlando, 
Jacksonville, Ocala, Florida; North Carolina; Richmond, Virginia; Columbia, 
South Carolina. 
Northern Hammerskins Great Lakes region, Detroit, Michigan; Chicago, Illinois; St. Paul, Minnesota 
(Panzerfaust Records Headquarters until 2005), Wisconsin 
Eastern Hammerskins Maryland, Delaware, Allentown, Pennsylvania, and Brick Township and 
Pennsville, New Jersey 
Western Hammerskins Phoenix and Mesa, Arizona and San Diego, California 
Midland Hammerskins Based in Wichita, Kansas. 5 core members since the late 1990s. Peaked with 40 
members in the early 1990s. Another affiliated node from Wichita River City 
Skins.  Affiliated nodes in Hutchinson, Kansas (Salt City Skins), Manhattan, 
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Kansas area (White Plague Skins). Other groups in Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska, 
South Dakota. 
Northwest Hammerskins Idaho; Portland, Oregon; Seattle, Washington  
Source: Anti-Defamation League (2009); Atkins (2011); Ross (2015); Southern Poverty Law Center (2015a) 
*In 2009, Anti-Defamation League identified 95 neo-Nazi skinhead groups in the United States.108 10 of them used 
“Hammerskin” in the name, but the official Hammerskin Nation of the 1990s was organized through these six 
regional groups listed above.  Cities are noted when known.  Group members and specific locations are secretive, 
unless without joining a private message board. 
 
Hammerskins have traditionally been referred to in the U.S. as a “hate group” or “street 
gang,” along with other white supremacist groups, but it epitomized a transnational terrorist 
organization from 1993 until 1999.  Along with the Aryan Nations, the group promoted 
politically motivated violence to establish global racial purity, possessed a clear financing 
scheme to support activities, and an identifiable insignia and structure (see Hoffman 2006).109  
The Hammerskin Nation’s primary financing source came from legal sources through the white 
power rock concerts and recordings from the St. Paul, Minnesota based Panzerfaust Records. 
The global white power rock music scene also served as an important unifying ideological force 
between European nodes and the U.S. hub (Atkins 2011; Anti-Defamation League 2002).  
White supremacist leader Jimmy Matchette stated that transnational reach was a key 
attribute of the Hammerskin Nation movement.  He stated that the mission of the original group 
“has drawn all of us from the four corners of the earth. The winds of destiny have drawn us and 
have carried us across geographical boundaries and from various ethnic branches of the White 
Aryan race to graft us into one Nation" (Anti-Defamation League 2002).  Many neo-Nazi 
activities are banned in Europe, so the presence of the group’s headquarters in the U.S. was 
critical due to the protection of civil liberties (START 2008). 
                                                 
108 A list of neo-Nazi groups can be found here: http://archive.adl.org/racist_skinheads/skinhead_alpha_list.html 
 
109 White supremacist groups also have legal political parties in the United States, such as the American Nazi Party 
and the National Socialist Party of America.   
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While the group actively recruited through the white power rock scene, it is similar to 
other well-organized terror groups in its strict membership criteria for prospective members. Due 
to their involvement in violent crime, Hammerskin members were secretive and prospective 
members went through a year-long probation and initiation process (Atkins 2011). Membership 
was limited to maintain security and ideological consistency as they value “quality over 
quantity.”110  At its peak in 1999, the U.S. had approximately 200-600 full members across 
twenty nodes and thousands of followers (Anti-Defamation League 2002; START 2008; 
Reynolds 1999; Atkins 2011).  
Hammerskin Nation used print and online media, much like other sophisticated terrorist 
groups, to promote its message and facilitate recruitment (see Hoffman 2006).  In late 1998 
Hammerskin Press praised its expanding influence, “Our enemies are seeing a movement far 
more advanced than the movement of 10 years ago. Camouflaged in society and rooted deep into 
the system, we're no longer an easy target, but a revolutionary force” (Reynolds 1999).  Soon 
after this communiqué the group appeared to be increasingly disorganized.  It ceased its print 
newsletter and relied solely on the Internet to spread its message (Anti-Defamation League 
2002).  
 Critical Antecedent: Loss of Support, 1996 Anti-Terrorism Act, and Litigation 
The beginning of the end for the right-wing terror boom of the 1980s and 1990s was the 
1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Like most right-wing extremists, the federal government’s 
actions at Ruby Ridge and Waco fueled Timothy McVeigh’s anger and inspired the bombing of 
the Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, the second anniversary of the 
Waco raid’s dramatic conclusion.  While the Oklahoma City bombing generally represents the 
                                                 
110 This selection and initiation process is similar to the most well-organized and effective transnational groups, 
notably al Qaeda’s central command, in order to maintain security and ideological consistency. 
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anti-government side of right-wing terrorism, McVeigh was personally inspired by elements of 
white supremacy through the Christian Patriot movement and The Turner Diaries (Hoffman 
2006).  He allegedly contacted the Christian Identity/Christian Patriot node in Elohim City, 
Oklahoma and the author of The Turner Diaries in the months preceding the attack. McVeigh 
packaged and built the bomb according to the fictional story depicted in the book but with 600 
pounds less ammonium nitrate fertilizer and fuel oil than the 5,000 mentioned in the book. 
(Juergensmeyer 2003).  
McVeigh’s Oklahoma City terrorist attack marked a turning point in society’s passivity 
toward right-wing extremism that the movement garnered from the perceived government 
overreach at Ruby Ridge and Waco.  Simply put, the anti-government message McVeigh 
attempted to convey in the bombing was completely overshadowed by the images of murdered 
young children being carried from the daycare facility that was inside the Murrah federal 
building (Hamm 1997).    
The rise of terrorism at home and abroad had gained some attention from the American 
public after the February 26, 1993 World Trade Center attack.  However, the 1993 World Trade 
Center occurred between the Ruby Ridge and Waco debacles, which ultimately limited the 
state’s ability to expand domestic counterterrorism measures. The disturbing images from 
Oklahoma City shocked the American conscious to reject violent extremism as a means of 
protesting the government. The Oklahoma City bombing, however, provided an opportunity for 
the state to gain additional penetrative capacity in domestic affairs.  In June 1995, less than two 
months after the Oklahoma City bombing, President Clinton issued the Presidential Decision 
Directive (PDD) 39 “U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism.” The PDD 39 designated the FBI as the 
lead agency on terrorism at home and abroad and defined all terrorist activities, domestic or 
131 
 
abroad, as threats to national security.  Over the next five years, a series of additional policies 
were put in place to counter terrorism.  The most extensive, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996, included an increase in counter-terrorism funding, requirements for 
chemical “taggants” so the police could trace bombs back to individuals, increased penalties for 
conspiracy to commit terrorist-related activity, and the ability to withhold aid to countries 
connected to state sponsors of terrorism (Alexander 2006, 29-30).   
After the Oklahoma City bombing, federal agents foiled at least ten right-wing militia and 
white supremacist terror plots between 1995 and 2003, which coincides with the added domestic 
security measures of the 1996 Anti-Terrorism Act (Hoffman 2006, 106). However, the cascade 
of events through the late 1990s that ultimately crippled right-wing terrorism and ended the 
white supremacist hub in the U.S. had little to do with the state’s strength or ability to counter 
terrorism.   
First, several societal changes occurred in the late 1990s that resulted in the loss of any 
base of societal support for the right-wing movements.  The Cold War ended and the Soviet 
Union fell in the early 1990s, which lessened the fear of communism.  The political Christian 
Right televangelist movement was marred by scandal and lost its broad public appeal (Hadden 
1993).  President Clinton’s administration was also leaving office, which had served as a rallying 
cry for those who perceived a threat to the 2nd Amendment from the U.S. government and United 
Nations (Juergensmeyer 2003).111  
Second, Hammerskin Nation and Aryan Nations each experienced a loss of membership, 
in-fighting, and financial disarray.  Aryan Nations, the umbrella group for white supremacy who 
                                                 
111 Right-wing extremists rely on the mainstream success of powerful societal actor, the National Rifle Association, 
to conjure gun control fear of the federal government and accompanying U.N. conspiracies, which it does with much 
more success during Democratic administrations. United Nations gun control conspiracies have been a cornerstone 




shared members with Hammerskin Nation, lost membership during the 1990s.  By 1997, half of 
Aryan Nations state chapters were closed and Hammerskin groups were losing members in its 
regional chapters.112 In 1999, an internal Hammerskin revolt began over a harsh punishment 
handed down to five members in an Indiana node for “misconduct.”  Thirteen members of 
Hammerskin Nation broke away and formed the rival “Outlaw Hammerskin” organization that 
advocated for less bureaucracy and attract others to defect (Atkins 2011, 117; Reynolds 1999). 
The U.S. Hammerskin Nation’s splintering significantly reduced its size, activity, and 
fundraising after 1999. The large rock concerts drew individuals from across the world and were 
a key ideological and financing aspect of the group.  Attendance dropped at the annual Bremen, 
Georgia concerts from 600 attendees in 1999 to 150 in 2002 (Anti-Defamation League 2002; 
Southern Poverty Law Center 2015). 
Third, in addition to loss of support, both Aryan Nations and Hammerskin Nation faced 
civil litigation lawsuits.  The official Hammerskin Nation is thought to have carried out its final 
violent attack against a young African American male in Temecula, California on March 17, 
1999.  The financial consequences of civil litigation against Hammerskin members are 
considered one of many catalysts for its collapse (Anti-Defamation League 2002).  The most 
striking blow to the U.S. white supremacist network, however, came from civil litigation against 
Richard Butler by the non-profit advocacy group Southern Poverty Law Center on behalf two 
victims of Aryan Nations violence.   
According to Victoria Keenan, on July 1, 1998 she and her son were driving past Butler’s 
Hayden Lake property when their car backfired or made a loud noise.  Aryan Nations guards 
believed they were under attack and chased and shot at the Keenan’s car.  When the Keenan’s 
                                                 
112 After the death of its leader,  the Wichita, Kansas Midland Hammerskin node, dropped from 40 (in the early 
1990s) to about 5 core members with possibly 20 others affiliated since the late 1990s (SPLC 2015a). 
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car wrecked Aryan Nations guards threatened to kill them because Victoria was Native 
American and they believed her teenage son was gay. As another car approached, the Aryan 
Nations guards released them.  The 20 acre Hayden Lake, Idaho compound was seized through a 
$6.3 million verdict against Richard Butler and the Aryan Nations in September 2000.  The 
lawsuit effectively ended the white supremacist hub.  Aryan Nations founder Richard Butler 
remained in Idaho and continued public white supremacist activism113 until his death on 
September 8, 2004 (Wakin 2004; Southern Poverty Law Center 2015b; Hoffman 2006). 
The once well-organized Hammerskin Nation disappeared when the Outlaw offshoot 
organization also splintered between 2001 and 2002.  Members remained ideologically 
connected through the Internet, but the group’s website also appeared to be in disarray. Prior to 
2001, the group’s website supported the global movement with a “Cyber Terrorist” page 
containing viruses, password stealing programs, hacking tools, bulletin boards and private chat 
rooms.  After the U.S. Hammerskin hub fell apart the website was thought to be supported by the 
British-based Hammerskins but it abruptly disappeared in 2002 (Anti-Defamation League 2002).  
The website’s disappearance may have been a result of the U.S. based Outlaw Hammerskin 
fallout in 2002.  Another possible explanation is that in 2002, London police found homemade 
recipes for ricin, cyanide, and botulism, during an investigation of the al Qaeda linked group 
Ansar al Islam.  British authorities noted that at least one of these recipes was downloaded from 
an “American white supremacist website” (Hoffman 2006, 275). 
A new Hammerskin Nation website later appeared that provides a history of the 
organization, direction on the Neo-Nazi skinhead lifestyle, and ideological goals of the current 
“leaderless” movement. Many neo-Nazis appear to focus on white power music rather than 
                                                 
113 Butler ran for Mayor of Hayden, Idaho in 2003 but received 50 votes (2%). Aryan Nation’s last “world congress” 
in 2004 attracted 40 people, while they drew several hundred in the early 1990s 
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managing a formal organization. Neo-Nazis and Hammerskins maintain a prison presence, which 
allows ideological cohesion,114 but the once well-organized transnational movement has not been 
revived. Independent Hammerskin nodes are still considered to be active throughout Europe, but 
the affiliation between them and groups in the U.S. is unclear. Former members of the original 
Hammerskin Nation publicly reject the splinter groups’ legitimacy, stating that they will never 
recognize "these wannabe renegade as any kind of Hammerskin in any way, shape, or form" 
(Anti-Defamation League 2002).   
The 2008 election of the first black President represents a significant shift in societies’ 
beliefs on racial equality, which may constrain the ability to reorganize. Traditionally prominent 
domestic terror groups like the KKK have lost significant membership from its 1920s peak in the 
millions to an estimated 3,000-5,000 in 2012 (Palmer 2012).115  Although the number of white 
power groups may be growing in number due to splintering, the overall membership size appears 
to be shrinking (Southern Poverty Law Center 2015c; Palmer 2012).   
 6.5 The State in Society: Religious Terrorist Hub and Nodes 
The religious-inspired terror wave of the 1980s and 1990s also attracted Islamic 
fundamentalist terror groups to establish sanctuary in the United States (Rapoport 2004).  Four 
                                                 
114 Those claiming to be Hammerskins continue to be arrested for violent crimes, the most recent on March 19, 
2015, when Hammerskin Ryan Giroux went on a shooting rampage in Mesa, Arizona.  Giroux, now 41 years old, 
was part of the Hammerskin movement in the 1990s before serving multiple short prison sentences for seven 
felonies in multiple states (Southern Poverty Law Center 2015). 
 
115 Wimmer, Cederman, and Mim’s “Ethnic Power Relations” rankings (2009) considered African Americans 
“powerless” in the American political process until 2009.  After 2009, African Americans have been considered a 
“junior partner” to the white “senior partner” within the government. Following society’s attitudes toward current 
perceived threats to the status quo, the newest surge of right-wing extremism has shifted some of the focus away 
from black Americans and Jews, particularly because Israel is a necessary alliance against the Muslim threat, toward 
anti-Muslim, xenophobic (anti-immigrant), and homophobic views (Palmer 2012).  Casting a wide right-wing 
extremist net, the current remnants of Aryan Nation leadership, based in Chillicothe, Ohio, or near Pulaski, 
Tennessee have followers through the Internet, where unifying ideology focuses on the belief that President Obama 




separate Islamic movements have operated in the United States since 1980.  First, the Pakistani 
based Islamic group Jammat al Fuqara established training, ideological, and financing hubs in 
1980.  This was followed in 1985 by the Peshawar, Pakistan based Afghan Service Bureau Front 
or Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), which established dozens of fundraising nodes for the group that 
became al Qaeda in 1988.  Third, Hezbollah established a financing and logistical node from 
1995 until 2002.  Finally, al Qaeda established nodes in the United States in 2000 to complete 
training for the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. 
The Muslim population in the U.S. grew significantly after the Ottoman Empire 
collapsed.  Beginning in the 1920s, various Islamic movements melded to existing cultures and 
sects in the United States. Islam grew in popularity through the 1970s and 1980s with the largest 
followings in New York, New Jersey, California, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, Texas, and California 
(Nanji 1996).116 Following the global force of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (October 1977-
December 1979) and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, fundamentalist 
jihadist interpretations of Islam also emerged in the U.S. (Nanji 1996). Domestic terrorist 
violence emerged as the result of rival interpretations of Islam that were influenced by the rigid 
conservative Islamic purity message spread internationally.  
The fundamentalist Islamic group Jammat ul Fuqra (or al Fuqara) was founded in the 
United States in 1980 by Pakistani cleric Sheikh Mubarak Ali Jilani Hashemi.117  Al Fuqara is a 
splinter of the Darul Islam movement that began in Brooklyn in 1962.  The Darul Islam 
movement was the result of black American Muslims’ dissatisfaction with the lack of 
representation in leadership at the State Street Brooklyn mosque.  In 1968 several members of 
                                                 
116 These are based on 1996 estimates.  Today, Muslims are considered most concentrated (per capita) in the Detroit, 
Michigan area. 
117 Jilani’s name also appears as Gilani in some sources. 
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the State Street mosque broke away and created the Sumpter Street mosque under a charismatic 
leader named Yahya Abdul Karim. Under Karim’s leadership, the Sumpter Street mosque 
instituted Darul Islam, a call to form a nation ruled by sharia law based on the Sunni Islam 
interpretation (Nanji 1996, 152).  
Members followed strict prayer schedules and were devout followers of Karim. The 
group rapidly grew through a call to recruit and convert others. In 1970, the group moved to the 
Yasin Mosque on Herkimer Street in Brooklyn, New York. After relocating to Herkimer Street, a 
militarized doctrine called “Rad” was introduced and members learned martial arts and received 
weapons training. Throughout the 1970s Karim’s movement spread to Baltimore, Pennsylvania, 
and Washington, D.C (Nanji 1996, 152-153).  
In the mid-1970s Sheikh Jilani, a Pakistani Sufi teacher, began attending the Dar 
(“house”) mosque and introduced the Islamic concept of jihad and a mystic element of Islam. In 
1979 Sheikh Jilani’s teachings formed its own following and the Dar splintered.  Many followed 
Jilani’s splinter that called itself Al Fuqara, while others remained with Karim because Jilani was 
not African American, an important element of Karim’s movement (Nanji 1996, 152).    
Jilani is thought to have joined the Afghan mujahedeen between 1979 and 1980 (Berger 
2011).  Sheikh Jilani maintained residence in Lahore, Pakistan but his following in the U.S. 
served as recruitment for black Muslims to the mujahedeen in Afghanistan.  His followers 
continued to spread his teachings in the Brooklyn area, as well as Virginia, Colorado, and 
Pennsylvania.  The members called themselves Jamaat al Fuqara, the Society of the Poor (Berger 
2011). Jilani’s teachings focus on seclusion to organize individuals to reject “the ills of modern 
society and strive to live in a pure Islamic community” (Ali and Rosenau 2008; START 2008).   
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Al Fuqara’s members, also known as Muslims of America, are predominately black 
Muslim converts118 some of whom were recruited in prisons and moved to al Fuqara communal 
living hubs and nodes upon leaving prison.  A Buena Vista, Colorado communal hub has the 
largest acreage, but the main headquarters is located in Hancock, New York.  These hubs 
provided weapons stockpiles and military training. Members visited Pakistan during and after the 
mujahedeen war to receive training and ideological guidance from Jilani through his Quranic 
Open University. Al Fuqara members follow an outspoken anti-Semitic ideology in addition to 
waging “jihad” or “holy war” within the United States (Clines 1993; Kane and Wall 2005; Anti-
Defamation League 1993).  In the early 1990s, al Fuqara had an estimated 1,000 to 3,000 
members with hundreds of individuals living in some of the major hubs throughout the United 
States (START 2008; Anti-Defamation League 1993). 
 
Table 6.3 Al Fuqara Hubs and Nodes 
110 acre hub- Colorado: Buena Vista 70 acre hub- New York: Hancock (main headquarters) 
California: Baladulla, Oak Hill (nodes) Oklahoma: Talihina (node) 
New York: Deposit (node) South Carolina: York County (node) 
Georgia: Commerce, Macon (nodes) Tennessee: Dover (node) 
Maryland: Hyattsville (node) Texas: unknown city 
Michigan: Coldwater (node) Virginia: Red House and Falls Church (nodes) 
Alabama: Marion (node) Washington: Onalaska (node) 
Source: Kane and Wall (2005, Appendix B) 
 
Jamaat ul Fuqara carried out a number of attacks in the United States, primarily against 
other ethnic and religious groups between 1980 and 1993.   Jilani is thought to financially 
support organizations in the Kashmiri struggle against India, and al Fuqara’s first documented 
terror attack was against an Indian owned hotel in 1983. The group also targeted Hare Krishna 
                                                 
118 This group had no connection to Louis Farrakhan’s Nation of Islam movement (Anti-Defamation League 1993). 
In fact, al Fuqara cites Nation of Islam as an enemy (Kane and Wall 2005). 
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temples, Sikh social organizations, Laotian temples, and competing Islamic movements. The 
majority of its terrorist attacks occurred between 1983 and 1986.  In total, 13 murders and 16 
bombings are linked to known al Fuqara members (Kane and Wall 2005, 26).  Members were 
initially believed to have conducted vigilante murders of drug dealers in support of the group’s 
purity message (Clines 1993), but these may have actually been tied to criminal elements used to 
fund the group. In the 1980s and 1990s, al Fuqara may have used gun running or “security-for-
hire” schemes for money (Berger 2011). 
The FBI investigated members of al Fuqara in connection with a 1983 Detroit bombing 
that targeted the rival Islamic Ahmadiyya Movement and subsequent bombings between 1983 
and 1989 (Kane and Wall 2005, 18).  The number of attacks directly linked to al Fuqara is 
difficult to corroborate because federal law enforcement do not disclose the group’s activities. 
Several members of the group were arrested for the 1980s bombings, but al Fuqara continued to 
operate (START 2008; Anti-Defamation League 1993; Kane and Wall 2005). 
The largest known investigation of al Fuqara was not conducted by federal law 
enforcement.  Colorado Springs local police stumbled across a storage locker on August 29, 
1989 during a stolen property investigation.  The owner of the storage locker allowed police 
access because the tenant had defaulted on payment.  Inside the storage locker Colorado 
authorities found very specific bombing and assassination attack plans for targets in Los 
Angeles, Tucson, and Denver, newspaper clippings of unsolved crimes, military manuals, bomb 
components and constructed pipe bombs, a weapons cache of handguns, evidence of identity 
theft, including 54 blank but embossed birth certificates from North Carolina and Louisiana, and 
documents signaling a network of fraudulent workman’s compensation claims.  The evidence of 
fraud allowed state and local officials to investigate the group in more detail. The extent of FBI 
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assistance in this matter came in 1990 when workman’s compensation claim documents were 
turned over (Kane and Wall 2005).  
During the initial stages of the investigation of evidence found in the storage locker, 
Colorado law enforcement contacted Tucson police to see if there had been any known attacks at 
a mosque.  Tucson police interviewed the mosque’s Imam as part of the Colorado investigation 
and the Imam told police that he had received threatening phone calls from “Colorado” due to his 
interpretations of the Koran (Kane and Wall 2005).   Imam Rashad Khalifa had been a wanted 
man by Sunni fundamentalists throughout the world since 1985, when a Saudi Grand Mufti 
issued a fatwa against Khalifa for a mathematically based coding scheme he used to prove the 
Koran was written by God.  When a few verses of the Koran threw off his theory, he determined 
those two verses must have been added by man and should be removed.  Khalifa was also 
disliked for his liberal views toward Muslim women (Berger 2011).   
On January 31, 1990, approximately two weeks after Tucson police interviewed Imam 
Rashad Abdel Khalifa, he was assassinated in the kitchen of his East Sixth Street Mosque in 
Tucson.  He was stabbed with a knife 29 times and his body covered with flame accelerant, the 
same manner described in the documents found in the Colorado storage locker months earlier.  
Three of al Fuqara’s members were suspected of taking part in the murder but initially only 
James Donald Williams was charged with of conspiracy to commit murder because his 
handwriting was found on the assassination plan.  Williams fled and was not found until August 
2000 in Virginia (Kane and Wall 2005).   
According to Colorado authorities, FBI officials were not forthcoming with local and 
state law enforcement during the investigation of the group’s activities (Kane and Wall 2005).  
The Department of Justice blocked the FBI’s investigation into al Fuqara based on the perception 
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that investigating an African American religious group would be viewed by the average 
American as suspicious profiling, since Americans were unaware of any of the group’s activities.  
The FBI also noted it wished to avoid “having another Waco incident” (Kane and Wall, 58).   
In the early 1990s when Colorado authorities were seeking the FBI’s assistance in the 
investigation of al Fuqra, federal law enforcement were engaged in a decade-long investigation 
of dozens of violent right-wing Christian Patriot militias and the Idaho-based hub of Aryan 
Nations.  From a federal law enforcement resource perspective, the Aryan Nations groups were 
likely a far greater threat to national security because they had threatened secession, had detailed 
plans of instigating a racially based war, and were stockpiling weapons and chemical toxins in 
far greater capacity than a storage locker.  After the Ruby Ridge and Waco incidents, federal law 
enforcement were constrained in acting against secretive, cult-like groups. 
Because the FBI did not want to become involved in the investigation, Colorado state and 
local authorities facilitated cooperation between local agencies across the country that connected 
al Fuqara’s network (Kane and Wall 2005). The U.S. compounds or jammats facilitated weapons 
training and ideological support from members trained in Pakistan, as well as providing 
financing for Jilani’s sponsored separatist terrorist movements in Kashmir.  Recovered 
documents from the Colorado raid suggest that members of the group were sending between 10-
30% of their fraudulent earnings to Jilani (Anti-Defamation League 1993; START 2008). 
On October 8, 1992, Colorado authorities were able to search Al Fuqara’s 110 acre Trout 
Creek Pass compound near Buena Vista, Colorado.  Police eventually uncovered a well-
organized network of fake security and construction companies.  The security companies 
allowed the group to gain access to bomb target locations, while the construction company 
facilitated fraudulent workman’s compensation claims.  Simultaneously, police in Williamsport, 
141 
 
Pennsylvania searched al Fuqara safe houses in the area.  Because Colorado lacked specific 
terrorism laws, a number of al Fuqara members were only convicted on specific criminal charges 
relating to “white collar crime” and one to the assassination of the Tucson, Arizona Imam.  The 
most important assistance from federal agencies in the investigation came from mail fraud 
investigations based on identity theft and document fraud, which is a critical counter-terrorism 
concern (Kane and Wall 2005).   
Because al Fuqara members have multiple alias through the identity theft and document 
fraud network, it is difficult to apprehend and convict members.  The vast network of secretive 
nodes in the U.S. and Canada also allows dozens of safe havens. Beginning in 1994, police 
pursued “Ben Wall” as a suspect in the Imam’s murder through a DNA match.  During the 
investigation and trial, “Ben Wall” also went by aliases "Ben Phillips" and "J.Q. Wall" (Smith 
2012).  A “Benjamin Phillips” was an al Fuqara member tied to the murder and a rented Tucson 
apartment in 1990 (Kane and Wall 2005).  In 2009 law enforcement eventually found the person 
they had sought since 1994, living in Canada, whose real name was Glen Francis. In 2012, Glen 
Francis was convicted in Pima County, Arizona of the Imam’s murder. During his trial it was 
disclosed that at least one other fingerprint and hair could not be attributed to Glen Francis 
(Smith 2012). 
For most of al Fuqara’s existence, the majority of American society was unaware of the 
presence of a radical Islamic group with active training facilities on U.S. soil. Since 1993 Al 
Fuqara has been less active but maintains its secretive closed communal living.  Al Fuqara has 
been referred to by federal authorities as a religious cult, based on the personality and teachings 
of Sheikh Jilani. During the late 1990s and early 2000s the group “rebranded” as Muslims of 
America (MOA) (Ali and Rosenau 2008).  The group’s desire to live in isolated compounds is 
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not a rare or new phenomenon in American society.  In the 1980s and 1990s, religious 
fundamentalists living in closed compounds and stockpiling weapons was actually quite popular 
in the United States, thus they attracted little attention (Ali and Rosenau 2008).   
After 9/11 the history of al Fuqara’s religious inspired violence in the United States and 
ties to fundamentalist Islam in Pakistan have raised concerns from politicians and many 
Christian-based organizations in the United States. Some Americans maintain that al 
Fuqara/MOA and other Islamic organizations are an unmitigated threat to the United States 
homeland, thus a considerable number of allegations regarding MOA’s activity over the past 
decade have been waged against the group. Much of the speculation is fueled by books authored 
by Christian Broadcast Network terrorism journalist Erick Stackelbeck (2011, 2013), a Christian 
Action Network book (Mawyer and Pierucci 2012), and a number of independent media sources, 
blogs, and self-published books.  These sources claim to document evidence that Al Fuqara 
remains an active terror threat, Americans are under a threat of sharia law being imposed on U.S. 
soil, and that the American government is ignoring the threat.   
Suspicion also stems from the U.S. State Department’s official position regarding the 
group.  Texas Congressman Louie Gohmert is an outspoken critic of the government’s failure to 
label al Fuqara a terrorist organization (Moore 2014). The State Department previously noted the 
group’s existence in annual reports on terrorist activity, but the official position of the U.S. 
government since 2000 (when al Fuqara changed its name) is that al Fuqara is not considered to 
be a terrorist organization, since it has not been connected to violence since at least 2000 (U.S. 
State Department 2002).   
The mystery surrounding al Fuqara or Muslims of America, has received additional 
attention from Americans for two incidents after 9/11. Sheikh Jilani is often connected to the 
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kidnapping and murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl on February 1, 2002.  Daniel Pearl 
was on his way to interview Jilani when he was abducted and later beheaded.  Daniel Pearl’s 
wife told investigators that he had sought an interview with Jilani, based on the claims that Jilani 
was tied to Richard Reid, the terrorist known as “the shoe bomber.” Jilani has denied a 
connection to Reid, who is alleged to have been a follower of Jilani’s movement119 (Ali and 
Rosenau 2008).  
A Pakistani and FBI investigation concluded that Jilani was not responsible for the 
murder of Daniel Pearl. In the hours following Pearl’s disappearance, Sheikh Jilani’s associates 
raised doubts that he would have ever elected to meet Pearl at the planned location.  Daniel Pearl 
thought he was going to meet Jilani but instead Pearl’s Pakistani contacts had perhaps 
unknowingly put him in touch with Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, a British-born al-Qaeda 
terrorist.  Al Qaeda pursued and murdered Pearl because of his Jewish heritage. In 2007, Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammad took credit for personally beheading him (Amanpour 2007).          
Muslims of America maintains its communal living in Hancock, New York 
(headquarters), Buena Vista, Colorado, Coldwater, Michigan, York County, South Carolina, 
Baladulla, California, and Falls Church and Red House, Virginia and its members are most 
commonly associated with criminal weapons charges, rather than terrorist activity.  MOA has 
similar communal living in Canada and followers in Trinidad and Tobago (Ali and Rosenau 
2008; Kane and Wall 2005).   
Little is known about al Fuqara/MOA’s current organizational structure, decision-making 
practices, or recruitment strategy. Yet, “given the history of violence, its access to weapons, and 
the physical isolation of its members, law enforcement and social service agencies should remain 
                                                 
119 Jilani’s sermons are posted on the Muslims of America website, so it is possible that he followed Jilani without 
his knowledge.   
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alert to any indications that the organization is on a violently self-destructive trajectory” (Ali and 
Rosenau 2008).120 At this time there is no clear linkage between al Fuqara and al Qaeda. 
According to analysts at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, “Jilani and Bin Laden 
are best understood as rivals rather than as confederates” (Ali and Rosenau 2008). 
The possible linkages between al Fuqara and al Qaeda appeared in the earliest al Qaeda 
nodes in the United States.  First, al Fuqara’s Colorado or New York hub crossed paths with an 
al Qaeda affiliate, Wadith El Hage, in 1990 through the murder of the Imam, a crime that law 
enforcement believe El Hage took part, but El Hage has never charged (Zill 2001).  Second, 
American born Clement Rodney-El (also known as Abdullah Rashid) was known to U.S. 
authorities as early as 1988, when he returned from fighting with the mujahedeen in Afghanistan 
(Ali and Rosenau 2008).  Hampton-el’s al Fuqara affiliation was connected through the 1992 
Colorado raid (Anti-Defamation League 1993) but whether he was an actual member is unclear 
(Ali and Rosenau 2008).  After 1993, a New York City Joint Terrorism Task Force member who 
investigated Hampton-el, stated that he did not seem to know about the group al Fuqara. 
Meanwhile, former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer who tracked Rodney Hampton-el (or Abdullah 
Rashid), stated that Hampton-el and his closest associates were “at least tangentially” involved 
with al Fuqara.   
In the Brooklyn, New York area throughout the 1980s and 1990s there were several 
mujahedeen veterans and inspired radical Islamic groups interwoven with criminal financing 
operations, thus, it would seem unlikely that Hampton-el would be oblivious to the existence of 
al Fuqara (Berger 2011, 36).  However, Sheikh Jilani also denies that al Fuqara ever existed and 
                                                 
120 During the al Fuqara investigation, Colorado state officials expressed concern that children living in closed 
compounds were isolated, home-schooled, and trained in military techniques (Kane and Wall 2005).  However, that 
behavior is not unlike militia groups in the U.S. that follow the same lifestyle in closed rural compounds (Ali and 
Rosenau 2008; START 2008). 
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that only non-members call it by that name, but Jilani’s statements on the name of the group 
follow its rebranding attempts under Muslims of America. 
The network that became al Qaeda established nodes in the United States during the 
Afghan-Soviet war in order to funnel money, recruits, and weapons to the mujahedeen in 
Afghanistan.  Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda’s ideological founder Abdullah Azzam formed 
Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK) in Peshawar, Pakistan in 1984 as the front organization for the 
global jihad (Berger 2011; Scheuer 2011).  In 1985, MAK (also known as Afghan Service 
Bureau Front or Al Kifah) established well organized recruitment and financing nodes in 
Brooklyn, New York and Tucson, Arizona that were maintained by trusted affiliates of Abdullah 
Azzam and Osama bin Laden (Wright 2006; Scheuer 2011; Berger 2011). 
Table 6.4 Early Fundamentalist Islamic Nodes 
Organization Location Individuals 





Transit point for fighters to and from mujahedeen in Afghanistan. 
Criminal enterprises included counterfeiting, gunrunning, petty 
crime. 
1984-1985: first office in Al Farooq Mosque; in 1986 moved to 
small apartment a few doors away from al Farooq Mosque at 566 










Formed in 1984 in Peshawar, Pakistani.  U.S. based financing 
and recruiting node for mujahedeen.  In the U.S. also referred to 
as Alkifah Afghan Refugee Center or Al Kifah Center. 
Abdullah Azzam  





1984-1985: First home to Alkifah Afghan Refugee Center 
Common meeting place Arab immigrants. Located in the middle 
of the Atlantic Avenue Arab cultural scene in Brooklyn, New 
York. 6 story converted factory (3 stories mosque, 3 stories a 
Muslim school).  
Frequented by all 
members of the 
Brooklyn al-Qaeda 
linked node. 




Jihadist fundamentalist mosque, unlike more traditional Al 
Farooq mosque. Established by Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman 
(The Blind Sheikh) in July 1990. Located above a Chinese 
restaurant in Jersey City, NJ and near the New Jersey warehouse 
used to plan 1993 WTC bombing. 
1993 WTC 
conspirators; El Sayid 
Nosair; Abouhalima; 
Ramzi Yousef; Rodney 
Hampton-el (Abdullah 
Rashid). 
Al Kifah Center  
 
Located in Tucson, Arizona. Criminal enterprises included 
gunrunning and counterfeiting. Also printed Abdullah Azzam’s 
literature in mid-1980s for mujahedeen recruitment.  
 
Wadih El Hage; Loay 






Financing front for al Qaeda. Founded by Osama bin Laden’s 
brother in law Mohammad Jamal Khalifa in the Philippines in the 
late 1980s. Funded global mujahedeen through offices in Bosnia, 
Philippines, Chechnya, China, and Russia.  U.S. branch 
incorporated through the state of Illinois on March 30, 1992 as a 
non-profit, tax exempt organization.  Operated openly in the U.S. 





Sources: U.S. Department of Treasury; Wright (2006); Scheuer (2011); Weiser, Sachs and Kocieniewski (1998); 
Berger (2011); Juergensmeyer (2003); Zill (2001) 
 
 
Table 6.5 Key Individuals of U.S. Nodes 




Lebanese born Catholic, who converted to Islam in Kuwait. Attended college in Louisiana in 
1979. Afghan mujahedeen fighter 1979-1985. Returned to the U.S. in 1985.  Involved in 
mujahedeen recruitment, gun-running, and counterfeiting between Tucson and New York 
nodes (1985-1992).   
 
Lived in Sudan and Kenya (1992-1997). Worked as bin Laden’s secretary and assisted in 
logistics and fundraising network.  His roommate in Kenya later became the commander of 
Al Shabaab until being killed in 2011. El Hage was expelled from Kenya in 1997 and 
returned to Arlington, Texas.  
 
May 2001: Convicted of conspiracy in 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing in Kenya. Currently 









Attended Alexandria University in Egypt and active in Muslim student organizations. Left 
Egypt in 1981 during Sadat’s Islamic fundamentalist crack-down.  Lived in Munich, West 
Germany as a secular Muslim (1981-1985).  In 1985, he traveled to U.S. on temporary visa 
with his German wife and settled in Brooklyn as a taxi driver.  
 
1990 getaway driver for Rabbi Meir Kahane assassination (Jewish Defense League founder); 
Driver and personal bodyguard for Blind Sheikh (1990-1993). Arrested in 1993 for WTC 
bombing and provided a detailed account of Al Kifah Refugee Center and its affiliates to 
federal agents.  Convicted in 1994 of WTC bombing as main co-conspirator with Ramzi 





Key fundamentalist Islamic and spiritual leader since the early 1980s.  Involved in inspiring 
Islamist political violence since the 1980s.  In July 1990 he came to the U.S. via Egypt-
Pakistan-Sudan, despite being on the State Department’s banned entry list.  Led MAK/ as bin 
Laden’s U.S. affiliate after 1991. Convicted of 1993 WTC bombing in October 1995. 





Pakistani born in Iraq and raised in Kuwait.  Follower of the Blind Sheikh. Came to the U.S. 
September 1, 1992 with the help of the Blind Sheikh after attending school in London.  
Learned bomb-making in Peshawar earlier in 1992. 
 
Planned 1993 WTC bombings with Abouhalima but escaped the U.S. prior to being arrested.  
Between 1993 and 1995 served as planner for al Qaeda central command with his uncle 
Khalid Sheik Muhammad. Captured in Karachi, Pakistan in February 1995.  Convicted of 




Egyptian born, Brooklyn electrical contractor in the early 1980s.  Traveled to Afghanistan 
and Pakistan in and fought with mujahedeen. Became closest trusted associate of Abdullah 
Azzam.  Between 1984 and 1985 he returned to Brooklyn from Afghanistan to head Al Kifah 
Center in New York for Azzam. 
 
Thought to have sponsored the Blind Sheik’s immigration to U.S. in July 1990, but the two 
competed for power of the Brooklyn node. Kidnapped and murdered by someone in inner 









Syrian born, naturalized U.S. citizen. Moved to Kansas City as a teenager and attended the 
University of Missouri-Kansas City (1982-1984). Joined mujahedeen in 1985. 
Note-taker in al Qaeda’s founding meeting in August 1988. Close affiliate/friend of Azzam 
and Osama bin Laden.  Moved to Sudan in 1992 and became Bin Laden’s business advisor. 
 
Moved to Illinois in 1994 to work for Benevolence International charity. On December 16, 
1994 Bayazid and BIF founder Khalifa were arrested in San Francisco after a flight from the 
Philippines. Bayazid was released and returned to Khartoum, where he lived openly as late as 
2006. He cooperated with FBI after 9/11. 
Sources: United States Department of Treasury121; Wright (2006); Scheuer (2011); Weiser, Sachs and Kocieniewski 
(1998); Berger (2011); Juergensmeyer (2003); Zill (2001) 
 
As early as 1979 and with more frequency between late 1984 and November 1989, 
Abdullah Azzam made trips from Peshawar, Pakistan to the U.S. and spoke to Muslim student 
organizations.  Osama bin Laden’s wife has alleged that bin Laden and Azzam actually met for 
the first time in Los Angeles, California in 1979 (Scheuer 2011; Wright 2006). While Azzam 
was on his speaking tour, he visited mosques and established approximately 30 field offices for 
MAK/Al Kifah.  After 1985, these were managed by his most trusted affiliates Mustafa Shalabi 
and Wadih el Hage. Known field offices include Brooklyn (headquarters), Tucson (secondary 
headquarters), St. Louis, Kansas City, Seattle, Sacramento, Los Angeles, and San Diego.  
Charities in support of the mujahedeen struggle were established throughout the world, 
but specifically in the United States due to the lax regulations on non-profit organizations (Kane 
and Wall 2005; Wright 2006; Clunan 2006; Sidel 2010).  Furthermore, the MAK/Al Kifah was 
“regarded as friends and allies of America” in the mujahedeen war against the Soviet Union from 
1979-1989. Azzam and Osama bin Laden became rivals in the late 1980s over the long-term 
goals of al Qaeda.  Members of Azzam’s inner circle turned against him for allegations of 
financial fraud.  He was killed by a car bomb in Pakistan in November 1989, assumed to be an 
                                                 




order from bin Laden122 (Berger 2011; Gunaratna 2002). Because Azzam’s trusted affiliate 
Mustafa Shalabi managed U.S. Al Kifah operations, Azzam’s death changed the power dynamic 
of the New York node as well. Osama bin Laden seized control of the New York node through 
the Blind Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman after Shalabi’s murder in February 1991.  This provided 
bin Laden with sole control over al Qaeda operations worldwide.  
The elaborate network created between 1985 and 1993 was severely disrupted after the 
February 26, 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) bombing, effectively ending al Qaeda’s ability to 
operate openly in the United States.  Many MAK/ Al Kifah affiliates were arrested in connection 
to the bombing between 1993-1995 (Gunaratna 2002; Juergensmeyer 2003).   
The most significant arrest and conviction was of the Blind Sheikh, who was the spiritual 
and organization leader of the Brooklyn node.  A former Theology professor at Cairo’s Al Azhar 
University, the Rahman was deeply embedded in fundamentalist Islamic thought during the 
mujahedeen and the affiliated transnational movement most often associated with al Qaeda.  He 
was spiritual leader to Ayman al Zawahiri’s123 fundamentalist Egyptian EIJ group/Gamaa 
Islamiya and his followers assassinated Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981.124 In 
1989, he was arrested in Egypt for inciting anti- government riots. Despite being barred from 
entry into the U.S. by the State Department for violent rhetoric, he was allowed entry in July 
1990 via Egypt-Pakistan-Sudan either with the help of a sympathetic U.S. embassy worker in 
                                                 
122 Other theories suggest the CIA, but Azzam had many enemies in Peshawar in the months leading up to his death, 
and the person with the most to gain from Azzam’s death in 1989 was Osama bin Laden. 
123 Ayman al Zawahiri was bin Laden’s second in command and became al Qaeda central’s leader after May 2011. 
 
124 Rahman was tried but not convicted for role in the assassination. He traveled to Afghanistan in the 1980s during 




Cairo or a CIA officer who signed off on his entry to the U.S.  As Osama bin Laden’s most 
trusted U.S. affiliate, his imprisonment limited al Qaeda’s operations in the U.S.125   
Because the Brooklyn node was a key point of contact for fundamentalists in the United 
States and the headquarters of planning terrorist attacks within the U.S. homeland, al Qaeda’s 
U.S. nodes were nearly eliminated after the 1993 attack. However, Ramzi Yousef, who fled the 
U.S. after the World Trade Center attack was not captured until February 1995 raid in Karachi, 
Pakistan.  The FBI later made connections to Yousef’s role in large al Qaeda operations.  Along 
with his uncle Khalid Sheik Muhammad (later the 9/11 planner), Yousef forged an alliance 
between al Qaeda central command and Abu Sayyaf and Moro Liberation Islamic Front in the 
Philippines.  During his two years evading U.S. intelligence, Yousef planned an assassination 
plot of the Pope in the Philippines and Project Boinka, a plot to blow up 11 American owned 
commercial aircraft over the Pacific Ocean in one day. (Gunaratna 2003; U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation 2008; Juergensmeyer 2003). 
The two remaining individuals from the first generation al Qaeda’s U.S. nodes (1985-
1993) were the key figures of the Tucson node, American citizens Wadih El Hage and Loay 
Bayazid.  Syrian born, naturalized American citizen Loay Bayazid, moved to Kansas City, 
Missouri as a teenager. He attended the University of Missouri-Kansas City between August 
1982 and May 1984.  Between 1984 and 1985 Bayazid moved to Tucson, possibly for graduate 
school but was inspired by Abdullah Azzam’s writings and joined Afghan mujahedeen in 1985.  
He became a close friend of Azzam and Osama bin Laden and is thought to have been an official 
note-taker in al Qaeda’s founding meeting in August 1988.  
                                                 
125 Although imprisoned in North Carolina, Rahman released a fatwa from prison that inspired the 9/11 attacks and 
maintains a following of Egyptian Arab Spring Islamists, who are focused on attempting to negotiate for his release 
and repatriation to Egypt. 
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Wadith El Hage was a Lebanese-born Catholic who grew up in Kuwait where his father 
worked in the oil sector. As a teenager in Kuwait, he converted to Islam, and was shunned by his 
Lebanese Catholic family.  In 1978 at the age of 18, Wadith El Hage moved to the U.S. to attend 
college at the University of Southwestern Louisiana in Lafayette but left Louisiana in 1979 to 
join the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, where he remained until January 1985.  During the early 
1980s, he became a close follower of Abdullah Azzam and likely formed a relationship with 
Osama bin Laden during his five years with the mujahedeen (Wright 2006; Scheuer 2011; Berger 
2011; Zill 2001).  
In January 1985 he returned to the University of Southwestern Louisiana and later that 
year, Wadith married an 18 year old American Muslim convert April Brightsky Ray from 
Tucson, Arizona.126  After the marriage, he settled in Tucson but traveled to Pakistan 
periodically for the mujahedeen.  In 1989, Wadith El Hage became a naturalized U.S. citizen 
through his marriage (Zill 2001).  Wadith El Hage provided the connection between the New 
York and Tucson MAK/Al Kifah nodes.  
As part of the Tucson Muslim society in the late 1980s, Wadith became critical of the 
Tucson Imam Khalifa’s beliefs.  In late 1989 New York MAK/Al Kifah director Mustafa Shalabi 
sent an envoy from New York to Tucson to investigate the Imam, who was murdered in January 
1990. El Hage was never formally charged with the Imam’s murder, but prosecutors maintained 
that he was likely involved in the murder along with members of the group al Fuqara.  In 
December 1989, El Hage met Mahmud Abouhalima at an Islamic conference in Oklahoma City, 
where the two discussed gun-trafficking for the assassination of Jewish Defense League founder 
Meir Kahane, which was carried out on November 5, 1990.  In 1990, he left Tucson and moved 
                                                 
126 The marriage was arranged by her Muslim convert mother through a social network of mosques that matched 
Muslim men and women. 
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his family to Arlington, Texas where he is thought to have continued his involvement criminal 
enterprises, such as gun-running for Brooklyn, New York node (Wright 2006; Scheuer 2011; 
Berger 2011; Juergensmeyer 2003; Zill 2001).    
Both El Hage and Bayazid found their way to Sudan to serve directly under Osama bin 
Laden in 1992, evading the 1993 World Trade Center attack counter-terrorism fallout.  El Hage 
specialized in illicit/criminal enterprises and Bayazid served as Osama bin Laden’s legitimate 
business advisor in the 1990s.  Bayazid continued to live in Khartoum and run bin Laden’s 
businesses after al Qaeda’s hub was relocated to Afghanistan.  Wadith El Hage was later 
convicted of his involvement in al Qaeda’s bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. 
From Sudan and Kenya, El Hage and Bayazid created a network of financing and recruitment 
that facilitated al Qaeda’s growth over the next decade (Zill 2001; Wright 2006).   
Wadith El Hage cut his teeth in crime and smuggling in the Tucson, Arizona and Dallas, 
Texas areas from 1985 to 1992.   In 1992, El Hage relocated his family to Sudan to run Osama 
bin Laden’s “Help Africa People” charity, which was considered a malaria control organization 
but served as a charity for money laundering. While in Khartoum, El Hage was Bin Laden’s 
personal secretary.  He dispersed al Qaeda’s payroll, acted as a courier for Bin Laden, and 
obtained fraudulent documents for al Qaeda associates (Feuer 2001; U.S. Department of Justice 
2013).  In 1993, from his home in Khartoum, El Hage was able to use a contact in the U.S., a 
pilot named Essam al Ridi, to purchase a T-39 aircraft from a used plane lot in Tucson so bin 
Laden could transfer Stinger missiles from Pakistan to Sudan.   Essam al Ridi purchased it, 




In 1994, he moved to Kenya where he roomed with Haroun Fazil. Between 1994 and 
1997, El Hage used his skills to become a gem trafficker between Afghanistan and Kenya (Zill 
2001).127 FBI authorities seized his personal computer from his home and found that his 
roommate, Fazil, was in charge of Al Qaeda’s East Africa node.  El Hage was expelled from 
Kenya, but Haroun Fazil was allowed to stay.128  In September 1997, El Hage and his family 
moved back to Arlington, Texas, where he began working at a tire shop.  Although El Hage was 
in Texas for nearly a year before the August 7, 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and 
Tanzania, he was arrested for his role in planning the attacks on October 7, 1998.  On May 29, 
2001 he was convicted of multiple counts of perjury for lying to a federal grand jury, making 
false statements to federal agents, and conspiracy to destroy U.S. government buildings and 
murder U.S. nationals, government employees, and internationally protected individuals.  On 
April 23, 2013 Wadith El-Hage was re-sentenced129 to life in prison (U.S. Department of Justice 
2013).  
After El-Hage and his Tucson counterpart, Loay Bayazid went to Sudan in 1992, and the 
1993 World Trade Center conspirators were arrested from 1993 to 1995 al Qaeda’s use of the 
U.S. as a sanctuary was financial.  The main al Qaeda financial node in the United States was 
through the Benevolence International Foundation charity, registered as a tax-exempt, non-profit 
in the state of Illinois founded in 1992 (U.S. Department of Treasury 2012).   
                                                 
127 Al Qaeda’s ties to the mineral or gem industry, forged through El Hage, are most likely tied to the Tanzanian 
tanzanite trade or the Afghan emerald trade, rather than the diamond trade.  This connection became clear in August 
and September 1997 when US authorities tried to question El Hage for his involvement in al Qaeda, but he was in 
Afghanistan on a “gem collecting trip.” 
 
128 Haroun Fazil is better known as Fazul Abdullah Mohammed.  He was a native of Comoros Islands where he 
attended a Wahhabi school, received a scholarship to go to Pakistan, where he was radicalized further and joined al 
Qaeda.  He rose in the Al Qaeda ranks from 1995 until becoming top commander of Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab in 
East Africa. He was killed on June 7, 2011 by Somali military in Mogadishu. 
129 On appeal, the Second Circuit court upheld El-Hage’s 2001 conviction and remanded for resentencing in light of 
the Supreme Court’s decision on federal sentencing guidelines in United States v. Booker.  
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A relative calm emerged between 1995 and 2000 from both right-wing and religious 
terrorist groups operating within the United States.  This is not directly attributed to the 1996 
Anti-Terrorism Act because its components focused on reactive counterterrorism strategy and 
came after terrorists were already arrested, splintering, or organizing al Qaeda overseas.  No 
policies were implemented to allow effective investigation and elimination of the numerous 
“charities” funding Islamic jihad throughout the world or other terrorism nodes within the United 
States.  In 1995, a group of 18 individuals caught the Charlotte, North Carolina FBI field office’s 
eye.  A large-scale cigarette smuggling ring from low-tobacco tax North Carolina to high-
tobacco tax New York and other states eventually initiated the FBI’s “Operation Smokescreen” 
in 1998.  The FBI knew the same group was purchasing night vision goggles, global position 
devices, mine detection equipment, cell phones and blasting equipment, and they were sending 
the equipment to Lebanon.  Due to a domestic and international intelligence sharing breakdown, 
the investigation stopped there and the FBI remained unaware that these individuals were a 
Hezbollah logistical and fundraising node (Nowell 2002).   
The intelligence community formed the Bin Laden Unit in 1996 and surveillance of al 
Qaeda’s activities led to some success in understanding the network (Bergen 2006; Scheuer 
2011). The U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 was a pivotal moment for 
the intelligence community, but not American society. The 1998 attacks abroad were not enough 
for the state to overcome staunch societal opposition to financial reform from civil libertarian 
interest groups and the banking sector (Clunan 2006). Counterterrorism in the United States 
relied on local, state, and federal police work, without a clear go-between to connect the 
domestic and international dots. 
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In July 2001 an FBI investigation began through the Phoenix special agent warned FBI 
headquarters of an influx of suspicious flight students from Jordan, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, and 
Pakistan in the Phoenix and Tucson area.  One of these students, Hani Hanjour, moved between 
Saudi Arabia and Phoenix between 1991 and 2001, socialized with fundamentalist Muslims in 
the area, and attended flight school and universities in Arizona and California (Berger 2011).  
The Phoenix field office alarm led to an Federal Aviation Administration warning of a possible 
hijacking plot but most of the flight training had already occurred in Florida and Oklahoma 
through 2000 and early 2001.   
Another hijacking alarm came on August 10, 2001 when Moroccan born, French citizen 
Zacarias Moussaoui enrolled in a Pan Am flight school in Eagan, Minnesota, paid cash, and told 
instructors he was only interested in learning to steer an aircraft rather than take off or land 
(Gunaratna 2002, 146).  The FBI arrested him on August 16, 2001 for an immigration violation, 
but he never provided investigators any additional information. Moussaoui was part of the 
Malaysian cell tracked by the CIA, so his arrest prompted a warning from the CIA that “two” 
other al Qaeda terrorists may be in the United States (Alexander 2006).130 
Table 6.6 9/11 Nodes 
9/11 Hijackers Transit Point U.S. Nodes 
Mohammad Atta 
Egyptian; 9/11 nodes 
leader; Pilot of Flight 
11 
Hamburg student 
since early 1990s. 
German passport. 
US via Czech 
Republic. 
Airman Flight School in Norman, OK (June 2000); Huffman 
Aviation in Venice, FL (July 2000-Dec 2000); Purchased flight 
simulation videos from Ohio store Nov-Dec 2000; Flight check in 
Decatur, GA (Feb 2001). Jan-July 2001 traveled to Switzerland, 
Czech Republic, and Spain to debrief al Qaeda plot leaders. 
Marwan al-Shehhi 




Airman Flight School in Norman, OK (June 2000); Huffman 
Aviation in Venice, Florida (July 2000-Dec 2000); flight check 
ride in Decatur, GA (Feb 2001). Residence in Hollywood, FL 
                                                 
130 Moussaoui was radicalized in London’s Finsbury Park mosque and fought in mujahedeen in Chechnya in the 
1990s.  The CIA tracked the Malaysia node when Moussaoui flew from Kuala Lumpur to Pakistan and then to 
Afghanistan and London to meet German contact in February 2001.  Upon arriving to the U.S. in March, he joined a 
fitness gym in Norman, Oklahoma and attended the Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma in May 2001 
before he enrolled in Pan Am’s Eagan, Minnesota flight school.  He is currently serving a life sentence in Colorado 








Florida Flight school (June 2000 to January 2001); Joined Florida 
gym (May-July 2001), learned martial arts, kickboxing, knife-
fighting.  Flight check (Feb 2001) in Fort Lauderdale, FL. 
Khalid al-Midhar 
Saudi; Flight 77 
Malaysia node Arrived in LA from Bangkok (January 15, 2001). Lived in San 
Diego, California.  New York City or New Jersey (July-August 
2001); Washington D.C. (August-Sept 2001) 
Nawaf al-Hazmi 
Saudi; Flight 77 
Malaysia node Arrived in LA from Bangkok (Jan 15, 2001). Lived in San Diego 
and Mesa with Hanjour. Fort Lee, NJ and Wayne, NJ (July-Aug 
2001); Washington D.C. (Aug-Sept 2001) 
Fayez Banihammad 
UAE; Flight 175 
UAE 
 
Orlando, Florida (June 2001) 
Ahmed al-Ghamdi 
Saudi; Flight 175 
UAE May 2, 2001. Delray Beach, Florida. Falls Church, Virginia 
Hamza al-Ghamdi 
Saudi; Flight 175  
UAE or London-
Student Visa 
May 28, 2001.  Affiliated to living in: Delray Beach, Florida; Falls 
Church, Virginia; Paterson, New Jersey 
Waleed al-Shehri 
Saudi; Flight 11  
UAE April 23, 2001. Hollywood, Orlando, and Daytona Beach, Florida 
Salem al Hamzi 
Saudi; Flight 77   
UAE-Visa Express, 
passport fraudulent 
Late June 2001. Addresses recorded: Fort Lee, NJ, and Wayne, NJ 
Ahmed al-Haznawi 
Algami 
Saudi; Flight 93 
UAE Arrived in D.C. area May 2001. Delray Beach, Florida later. 
Hani Hanjour 
Saudi; Flight 77 Pilot 
Returned to US 
(AZ) in Dec 2000 
from Saudi Arabia. 
Commercial pilot license from Scottsdale, AZ in 1999. Jan to 
March 2001 attended Phoenix Pan Am flight school.  Lived in 
Falls Church, VA (April 2001) and Paterson, NJ (May 2001) 
Majed Moqued 
Saudi; Flight 77  
UAE Arrived May 2, 2001 lived New Jersey or Washington, D.C. area 
Saeed al Ghamdi 
Saudi; Flight 93 
UAE Recorded address: Delray Beach, Florida (June 2001) 
Wail Shehri 
Saudi; Flight 11 
UAE Recorded address: Hollywood, FL and Newton, MA (June 8, 
2001) 
Abdul Aziz al Omari 
Saudi; Flight 11 
UAE-Visa Express June 2001: Stayed with others in Paterson, NJ. Later used flight 
simulators and lived in Vero Beach, Florida 
Satam al-Suqami 
Saudi; Flight 11 
UAE-Fraudulent 
Passport markers 
Fort Lauderdale or Delray Beach, FL (April 2001, possibly 
earlier) 
Mohald al-Shehri 
Saudi; Flight 175  
London to UAE Delray Beach, Florida (May/June 2001) 
Ahmed al-Nami 
Saudi; Flight 93  
New Saudi 
passport;  US via 
UAE 
Delray Beach, Florida (May 28, 2001) 
Source: U.S. FBI Press Release (2001); Gunaratna (2002, 140-145); Yardley (2002); Berger (2011); Eldridge, et al. 




The nineteen al Qaeda terrorists that conducted the September 11, 2001 hijacking and 
World Trade Center aerial attack illustrates the constraints placed upon the state’s ability to 
eliminate terrorist organizations through the pre-9/11 security apparatus.  The 9/11 hijackers 
were sophisticated in their U.S. entries, traveling from Germany, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Thailand (via Malaysia) at different times between 2000 and 2001.  Cognizant of the intelligence 
strengths and weaknesses of U.S. intelligence abroad, al Qaeda formed a new global network to 
plan the September 11th attacks that involved many countries not tracked by U.S. intelligence, 
such as Germany and the United Arab Emirates (Gunaratna 2002). As early as 1993, al Qaeda 
had acquired the U.S. “Red Book” consulate training manual for how to spot a terrorist and 
fraudulent markers on passports.  Al Qaeda was also aware of the lax visa policies afforded to 
wealthy countries and individuals with citizenship in wealthy countries.  Consequently, all the 
9/11 hijackers were Saudi, Emirati, or had lived in Germany long enough to not be considered 
suspicious. Members of the Hamburg, Germany node who were unable to obtain U.S. visas, 
Moroccan Mounir al-Matassadeq and Yemeni Ramzi bin al Shibh, served other functions for the 
U.S. nodes from nodes in Europe131 (Gunaratna 2002). 
The pre 9/11 visa policies intended to streamline the tremendous number of applications 
received by State Department consulates was based on the conventional wisdom that terrorists 
were poor and originated from failed states (see Eldridge, et al. 2004). The only prospective 
hijacker who did not receive a visa was Yemeni. Thus, the hijackers from Saudi Arabia, United 
Arab Emirates, and Germany had no problem gaining visas, although each of them had 
previously traveled to Afghanistan (Gunaratna 2002). To “clean” their passports from stamps 
                                                 
131 Ramzi bin al-Shibh was a roommate in Hamburg, Germany to other members of the node. He failed to obtain 
U.S. visa so he served as UAE-German (Dusseldorf, Hamburg) intermediary.  He is currently in U.S. detention at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  Mounir al-Matassadeq was a Hamburg, German student since 1993.  He was convicted of 




that showed travel through Pakistan, Iran, or Afghanistan, they acquired new passports from 
Germany and Saudi Arabia.132    
In June 2001, the visa process was made much easier for the last wave of Saudi and 
Emirati hijackers.  The U.S. consulate in Saudi Arabia outsourced the visa process to local travel 
agencies through the “Visa Express”133 program (Eldridge, et al. 2004).  Emirati citizen Fayez 
Banihammad submitted a five day old passport and an incomplete visa application to the 
American consular in Abu Dhabi, UAE.  He was not interviewed before being given a 
tourist/business visa to the United States.  After 9/11 when the consular officer was questioned, 
he noted that the consulate “almost never required interviews of Emirati citizens because the 
UAE was considered a welfare state that took good care of its citizens and that the UAE was 
treated as a de facto visa waiver country” (Eldridge, et al. 2004, 25). 
When the hijackers arrived in the U.S., they maintained separate bank accounts and lived 
in different parts of the country, attending flight school in Oklahoma, Florida, Minnesota, and 
Arizona.  The group of hijackers that lived in Florida were spread throughout the state, moved 
often, and tended to rent their own apartments or long-stay hotel rooms to avoid detection 
(Gunaratna 2002). 
Only the Malaysia node caught the CIA’s attention because Malaysia did not require 
Muslims to provide a visa to enter the country (Eldridge, et al. 2004).  Due to institutional 
                                                 
132 Hijackers simply lied about their previous travel with new passports.  In the case of at least four Saudi hijackers, 
the timeline for a new passport, visa to the United States, and a flight out of the United Arab Emirates was less than 
two weeks. 
 
133 No strict verification process (such as fingerprinting) was attached to Visa Express. A visa application was filled 
out, the travel agency took it to the American consulate, and it was often returned the next day. Description of visa 





disagreements between the FBI and CIA regarding counterterrorism strategy134, the CIA did not 
share any information with the FBI regarding the Malaysian cell inside the U.S. until Zacharias 
Moussaoui’s August 2001 arrest.  In August 2001, when the FBI learned from the CIA that two 
additional al Qaeda linked members were in the U.S., the FBI only had three weeks to find them 
before September 11, 2001 (Alexander 2006).  
 Critical Juncture: September 11
th
 and the U.S. Patriot Act 
The Patriot Act was signed into law on October 26, 2001135 and limited a number of pre-
existing privacy protections through expanded domestic intelligence collection (Alexander 
2006).  The Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002 also instituted protections against 
document fraud in the United States (Kane and Wall 2005) and the Visa Express program ended 
(Eldridge, et al. 2004). Financial regulations on banks and non-profit organizations that had 
previously been rejected by business interests and civil liberties groups were implemented for the 
first time to counter terrorist financing and money laundering (Clunan 2006).   
The charities that funded the mujahedeen in the Soviet-Afghan war did not disappear 
with the operational al Qaeda node’s arrests after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing (Wright 
2006).  Instead, they grew, took on new forms and financed jihad in Bosnia and Chechnya 
through the transnational Benevolence International Foundation.136  The BIF was established in 
1992 as a tax exempt, non-profit organization in Illinois and was not suspended until December 
2001 and was not officially banned until November 2002 through additional authority granted to 
                                                 
134 The CIA and FBI had an institutional disagreement over Osama bin Laden that began in the mid to late 1990s.  
The CIA reportedly wanted Osama bin Laden to be killed, while the FBI wanted to capture and criminally prosecute 
him.  Former employees of both agencies indicate that disagreements and personality conflicts between CIA and 
FBI managers bred competition for information and an information wall between the agencies (Wright 2006).  
  
135 Highlights of the Patriot Act are available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm. 
 
136 Now a globally banned “charity” because it was the financing front for Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. BIF 
maintained offices in Bosnia, Chechnya, Pakistan, China, Ingushetia, Russia, and other countries.   
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the Department of Treasury after 9/11.  For a decade after the 9/11 attacks, federal agencies 
continued to uncover Islamic charities financing terrorism through the authority of post 9/11 
legislation (Kane and Wall 2005; Wright 2006; U.S. Department of Justice 2008; U.S. 
Department of Treasury 2012). 
Furthermore, the aforementioned Department of Homeland Security was established, 
which facilitates centralized intelligence sharing between agencies (Alexander 2006). Taken 
together, these new laws provided the state with tools to strengthen its penetration of society and 
gain significant effectiveness in countering terrorism. One terrorist sanctuary in particular, 
Hezbollah’s node in North Carolina, which had provided funding and material support to the 
organization since 1995, was quickly disrupted by March 2002 after the fruitless four year 
“Operation Smokescreen” investigation between 1998 and 2001 (U.S. Congress, n.d.).  
Testimony by FBI Assistant Director of the Criminal Investigation Division Chris Swecker noted 
that “the ‘wall’ between intelligence investigation and criminal investigation made it extremely 
difficult to connect the dots” between the North Carolina node and Hezbollah’s hub in Lebanon 
(U.S. Congress, n.d).   
The American public remains divided on the provisions of the Patriot Act and subsequent 
re-authorizations since 2001, but has generally accepted the state’s increased reach.  Since 2004, 
the percentage of Americans who believe that the Patriot Act is a necessary tool to fight 
terrorism has risen from 33% to 42% in 2011. Similarly, those who believe it threatens civil 
liberties has dropped from 39% to 34%, but many Americans remain undecided (Pew Research 
2011). The views of society are also reflected in Congress’s re-authorization of the laws which 
have faced less scrutiny since the initial implementation. Interest groups like the Americans for 
Civil Liberties Union have consistently challenged governmental overreach in surveillance and 
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policing, but have had minimal success in blocking Congressional reauthorizations of the 2001 
Patriot Act and the 2008 Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments, or effectively 
challenging these laws in the Courts (American Civil Liberties Union 2013).  
The American public’s view of electronic surveillance programs that were revealed with 
Edward Snowden’s National Security Agency leaks in 2013 has renewed this debate.  Nearly 3 
in 4 Americans believe that society should not have to give up privacy or freedom to protect 
against terrorism and half of society believes that bulk collection electronic surveillance goes too 
far (Desilver 2014).  The state has been granted extensive legal authority since the 9/11 terror 
attacks, but the fact remains that society monitors and dictates the acceptable level of reach.   
 6.6 Summary and Discussion 
This chapter provides a new understanding of how strong states and weak states are 
categorized as they pertain to domestic security.  The analysis illustrates how weak state capacity 
can lead to the establishment of terrorist hubs and nodes. The state maintained the physical 
capacity to penetrate society through infrastructure and bureaucracy, but the strength of societal 
actors limited the ability to use its capacity. A notable finding through this process is how 
significant and rapid the state’s role can be in eliminating terrorist sanctuaries if infrastructure is 
in place. Since the state gained the ability to penetrate society with a more centralized security 
apparatus, terrorist groups have struggled to gain a presence on American soil.   
As the above analysis suggests, terrorism was not a rare phenomenon in the United States 
prior to the September 11th terrorist attacks. The United States’ experience as a terrorist 
sanctuary (both hubs and nodes) from 1970-2001 is extensive, but the sustained presence of 
terrorist hubs and nodes has been eliminated since early 2002.  In short, American society is both 
multi-cultural and polarized but maintains a core set of anti-statist beliefs that define state-
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society interactions.  Society’s focus on protecting civil liberties has traditionally restricted the 
state’s ability to counter terrorist groups within the U.S. but after 9/11 society acquiesced more 
authority to the state in domestic surveillance. Thus, the United States presents a within-case 
analysis testing of two hypotheses presented in Chapter 3.   
The failure of the Weathermen left-wing movement in the United States supports the 
hypothesis presented that societal strength, when firmly united against an ideological 
transnational terrorist movement, can drastically reduce its survivability.  The communist 
message was rejected by American society because it was not compatible with any core 
philosophical beliefs.  After the Vietnam War ended, the left-wing movement lost any source of 
passive societal support.  Thus, the state was able to extensively infiltrate the remnants of the 
left-wing movement with little resistance from society. 
In contrast to left-wing terrorism, much of American society and the state was 
complacent in rejecting domestic right-wing terrorism for over a century.  The KKK’s beliefs 
and activities promoted a Christian based justification for racism the institutionalized violation of 
civil rights, which were consistent with the status quo in American society until 1964. The 
extensive and violent history between the black minority and the white majority led to numerous 
racially based domestic terrorist groups veiled in Christian beliefs that were not pursued by the 
state.  This history laid the ideological groundwork for the rise of a well-organized transnational 
neo-Nazi network that gained momentum in an era of increasing racial equality and anti-
communist, anti-government fervor.   
As a result, right-wing terrorism’s religious and anti-statist foundation was protected by 
civil liberties organizations in society for decades.  Right-wing racist organizations were only 
effectively challenged by civil rights activist organizations through civil litigation, not by the 
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state. Access to civil litigation in the United States provides societal actors power when the state 
is unwilling or unable to address societal grievances. Societal actors’ ability to regulate behavior, 
rather than the state, is in stark contrast to strong states with weak societies.  
The micro-level state-society interaction approach provides an explanation for why 
American society continued rejecting state authority in domestic affairs until 2001 and why some 
ideological terrorist movements can survive longer than others in certain societies.  The presence 
of the pan Aryan hub in Idaho that served the transnational pan-Aryan movement from 1977-
2000 and al Fuqara’s terrorist hubs and affiliated nodes in the United States from 1980-1999, 
illustrates the ability of terrorist organizations to operate in strong societies that reject state 
penetration.   These cases lend support to the hypothesis presented in Chapter 3 that weak states 
with strong societies are more likely to be terrorist hubs. 
The state’s weakness is also evident in the explicit hesitation of the FBI to openly pursue 
al Fuqara’s training and financial hub, even after its members were involved in violence.  
Furthermore it illustrates the strength of Constitutional protections involving religion and guns 
and the societal backlash when the state attempts to exert authority in either of these areas.  Al 
Fuqara or Muslims of America’s structure is similar to the right-wing militia groups that 
stockpile weapons, live in isolation from society, and provide children with weapons training and 
an ideology based on God’s law as a replacement for the government’s law (Anti-Defamation 
League 1993; START 2008; Ali and Rosenau 2008).  The state’s attempt to regulate these 
groups through federal prosecution and force throughout the 1980s and 1990s ultimately failed.  
In strong states, purchasing property for military exercises, stockpiling weapons, and 
simultaneously espousing goals of a global race war or holy war would not be tolerated.  This 
unique feature of American society illustrates the inherent weakness of the state in addressing 
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challenges to its authority.  This weakness has drawn fundamentalist Christian white 
supremacists and fundamentalist Islamic jihadists to American soil because they face legal 
limitations nearly everywhere else.   
For decades, al Fuqara, Hezbollah, and al Qaeda operated in the United States and 
financed their hubs and nodes through white collar crime and unregulated non-profit 
organizations, without challenges from the state because powerful societal groups rejected 
financial reform. Societal interest group’s ability to maintain limited regulations of weapons and 
military equipment sales also illustrates a weakness of the state vis-à-vis society.  Access to 
weapons components in the U.S., therefore, resembles other weak states across the globe and is 
commonly referenced as reason terror organizations may be drawn to post-conflict societies.  As 
a result, the U.S. has served fundraising and logistical functions for transnational terror groups 
with little interference.  Hezbollah’s fundraising and logistics node was established due to 
economic regulatory weaknesses and the easily accessible military equipment that could be 
shipped overseas.  This illustrates the calculations terrorist groups make in choosing sanctuaries.  
The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing marks a critical antecedent for society’s willingness to 
accept increased state authority, but the critical juncture in state-society interactions did not 
occur until after the catastrophic September 11, 2001.  The societal constraints placed upon the 
state reached critical mass after the September 11th attacks, at which point society conceded 
authority to the state for the specific purpose of countering terrorism. After 9/11, the United 
States is a strong state with a strong society. Society remains exceptionally strong, notably in the 
area of economic elite dominance in public policy-making, but also the strength of organized 
interest groups (Gilens and Page 2014).  Through legislative reforms, the state was able to 
implement necessary financial regulations, but only for the purpose of counterterrorism.   
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Legislation after September 11th significantly increased the state’s reach into society, 
which allowed law enforcement to counter terrorism proactively, rather than reactively, and 
effectively filled a governance gap in the United States. The shift in state-society interactions 
also increased civil rights protections against right-wing violence that had previously been 
rejected.  Comprehensive hate crime legislation, which gave the federal government the power to 
prosecute hate crimes, was passed for the first time in 2009 through the Shepherd Byrd Hate 
Crimes Prevention Act. The 1964 Civil Rights legislation made it a crime to violently attack an 
individual based on race if the person was conducting a “federally protected activity,” but 
prosecuting through the statute led to lengthy appeals due to the vague wording in the statute.  
Subsequent policy changes were implemented through the 1990s for hate crime sentencing and 
federal assistance in hate crime investigations, but these did not address the difficulty to convict 
individuals for hate crimes. The 2009 Act eliminated the 1964 “federally protected activity” 
provision and provided federal authorities the ability to address the wave of violent attacks based 
on perceived sexual orientation and the increased violence toward Muslims and Sikhs (who are 
often confused as Muslims) (Wagner 2014).   
The analysis above provides support for two hypotheses in Chapter 3.  Increased state 
strength has been effective in eliminating terrorist hubs and nodes since 9/11 that weak state 
capacity could not.  However, after 9/11 the state’s inability to implement rules that govern 
society over the wishes of powerful social actors have remained in portions of the United States 
and these areas are most vulnerable to terrorist activity.  Neo-Nazis, al Fuqara, and al Qaeda, 
located terrorist hubs and nodes in the Western portion of the United States.  Portions of the 
Western U.S. present the greatest challenge for the state’s penetrative capacity and resemble the 
same societal and territorial challenges associated with weak and failing states around the globe.   
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The history of the West molded societal rejection of centralized authority, which has 
consequently led to the state’s inability to gain control of illicit activity.  The state has 
traditionally been unable to penetrate the southwest region based on strong anti-government 
sentiment.  Furthermore, the West’s geography consists of vast deserts, forests, and mountains, 
which are difficult for the state to physically penetrate and are geographic features used by 
violent non-state actors worldwide.  Tucson, Arizona is also less than an hour from the porous 
Mexican border through the Sonoran desert. The region has been a consistent base of gun-
running, document fraud, and all illicit enterprises that have funded terrorist activity and criminal 
gangs for decades (Horowitz 2011).  
Right-wing anti-government and white supremacist activity has been common in the 
region, but Tucson, Arizona’s Islamic terror activity puzzled law enforcement prior to 9/11 
because the area does not have a particularly large Muslim population (Berger 2011).  Federal 
law enforcement in Arizona noted that before September 11, 2001 their number one priority was 
controlling gun crime but on September 12, 2001 the “paradigm shifted” toward terrorism 
(Anglen 2011).  However, viewing these two issues as distinct does not reflect the reality of why 
terrorists have been drawn to Tucson, Arizona as a terrorist sanctuary.  Criminal and terrorist 
networks are often difficult to distinguish because terrorist organizations rely on illicit activity to 
meet the organization’s needs.   
The strong state and strong society interaction in the U.S., united against expelling the 
current terrorist threat from Islamic extremism is less likely to harbor terrorist sanctuaries.137 
                                                 
137 The only known individuals inspired by a global movement with a sustained presence in the U.S. are affiliated 
with the eco-terrorist and animal rights movement.  The Animal Liberation Front was established in the UK in 1976 
and appeared in the U.S. in 1982 (START 2008).  While these groups are considered economic threats to certain 
industries and companies, the group tends to attack “inanimate objects” like research facilities, commercial real 
estate developments, and commercial logging operations (Hoffman 2006, 32-33).  The group’s stated principles do 
not support harming animals or humans. These groups are also considered “leaderless,” with lone wolves gaining 
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Americans have vigilantly reported suspicious activity of neighbors, strangers, and family 
members, leading to better surveillance and disruption of nodes when they are formed (see 
Zuckerman, et al 2013).138  Inspired lone actors are currently the most significant threat to 
homeland security.  However, the reliance on Internet communications due to isolation from 
society have allowed the state to closely this behavior through extensive electronic surveillance.  
In short, pushing potential terrorists to communicate online is an effective strategy, so long as the 
state maintains its legal authority to monitor the behavior.   
                                                                                                                                                             
inspiration online and carrying out burglaries and arson (START 2008).  The attacks carried out by the Animal 
Liberation Front or Earth Liberation Front are difficult to compare to other terror groups since there are no fatalities 
attributed to the groups during its thirty year history in the United States (START 2013). 
 
138 The United States has successfully disrupted the vast majority of 60 known terrorist plots planned by nodes 
within its borders, in part due to intelligence authority but also the willingness of the American public to support and 
assist in counter-terrorism efforts.  As noted by Zuckerman, et al (2013) “The reality, of course, is that no matter 
how good a nation’s security and intelligence agencies are, they cannot prevent 100 percent of planned attacks. 
While there has not been a catastrophe on the scale of 9/11 in the past 12 years, terrorists have succeeded in 
attacking the homeland four times: (1) the intentional driving of an SUV into a crowd of students at the University 
of North Carolina–Chapel Hill in 2006; (2) the shooting at an army recruitment office in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 
2009; (3) the shooting by U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan at Fort Hood, also in 2009; and (4) the bombings in 
Boston.”    
167 
 
Germany Chapter 7 - 
 7.1 Introduction 
In the months following the September 11th terrorist attacks against the United States, 
Germans were shocked to learn that three of the most prominent hijackers radicalized and 
organized in Hamburg, Germany and they received German passports for entry into the United 
States (Eldridge, et al. 2004). The state’s security apparatus had quickly adapted to terrorist 
threats from left-wing and right-wing movements since the 1960s.  However, German officials 
struggled to acknowledge, understand, and counter the presence of Islamic inspired terrorist 
nodes operating throughout the country prior to 9/11 because terrorist incidents (attacks) were 
noticeably absent139 (Steinberg 2013).  Germany does not possess the political, economic, or 
geographic characteristics believed to influence the location choice of terrorist sanctuaries, yet 
several transnational terror groups have established operational nodes within the country.  “The 
various groups involved in terrorist activities [in Germany] differ largely in their ideological 
background, political ambitions, organizational structures, operational profiles, use of violence, 
and last but not least, scope of activities” (Alexander 2006, 72).   
Germany is comprised of a nation of people with a shared history, language, and culture.  
The country’s rapid transformation from devastating defeat in World War II to rapid 
industrialization and democratic institutions was supported in part by the lack of societal 
fractionalization (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Alesina, et al. 2003; P. Miller 2013).  The absence of 
cleavages has typically led to less friction between the state and the distinctly homogenous 
society. Furthermore, the state apparatus is highly capable of penetrating society, regulating 
                                                 




social behavior, and effectively facilitating the delivery of public goods, thus, Germany presents 
a crucial case for analysis.   
However, since the late 1980s an increasingly multicultural society has produced some 
tension between the German state and its citizens on the one hand, and German citizens and the 
non-German migrants on the other hand.  Germany is considered a full democracy, but state 
policies reflect the desires of the ethnic German majority and eclipse the voice of the rapidly 
growing minority population.  Germany’s weak societal structure and the state’s restrictive 
citizenship policies have limited political participation for approximately 10% of the population.  
Thus, the isolated, parallel society is critical to understanding state-society interactions (Osborne 
2012; Cullen and Goetz 2013; Bucerius 2014).  
This chapter will explain how the history and structure of the Federal Republic of 
Germany has shaped its interactions with society.  Next, an explanation of the two distinct or 
segregated portions of German society and how each interacts with the state will shed light on 
certain cleavages that do exist but are overlooked in macro-level analyses.  Finally, this chapter 
will explain the presence of left-wing terrorist nodes from the 1960s through the 1980s, the 
emergence of a strong neo-Nazi terror movement from the 1970s to the 1990s, and finally the 
growth of fundamentalist Islamic nodes from the 1990s until 2014.  A summary and discussion 
follows.  
 7.2 State-Society Interactions in Germany 
The basis for a strong state and weak society in Germany was constructed through King 
Wilhelm of Prussia’s unification of German speaking societies and appointment as Kaiser of 
Germany in 1871. A hallmark of Kaiser Wilhelm’s German state was its lack of ethno-linguistic 
diversity, which staked the legitimacy of the state on being “the political expression of German-
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speaking people” (P. Miller 2013, 121). Germany achieved rapid economic success and was 
subsequently transformed into the Weimer republic after World War I, but economic distress and 
political extremes that emerged on the right and left ultimately gave rise to The Nationalist 
Socialist Party in 1933.  The Nazi Party immediately consolidated power in Germany through 
brutal repression before expanding its reach across Europe.  It also expanded the concept of 
“German-ness” through the exclusion of Jews, Romas, and Poles, but particularly the genocide 
of seven million Jews and Romas (P. Miller 2013, 122-123). The rise and fall of the Nazi regime 
lasted approximately twelve years, but shaped the future of the German state and society for the 
decades that followed.   
Following World War II, the West German state (Federal Republic of Germany) was 
reconstructed through the vision of the United States, Britain, and France. The state-building 
process was particularly complex because it involved these powers making institutional statecraft 
decisions while accounting for the Soviet Union’s fear of a resurgent German military 
(Trachtenberg 1999).  The construction of the German state was different than previous state-
building operations as it involved the political dismemberment of the embedded National 
Socialist Party system through “de-Nazification.”  Meanwhile, it required a carefully reinstituted 
social welfare system that had long been a part of the German system (P. Miller 2013).   
Despite considerable challenges, West Germany’s transition was rather smooth. Pre-war 
German society was conditioned to accept centralized authority as the state was the image of the 
homogenous society.  Germany also experienced democracy for a brief period prior to the Nazi 
rise to power and had the foundation for an industrialized economy.  Beginning in 1945 the 
occupation of Allied troops spread throughout the country and directly oversaw the local 
communities.  Within two years the stable security environment allowed a form of indirect 
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control to emerge.  The occupation force monitored but did not directly administer the local 
authorities that had been put in place (P. Miller 2013).   
The U.S., Great Britain, and France expected rebellion in the postwar period and were 
surprised by the relative calm in Germany after an exceptionally brutal war.  Aside from crime 
and banditry, it was “the dog that did not bark.” There were no mass uprisings or guerrilla 
movements and no widespread retaliation from civilians toward the former Nazi regime (P. 
Miller 2013, 121).  The de-Nazification program in 1946 removed former Nazis from civil 
service and disbanded the military without an uprising.  The absence of widespread rebellion 
from former Nazis or German society was particularly notable since only 117,000 (or 3%) of 
eligible Nazis were charged and convicted under the de-Nazification laws.  However, several 
hundred thousand Allied troops were present to ensure an uprising did not take shape (P. Miller 
2013, 125).   
The Constitutional limitations placed upon the German state were intended to constrain 
its penetration into society. With the exception of the social welfare state apparatus, the German 
state was decentralized during the occupation and the decades that followed (see Trachtenberg 
1999; P. Miller 2013).  To weaken the state’s ability to resurge, the security structure was created 
without a centralized national police force, which is part of other European security structures (P. 
Miller 2013). The Marshall Plan helped rebuild much of the infrastructure in Germany and close 
ties throughout Europe aided in economic recovery (Judt 2005).  While postwar German state-
building took an extraordinary amount of money and a sustained monitoring effort for a decade, 
the result was decidedly different than most 20th century state-building attempts (P. Miller 2013). 
By 1955, the German state had built an efficient bureaucratic apparatus (P. Miller 2013).  
Although much of the bureaucracy was decentralized, the sixteen Lander (states) possessed 
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strong penetrative capacity in the respective societies. The intelligence service and law 
enforcement were made distinct in the German Constitution (Basic Law) and organized through 
a federal system. Similar to the United States’ security design, nearly forty different agencies 
address various security threats (Alexander 2006). Therefore, the major powers constructed the 
critical infrastructure and political institutions of a dismembered Germany, while simultaneously 
keeping the state security apparatus decentralized and weakened. 
The individual Interior Ministries of each of the Lander coordinate respective activities, 
rather than a centralized authority from one federal agency. The Federal Office for the Protection 
of the Constitution is independent of the 16 Lander offices and the Federal Office cannot 
supervise or direct the Lander offices that oversee the domestic security in the respective states 
(Alexander 2006).  The Federal Criminal Police Office is also divided along the 16 Lander 
offices with a central office that facilitates information exchange between the individual Lander 
police offices.  The post-WWII intelligence services created were the Federal Intelligence 
Service (similar to U.S. “CIA”), Military Counterintelligence Service (similar to the U.S. 
“DIA”), Federal Border Guard, Customs, and the Office of the Attorney General.  Most 
importantly, the German military cannot be used for domestic peacekeeping purposes and until 
2001 its involvement outside Germany has been limited to U.N. peacekeeping missions 
(Alexander 2006, 80-82). 
With strong political and economic institutions in place, the German economy began to 
rapidly grow between 1955 and 1960. The German state was reliant upon a guest worker 
program to sustain the post-war industrial and mining growth.  Thus, economic success created a 
demographic shift from a distinctly ethnic homogenous society to the migration of guest workers 
from all over Europe.  In 1955, Italy and Germany entered into a recruitment treaty for guest 
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workers to assist with the expansion of production.  In 1960, Germany entered into a similar 
agreement with Spain, German industries’ needs were still not met.  Therefore, the largest guest 
worker agreement was signed on October 30, 1961 between Turkey and Germany (Prevezanos 
2011).    
The Turkish agreement established the guidelines for a large-scale guest worker program 
complete with a German satellite office in Istanbul.  German companies requested workers 
through the satellite office and Turkish authorities screened applicants and organized interviews 
with German authorities.  The initial guest worker program included a two year stay, but Turkish 
workers were not allowed to bring their families to deter permanent immigration to Germany. As 
a recruitment strategy, travel expenses from Turkey were included in the worker agreement, but 
many German businesses did not pay for the return trip. By 1964, the inefficient and expensive 
two year term was extended.  The demand for workers remained high so Turkish workers began 
to bring their families.  Furthermore, the German government signed agreements with Morocco, 
Portugal, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia between 1962 and 1968 to fill additional demands for workers 
(Prevezanos 2011).  
Between 1961 and 1973 approximately 750,000 Turkish guest workers came to Germany 
(Prevezanos 2011). Germany’s guest worker program abruptly ended in 1973 due to global oil 
shocks and an economic downturn, but political unrest in Turkey throughout the 1970s and early 
1980s caused many Turkish nationals to remain in Germany (Kenyon 2013).  In the 1970s, the 
Turkish guest workers’ status entered a gray area.  They were no longer “guest workers” but 
“denizens” without German citizenship or any privileges associated with it (Rosenow-Williams 
2012, 118). Germans and the Turks viewed the situation as a temporary one, thus, they did not 
integrate their vastly different cultures.  The Turks self-segregated and formed their own parallel 
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society.  They spoke Turkish, practiced Islam, and clustered in neighborhoods where their 
children attended schools heavily populated by other guest worker families (Rosenow-Williams 
2012; Kenyon 2013; Bucerius 2014).  To encourage the Turkish nationals to leave, the 
government offered each adult guest worker $1,000 and each child $175140 to return to their 
home countries but only 10% of the guest workers took advantage of the incentive (International 
Crisis Group 2007). 
Societal tensions grew throughout the 1980s as more second and third generation ethnic 
Turkish nationals were born in Germany. The growing tension between Germans and Turkish 
nationals is based on ethno-linguistic and religious differences141 as well as economic fears from 
the majority German population.  Two main grievances have dominated the German-Turkish 
societal divide since the 1980s.  First, Germans argue that Turkish nationals refuse to learn the 
German language or assimilate into German culture. Second, Germans believe that immigrants 
are an economic drain because they take advantage of the social welfare benefits, but fail to 
participate in the formal economy (Ozcan 2007; Bucerius 2014).   
To reflect the will of the German population, state policies offered no incentive for the 
parallel societies to assimilate. Guest workers were provided no clear path to citizenship and 
preferential employment practices were institutionalized to favor Germans. The state 
strengthened privileged job status for Germans and limited the sectors in which immigrants may 
work (Bucerius 2014; International Crisis Group 2007).   
The societal segregation has led to poor educational and employment opportunities for 
Turkish nationals living in Germany.  As a result, since the 1990s second and third generation 
                                                 
140 U.S. dollar estimates. 
 
141 The Turkish immigrant population is predominately Muslim, while ethnic Germans tend to be Catholic and 
Protestant (Ozcan 2007).   
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Turkish nationals have dropped out of school at proportionally higher rates to pursue 
employment in the illicit economy, sometimes as European drug traffickers, because they believe 
their potential in the formal economy, even with an education, is limited (Bucerius 2014).  







Source: International Crisis Group (2007, 4)142 
 
An additional wave of demographic changes in the 1990s was the result of civil conflict 
throughout the world.  Consequently, German reunification in 1990 coincided with a steady 
stream of refugees that sought safe haven throughout Europe. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
Germany struggled to regulate large migration flows from conflict regions while simultaneously 
merging the East and West German societies (International Crisis Group 2007; Ozcan 2007).   
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s Iranians, Iraqis, Bosnians, Kurds from Turkey and 
Iraq, and Palestinians sought political asylum. Conflicts forced staggering numbers of refugees to 
Germany and other European states. For example, more than 200,000 Bosnians143 fled conflict in 
the Balkans and received asylum in the early 1990s (International Crisis Group 2007; Cullen and 
Goetz 2013).  Approximately 1.1 million arrived in Germany between 1988 and 1992 (440,000 
in 1992 alone),144 and filed applications for asylum. The mass influx prompted the Lower House 
                                                 
142 The International Crisis Group Report can be viewed at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/181_ 
islam_in_germany.ashx 
 
143 Bosnians comprise the second largest Muslim group in Germany after Turkish nationals (International Crisis 
Group 2007). 
 
144 Article 16a of Basic Law allows individuals who face political persecution to apply for asylum. Those who seek 
asylum in Germany are placed in the country's various federal states, where they are first assigned to a central 
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of Parliament (Bundestag) to institute the “safe third country” policy in 1993.  This policy 
declared asylum seekers’ applications invalid if they applied for asylum from within a country 
deemed “safe.”  Nonetheless, Germany granted asylum to more individuals than any other 
European country in the 1990s (Ozcan 2007).  
The collapse of the Soviet Union also initiated a repatriation of individuals with German 
descent from the former Soviet Union, Poland, and Romania (Cullen and Goetz 2013).145 
Between 1988 and 2005, 3 million Aussiedler (repatriated Germans) came from Central and 
Eastern Europe. German Jews who sought repatriation from the Soviet Union were provided 
privileged status to rebuild the Jewish population in Germany (Ozcan 2007).146  
Of the millions of individuals who sought refuge in Germany throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, only repatriated ethnic Germans fell under the 1913 citizenship policies of “imperial and 
state citizenship law” (International Crisis Group 2007, 5). Therefore, German citizenship was 
determined by genealogy rather than the location of birth.  Repatriated individuals resemble a 
middle tier of the social hierarchy, since they possess an ethnic German claim.  Political 
refugees, guest workers, and their children and grandchildren were politically excluded from 
citizenship, not guaranteed all constitutional protections, and comprise the bottom of the social 
hierarchy in Germany. Highly educated immigrants and those who learn German are also 
afforded more privilege in this system (Kinkartz 2012).  Although there is a hierarchy, all 
                                                                                                                                                             
facility and later to the supervision of local authorities; cities and communities must provide for their 




145 Between 1950 and 1988, 1.4 million individuals from Poland and Romania came to Germany (Ozcam 2007, 2). 
 
146 An estimated 10,000 to 45,000 Jews lived in Germany after World War II (Urban 2009; Lipka 2015). Germany 
did not maintain clear records on the religious affiliation of migrants prior to 1993, but between 1993 and 2005 an 
estimated 205,000 Jews settled in Germany (Ozcan 2007).Estimates from Pew Research Center indicate 
approximately 230,000 Jews living in Germany in 2010 (Lipka 2015). 
176 
 
residents are allowed access to the social welfare benefits provided by the state, which has 
created hostility between citizens and non-citizens (Ozcan 2007; International Crisis Group 
2007; Rosenow-Williams 2012).  
Anti-Muslim sentiment surged after the revelation that 9/11 hijackers were tied to 
Hamburg.  In response, various Islamic social and religious organizations unified to establish a 
relationship with the German state and society. The Central Council of Muslims in Germany 
(ZMD) became an umbrella interest group comprised of 18 separate Muslim groups147 that 
represent mosques and Muslims.  In February 2002 the ZMD clarified its active mission after 
9/11 (Central Council of Muslims in Germany 2002), 
Muslims are under the obligation to integrate themselves into German society, with an 
open mind, and to enter into dialogue about their faith and religious practices. In turn, the 
majority in this country is entitled to learn the position Muslim take towards basics like 
the Federal Constitution, the rule of law, democracy, pluralism, and human rights. It is 
not as if the Muslims had failed to pronounce themselves on such issues. Yet there is a 
need to give the majority in this country answers that are clear, definite, and 
comprehensive, a necessity ever more obvious now than before September 11, 2001. 
 
The ZMD provides Muslims with a peaceful political outlet, but it has not been 
successful in challenges to religious restrictions imposed since 9/11.  Therefore, the ZMD’s main 
role in German society is to publicly promote moderate Islamic beliefs within the German 
political system, serve as a point of contact for the German government, and assist police with 
terrorism investigations (Rosenow-Williams 2012). 
The War on Terror conflicts pushed more refugees to Germany. Approximately 100,000 
refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq (U.S., CIA 2014) have gained asylum 
in Germany.  Germany (and the European Union) have attempted to streamline political asylum 
procedures to meet the growing demand from conflicts around the globe.  Germany’s federal 
                                                 
147 The 18 groups are concentrated in Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, Aachen, Dusseldorf, Dresden, and Bonn.   
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structure dictates that asylum seekers are sent to one of the federal states while the application is 
processed, but the strain placed on the German states makes it difficult to adequately monitor the 
refugees.148  Polling throughout Europe suggests that Germans are less likely to be against 
immigration, generally, but are more anxious toward Muslim immigration, specifically (Wike 
2014).149  
In 2005, the German state addressed the immigration issue and amended aspects of the 
Basic Law in response to societal pressure.  The 2005 immigration law articulates a path to 
citizenship for immigrants after 8 years of residency, but it mainly addressed national security 
concerns toward the rise of Muslim immigration.  The law allows Lander institutions to issue 
deportation orders against persons with a suspected terrorist background or those who may 
threaten the public order.  No proof, only suspicion, of terrorist activity is necessary (Alexander 
2006).   
In conjunction with the 2005 immigration policy, the German state initiated a campaign 
to support dialogue and integration in German society (Osborne 2012; Cullen and Goetz 2013) 
but instead the immigrant population became increasingly disengaged and angered by the law 
because it lacked a burden of proof and was vaguely worded.  In fact, 2006 marked the first year 
of a net outflow of migrants from Germany to Turkey (Popp, Gezer, and Scheruermann 2011). 
                                                 
148 “Those who seek asylum in Germany are placed in the country's various federal states, where they are first 
assigned to a central facility and later to the supervision of local authorities; cities and communities must provide for 
their accommodation and care. However, with a greater number of refugees, those local authorities have reported 
problems in providing such housing and care, and they have called upon national and state authorities for assistance. 
The cities and towns have also called for the asylum process to be shortened. Refugees reportedly must wait on 
average seven months, but often a year or more, in order for their applications to be processed, "much longer than 
was intended" and not in conformity with the European Union's processing guideline of no longer than six months. 
In response, the German government has stated that it would seek to reduce the processing time to three months, and 
it may provide in the 2015 budget for additional staff in the responsible offices in order to reduce the workload; 
resources for 300 additional employees were earmarked in the 2014 national budget” (Library of Congress 2014). 
 
149 Germany receives more asylum applications from war-torn Middle East countries, which adds to the existing 
tension between Germans and the Turkish population in Germany. 
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Between 2007 and 2011, an estimated 193,000 Turkish nationals born and raised in Germany 
moved to Turkey to escape “Islamophobia”150 (Kenyon 2013).  At the same time, between 1990 
and 2010 Germany’s Muslim population grew from 2.5 million (3.2%) to 4.1 million (5%) (Pew 
Research Center 2011). 
Germany is regularly at the bottom of international rankings that compare the educational 
opportunities of children with and without immigrant backgrounds.  Nearly one third of 
individuals between the ages of 25 and 35 with foreign roots have no professional 
qualifications151 (Popp, Gezer, and Scheuermann 2011).  In society’s view, “Germany's status as 
a country of immigration is reflected primarily in its crime and unemployment statistics….the 
German reality is that the unemployment rate is almost twice as high among immigrants as 
Germans.”  In some areas of the country, German unemployment is significantly lower at a rate 
of 2.6% compared to 9.1% for the immigrant population (Popp, Gezer, and Scheuermann 2011).  
German society’s frustration with Muslim immigration reached a new height in 2010 
when a member of the German Central Bank board, Thilo Sarrazin, released the book Germany 
Abolishes Itself.  Sarrazin’s economic argument focused on Muslim immigrants’ failure to pay 
taxes because many work in the informal economy, selling both legal and illegal goods and 
services, while also taking advantage of the state’s social welfare system. The most controversial 
premise argued that Arabs and Turks are intellectually inferior and will ultimately make German 
society less intelligent, since Arabs and Turks are reproducing faster than ethnic Germans.  His 
                                                 
150 Even though many were born and raised in Germany, some second and third generation Turkish nationals have 
not pursued German citizenship and moved to Turkey instead where they face less employment discrimination. 
Some Turks in Germany have college degrees and speak three or four languages are unable to find work if their 
names are Turkish (Kenyon 2013). 
 
151 For the three million Turkish nationals, the share of young Turks with no professional qualifications rose from 
44% to 57% percent between 2001 and 2006. 
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arguments on Muslim immigration’s toll on German society concluded that “in no other religion 
is the transition to violence, dictatorship, and terrorism so fluid” (Sarrazin 2010, 156).   
German politicians were initially outraged by the book’s assertions, but its tremendous 
popularity and polling suggested that half the German population (including some immigrants) 
agreed with his depiction of the Muslim population living in Germany (Bucerius 2014). 152 The 
book’s popularity prompted Chancellor Angela Merkel to respond, “We kidded ourselves a 
while, we said: 'They won't stay, sometime they will be gone', but this isn't reality…And of 
course, the approach to build a multicultural society and to live side-by-side and to enjoy each 
other... has failed, utterly failed” (Evans 2010).   
While all democracies encourage voice and dissent, German society has contested the 
state to a lesser degree because of the organization of society.  Aside from Basic Law 
(Constitutional) constraints that provide civil liberties protections, the traditional societal 
challenges to the state’s rule-making authority are weak in Germany. First, Germany has 
traditionally lacked ethnic and religious polarization that is able to challenge the rule-making 
authority of the state. Societal tension does exist between Muslim migrant groups and the 90% 
majority of ethnic Germans, but this tension does not appear through the formal political process 
because migrants are vastly outnumbered and many cannot vote (Bucerius 2014). Unlike strong 
societies, religious social actors have not played a prominent role in challenges to the state 
because Christians have dominated the political landscape. Since 1993, Muslims from Turkey, 
the Balkans, and Arab states have formed a number of social organizations to provide an outlet 
for political dialogue between Muslims, the German state, and the ethnic German majority.  
                                                 
152 Study conducted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation think-tank. Another poll in 2010 found that 30% of Germans 
believed the country was being “overrun by foreigners” with the same amount asserting that immigrants had moved 
there only to enjoy the social welfare benefits (Evans 2010). 
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However, these groups have not effectively challenged any of the state’s passage or 
implementation of restrictive religious policies (Rosenow-Williams 2012).153   
Second, the state has strong penetrative capacity through the social welfare system 
infrastructure, which provides more reach into society and the ability to implement policies more 
efficiently.  Third, economic and business interests are regulated to a higher degree. In contrast 
to the United States, “taxpayers versus the state has never really shaped German politics” 
(Strunck 2013, 217). This has shaped the power of interest groups. One interest group, the 
Federation of Taxpayers, represents business interests but another collection of interest groups 
protect and promote the maintenance of the social welfare system.  However, German interest 
groups are “far from having the institutional capacities” of those in the United States.  Instead, 
the multi-party political system has traditionally replaced the need for strong interest groups 
(Strunck 2013, 216-218).  
 Taken together, these measures define a strong state-weak society interaction, which is 
common in other European polities. As a result of the post-World War II reconstruction effort, 
the state’s security structure was more decentralized and weaker than others throughout Europe 
until the 1970s. As Cullen and Goetz explain, “Empirically, the German state has never closely 
approximated the liberal image content with policing the ground rules which allow society the 
highest possible degree of self-regulation…it is equally clear that the 20th century has been 
characterized by a steady extension of state activities which has resulted in a profound qualitative 
re-orientation in state-society relations” characterized by the growth of the welfare and protective 
state (2013, 28).   
                                                 
153 Muslims living in Germany tried to challenge a public school ban on headscarves for Muslim women, but the 
Court upheld the law on the grounds that ideological, religious, or political symbols endanger or harm the peace in 
public schools (Rosenow-Williams 3012, 332). 
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Much of this state extension is a result of growth in the social welfare state (Alesina, 
Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2006) but an expansion of the security apparatus has also been necessary 
to address migration flows and the three waves of terrorism in Germany.  First, the left-wing 
terrorist movement beginning in 1968.  Second, the continued effort to limit right-wing neo-Nazi 
terrorist organizations that have remained an undercurrent of German society since World War 
II.  Finally, the rise of religious extremism tied to the global jihad movement, which appeared in 
Germany as early as 1998 (Steinberg 2013). 
 7.3 The State in Society: Left-wing Terrorist Nodes 
The left-wing movement in Germany began in the early 1960s through the same global 
wave that inspired college-aged students throughout Europe and the United States. The left-wing 
movement included opposition to the Vietnam War in addition to a rejection of the rapid pivot 
toward materialism in Germany after World War II.  Compared to the United States, European 
social policies generally represent center-left ideology and those inspired by the New Left 
movement in the 1960s did not believe the progressive voice was allowed its rightful place in 
German politics (Kellen 1990).   
Left-wing ideology in Europe has indigenous inspiration from philosophers Karl Marx, 
Jean Paul Sartre, and Herbert Marcuse. Marcuse attended university in Berlin and Freiburg 
before he became affiliated with the Frankfurt School of thought in 1932.  He fled Germany 
during the Nazi rise to power between 1932 and 1933 and permanently settled in the United 
States in 1934.  Although Marcuse never returned to Germany, his writings became the 
ideological inspiration for the New Left movement (Kellner 1984).  
The rise of left-wing ideology in Germany and its sustained support throughout the Cold 
War period was a direct reflection of the Nazi experience. Many individuals who passively or 
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actively supported the left-wing cause were frustrated with the prestige allowed to former Nazis.  
Many former Nazis were not tried or convicted of their crimes against humanity, while Nazi 
opponents struggled to rebuild their lives (Kellen 1990). A former Nazi propagandist, Kurt 
Georg Kiesinger, became the Chancellor of West Germany in December 1966, which became a 
rallying cry for the left-wing movement (Kaplan 2009).   
The 1960s left-wing student movement forced an open conversation with their parents’ 
generation regarding its Nazi past that continued for decades through popular media (Kellen 
1990).  The West German youth viewed it their moral obligation to not standby and accept 
injustice as their parents did but to take action.  The baseline for this perceived injustice by the 
West German state was quite different than what their parents’ generation had experienced under 
the Nazis, thus, it received little support from the population over 40 in Germany (Kellen 1990).   
On June 2, 1967 a peaceful student protest of the Shah of Iran’s visit to West Germany 
turned violent when police attacked the protesters.  In the 1960s, any police action in West 
Germany was interpreted as analogous to the Third Reich, so actual police brutality invigorated 
the left-wing movement (Kaplan 2009). In response, some left-wing ideologues took up arms 
against the state and against perceived imperialist interests, such as the United States and NATO. 
A few different terrorist factions were born from the large left-wing movement in Germany.  The 
June 2 Movement terrorist group was named after the police brutality against protesters in 1967 
(Kellen 1990), but June 2’s periodic rival and ally, Baader- Meinhof Gang or Red Army Faction 
(RAF), 154 emerged as the most notorious left-wing terrorist group in Germany.   
                                                 
154 The group named themselves the Red Army Faction (RAF), inspired by the Japanese Red Army Faction, but the 




The terror group that became known as Red Army Faction began in 1968 and was led by 
Andreas Baader, his girlfriend Gudrun Ensslin, and two friends, Horst Söhnlein, and Thorwald 
Proll.  Andreas Baader is often considered an outlier of the terrorist profile, as he lacked a 
strategic vision and was not particularly ideological in the early years (Kellen 1990). Baader was 
a vulgar, violent “weapons maniac” (Hoffman 2006, 246), a high school dropout and criminal, 
with a general propensity for being a “bad boy” (Kellen 1990, 54).  His girlfriend, Gudrun 
Ensslin, suggested targets for attacks and Baader was eager and willing to carry them out 
(Hoffman 2006).   
The group did not have a clear “game plan” for the communist revolution, only that the 
destruction of the West German state needed to come first and the rest would follow (Kellen 
1990).   The group’s first arson attack on a Frankfurt department store on April 2, 1968 was 
intended to protest the Vietnam War, which was a popular issue among the West German youth 
in the 1960s (START 2008; Kaplan 2009).    
Andreas Baader was arrested two days after the arson on April 4, 1968.  After being 
released, he and Gundrun Ensslin fled to France.  The two returned to West Berlin and 
regrouped.  They began to rob banks to protest symbols of capitalism, attacked “imperialist” 
American military interests in Germany, and German government and industry representatives. 
Between 1968 and 1970, Red Army Faction gained a following within the left-wing student 
movement, although RAF only had a few actual members. Andreas Baader was arrested again in 
May 1970 but escaped from jail with the help of left-wing journalist Ulrike Meinhof, who gained 
access to Baader through her media credentials (Kellen 1990; Hoffman 2006; START 2008).  
Baader’s general thirst for violence cohesively merged with the global communist movement 
through the ideological intellect of Ulrike Meinhof.  Meinhof quickly gained prominence in the 
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movement’s leadership in 1970 and the terrorist group became known as Baader-Meinhof by the 
German media (Hoffman 2006; Kellen 1990).   
After the jailbreak, Red Army Faction took a new turn.  The RAF (and later June 2 
members), formed an official relationship with the larger Palestinian left-wing movements, 
which allowed the RAF to become better trained, equipped, organized, and ultimately more 
destructive. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s relationship with Red Army 
Faction marked a significant milestone in the history of transnational terrorism, as it involved 
one group training another (Rapoport 1987). The PFLP provided the Red Army Faction access to 
fraudulent documents for international travel but beginning on June 8, 1970, approximately 20 
RAF members traveled through East Germany to a PFLP training hub outside Amman, Jordan.  
For two months, the RAF learned warfare techniques, weapons skills, and guidance on left-wing 
ideology and the Palestinian cause (Aust and Bell 2008; START 2008; Hoffman 2006).   
After training in Jordan, the RAF returned to their West Berlin node.  In early 1971, the 
RAF established a node in Hamburg for weapons storage, production of counterfeit documents, 
and a base to plan and conduct a series of assassinations and kidnappings. The group maintained 
a following within Germany as a result of Ulrike Meinhof’s media ties in the left-wing press.  A 
1971 poll found that 20% of Germans under the age of thirty sympathized with the Red Army 
Faction’s message and many young Germans expressed a willingness to help hide its members 
(Leech 2008).   During the peak of activity between 1971 and 1972, Red Army Faction 
conducted more than 40 terrorist attacks.  Throughout the summer of 1972 the RAF’s leadership 
was arrested by police in Hamburg and Frankfurt apartments after raids of the group’s two main 




Table 7.2 Red Army Faction Nodes 
West Berlin (main node) 
April 1968-1971 
Nodes likely in France, 
Italy, Switzerland 
Estimated two dozen members, many sympathizers within society from the under 
30 left-wing student movement. Berlin apartments used for storage of weapons and 
to plan attacks. 
Amman, Jordan 
PFLP training camp 
June 1970-August 1970 
(returned to West Berlin 
after training) 
Approximately 20 members unknown to police flew from East Germany to 
Amman, Jordan. Baader and Meinhof traveled as Arabs through E. Germany, 
Palestinian controlled Damascus, to Amman with fake passports. 
Weapons training (rifles, grenades, military tactics), acquired fraudulent United 





Some members traveled around W. Germany stealing cars, passports and identity 
papers from government offices. Others stayed in Berlin and planned to move 
operations into West Germany from West Berlin. 
Heidelberg, Frankfurt, 
Hamburg (main node) 
Early Spring 1971-
February 1974 
Core members lived in Hamburg full or part time. Several apartments in Hamburg, 
one in Heidelberg, one in Frankfurt used for planning. Document fraud operations 
in Hamburg apartments.   
May 6, 1971: First RAF member found, intel leads to 1 other Hamburg planning 
apartment. 
October 22, 1971: 3Members involved in killing police officer. 1 caught 
immediately 
West Berlin 
October 15, 1971-January 
1972 (date Baader seen in 
Cologne) 
Baader and Ensslin returned to W. Berlin due to Hamburg police pressure. Planned 
assassinations of U.S. and German officials while lesser known members stayed in 
Hamburg. 
Across W. Germany: 
Hamburg (main node), 
Cologne, Augsburg, 





RAF members conducted bombings, bank robberies, and shoot outs with police.  
June 1, 1972: Police capture Andreas Baader, Jan Carl Raspe, and one other 
member in Frankfurt garage, where explosives were stored. 
June 8, 1972: Gundrun Ensslin is captured in Hamburg 
June 15, 1972: Ulrike Meinhof and one other captured in Hanover 
March 1973: Some members arrested in Khartoum, Sudan with Black September. 
February 4, 1974: Six members captured in Frankfurt and Hamburg 
Original RAF members 
imprisoned in W. Berlin. 
1973-1974 
Main members tried and convicted, begin hunger strikes and writing communiques 
from prison. The members communicated through lawyers. 
February 1973: Margarit Schiller released from jail 
November 1974: RAF member Holger Meins starves to death.  
Throughout Europe 
Red Army Faction 
splinter re-emerges in 






RAF and June 2 Movement were operationally allied with French, Italian, Belgium, 
and Palestinian terror groups through Carlos the Jackal. Conducted attacks in 
Stockholm, Sweden, Mons, Belgium.  
December 1975: OPEC seizure in Vienna, Austria. 
May 9, 1976: Ulrike Meinhof found dead in prison cell. 
June 1977: attempted assassination of NATO commander. 
September 5-October 17, 1977: RAF and Palestinian terror groups carry out 
kidnapping/hijacking attempt to release RAF members from prison.  
October 18, 1977: Baader and Ensslin found dead in their prison cells. 
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1980/1981- June 1990 
East Germany 
 
East German government provided apartments, new identity papers, and jobs for 
approximately 25 Red Army Faction members wanted for bank robberies, 
bombings, murders, kidnappings. Attacks inside W. Germany: 
August 1981 Ramstein U.S. Army Base attack; September 1981: Attempted 
assassination of US Army's West German Commander; December 1984: Attempted 
bombing of NATO school for officers; August 1985: Car bomb Rhein-Main US Air 
Force Base Frankfurt. 
Sources: Jones (1990); Aust and Bell (2008); START (2008); START (2013) 
After the 1972 arrests of key RAF members, other left-wing terrorist groups continued to 
operate.  The West German state responded in three ways, which dramatically increased counter-
terrorism capabilities. First, it began to collect computerized data on tens of thousands of 
Germans and their travel across borders through the “trawl net search.”  The trawl net system 
placed few restrictions on the security apparatus and could be implemented if surveillance was 
considered necessary for counterterrorism or a criminal investigation (Alexander 2006, 83).   
Second, from 1974 until 1978 a series of laws banned the formation of terrorist groups, 
criminalized support and encouragement of terrorism, strengthened the powers of prosecution for 
offenses, and limited the legal rights of accused terrorists by restricting contact between 
prisoners and lawyers. In 1977, some prisoners were banned from written or verbal contact with 
their lawyers. This law was in response to imprisoned Red Army Faction members’ ability to 
communicate through their lawyers to organize hunger strikes and maintain a following in 
German society.  These new legal restrictions and the 1974 starvation death of a RAF prisoner 
Holger Meins gained sympathy from some West Germans, who perceived the treatment of RAF 
members as brutal and a violation of civil liberties.  Despite protests over the new laws, in 1978 
the Constitutional Court upheld even the most controversial contact ban law (Alexander 2006; 
Aust and Bell 2008). 
Third, in 1975 the German government formed an elite anti-terror group GSG9 under the 
Federal Criminal Police Office to counter the new RAF splinter (Alexander 2006, 81-83; Aust 
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and Bell 2008).  The Red Army Faction splinter group was formed in 1975 to conduct attacks 
and negotiate for Baader, Meinhof, and Ensselin’s release from prison (START 2008; Alexander 
2006), but Germany’s counterterrorism measures marked a turning point in left-wing terrorism in 
Germany.  The Red Army Faction splinter group was forced to spend most of its time outside 
West Germany to plan operations (START 2008; START 2013). 
The RAF splinter strengthened international ties with Palestinian groups, Action 
Directe155 in France, Brigate Rosso in Italy, and Combatant Communist Cells in Belgium, for 
ideological, operational, and logistical support (Alexander 2006).  Furthermore, the German June 
2nd Movement, which also received PFLP training at the Jordanian hub, was both a rival and 
ally of Red Army Faction from 1975 until 1981.  June 2nd and Red Army Faction members had 
an ideological disagreement over whether an anarchist or Marxist path was best to achieve 
communism, but at times were operationally allied through the Venezuelan-born Palestinian 
terrorist “Carlos the Jackal”156 (START 2008). 
In a co-planned terrorist attack that attempted to force the release of RAF leaders, the Red 
Army Faction kidnapped German business leader Hans Martin Schleyer in Cologne, West 
Germany on September 5, 1977.  A month later on October 13, 1977, the RAF and the PFLP, 
hijacked an aircraft.  After making stops in Italy, Dubai, and Somalia on October 17th, 
Germany’s newly instituted anti-terror force GSG9 stormed the plane, rescued some hostages, 
                                                 
155 The Action Directe group was specifically more transnational in its goals, consisting of a “national” branch and 
an “international” branch.  The most well-known of these was the 1985 car bombing of the American Air Force base 
in Germany, which was conducted in conjunction with Red Army Faction (START 2008). 
 
156 Carlos the Jackal is the nickname for Illich Sanchez one of the world’s most renowned terrorist masterminds, 
planning attacks for both left-wing and religious inspired groups.  Carlos the Jackal was pursued by French 
authorities for nearly two decades before being captured in 1994 (Hoffman 2006).  He remains in prison and has 
been an avid follower of Osama bin Laden, writing a book about him in 2003 titled Revolutionary Islam. 
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and killed four Palestinian terrorists on board (Aust and Bell 2008).  German’s response to the 
hijacking signaled that the GSG9 was prepared to meet the RAF with force (Alexander 2006). 
The Red Army Faction was unable to negotiate for the release of its members.  In 
response, all imprisoned RAF members killed themselves in a Stuttgart, German prison on 
October 18, 1977, known as “Death Night.” However, many Germans believed that the 
overnight suicides were an extrajudicial killing carried out by the German government.  In 
response to the deaths of the imprisoned members, the RAF murdered Hans Martin Schleyer the 
same day (Aust and Bell 2008).   
After the 1977 hijacking, the left-wing terrorist groups maintained some societal support 
among the youth population but this waned over the next decade. The June 2 Movement 
officially merged with the RAF in 1980 (START 2008). Many left-wing terrorist groups failed 
across Europe by the 1980s, but the RAF was sustained for two reasons.  First, after the 
restrictive laws were put in place in the 1970s, a portion of German society was not fully 
prepared to abandon the fear of a resurgent fascist government. The German state and society are 
highly sensitive to its Nazi past, and the world’s interpretation of the Holocaust atrocities being 
that the Gestapo merely carried out the wishes of the entire German nation (Kellen 1990).   
As journalist Stefan Aust notes, “Germany even into the ’70s was still a guilt-ridden 
society” (Kaplan 2009).  However, when organized neo-Nazi groups publically emerged in the 
early 1980s, the German state security apparatus demonstrated that it planned to counter right-
wing extremism with the same vigilance (Lewis 1996; Spiegel 2005; Kaplan 2009).  
Furthermore, passive support for the Red Army Faction dwindled in the 1980s as leftist political 
parties began to achieve electoral success (Spiegel 2013).  
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 Critical Antecedent: Reunification and Immigration 
The second and most significant reason the Red Army Faction survived the 1980s 
without societal support and restricted operational capacity in West Germany was due to the 
state-sponsored safe haven provided by East Germany and a consistent flow of weapons from the 
PFLP (Hoffman 2006).  From its East German sanctuary, the RAF targeted NATO commanders 
and U.S. military installations throughout the 1980s (START 2013).   When the Berlin Wall fell 
in November 1989, the RAF became politically marginalized without the “ideological resilience” 
sustained through communist East Germany (Hoffman 2006, 78).  Moreover, government 
officials protected RAF members through a ban on “Wanted” posters in the 1980s, but during 
reunification East Germans provided police with information that led to several immediate 
arrests (Jones 1990).  The RAF carried out its last attack on June 8, 1991 and in 1992 issued a 
cease-fire communiqué.  The group formally disbanded on April 22, 1998 through an eight-page 
letter sent to Reuters news agency (Cowell 1998; START 2008; START 2013).   
 7.4 The State in Society: Right Wing Terrorist Nodes in Germany 
The political reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany on October 3, 1990 was a 
relatively smooth process (Zelikow and Rice 1997).  However, many Germans were unsettled by 
the dramatic population and demographic changes within society and the subsequent electoral 
success of leftist political parties. Taken together, extremist right-wing ideology openly surged 
for the first time since the fall of Nazi regime. 
Nazi Germany serves as the inspiration for the pan-Aryan ideological movement, but 
since World War II German right-wing extremists have derived much of their ideological 
support from abroad.  Neo-Nazis in the U.S. and throughout Europe view a revival of Hitler’s 
Nationalist Socialist party as necessary to promote the ideal Aryan society (Hoffman 2006).  The 
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German neo-Nazi movement or “German Action Group” led by Manfred Roeder until 1981, 
advocated that followers replicate the 1970s Red Army Faction and June 2nd left-wing terrorists 
to gain the publicity (Hoffman 2006; Andrews 1997). Throughout the 1970s, neo-Nazis in 
Germany carried out periodic street beatings of Jews and immigrants, or the occasional “hurling 
of Molotov cocktails” at refugee shelters and guest worker housing, but they lacked plans for 
sophisticated attacks.  The turning point in the right-wing ideological revival in Germany began 
on September 26, 1980, when neo-Nazis bombed the Munich Oktoberfest, killing 14 and injuring 
more than 200 people (Hoffman 2006, 237).  
Germany’s neo-Nazi leader Manfred Roeder was a regular contributor to the U.S. based 
Aryan Nations’ publications and traveled to the white supremacist hub in Idaho between 1980 
and 1981.  Roeder provided Richard Girnt Butler with a list of German supporters interested in 
visiting Hayden Lake and receiving neo-Nazi propaganda from the United States.  This 
relationship unified the German and U.S. right-wing movements and insured that right-wing 
violence continued during Roeder’s imprisonment between 1982 and 1990157 (Andrews 1997; 
Kaplan and Weinberg 1998).  Through the 1980s, the pan Aryan hub in Hayden Lake, Idaho 
provided ideological support to German right-wing terrorist groups through the Aryan Nation’s 
Calling our Nation publication.  The National Socialist Vanguard Report based in Oregon and 
the Arkansas KKK’s White Patriot periodicals were also disseminated across European neo-Nazi 
nodes (Kaplan and Weinberg 1998).   
                                                 
157 Manfred Roeder was in prison from 1982 to 1990 for a bombing that targeted Vietnamese immigrants (Andrews 
1997).   
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During the resettlement of Jews in Germany from Central and Eastern Europe, anti-
Semitic acts tripled from 489 in 1980 to 1,685 in 1990 (Lewis 1996, 98).158  In 1985, Germany's 
parliament passed a law that criminalized Holocaust denial on the grounds that it violated human 
dignity. The law imposed a maximum one year prison sentence or a fine (Bleich 2011)159 and 
provided the German state with tools to counter hate speech and propaganda.  However, 
Germany’s right-wing legacy, the drastic demographic shift between 1985 and 1995, and 
international support from the pan Aryan hub in the United States impeded the state’s ability to 
counter right-wing extremism.   
In the late 1980s, some younger Turkish nationals and migrant populations responded to 
the rise of neo-Nazi violence against their communities through the formation of organized street 
gangs for protection.160 Although the German state implemented policies to counter right-wing 
extremism, the Turkish population did not feel they were adequately protected by the state in the 
“war” waged against them by neo-Nazis (Kenyon 2013).  
In 1989, the German state’s interior ministry banned several social groups and political 
parties that facilitated the establishment of terrorist nodes, such as Viking Youth, Nationalist 
Front, German Alternative, and German Comrades League, but groups quickly reorganized 
under new names. German police raided members’ homes and seized bank accounts, Nazi 
propaganda, and weapons in an effort to minimize the groups’ impact (Lewis 1996; Kaplan and 
                                                 
158 Anti-Semitic attacks tend to be documented more than racially based attacks against immigrants.  These are often 
not recorded as terrorist attacks, but rather crimes, and immigrant groups also take matters into their own hands in 
Germany because they believe that the German state does not do enough to protect them from neo-Nazi racism. 
 
159 Similar laws exist in many European countries with an occupied Nazi, fascist, or even sympathizing past.  These 
include Austria, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, and Portugal (Bleich 2011).  Country by country legislation 
can be found at http://www.antisemitism.org.il/eng/Legislation%20Against%20Antisemitism%20and%20Denial 
%20of%20the%20Holocaust 
 
160 One of the most notorious of these gangs was the “36 Boys” named after the Berlin postal code neighborhood 
they sought to defend. 
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Weinberg 1998).  The height of neo-Nazi violence in Germany occurred between 1990 and 1994, 
when the country experienced an influx of hundreds of thousands of Jews and Muslims and 
migrants from Poland and Romania. The state responded to right-wing violence by continually 
banning neo-Nazi political parties, arresting attackers, and seizing assets and propaganda through 
dozens of police raids (Lewis 1996). 
The peak of neo-Nazi violence was between 1991 and 1993, which perpetuated the 
growth of street gangs. Between 1990 and 1994, neo-Nazis were accused of 31 murders and 
approximately 5,000 attacks on immigrants and German nationals (Lewis 1996, 95).  In 
response, by 1993 approximately 40 street gangs made up of 1,000 young men and women were 
organized in Berlin, Frankfurt, and Solingen (in North Rhine-Westphalia) to counter-attack neo-
Nazis. Roughly half the gang members were Turkish nationals but the other half were Poles, 
Bosnians, Croatians, Italians, and Germans.  The groups physically trained in gyms and 
stockpiled weapons for “Day X” or the future war envisioned against the neo-Nazis.  When 
migrant homes were attacked the gangs retaliated and planned bombings of known neo-Nazi 
nodes (Shanker 1993).  
The German state was not sympathetic to the gangs’ cause and deported Turkish 
nationals involved in the violence (Jones 1993). The gangs’ initial motivation appeared 
defensive, but after the gangs were founded they followed their own criminal trajectory as drug 
traffickers, burglars, and vandals (Shanker 1993; Kenyon 2013).  Thus, any societal support the 
gangs received for their protective services was overshadowed by their criminal activity and 





7C. Key German Right-Wing Node Cluster Cities 
Node Cities State Action 
Dortmund, North Rhine-Westphalia  
 
Consistent, strong neo-Nazi presence since 1970s 




Viking Youth outlawed November 1994, several hundred 
members; German neo-Nazi leader Ingo Hasselbach’s National 
Alternative Party, several hundred members in the early 1990s 
Early November 1994 raid (apartment of  
Wolfram Nahrath, Viking Youth leader) 
 
Provided link between Germany and 
international neo-Nazi cells. Nazi songbooks, 
money, knives, uniforms, computer disks. 
Braunschweig and Wilhelmshaven, Lower Saxony 
 
Nationalistic Front, approximately 150 members 
December 9, 1992 raid in Wilhelmshaven; 60 
apartments raided in Lower Saxony in early 
March 1993 
Dresden and Leipzig, Saxony and throughout state December 1991 (dozens of homes raided; 
January 1994 raids) 
Cotbus and Brandenburg city, Brandenburg 
 
National Alternative Party 
December 1991 (dozens of homes raided) 
Frankfurt and Fulda Hesse; major presence based in Hesse 
through neo-Nazi leader Michael Kuhnen  
February 1989 raid; January 1994 raids 
Nuremburg and Marzling, Bavaria December 1991 (dozens of homes raided) 
Sources: Lewis (1996, 91); Kaplan and Weinberg (1998); Bleich (2011); Atkins (2011); Orlando Sentinel (February 
10, 1989; December 4, 1991; December 22, 1992; March 4, 1993) 
 
The largest concentration of right-wing extremist nodes in the 1990s were located in the 
eastern half of Germany, near the border with Poland, Austria, and the Czech Republic, which 
also host neo-Nazi nodes. Nodes are also present in Western German cities (such as Dortmund) 
with a higher than average migrant population from the industrial and coal mining boom of the 
1960s and 1970s (Lewis 1996; Kaplan and Weinberg 1994; Smale 2014).   
Despite numerous police raids that confiscated materials throughout the country, German 
security was unable to counter the onslaught of Nazi propaganda and memorabilia that flowed 
from the United States into Germany throughout the 1990s. In addition to the aforementioned 
newsletters and propaganda from the 1980s, U.S. based Hammerskin Press distributed in 
Germany from 1993 until 1998 (Reynolds 1999; START 2008).   
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A consistent source of Nazi propaganda and memorabilia came from American Gary 
“Gerard” Lauck.  Lauck was a resident of Chicago and frequent visitor to Germany throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s. Authorities monitored him for decades as he sent “Jews are our 
misfortune” and “Foreigners out” swastika emblazoned materials to neo-Nazis in Germany 
(Cowell 1998). In 1976 he spent four months in jail for disseminating written copies of Hitler’s 
speeches throughout Germany.  After he formed his U.S. based political party “National Socialist 
German Workers’ Party-Overseas Organization” in the mid-1970s, he mailed Nazi memorabilia 
and his newsletter Nazi Battle Cry from a Lincoln, Nebraska address. The U.S. government 
would not intervene because Lauck’s actions were protected by the First Amendment, so 
Germany confiscated the materials through police raids (Lewis 1996; Kaplan and Weinberg 
1989; Atkins 2011).   
The rapid growth of neo-Nazi nodes across the world in the early 1990s and the 
prevalence of attacks corresponded to another German law on anti-Semitism (Alkins 2011).  On 
December 1, 1994, a second law took effect that extended the definition of anti-Semitic behavior 
to include any public endorsement of or agreement with Nazi regime actions, the minimization 
of the genocide against Jews, or the use of Nazi Party insignia or slogans. The 1994 law based on 
“offending the memory of the dead” imposed a minimum fine and a maximum of five years in 
jail for disruption of the public peace (Lewis 1996, 91; Kaplan and Weinberg 1998; Bleich 
2011).  Although the laws restricted civil liberties, the majority of German society supported 
these actions as a means to maintain order and international image (Bleich 2011; Spiegel 2005).   
After the 1994 law’s implementation on December 1, the German state had an 
immediately stronger grip on right-wing nodes through the broad legal power to ban the 
assembly of neo-Nazis.  Throughout December 1994, police conducted raids and arrested 
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individuals that spread Nazi propaganda. In one instance, approximately 160 neo-Nazis gathered 
in a tavern in Marzling (north of Munich) before a planned bonfire rally.  Police raided the 
bonfire site before the rally could be held (Lewis 1996).  
In 1995, the German government estimated that there may be as many as 40,000 neo-
Nazi sympathizers, although most were not active participants in violence.  Due to the rapid 
arrests and disruption of organizational capacity in December 1994, neo-Nazi violence tapered 
off throughout 1995 (Lewis 1996). In another blow to the movement, Germany issued an arrest 
warrant through Interpol and American propagandist Gary Lauck was detained on March 20, 
1995 outside Copenhagen, Denmark.  Neo-Nazi materials were smuggled through Denmark 
because laws restricted Lauck’s ability to enter Germany (Cowell 1998). Immediately after his 
arrest, police searched 84 residential apartments and seized additional propaganda through 
operation Atlantik II (Lewis 1996).   In August 1995, Lauck was sentenced to four years in a 
German prison.  Upon release in March 1999, he returned to Chicago and began to use websites 
and blogs to propagate white supremacy, but the global pan Aryan movement was less organized 
and had lost momentum (Atkins 2011; Bleich 2011).  
Since the 1990s, mass emails and chat rooms have allowed neo-Nazis to share 
propaganda.  White power rock music promoted through U.S. based Panzerfaust Records and 
Resistance Records and concerts in the U.S. and countries with fewer anti-Semitic laws, such as 
the Czech Republic, have facilitated recruitment of neo-Nazis161 (Atkins 2011; START 2008).    
Anti-Semitic ideology and violence is rejected by the vast majority of German society and 
organized neo-Nazis were consistently challenged by the German state throughout the 1990s. 
However, right-wing extremism has been sustained due to a steady rise in Muslim population 
                                                 
161 There are several indications that the pan Aryan movement throughout the world lacks the organization it once 
did, so music and the Internet communication does provide dispersed individuals a sense of unity. 
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growth.  General anti-immigrant sentiment has produced a wider base of support from ethnic 
German society (Capon 2015).   
Since the 1990s, an economic debate over immigration policies has played a role in intra-
societal tension.  Many ethnic Germans have steadily maintained that the second and third 
generations of Turkish nationals, children of those that arrived in the 1960s, do not contribute to 
society but rather sell drugs and take advantage of Germany’s social welfare benefits (Bucerius 
2014).  Young Turkish nationals are over-represented in the informal criminal economy and 
Turkish national public figures in Germany have criticized the younger generations’ choice to 
opt out of assimilation and live in a “parallel society” (Bucerius 2014, 20).  However, second and 
third generation Turkish nationals have maintained that their opportunities are severely limited 
due to institutionalized employment policies that promote discrimination and favor ethnic 
Germans (Bucerius 2014).   
In short, many of the young Turkish men who joined gangs in the early 1990s for 
physical protection against neo-Nazis continued to be active in drug trafficking, smuggling, and 
organized crime as an economic survival strategy. The Turkish drug traffickers have maintained 
that this provides a sense of dignity in a society that has continued to treat them as outcasts.  
Furthermore, these young men view their “jobs” as a benefit to the German state and society, as 
they do not use the social welfare system to the extent they would if they were fully unemployed 
(Bucerius 2014).  Mainstream German society, however, does not view the plight of young 
Turkish men this way. Instead, these activities have perpetuated the stereotype that Turkish 
nationals, immigrants, and Muslims are the root cause of crime and violence. 
Germany failed to address the immigration and naturalization issue that originated in the 
1960s guest worker program. Until 2000, Turkish nationals and other migrant groups were not 
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afforded citizenship privileges or a path to citizenship without ethnic German heritage 
(Rosenow-Williams 2012). A leftist coalition government took control in 1998 and began to 
implement major changes to citizenship laws. A law that took effect in 2000 “grants citizenship 
to children born in Germany to non-German parents if at least one parent has been a legal 
resident for more than five years…The reform, however, did not remedy the exclusion of the 
millions of residents born before 2000” (International Crisis Group 2007, 5).  The changing 
demographics in Germany and continued isolation among ethnic German and Muslim societal 
groups sustained the presence of right-wing extremism and ultimately the rise of Islamic inspired 
terror nodes (Pew Research Center 2011).   
 7.5 The State in Society: Religious Terror Nodes in Germany 
Prior to the September 11th attacks, German officials argued that Turkish nationals did 
not fit the terrorist profile and that radical Islamist thought was not an issue among the Arab and 
Kurdish Muslim communities living in Germany.  The German state had little interaction with 
the Muslim immigrant population, so security officials assumed it was not prevalent.  
Furthermore, because the state was successful in limiting public extremist groups and hate 
speech, extremist thought happened behind closed doors.  In reality, when Germany accepted 
millions of political asylum seekers and refugees in the 1980s and 1990s, former mujahedeen 
fighters and a variety of fundamentalist Islamic ideologies migrated as well (Steinberg 2013; 
International Crisis Group 2007).   
German security officials were aware that fundamentalist Islamic thought existed in some 
capacity but believed it was controlled by the 1985 and 1994 anti-Semitic hate speech and 
assembly laws.  The Islamic Liberation Party, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, is a Palestinian based political 
party that emerged in Germany and throughout Europe after World War II. The party calls for 
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the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate and denounces Israel as a legitimate state. Hizb-ut-
Tahrir has not been openly violent in Germany but propagates anti-Semitism and anti-Western 
views, which have inspired a variety of terrorist groups since the 1980s. The German state 
limited Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s anti-Semitic activity in the 1980s and 1990s through the same laws that 
countered right-wing terrorism, but the wave of Arab asylum seekers in Germany sustained its 
presence in society. The party is estimated to have approximately 200 members in Germany with 
influence concentrated in Duisburg and Hamburg. German security officials maintained that 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir was tied to the first Hamburg al Qaeda node, although evidence did not clearly 
substantiated a connection.  Germany banned the political party in December 2001 through 
restrictions on “hate preachers” and anyone “against the concept of international understanding” 
(Lambroschini 2004; Alexander 2006).162  
The second well-established political organization that gained prominence through the 
1980s asylum wave was known as the Kaplan Organization, Caliphate State, or Hilafet Devleti.  
The Kaplan Organization was established in 1984 in Cologne, Germany by Cemalettin Kaplan 
(birth name Cemalettin Hacaoglu), who was nicknamed the “Cologne Khomeni” by the German 
media (Steinberg 2013, 204).  Cemalettin Kaplan and his son, Metin, claimed asylum in 
Germany in 1983 after Cemalettin was sentenced to death in Turkey for his political beliefs. 
Cemalettin’s goal was to unite the large Turkish population in Germany to reinstall the Islamic 
Caliphate that was destroyed by Kemal Ataturk’s establishment of the secular Turkish state in 
1924 (Roy and Sfeir 2007; Rubin 2010).   
                                                 
162 Paul Wilkinson, director of the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. 
Andrews in Scotland, states that this group is one of many that is "very smart in walking the very fine line between 
propaganda and incitement to terrorism" (cited in Lambroschini 2004). 
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Under Cemalettin Kaplan’s leadership the movement was a well-organized, 1,100 
member strong group, divided along 19 sub-organizations, with as many as 7,000 Turkish 
national supporters in Germany and Turkey (Rubin 2010).  Although the group was not directly 
responsible for any violence in Germany it advocated the overthrow of the Turkish political 
system, so German police began to monitor Kaplan’s activities in 1984 and closed the group’s 
Islamic center in Cologne in 1987.  Some members of the group were veteran mujahedeen from 
the Chechen, Bosnian, and Afghan wars who gained asylum in Germany throughout the late 
1980s and early 1990s (Roy and Sfeir 2007; Kohlmann 2004; International Crisis Group 2007). 
After Cemalettin died in 1995, the organization quickly lost supporters through Metin 
Kaplan’s poor leadership (Rubin 2010).  Between 1995 and 1996, Metin and a core group of 
between 6 and 24 members formed a financing and logistics node for the terrorist group Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan through the IMU’s German representative, Zayniddin Askarov 
(Steinberg 2013).  The Kaplan Organization was re-named Caliphate State and transitioned 
toward broader aims in support of the Islamic transnational terrorist movement.  
After Uzbekistan expelled the IMU, Osama bin Laden allowed the group to establish a 
training hub in Afghanistan.  The IMU also established recruitment in financing nodes in 
Pakistan and throughout Europe. Between November 1996 and March 1997, some Turkish 
members of the IMU node Caliphate State visited the Afghan hub, where they met Osama bin 
Laden and stayed at the IMU’s Kabul headquarters (Steinberg 2013).  In October 1998, the 
IMU’s Caliphate State node was implicated in a terrorist plot on Ataturk’s memorial site in 
Turkey.  Metin Kaplan completed a four year prison sentence in Germany for an assassination 
order against a political rival before he was extradited to Turkey and sentenced to life for the 
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Ataturk memorial plot and financially supporting terrorist groups in Bosnia, Chechnya, and 
Afghanistan (Roy and Sfeir 2007; Steinberg 2013).  
Although German intelligence monitored Caliphate State and Hizb-ut-Tahrir since the 
1980s, knew many veteran mujahedeen had settled in Germany, and began to tracked Arab arms 
smugglers in 1997 (Brisard and Martinez 2005), security officials did not consider and outright 
rejected the idea that these activities supported transnational terrorist groups.  Furthermore, the 
German state also allowed Hezbollah’s public charitable fundraising operations because they 
were not considered a terrorist-related activity.  Officials believed that U.S. intelligence warnings 
of an al Qaeda presence in Germany between 1998 and 2001 were exaggerated and the U.S. was 
“simply looking for a new enemy…and that is why they pester us with these Arabs.”  One 
German official told U.S. intelligence that “those guys that we have around here, they don’t do 
anything” (Steinberg 2013, 38).   
In November 1998, German security officials were “puzzled” by a request to extradite 
Mahmud Mamduh Salim, a Kurdish Iraqi and former Afghan mujahedeen fighter, who the U.S. 
wanted in connection to the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.  German media 
echoed the belief that U.S. accusations of Salim’s involvement in al Qaeda were likely inflated 
because “All of his contacts were harmless” (Steinburg 2013, 38).  As it turned out, most of his 
contacts came to Germany in the early and mid-1990s, were radicalized at the al Quds mosque in 
Hamburg, and became full members of al Qaeda by 1999.  His eight closest friends were 
consequently the al Qaeda Hamburg logistical node responsible for the 9/11 attacks.  Three of 
the pilots, Mohammad Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah received new passports from 
Germany for their travel to the U.S. in 2000, where they completed flight training. The 
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remaining members of the Hamburg node were left behind to facilitate planning and financial 
support for the U.S. nodes (Gunaratna 2002).  
 The al Qaeda node became active in Germany at roughly the same time the Islamic 
Movement Uzbekistan established ties with Caliphate State. The operational commander of the 
September 11th node in Germany and the nodes in the United States, Egyptian Mohammad Atta, 
moved to Germany to study architecture at Hamburg Technical University. Atta was first 
recruited into the Egyptian extremist organization Takfir Wal Hijra, and later al Qaeda in the 
early to mid-1990s as he traveled between Egypt and Germany. Atta was a full member of al 
Qaeda by 1996, when he trained at al Qaeda’a Afghan hub.  As a student in Hamburg throughout 
the 1990s, Atta formed an Islamist discussion and prayer group at the University, where he 
recruited fellow students Marwan al-Shehhi from the United Arab Emirates and Ziad Jarrah from 
Lebanon into al Qaeda (Gunaratna 2002).  
Between 1997 and 2001, they traveled to and from Germany and Afghanistan and formed 
a node in Germany to facilitate logistics and financing for the 9/11 attacks with guidance from 
their handlers in Afghanistan.  None of the German node members had been arrested or 
implicated in terrorist activities, thus, Al Qaeda commanders were confident that the German 
node was less likely to be uncovered, whereas the affiliated Malaysia node was most likely to be 
under surveillance.  Because the German node was not under surveillance, between 2000 and 
2001 Mohammad Atta was able to travel without restraint to the Czech Republic and the U.S. 
before returning to Switzerland and Spain where he met with 9/11 planner Khalid Sheik 
Mohammad for final preparations.  Meanwhile, Yemeni Ramzi bin al-Shibh remained in 
Germany and managed the finances for the German node’s travel and expenses in the U.S. along 
with UAE based al Qaeda accountant Ahmed al-Hawsawi (Gunaratna 2002, 140-145). 
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Table 7.3 Religious Inspired Terror Nodes 
Organization/Dates Node Locations and Activity State Action 
Hezbollah 
 
Likely established nodes 
by late 1980s. Monitored 
and growing since 2001. 
800-1000 supporters throughout Germany; established 
nodes for charity/financing operations. Charity operated 
openly until 2014. 
 
Hamburg (Ali Imam Mosque financial node), Gottingen 
and Essen (“Orphans Project Lebanon” charity 
headquarters, financial node). Annual Al Quds Day 
festivities in Berlin sponsored by Iran. 
Limited the 
charity’s tax 
deductions in 2009, 
banned Orphans 
Project Lebanon 






Connected to Tawhid and 
Jihad node 
Estimated 5-12 individuals in each node:  
Hamburg (I, II); Dusseldorf; Frankfurt 
 
9/11 logistics and financial node; acquired real and 
fraudulent passports; arms trafficking. 
Some arrests 
beginning in 1998, 
most between 2001 
and 2011. 
Islamic Movement 




24 individuals in Sauerland and Cologne made up of 








Worked alongside Ansar al 
Islam in Iraq and al Qaeda 
in Germany 
Approximately 11 Jordanian individuals between Essen 
(logistical node); Hamburg, Berlin, Wiesbaden 
(recruit/financing nodes).  
German Tawhid and Jihad contact Abu Ali/Abu Dhess, 
Jordanian arms trafficker under surveillance since 1997.  
11 members arrested 




and Abu Ali for 
years 




4-12 individuals total; Munich, possibly others in south 
Germany 
Shared connection with Germany’s Tawhid and Jihad 
node for Zarqawi’s Iraq operations 
Wiretapped, 
Arrested 
Sources: Lambroschini (2004); Anderson (2006), START (2008), Rubin (2010), Steinberg (2013), Crenshaw 
(2015); Brisard and Martinez (2005) 
 Critical Juncture: September 11
th
, 2001 and the Iraq War 
The September 11th attacks highlighted a security gap in Germany and the state took a 
number of actions to strengthen its counterterrorism capabilities.   In December 2001, the First 
Security Package allowed the government to ban previously protected  religious groups if their 
purpose or activities countered criminal law, are directed against the constitutional order, or 
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“disregard the idea of international understanding” (Alexander 2006, 86). With these new 
powers, Caliphate State and Hizb-ut-Tahrir were banned in December 2001 (Lambroschini 2004; 
Rubin 2010). 
The Second Security package in January 2002 improved the exchange of information 
between Lander organizations, allowed armed air marshals, and armed federal border guards. 
Additionally, any individual with a history of “constituting a threat to democracy, freedom, 
security of Germany, or who incite use of force in public,” are not granted entry visas or 
residence permits.  New “forgery-proof” national identification cards were also introduced to 
provide the storage of personal data for security purposes (Alexander 2006, 88).  In September 
2002, the German state gained the ability to convict individuals who support or are members of 
foreign terrorist organizations.  In addition to these security measures, a number of financial, 
money laundering laws and regulations were also added (Alexander 2006).   
Through its rapidly instituted counterterrorism policies, the state realized the extent of 
transnational affiliated groups in operation.  German security officials found that a Jordanian 
arms smuggler they had monitored since 1997 was al Qaeda affiliate Tawhid and Jihad’s leader 
in Germany (Brisard and Martinez 2005).  Several members were arrested in April 2002, but 
surveillance of Tawhid and Jihad provided intelligence on the group’s Iraqi Ansar al Islam 
affiliation.  Through fraudulent document contacts in Denmark, Ansar al Islam and Tawhid and 
Jihad logistic nodes ultimately provided Abu al Zarqawi, the future leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, 
and 300 of his fighters with passports to travel across Iran and into Iraq.  Furthermore, Ansar al 
Islam provided Zarqawi’s fighters with sanctuary in its Kurdish Iraqi hub upon his arrival to Iraq 
in 2002 (Brisard and Martinez 2005). In addition to dozens of arrests, German security also 
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uncovered organized al Qaeda nodes in Hamburg (late 2001, 2009), Dusseldorf (2010), and 
Sauerland (2007) (Steinberg 2013). 
The German government centralized its Lander offices in 2004 through a new federal 
office for assisting with “catastrophes” such as a weapons of mass destruction attack (Alexander 
2006, 89).  The Lander offices were also granted authority through the controversial 2005 
immigration law to issue deportation orders for any individuals that are suspected of past or 
present terrorist related activities (Alexander 2006).    
Despite substantial success in countering terrorism since 2002, Germany’s role in the 
War on Terror in Afghanistan and the German government’s relationship with the authoritarian 
Uzbek regime has served as a rallying cry sympathetic Islamists.  Thousands of radicalized 
German Muslim converts, Arab, Turkish, and Kurdish Muslims have continued to travel in and 
out of Germany to fight Western militaries in Afghanistan (Steinberg 2013) and to fight 
alongside the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. 
 7.6 Summary and Discussion 
Germany’s state-society interaction is understood as a pyramidal polity.  The above 
analysis lends support for the hypothesis that strong states with weak societies are able to 
minimize a terrorist presence to nodes. Terrorist nodes have been exceptionally common in 
Germany, even after post-9/11 reforms, but the state has been highly capable of pursuing terrorist 
nodes by consistently passing anti-terror laws, even if the laws limit civil liberties and draw 
criticism from society.   
The German experience with left and right wing terrorism differs from the religious 
terrorist nodes in considerable ways.  Left-wing and right-wing ideologies have a historical 
legacy in many European societies. The left-wing Red Army Faction and June 2 Movement 
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operated with passive societal support from within West Germany, a sanctuary in East Germany 
until 1989, and assistance from the PFLP.  The left-wing nodes enjoyed support from German 
society between 1968 and 1977 due to the Vietnam anti-war movement and the societal fear of 
the fascist German state, at which point the Red Army Faction’s operational capacity was limited 
and it relocated its sanctuary to East Germany.  
 Right-wing fascist thought’s strength is tied to Nazi Germany and the German state has 
consistently been forced to contain its remnants. The German state has vigorously pursued right-
wing neo-Nazi organizations, but racism, Islamophobia, and anti-immigration sentiment 
contributed to a large base of support within German society. Furthermore, propaganda from the 
United States hub provided an ideological base for the neo-Nazi movement. Societal and 
international support allowed the groups to survive despite the state’s penetrative capabilities.  
The German state gained considerable strength between 1974 and 1995 that kept left and right 
wing terrorist nodes dispersed and unable to sustain organizational structures, but societal bases 
have allowed nodes to consistently re-emerge. Right-wing, anti-immigrant has been a mainstay 
in Germany, but the widespread acceptance for it and presence of neo-Nazi groups has been 
drastically reduced. As late as January 2015 widespread organized anti-Muslim Pegida protests 
were banned in spite of scrutiny from politicians and citizens (Torry and Troianovski 2015). 
The demographic shift throughout the 1990s became a critical antecedent to the growth 
of both right-wing and religious terror nodes, but transnational religious nodes were established 
in Germany through different pathways. Prior to 2014, Hezbollah was not considered a terrorist 
threat by the German state since it provides social welfare services and acts as a political 
organization in Europe. Al Qaeda, Tawhid and Jihad, and Ansar al Islam operatives migrated to 
Germany as refugees from Syria, Yemen, Jordan, and Kurdish Iraq, or students from the United 
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Arab Emirates and Egypt. Some had experience with the mujahedeen in Bosnia, Afghanistan, or 
Chechnya, but many arrived in Germany prior to being radicalized (Gunaratna 2002; Alexander 
2006; Steinberg 2013).   
German state capacity remains strong enough to penetrate society, continually collect 
intelligence, deny the establishment of terrorist hubs, and quickly counter and disperse terrorist 
nodes. Since 2001 Germany has increasingly been challenged by the rise of al Qaeda and Islamic 
Movement Uzbekistan (IMU), leftist inspired movements from Turkey (and domestic left-wing 
nodes), in addition to the continued presence of right-wing racist groups (Steinberg 2013). 
Although the German state apparatus has struggled to adapt to demographic and 
population changes since 1990, the structure of German society has provided the state without 
any formidable challenges. Macro-level data on Germany does not suggest high fractionalization 
within society but micro-level analysis sheds light on a cleavage in German society. September 
11th was a critical juncture that supported the extension of the state’s rule-making authority, 
particularly in regulating public religious practices and national security matters. Thus, moderate 
Muslim societal groups have only maintained an interaction with the state in that they provide 
intelligence on terror investigations, but have not received concessions in return.  Through the 
democratic process, the German state’s policies clearly favor the majority electorate at the 
expense of the immigrant population.  
The immigrant population in Germany is faced with a number of structural constraints 
leading to poverty and marginalization that do not appear in Germany’s political and economic 
indicators. Isolation between Germans and immigrants has facilitated an environment where the 
parallel societies do not assimilate.  The social welfare system provides basic needs, but Muslim 
immigrants have relied on religion and criminal enterprises for a sense of dignity and belonging 
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(Bucerius 2014).  In some cases this has involved religious radicalization but also presents 
schemes for terror nodes to self-finance, fundraise, and access a range of criminal enterprises 
from arms trafficking to fraudulent documents. Through these pathways, the numerous jihadist 
fighters who have appeared on the battlefields in Afghanistan and Iraq since 9/11 and their 


















Iraq Chapter 8 - 
 8.1 Introduction 
In 2014, Iraq became a hub to the most significant threat to come from the transnational 
Islamic terror movement since the Afghanistan hub was disturbed in late 2001. Iraq's security 
threat today is a result of the interplay between religious cleavages, the fall of authoritarianism in 
2003, the transition toward democracy since 2005, the neighboring Syrian civil war beginning in 
June 2011, and the destabilizing force of the U.S. led coalition’s troop withdrawal in December 
2011.  In effect, the complex web of societal strongmen or local power brokers that were 
managed through authoritarianism and coalitions with the Iraqi state, developed a new survival 
strategy in the midst of the 2003 invasion that is more difficult for the current regime to manage. 
Throughout Iraq’s history, nationalist-separatist struggles and sectarian conflict have 
permeated state-society interactions to varying degrees.  The consolidation of authoritarianism in 
Iraq under Saddam Hussein stifled much of the political violence from societal groups toward the 
state.  Saddam Hussein, like many strong authoritative figures, managed societal control 
carefully and was cognizant of any potential challenges to the authority of the regime and state.  
In general, authoritarian leaders do not typically provide terrorist organizations sanctuary without 
consent and the organization is not allowed to operate the sanctuary at free will.  This certainly 
holds true for social revolutionary terrorist organizations because they are a threat to the regime’s 
consolidation over society.  In broad terms, Iraq was a terrorist sanctuary throughout Saddam 
Hussein’s reign.  However, the organizations that operated in Iraq were invited and served as a 




Iraq’s history as a terrorist sanctuary took a dramatic turn when Saddam Hussein’s 
regime collapsed in 2003.  Iraq’s state weakness, changing state-society relations, Western 
intervention, and the subsequent U.S. troop withdrawal, created a perfect storm for the presence 
of multiple Islamic jihad organizations.  This interplay created a full-scale terrorist hub to be 
established in Iraq, leaving societal strongmen caught between defending the weak Iraqi state 
and supporting a brutal global terrorist movement as local actors determine the best survival 
strategy. Iraq’s status today is a critical case for the study of how terrorist sanctuaries develop 
and evolve. The current state of violence and the presence of the most notoriously violent group 
to emerge from the global Islamic terrorism movement, the Islamic State, is a culmination of 
many domestic and international factors.  Thus, the Iraqi experience from 1960-2014 presents a 
clear case of the role of state-society interactions in the presence and absence of terrorist 
sanctuary through different points in recent history.   
This chapter will proceed with an explanation of the historical shifts in state-society 
interactions in Iraq.  Next, the legacy of Iraqi state sponsorship of terrorism and society’s 
relationship with various transnational terrorist groups is detailed, with particular attention to 
consequences of the 2003 American-led intervention.  A summary and discussion follows. 
 8.2 State-Society Interactions in Iraq 
 The current relationship between fractionalized groups in Iraqi society predates the 
formation of the Iraqi state.  Iraq’s territorial boundaries encompass several ethnic and religious 
factions that have played varying roles in state-society interactions. Tensions within society and 
between the state and society that re-emerged in 2003 are engrained in a history that dates to 633 
AD when the Arab Islamic conquest in Mesopotamia introduced Islam and Arabic, which 
became the dominant religion and language in the area.   
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The most significant cleavage within Islam today resulted from the relocation of the 
Islamic empire’s capital from Medina (Saudi Arabia) to Damascus (Syria). Iraqis often revolted 
against Damascus’s authority, which ultimately led to the assassination of Ali (the fourth 
Caliph163 and Mohammad’s son-in-law) in Iraq in 661.  Ali’s rival established the Umayyad 
Caliphate in Damascus.  In 680 Ali’s son Husayn challenged the Umayyad’s power but was 
killed.  Ali’s remaining followers eventually became a distinct sect (Shia) from the Sunni 
Umayyad (Sunni) (Marr 2002).  While the Shiites are not the minority in Iraq, they have been 
shut out of the political process throughout much of Iraq’s history. 
 Another inner-Sunni revolt against the Umayyad in 747 resulted in the establishment of 
the Abbasid caliphate, and the city of Baghdad was founded as the capital. The Abbasid period 
was a prosperous time in Iraq and Islamic history (750- 1258), which Iraqis and Muslims still 
consider a proud era.  Baghdad became the center of literature, architecture, and sciences.  Class 
cleavages emerged throughout the period of prosperity but the ultimate blow to Baghdad came 
when the Mongols led by Hulagu, Genghis Khan’s grandson, destroyed most of the city in 1258.  
Another Turkish-Mongol invasion by Timur the Lame in 1401 disabled present-day Iraq from 
recovering for centuries (Marr 2002). 
 The next phase of conquest came from the Ottoman Empire, which consolidated power 
over Iraq between 1514 and 1534.  The Ottoman conquest resulted from a disagreement between 
the Sunni Ottoman sultan and the Shia shah of Persia, adding another sectarian divide in Iraq’s 
history.  After the conquest, the majority of present-day Iraq was governed through Ottoman 
                                                 
163 The word caliph is a form of khalifa, which means successor.  The caliphs were those in line after Mohammad. 
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rule, which divided Iraq into Mosul (north), Baghdad (central), Basra (south) (Tripp 2007; Marr 
2002).  This territorial division within Iraqi society has generally remained.164   
 The Ottoman rule over Iraq varied, which ultimately strengthened tribal structures within 
society.  From 1534 to 1830, local Arab and Kurdish tribal leaders gained significant power as a 
system of indirect control emerged, fractionalizing the ethnic groups in Iraq. In 1831 the 
Ottoman ruler in Iraq, Sultan Mahmud II reasserted direct control. Shia segments of society 
rejected the Sunni rule and refused to participate in the secular leaning education system led by 
Turks.  As a result, the Shia were also left out of leadership in the government bureaucracy and 
military, a trend which continued into the British colonial period. Therefore, Sunni power and 
inclusion in governing institutions became the status quo decades prior to the formation of the 
Iraqi state.  During Ottoman rule, Shi’ites in southern Iraq isolated themselves in the south 
(Tripp 2007; Marr 2002).   
The attempt at direct rule in the rural areas of Iraq was unsuccessful, which led to a 
transition to indirect rule through the latter part of the 19th century. In 1858 Ottoman rulers 
initiated land reform that elevated the status of tribal sheiks to “landlords” and their populations 
became “sharecroppers” of the land.  Sheiks were also given the power to form their own 
protective armies and these locally governed areas did not follow national legal jurisdiction 
(Marten 2012, 153).   
The British gained control over Iraq during World War I and extended this system of 
indirect control.  The British created the Iraqi state’s current territorial boundaries and was 
granted formal authority in April 1920 at the San Remo Conference. Iraqis immediately 
                                                 
164 When the U.S. coalition invaded Iraq in 2003, coalition forces were split between these regions. The Iraqi “Three 
State Solution” idea also followed these general regions. The British largely focused on Basra, while U.S. forces 
focused on Mosul and Baghdad. 
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contested British authority, so to gain legitimacy the British created a monarchy through Prince 
Faysal of the Hashemite family that claims a lineage predating the Prophet Mohammed. While 
the monarchy was given extensive power to govern Iraq, the British still relied on societal power 
brokers to fill the ranks of bureaucracy and parliament to limit dissent (Tripp 2007; Marr 2002).  
For the majority of Ottoman and British rule, which collectively lasted four centuries, centralized 
authority in Iraq was weak vis-a-vis the strong society.  The strength of societal bonds was 
illustrated by the consistent need for indirect governance strategies by those who conquered the 
territory.  
A growing resistance to British authority came first from the Kurds and increasingly from 
the Shia tribal leaders. In 1932 the British mandate expired, leaving Great Britain out of Iraqi 
politics for the next decade.  The Hashemite monarchy struggled to maintain legitimacy and 
social control. An Assyrian uprising in the north in August 1933 led to the massacre of Assyrians 
by the national army, followed soon after by an uprising of Shia tribal leaders in the south, who 
demanded increased local authority.  Prince Faysal died in September 1933 of a heart attack and 
his son, Ghazi, succeeded him.  The monarchy ignored demands for autonomy and periodically 
responded with military force. The third in line to the monarchy was four years old at the time, 
which created an opening for competing political factions divided over British influence in Iraq 
(Marr 2002).  
During WWII the British exerted authority over Iraq again.  Between 1945 and 1958, 
Iraq’s oil infrastructure was developed allowing the allocation of funds to strengthen education. 
As a result, Kurdish, Shia, and Sunni Iraqis gained equivalent educational opportunities and 
shared positions in the government bureaucracy.  However, Prime Minister Nuri al Said, who 
served multiple terms between 1941 and 1958, made politically unpopular decisions to form 
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alliances with the West in an era of Arab nationalist sentiment.  On July 14, 1958, a military 
coup led by Army Brigadier Qasim overthrew the regime, killing the monarchy family and Prime 
Minister Nuri al Said (Batatu 1978; Yaqub 2004). 
The coup ushered in the Republican era of Iraq, which lasted from 1958-1963.  This was 
also the era in Iraqi politics that officially embraced communism, which was short lived. 
Unpopular and inefficient reforms were implemented such as limits on private land ownership 
and seizing territory controlled by the foreign-owned Iraqi Petroleum Company. Furthermore, by 
1961 the Qasim regime began executing dissidents, failing to fulfill promises for Kurdish 
autonomy, and exerted authority over Kuwait after it gained independence.  In short, in the first 
three years the Qasim regime had alienated many important allies domestically and 
internationally (Marr 2002). The Qasim regime was closely tied to the global communist powers, 
drawing criticism from the Western powers, as well as Arab nationalist forces.  The short-lived 
Qasim regime was overthrown on February 8, 1963 by a combination of Iraqi army, Baath Party 
members, and Arab nationalists (Batatu 1978; Gabbay 1978). 
The next five years were filled with domestic turmoil between the Baath Party and Arab 
nationalists changing power.  On July 17, 1968 the Baath Party took control through a coup.  The 
Baathists were led by Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein undertook a brutal campaign 
to consolidate power through suppression of dissident behavior and brutal military rule.  
Repression and authoritarian rule, along with socialist economic policies, were essentially 
institutionalized in the July 1970 Constitution, allowing the Baath Party to rule Iraq until 2003.  
The first decade of Baathist rule was prosperous.  Oil revenues allowed large scale industrial, 
education, and health care investments (Marr 2002; Tripp 2007).   
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However, the Kurdish war that broke out after the failure of the Qasim regime to grant 
Kurds autonomy was still raging in the north against the Iraqi army (Vanly 1993; Karadaghi 
1993). President al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein relocated approximately 500,000 Kurds to urban 
areas and Arab Shia dominated southern Iraq.  Furthermore, the Baath regime encouraged Arabs 
to move to the north to diffuse the concentration of Kurdish power.  To incentivize this 
relocation, but also to greatly expand the Iraqi state’s penetrative capacity in the event of another 
uprising, the state invested heavily in infrastructure (roads, communications) (Vanly 1993; Tripp 
2007).   
Saddam Hussein believed that the tribal leaders were “an archaic relic from imperial 
times that did not accord with revolutionary progress (Marten 2012, 154). Throughout Saddam’s 
time as second in command of the Baathist regime he sought to undermine local power brokers, 
particularly the most powerful sheiks, who posed the greatest threat.  First, the Baathist regime 
banned the public use of “tribal names.”  Second, the Iraqi state created the penetrative 
infrastructure to reach the villages and control the strongmen.  In the early 1970s Saddam knew 
that the consolidated societal structure meant that he must work with these local strongmen, so 
he created the Committee of Tribes to help diversify the Iraqi security forces and build his 
national base of support.  Saddam ranked the tribes by their relative power in society through A, 
B, C categories and provided the strongest local leaders with money.  The categories were not set 
in stone, however, as strongmen could achieve more status and rewards through more loyalty. 
Just as the Ottomans and British had done before him, local policing was left to the strongmen, 
while the state turned a blind eye to smuggling or informal economies that did not disrupt the 
states revenues. Publicly, Saddam continued to ridicule the tribal structure as backwards to the 
urbanizing Iraqi society (Marten 2012). 
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Saddam Hussein began acquiring more control in the Iraqi state apparatus throughout the 
1970s, but the Iranian Revolution in 1979 was a catalyst for al Bakr’s resignation in mid-July 
and Saddam’s immediate rise to the Presidency. Saddam was increasingly paranoid that the 
Iranian Revolution could spread to Iraq, as the Ayatollah Khomeini’s cassette tape recorded 
messages gained popularity among Shia and Sunni Iraqis. The Baath party was secular, thus 
downplayed the role of religion in society during the 1970s and 1980s as another instrument of 
social control.  Women had gained more social status during communist rule in the 1960s, but 
the Baath party also emphasized gender equality in education to promote secularism (Marr 2002; 
Tripp 2007). 
Baathist rule quickly moved toward a personal dictatorship surrounding Saddam Hussein.  
His paranoia led to massive purges within Iraqi government in late 1979 but the purges also 
promoted a very loyal group of Iraqis through a patronage system.  In short, he consolidated 
power through a blend of “charm, generosity, and ruthless terror” (Tripp 2007, 223). Saddam 
also protected his power by promoting family members and loyal longtime allies from his 
hometown of Tikrit (Marr 2002).  A massive bureaucracy of intelligence and security services 
was built ensuring that Iraqi society, which was also increasing moving toward urban areas, was 
reached by the state (Tripp 2007). 
By surrounding himself with “yes” men, Saddam made the miscalculated decision to 
invade Iran on September 23, 1980.  The decision was based on the Iranian Islamic regime’s 
attempt to provoke Shi’a and Kurds to challenge the Iraqi regime, but also to seize a perceived 
moment of weakness to gain the oil-rich Khuzestan region (Marr 2002). The war lasted a total of 
eight years and took a tremendous toll on Iraqi society and the state’s financial and military 
resources. The Kurds experienced the most dramatic human loss during the Iran-Iraq war, with 
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the regime using chemical weapons against the Kurds and destroying thousands of Kurdish 
villages.  However, the war did promote a sense of nationalism among portions of Iraqi society 
(Karadaghi 1993).  
 Critical Antecedent: A Weakened State, Outsourcing Social Control 
Less than two years after the war with Iran ended, Saddam made the desperate choice to 
recuperate financial resources by threatening Kuwait with invasion if it did not help pay Iraq’s 
war debt.  When Kuwait refused, Saddam invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990 in an attempt to 
seize oil fields.  The invasion was met with United Nations sanctions and mandate to send troops 
from a coalition of 30 countries (Marr 2002).   
From January 16, 1991 until February 28, 1991 the coalition pushed Iraqi troops from 
Kuwait.  The war led to uprisings in the southern Shiite region and the northern Kurdish regions 
as they attempted to seize the perceived moment of weakness.  Saddam responded through brutal 
force first in the south, squashing the rebellion and sending populations fleeing to Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, and Iran (Karadaghi 1993; Chatelard 2009).   Then, the Iraqi Army turned to the north 
where some of Saddam’s tribal loyalists had begun siding with the organized Kurdish opposition. 
On March 29, 1991 Iraqi forces began the assault on Kurds.  Within days the opposition 
movement was decapitated and approximately two million Kurds fled for Iran and Turkey 
(Karadaghi 1993; Amos 2010; Chatelard 2009).  Meanwhile, central Iraq remained 
predominately Sunni Arabs, Saddam’s favored group, and was largely untouched from the 1991 
war. When Turkey refused to accept the mass of Kurdish refugees, protective no-fly zones were 
established in the north and south to avoid further bloodshed (Marr 2002).  The U.S. urged the 
Iraqi population to rise up against the regime, but no formal assistance for the overthrow was 
provided in 1991 (Tripp 2007). Sanctions over the next decade also continued to harm the Iraqi 
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economy. The United States165 and Britain tried once more to cast a final blow to Saddam’s 
regime in 1998 under Operation Desert Fox, a four-day aerial bombardment from December 16 
to December 19, which targeted the Iraqi military and was intended to facilitate an overthrow of 
the regime.  However, the attempt did not work (Tripp 2007).  Instead, Saddam had already 
redefined a survival strategy for his regime. 
As Saddam Hussein’s regime faced constraints throughout the 1980s and 1990s, he 
undertook two methods of handling domestic and foreign relations.  First, he revised his current 
secular position in favor of a revival of religious freedom. A key consequence of the wars of the 
1980s and 1990s was a “brain drain” of 500,000 Iraqi professionals and intellectuals fleeing the 
country from war and the “constant supervision” of the state (Tripp 2007, 226).  Since much of 
the middle-class was secular and this base was waning, Saddam pivoted toward implementing 
traditional religious policies in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Among them, the legalization of 
“honor killings”166 and a general revival of Sunni and Shia religious practices (Tripp 2007, 227; 
Marr 2002).  Religious revival in Iraq also facilitated Saddam’s outsourcing of social control 
through tribal leaders in rural portions of Iraq during the post Iran-Iraq war financial crisis and 
beyond (Marr 2002). 
Saddam’s increased use of loyal tribal sheiks is a stark contrast from the firm 
authoritarian grip held over most of society during the 1970s and 1980s.  The reward structure 
that emerged with more velocity in the 1990s was the key to his ability to remain in power until 
2003.  Tribal authorities were granted the ability to settle local disputes and regulate affairs 
                                                 
165 In early 1998 eighteen neoconservative thinkers wrote President Clinton a letter stressing the threat Iraq posed 
stating “We urge you….to turn your Administration’s attention to implementing a strategy for removing Saddam’s 
regime from power” (quoted in Migdal 2013, 235).  Among them were Richard Armitage, John Bolton, Elliott 
Abrams, William Kristol, and Paul Wolfowitz, who gained policymaking prominence during the George W. Bush 
administration (Migdal 2013). 
 
166 Honor killings permitted men to kill their wives or female family members for shaming the family. 
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among the tribesmen and between tribes. In return, the most loyal sheiks (typically Arab Sunnis) 
received land rights, arms (including rocket-propelled grenade launchers, mortars, and 
howitzers), and their followers received the best positions within the Iraqi bureaucracy. The 
tribal sheiks enjoyed their renewed power and in return they delivered their tribes’ loyalties 
through the “acquiescence” of the state’s authority (Tripp 2007, 265; P. Miller 2013; Marten 
2012).  This provided the regime with a sense of security that complemented the large existing 
bureaucratic intelligence and security structure. 
A second strategy, designed to outsource aspects of foreign policy, was the use of state 
sponsorship of terrorist organizations.  These strategies, however, are not mutually exclusive.  
By embracing terrorist organizations that pursued actions against Israel, Turkey, or Iran, the Iraqi 
state could gain favor with societal groups within Iraq.  Iraq’s state sponsorship increased in the 
late 1980s and 1990s in conjunction with the Iraqi state’s financial issues, which could 
compensate for emerging weaknesses. 
Table 8.1 Iraqi State Sponsorship of Terrorist Organizations 




Kurdistan Workers Party 
(PKK) 
(1991-2003) 
Establish an independent 
democratic, left-leaning 
Kurdish state 
Sanctuary Shape Opposition, 
Destabilize or Weaken 
Neighbor 
Abu Nidal Organization 
(ANO)**, Palestinian 
Leftist Groups167  
(1970s-2003) 






Project Power, Shape 
Opposition, Enhance 






Training; Money, Arms, 
Logistics; Sanctuary 
Destabilize or weaken 
Neighbor, Military or 
Operational Assistance 
Source: Byman (2005) *Byman (2005) notes that Saddam Hussein had “little ideological sympathy for the mix of 
Marxism, radical Islam, and the cult of personality that drove the MEK” but backed the group anyway because it 
weakened the Iran (37). **In August 2002, Iraq announced that the leader of Abu Nidal Organization was found 
dead of an apparent suicide. However, some speculate Saddam Hussein believed that Abu Nidal was a spy for the 
United States. This coincided with the increased rhetoric from the U.S. toward Iraq. 
                                                 
167 Palestine Liberation Front, Arab Liberation Front, May 15 Organization for the Liberation of Palestine 
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The terrorist organizations Saddam elected to sponsor did not have wide-ranging social 
revolutionary goals.  Saddam Hussein did not sponsor al Qaeda or any known affiliates.  Instead, 
these organizations had very specific domestic goals in neighboring states that complemented the 
Iraqi state’s goals. The most extensive active support for a terrorist group from the Iraqi regime 
was for the group Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK).  The group was founded in Iran in the 1965 by 
left-leaning Iranian students opposed to the Shah Reza Pahlavi. MEK assisted with the overthrow 
of the Shah during the Iranian Revolution in 1979, but was pushed out of Iran in 1981 by the 
Iranian clerics and hid in France until 1986-1987.  MEK consistently attacked American interests 
in Iran throughout the 1970s but turned its attention to killing Iranian leaders since the 1980s 
(Masters 2014).  An agreement between France and Iran expelled the group in 1986 and MEK 
relocated to Iraq at the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Saddam Hussein then used the group to launch 
massive attacks against Iran and in one battle an estimated 2,000 MEK members were killed.  
Some reports indicate that Saddam also used the group to attack Kurds during the 1991 uprising 
in northern Iraq, although the group denies any involvement in the 1991 attacks (Masters 
2011).168  
By combining the strategy of outsourcing social control to tribal sheiks and outsourcing 
foreign policy actions to terrorist organizations, Saddam Hussein was able to retain power 
although the wars had taken a toll on society.  As Tripp (2007) notes,  
                                                 
168 As of 2011, the group’s estimated strength ranged from 5,000-10,000 spread throughout the world (Masters 
2014). MEK also has ties to interests in the United States.  Byman (2005) notes that a fundraising/lobbying wing of 
MEK was allowed to operate in the United States.  Since losing state sponsorship in 2003, its financing comes from 
wealth Iranians who oppose the Iranian regime and diaspora communities in the United States and Europe.  After the 
U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003, MEK members were placed at Camp Ashraf and declared “protected persons” 
under the Geneva Convention by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.  In 2011, MEK was relocated to Camp 
Liberty in Baghdad, where approximately 3,000 members remained in late 2014 while they await relocation to other 
countries.  In the U.S. a number of high profile politicians like Rudy Giuliani, Howard Dean, and Ed Rendell 




The ability of Saddam Hussein to maintain his regime and much of his ruling circle intact 
during the years that followed the 1991 defeat was a testimony to the resilience of the 
system he had constructed.  To some degree also, it was a testimony to his skill in reading 
Iraq’s diverse communities, knowing whom to favor, whom to exclude and when (259). 
 
After the February 28, 1991 Gulf War defeat and the March 1991 brutal force used in the 
north and south, the Iraqi state’s penetrative capabilities were limited but not by Saddam 
Hussein’s choice. The decision to brutally crush the rebellions in March 1991 was essential to his 
regime’s survival, but they also drastically limited the Iraqi state’s ability to maintain authority.  
Particularly in northern Iraq, Kurdish autonomy became a reality (Karadaghi 1993). The 
regime’s strategy to turn toward allocating social control to a much larger degree after 1991 was 
the result of internationally placed restrictions on the state’s security apparatus.   
First, on April 1991, an Iraqi no fly zone or “safe haven” was established from just south 
of Irbil169 extending north to the Turkish border by U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 
(Frelick 1993). Second, in May 1991 the United Nations Special Commission on Disarmament 
began intrusively investigating Iraq’s security structure and capabilities.  The U.N. attempted to 
negotiate with Saddam throughout the 1990s to lift sanctions but the regime remained defiant 
until 1996.  The post-war sanctions took a toll on the Iraqi people throughout the early 1990s, but 
not on the regime’s ability to remain in power. Between 1991 and 1996 Saddam was able to sell 
oil on the black market, facilitated by Jordan, to continue raising revenue (Amos 2010).  The 
1996 deal was more desirable as it allowed Iraq to re-emerge into the formal global economy 
(Tripp 2007). Saddam’s “winning coalition”170 throughout the 1990s contained about 500,000 
loyal Iraqis, security forces, and bureaucrats, out of a population of about 20 million. The 
                                                 
169 Also spelled Arbil in some sources. 
 
170 Winning coalition refers to the number of people needed to remain in power. For autocracies this number is much 




majority of the regime’s base was Sunni Arabs living in the central portion of the country, thus 
allowing a protective enclave for the state.  Saddam also stressed to the Iraqi people that the fall 
of his regime would be much worse than living under his power (Tripp 2007).  
The third, expanding on the first, were the U.N. mandated missions that placed 
constraints on the Iraqi’s states ability to exert authority over the population in the same way that 
had kept the Baath regime in power.   First, on April 3, 1991 the United Nations began a 
monitoring effort in the south along the Kuwaiti border, which lasted until September 30, 2003 
(Kisangani and Pickering 2008). In addition, the American, British, and French coalition’s 
humanitarian missions in the north and south of the country were more than just aid operations.  
Without a clear definition of what constituted a humanitarian organization, the U.N. 688 
Resolution in effect created a military occupied zone with the clear potential to destabilize the 
Iraqi regime (Frelick 1993). The three operations Operation Provide Comfort (April 9, 1991- 
December 31, 1996)171, Operation Northern Watch (January 1, 1997-May 1, 2003), and 
Operation Southern Watch (August 27, 1992- March 19, 2003) established a level of security 
against Iraqi army force in the north and south (Kisangani and Pickering 2008).  
The protection provided from 1991 until 2003, thus, led to another security related issue.  
Some of the refugees that fled during 1991 made their way back home over the next decade.  The 
borders were particularly fluid between Jordan and Iraq but Kurds were also resettling from 
Turkey and their internal displacement within Iraq (Chatelard 2009).  Jordan was essentially 
“wide open” between 1990 and 2003 and took in approximately one million refugees in the early 
1990s.  Some Iraqi refugees settled in Europe and the United States but slowly made their way 
back to Iraq during the 1990s (Amos 2010, 119; Chatelard 2009).   By 2001, many Kurds had 
                                                 
171 Turkey also participated in Operation Provide Comfort (Kisangani and Pickering 2008). 
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resettled in northern Iraq and the settlements that had been destroyed by Saddam Hussein in the 
1980s and early 1990s were being rebuilt (Marr 2002).  However, the post-1991 sense of 
autonomy outside the brutal grip of the Iraqi state’s power in the north and south led to the 
steady growth of domestic terror threats from within the Shiite and Kurdish societies (START 
2008). 
 The Iranian backed Shiite domestic groups that emerged during the Iran-Iraq War in 
1982, sought safe haven in Iran during the war with Iraq. Shiite opposition groups were banned 
and viciously pursued following a 1982 assassination attempt by a Shiite Islamic Dawa Party 
(BBC, 2014).172  The Shiite group(s) known as Badr Organization for Reconstruction and 
Development, The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and Movement of the 
Islamic Action of Iraq were mainly focused on overthrowing the Baath regime and replacing it 
with one similar to the Iranian regime.  Portions of these groups then led the March 1991 
uprising against Saddam’s regime (Crenshaw 2015; START 2008).   
While briefly successful, the Shiite nationalist terror movement was crushed within 
weeks.  The Shiite movement retreated and formed a node, supported by the Iranian government, 
in southern Iraq under the safe haven provided by Operation Southern Watch.  The Shiite groups 
remained there until 2003 when it re-emerged with political goals173 (Crenshaw 2015; START 
2008).  A clearer picture of how some domestic terror groups in northern Iraq facilitated 
transnational terror sanctuaries emerges through the tracing of the post-1991 refugee flows, 
                                                 
172 Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki was a member of the Shia Islamic Dawa Party in the 1970s (BBC 
2014). 
 
173 The node from southern Iraq is considered distinct from the Shiite Mahdi Army and affiliates that emerged after 
the U.S. invasion in 2003, but membership of the nationalist movement (between safe havens in Iran and southern 
Iraq) in the tens of thousands, it is likely that some of the members’ paths crossed.   
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Kurdish resettlement, Kurdish-region Sunni radicalization, and the emergence of transnational 
terror groups. (START 2008; Crenshaw 2015). 
Table 8.2 Domestic Terror Groups before 2003 
Terrorist Group  Dates of 
Operation 
Aims/Goals Size Affiliations 
Related groups:  
Badr Organization for 
Reconstruction and 
Development; 
Movement of the 
Islamic Action of Iraq 
or The Supreme 
Council for Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq 
(SCIRI)- Renamed 
Supreme Iraqi Islamic 

















uprising in 1991 




be large (tens 
of thousands) 
Iranian- Khomeni regime support;  
Shiite armed political group 
formed by Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard to fight in Iran-Iraq War. 
Rival of Mahdi Army.  
Attacked Iraqi interests in 
Thailand and France in 1982.   
 






















Supported by Iran. Traditionally 
assisted in delivery of social 
services. Former political party 
angered by electoral losses. Three 
groups split from IMK over the 
cooperation with secular KRG in 
1998. (1999-2001) Hamas (not 
affiliated with Palestinian 
Hamas), Tawhid, and the Secord 
Soran Front.  
United Organization of 
Halabjah Martyrs 
1989 Anti- Iraqi state. Less than 100 Kurdish. Retaliation for Iraq’s use 
of chemical weapons against 
Kurds in Halabjah. 
Al-Tawhid Islamic 
Front (TIF) 
Became Jund al Islam 
*see also Ansar al 
Islam and Islamic 













Kurdish. Splinter of IMK, Merger 
of Tawhid and Iraqi Hamas 
(unrelated to Palestinian Hamas) 
TIF merged with the Second 
Soran Unit, also a splinter group 
of the IMK, to form Jund al-
Islam. 
Ansar al Islam 
Formerly named Jund 
al Islam. Ansar al Islam 
progressed from splits 
and mergers beginning 
in 2001. 
*see also Al-Tawhid 
Islamic Front (TIF) and 




















Radical Kurdish Sunnis. Other 
Kurdish Iraqis fought with U.S. 
forces against this group in 2003. 
Prior operational ally of al Qaeda-
Iraq. Rival of ISIS. TIF, Second 
Soran Unit, Jund al-Islam became 
Ansar al Islam. Ansar al-Sunnah 
Army; Shared members with 
Tawhid and Jihad 
Source: START (2008); Jones and Libicki (2008); Crenshaw (2015) 
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 The first signs of religious radicalization in the Kurdish region in northern Iraq appeared 
as early as 1987, when a political party the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan was formed to 
promote religious based education in the Kurdish region.  Whether Saddam Hussein was aware 
of Islamic fundamentalism taking root in northern Kurdish Iraq is unclear. Between 1987 and 
1988 U.S. intelligence provided Saddam Hussein with satellite imagery in support of the Iran-
Iraq war.  Iran exploited Iraq’s security weakness in the northern mountainous border region as 
well as areas of southern Iraq.  Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons several times against 
Iranian troops, but the March 1988 civilian attack was in response to the fall of Halabja to 
Kurdish militias who supported the Iranian military (Harris and Aid 2013).  The chemical 
weapons attack in Iranian border town of Halabja killed 5,000 Kurds and injured tens of 
thousands more (Rubin 2001).  The use of chemical weapons tipped the balance of the war back 
in Iraq’s favor, but Saddam Hussein continued to use brutality against Kurds into the early 
1990s, who were viewed as disloyal traitors174 (Harris and Aid 2013).   
The Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK) grew after the March 1988 chemical weapons 
and sought to facilitate social services to those impacted by the weapons attack but it remained a 
small minority party in Kurdish Iraq (Rubin 2001).  The IMK was angered by electoral losses in 
1991 and revolted against the Kurdistan Regional Government.175  Political parties turning 
                                                 
174 Declassified CIA documents uncovered in 2013 detail that President Reagan, CIA Director William Casey, and 
key military leaders were fully aware of Saddam Hussein’s use of mustard gas and sarin nerve gas against Iranian 
troops that began as early as 1983. Saddam disclosed his mustard production facilities and procedures to U.S. 
intelligence sources, who chose not to report it through the Geneva protocol because the Soviet Union had used 
similar tactics in Afghanistan without consequences.  The CIA then provided Saddam Hussein with satellite imagery 
throughout 1987 and 1988, which indicated that Iranian troops were preparing an offensive. The Iraqi military used 
the intelligence to plan military attacks (Harris and Aid 2013).  
 
175 In 1991 the KDP won 46% of the vote and the PUK won 45%, while the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK) 




violent is not uncommon176 and the increasingly autonomous and democratizing Kurdish region 
of Iraq, facilitated by the U.S., French, and British safe haven, was no different in the 1990s. The 
dominant ruling parties of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) were secular but also had a violent 
dispute between 1994 and 1996 that led to a division of the autonomous Kurdish region.  The 
KRG controlled the western and northern border region of Kurdistan, while the PUK controlled 
the south and the east.  An agreement between the secular PUK and more religious Islamic 
Movement Kurdistan allowed the IMK to operate with some autonomy in the eastern city of 
Halabja, near the Iranian border (Rubin 2001).  The disagreement appeared to be settled in 1998 
as the IMK was granted some local authority, even though it was a very small political party 
(Rubin 2001; Crenshaw 2015). However, a faction of the IMK was not satisfied with the secular 
nature of the Kurdish Regional Government or the IMK’s acceptance of the majority political 
party in the area (PUK) as a legitimate governing entity (Crenshaw 2015).  
 8.3 State-Society Interactions: Religious Terrorist Node in Iraq 
Between 1999 and 2001 three fundamentalist Islamic splinter factions of the Islamic 
Movement of Kurdistan political party emerged: Hamas (not affiliated with Palestinian Hamas), 
Tawhid, and the Secord Soran Front. The first two splinters formed Tawhid United Front in July 
2001, followed by Second Soran Front joining in September 2001 to become Jund al Islam 
(START 2008; Crenshaw 2015).  The rather rapid and sudden emergence of violent jihadist 
ideology in the Kurdish region of Iraq concerned the overwhelming majority of moderately 
religious or secular leaning Kurds (START 2008; Crenshaw 2015).  The violent strategy to 
impose Islamic sharia law and revivalist Islamic customs on the Kurdish population began in 
                                                 
176 See Danzell (2011) on the processes political parties turn to terror. 
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1999 in the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan’s designated territory near the Iranian border. Saudi 
funded schools and mosques were built in Halabja and the surrounding area (Rubin 2001).  
The first splinter group to emerge, Hamas, led by Umar Abdul Karim Abdul Aziz was 
known to follow a literal interpretation of the Koran (Salafist) in the early 1990s. Aziz had 
fought in Afghanistan with two other members of the 1999 splinter Hamas. The second group, 
Tawhid, developed out of a mosque in Irbil (the capital of the Kurdistan region) and began 
terrorizing Kurds in 2000 by throwing acid on unveiled women.  The Kurdistan Democratic 
Party (KDP) pushed Tawhid out of Irbil where it relocated to Halabja.  Two of the spiritual 
leaders of Tawhid, Abu Qatada and Mullah Abu Bakr Hawleri are thought to have known Osama 
bin Laden and facilitated training at al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan for at least five other 
Iraqi Tawhid members in July 2001 (Rubin 2001).  The third group, Second Soran Front, a 300-
400 member armed group of the Islamic Movement Kurdistan joined Hamas and Tawhid’s 
splinter group Tawhid United Front to form Jund al Islam on September 1, 2001 (Crenshaw 
2015; Rubin 2001).  
The Jund al Islam merger was accompanied by a collection of $300,000 of seed money, 
possibly from Osama bin Laden (Rubin 2001) or another source affiliated with the transnational 
Islamic terror movement. However, that is a much larger sum of cash than bin Laden tended to 
give groups not directly under the al Qaeda command. These groups had also been receiving 
Saudi funding for madrasas and mosques in Kurdish Iraq, which would be a more likely source 
of this amount of money. This merger essentially formed a well-organized and funded armed 
radical Islamic node in and around Biyara, Halabja, and Tawela, a mountainous stretch of Iraqi 
territory along the Iranian border (Rubin 2001).   
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Within weeks of the September 1, 2001 formation of Jund al Islam, it hardened its 
policies on creating a Taliban-style society in northern Iraq.  The group destroyed non-Islamic 
religious symbols and began carrying out horrific attacks against “secular and apostate forces” in 
northern Iraq (Osman 2001).  The previous splinter groups of the Islamic Movement of 
Kurdistan had carried out assassinations and had some plots foiled by the security forces in the 
Kurdistan Regional Government between 1999 and 2001, but the September 23, 2001 military 
assault against the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) near the city of Halabja was different 
(Osman 2001; Rubin 2001).  Jund al Islam mutilated and killed dozens of PUK militia fighters 
with machetes (Osman 2001).  In early October 2001, the PUK surrounded and attacked Jund al 
Islam in its mountainous hideout. The fighting continued into December with some territorial 
gains and losses by Jund al Islam, but the PUK militias were unable to completely eliminate the 
group.  Instead, the PUK negotiated a truce in December 2001 that was intended to moderate 
Jund al Islam (Rubin 2001).   
What became apparent to the Kurdish PUK militias fighting from September-December 
2001 is that a relatively small portion of the Jund al Islam fighters were ethnic Kurds.   The PUK 
knew that approximately 34 Kurds affiliated with Jund al Islam had traveled to Afghanistan for 
training (Osman 2001), but the other 400-600 heavily armed fighters with anti-tank and anti-
aircraft weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars appeared to be “Afghan Arabs” (Rubin 
2001; Osman 2001).  Additionally, the “truce” signed in December 2001 did not hold.  Instead, 
the Jund al Islam fighters broke off to form a new group, Ansar al Islam (also later Ansar al 
Sunnah) the same month (Gregory 2008). 
Ansar al Islam is the final Kurdish Islamic group to emerge in the territory. The 
preceding terrorist nodes in the Kurdistan region had established ties with Afghan based 
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terrorists throughout the summer of 2001, so the U.S. invasion naturally pushed several hundred 
fighters and their Toyota Land Cruisers across Iran to the already established node in the 
mountainous border region of Iraq (Rubin 2001; Crenshaw 2015).   Ansar al Islam certainly 
benefited from the additional fighters, financing, and weapons in its continued fight against 
secular Kurdish forces, but the bonds it had forged with the wider transnational movement 
ultimately proved detrimental to the group’s ability to maintain a strategic objective in the 
Kurdish region. Beginning in late 2002 and 2003 a flood of fighters from throughout the globe 
moved into Ansar al Islam’s node and throughout northern Iraq, establishing a hub of thousands 
of foreign fighters with much wider strategic objectives for Iraq (Crenshaw 2015).  Between 
January 2002 and March 2003 (U.S. led invasion) these fighters were only constrained by the 
secular Kurdish militia’s (peshmerga) attempt to challenge them. 
 Whether the Tawhid United Front and Jund al Islam groups (1999-2001) were organic or 
implanted is not entirely clear. Based on the size of the groups in 1999-2000, the seed of Islamic 
radical thought may have only begun with a few dozen radicalized individuals. However, 
migration flows may have brought these few dozen to northern Iraq in the late 1990s. Some of 
the members had fled to Iran and later Afghanistan in the early 1990s before returning to 
northern Iraq in the late 1990s (Rubin 2001).   
Other studies on Iraqi migration flows in the 1990s also shed light on the possibilities for 
how these groups began emerging in 1999 but with more strength in 2001.  In the early 1990s 
Kurdish refugees fled en masse to Turkey, European countries (specifically Germany and the 
U.K.), as well as Iran, where Kurds had existing social networks (Chatelard 2009; Steinberg 
2013).  A likely possibility for what transpired over the next decade before many resettled in 
northern Iraq (by mid-2001) is that Iraqi Kurds were radicalized in other countries before 
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returning to Kurdish Iraq. For example, an estimated 50,000-80,000 Iraqi Kurd refugees were 
still living in Germany in 2002.  A significant portion of Kurds fled to Germany through the 
1990s either through Turkey or through Germany’s political asylum policies (Steinberg 2013).   
After Saddam Hussein’s chemical weapons attack against the Iraqi Kurdish region, they 
would certainly possess the credentials needed to be classified as a political refugee in Europe.  
The isolation of immigrant communities, the protection of civil liberties for radical Islamic 
thought, coupled with the presence of an organized network of terror nodes throughout Europe 
since the early 1990s, has contributed in part to the thousands of Islamic fighters that flowed into 
northern Iraq in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These young Iraqi Kurds living in Germany were 
increasingly radicalized, along with many other young Sunni immigrants in Germany who found 
their way to the jihad in Afghanistan and later Iraq (Steinberg 2013). Steinberg (2013) notes that 
in 2002-2003 the Iraqi Kurds living in Germany increasingly provided financial and logistical 
support to the group Ansar al Islam, the successor group to Jund al Islam and Tawhid United 
Front.  
The individuals who spent time in radicalized European nodes or even in training camps 
in Afghanistan comprised at least a portion of the new radical Islamists that appeared in northern 
Iraq by 2002. Furthermore, the beginning of the invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001 may have 
caused many that traveled from Europe to Afghanistan to return to Iraq. Upon returning to Iraq 
they joined the jihad to challenge the long-established secular nature of Kurdish Iraq. Moreover, 
beginning in late 2002 and early 2003, other terrorist groups rapidly emerged in Iraq with ties to 
Afghanistan to prepare for the U.S. coalition’s invasion.  Thus, two separate movements, one 
more separatist in nature (Ansar al Islam) and subsequent ones with global social revolutionary 
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aims (evolving into al Qaeda and ISIS) converged in an isolated portion of Iraq before spreading 
south toward Baghdad. 
Abu Qatada’s alleged role in the early 2000s in Irbil’s Tawhid Islamic movement is 
significant, as Qatada has been a mainstay in the Islamic jihadist preaching circuit since the late 
1980s, providing the spiritual guidance to encourage jihad.177 He is generally thought to be tied 
to his own Ansar al Sharia ideological movement and formed a base of support in 
“Londonistan,” comprised of Muslim immigrants with ties to Algeria, Bosnia, and Egypt (Bale 
2007).  As Islamic terrorism gained more prominence throughout the world in the mid to late 
1990s Qatada came under increased scrutiny from European security agents. During at least one 
German terror node investigation police found Abu Qatada’s sermons and his teachings have 
also been linked to the 9/11 hijackers that lived in Hamburg, Germany.  In February 2001, 
British police searched his London home and found an envelope with money specifying “For the 
mujahedeen in Chechnya” and an additional $175,000- 200,000 in cash in his home.  At the time 
the U.K. did not have a law that allowed them to detain him without specific charges, so he fled 
before a law was passed.  His whereabouts were unknown for at least a year (Casciani 2014).   
Following this timeline, it would have been possible for Abu Qatada to be in northern Iraq in 
2001 and 2002.   
Qatada had traveled and acquired influence and money, but he has continually asserted 
that he is not an al Qaeda affiliate (Casciani 2014).  In fact, Abu Qatada has his own following 
ideological following throughout Europe and the Islamic world that has produced some of the 
most ruthless terrorist groups associated with the transnational Islamic terrorist movement.  
                                                 
177 Abu Qatada spent time in Peshawar, Pakistan in the late 1980s until 1993 before seeking asylum in the U.K.  He 
resided in London from 1993 until 2014, where he received political asylum in 1994 for being tortured in Jordan in 




Abu Qatada was a spiritual mentor for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (Bergen 2006), a Jordanian born 
criminal turned world renowned terrorist, whose unrestrained targeting tactics made Osama bin 
Laden uncomfortable. From 1989 until Zarqawi’s death in 2006 he “transformed himself into a 
nationless freelance terrorist. Tactically, geographically, and to some extent philosophically, he 
established a pattern of inconsistency. His flexibility made him all the more fearsome—and all 
the more difficult to pin down” (Teslik 2006). 
Tracing the path of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi from the 1980s until his arrival in Iraq in mid-
2002178 can explain the emergence of al Qaeda in Iraq in 2004 followed by the most abhorrent 
terrorist group operating in the world in 2014, The Islamic State.  Al-Zarqawi spent much of the 
1980s as a Jordanian criminal imprisoned for sexual misconduct and drug possession (Teslik 
2006).  In prison he sought to redeem his human faults and became radicalized in Islamic 
thought and inspired by the mujahedeen fight in Afghanistan.  In 1989 he was released from 
prison in Jordan and traveled to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region but arrived too late as 
the war was ending (Bergen 2006). He stayed in Peshawar, Pakistan, a hub of radical Islamic 
thought and smuggling, perhaps working in the informal economy or for a written publication for 
mujahedeen (Teslik 2006; Joffe 2006).  Abu Qatada (another Jordanian) and Osama bin Laden 
                                                 
178 START (2008) notes that Zarqawi’s Tawhid and Jihad appeared in Iraq in 1999 but this is highly unlikely based 
on Zarqawi’s known whereabouts from 1999 until mid-2002 (Crenshaw 2015; Joffe 2006).  The confusion between 
Tawhid and Tawhid United Front, which appeared as the IMK splinter around 1999-2001, and Tawhid and Jihad 
(Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s group) in START (2008) is likely based on the groups having similar names.  The word 
tawhid translates to “monotheism” and it is not uncommon for multiple terrorist groups to use a combination of the 
same words (Steinberg 2013).   
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were both in Peshawar at the time and Zarqawi might have met Osama bin Laden179 between 
1989 and 1992 (Joffe 2006).180    
While in Peshawar, Zarqawi did become close to Salafist spiritual leader Sheikh Abu 
Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and the two traveled back to Jordan in 1992 to begin forming an Islamic 
militant organization to target the Jordanian regime and lend support to the Palestinian liberation 
cause (Kirdar 2011; Crenshaw 2015).181 While in Jordan, al-Zarqawi and Maqdisi were arrested 
and imprisoned in 1993 for their outspoken criticism of King Hussein’s treaty with Israel and 
harboring weapons materials (Kirdar 2011).  While in prison, Sheikh Maqdisi became the brains 
and Zarqawi the brawn for their radical Islamic prison gang.  From 1993-1999 the two were able 
to send messages out of prison through relatives and guards to be posted on Salafist websites.  In 
the later years (1997-1999) Zarqawi began to split with Maqdisi’s ideology and constructed 
some of his own, more radical and unencumbered musings that portrayed any individual, Muslim 
or otherwise, who disagreed with his thought the enemy. Maqdisi’s and al-Zarqawi’s writings 
gained a following in Europe and the Middle East but Zarqawi’s ultimately caught the attention 
of Osama bin Laden in May 1998 (Kirdar 2011), who was back in Afghanistan after being 
expelled from Sudan. A year later, in spring 1999, Zarqawi was released from the Jordanian 
prison under amnesty by king and he quickly made his way to Kandahar, Afghanistan where he 
met Osama bin Laden (Kirdar 2011; Steinberg 2013). 
                                                 
179 Late 1989 also marks when Osama bin Laden took control of the movement that became al Qaeda after Abdullah 
Azzam’s death in Peshawar in November 1989, which was likely orchestrated by bin Laden. 
 
180 Teslik (2006) states that he met Osama bin Laden in the early 1990s, but other reports indicate that the two may 
have met on al-Zarqawi’s trip to Afghanistan in 1999-2000 (Crenshaw 2015).  Al-Zarqawi did meet Abdullah 
Azzam’s (founder of al Qaeda) son in Afghanistan around 1990-1991 (Bergen 2006). 
 
181 Al-Maqdisi shares many of the Salafist beliefs of Abu Qatada, and remains an influential Islamic spiritual leader. 
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Zarqawi’s writings did not gain bin Laden’s attention because they impressed him but 
rather his writings illustrated the rogue nature of this prison tattooed Jordanian thug. His writings 
criticized al Qaeda’s support for the Taliban’s fight against the Northern Alliance as un-Islamic 
and he disagreed with al Qaeda’s focus on the “far enemy” (the United States) rather than the 
“near enemy” (Jordan’s Hashemite regime) (Kirdar 2011, 3). When he arrived in Afghanistan, 
bin Laden was also paranoid that Zarqawi could be part of a Jordanian sting operation in 
Kandahar.  Ultimately, some of bin Laden’s advisors convinced him to give Zarqawi $5000 and 
send him to Herat, Afghanistan near the Iranian border, approximately 250 miles away from al 
Qaeda’s main training camps (Kirdar 2011; Bergen 2011). Zarqawi refused to join al Qaeda in 
1999-2000 although Osama bin Laden sought to bring Zarqawi into the group (Teslik 2006), 
likely to keep close control of his erratic beliefs and potential for disrupting the coherent 
transnational movement’s message.  Instead, in 1999-2000 Zarqawi formed his own terrorist 
group, Tawhid and Jihad, in the Herat, Afghanistan training camps (Kirdar 2011; Bergen 2011).  
Zarqawi was really nothing like Osama bin Laden or al Qaeda central leadership.  He had 
grown up in poverty and dropped out of school before turning to crime and violence. He did not 
fit the mold of many religious terror masterminds like Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri 
who had privileged backgrounds, but Zarqawi was not a mastermind. His long-term strategic 
vision encompassed igniting a civil war between Sunnis and Shiites, which strategically Osama 
bin Laden disagreed (Bergen 2011).  This vision was later revealed through his targeting tactics.  
Zarqawi’s personal strength was physically training terrorists, making bombs, orchestrating 
suicide attacks, and generally planning indiscriminate violence against civilians, rather than 
applying the violence to a viable coherent ideological message.  Nonetheless, he had built a large 
movement of 2,000-3,000 trained fighters in Herat by October 2001.  Many of these fighters 
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came through the global call to jihad during the U.S.-led invasion in Afghanistan (Kirdar 2011).  
During airstrikes in Herat and the fall of the Taliban by early 2002 many of Zarqawi’s fighters 
fled to Iran to establish a temporary safe haven before Tawhid and Jihad’s next move (Kirdar 
2011; Bergen 2011). 
The presence of al Qaeda or like-minded fighters in Iran caught the attention of U.S. and 
European intelligence agencies in late 2001 and early 2002 when several counter-terrorism raids 
in Britain, Spain, and France connected the Iraqi Kurd Islamic terror group, Ansar al-Islam, to al 
Qaeda in Afghanistan (Hoffman 2006). It was close, but in reality, the connection was between 
European affiliates of Ansar al-Islam or Tawhid and Jihad to Tawhid and Jihad in Iran (Kirdar 
2011).  At this time, Zarqawi’s Tawhid and Jihad remained opposed to joining al Qaeda.  
Possibly one of these raids or a subsequent London raid in early 2001 uncovered the 
aforementioned link between the spiritual leader Abu Qatada and northern Iraq. 
The most incriminating evidence found in one of the London apartment search of the 
Ansar al-Islam and Tawhid and Jihad affiliated node were printed do-it-yourself recipes for ricin, 
botulism, and cyanide.  Interestingly, some of these recipes were retrieved from an American 
“white supremacist website” (Hoffman 2006, 275).182 Nonetheless, this finding set off the 
international hysteria that likely led to the “Axis of Evil” claim in President Bush’s State of the 
Union address on January 29, 2002 (PBS 2002).   
The “Axis of Evil” was particularly puzzling because it seemed to allude that Shiite Iran 
sponsored the distinctly Salafist, Sunni-inspired social revolutionary al Qaeda movement.  Some 
sources have connected Iran’s support to radical Sunni factions during the subsequent Iraq War, 
                                                 
182 Although not specified, this time frame (early 2002) does exactly coincide with the abrupt removal of the 
transnational terror group Hammerskin Nation (ADL 2002), which was being ran by either U.S. or British 
Hammerskins at the time. 
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while others have argued the Iran was very helpful against Sunni extremism (CBS 2008; Kirdar 
2011; Crenshaw 2015). Iraq’s role in the Axis of Evil made slightly more sense, as the Baath 
regime did favor Sunnis, but Saddam had violently targeted the portion of Kurdish Iraq where 
Ansar al Islam ultimately formed.  However, when the U.K., U.S., and France established a 
humanitarian safe haven for Kurds (1991-2003) and the unintended safe haven node for terrorist 
organizations (2000-2003) Saddam Hussein was no longer capable of countering Islamic 
extremism. 
Iran and Iraq’s place in the Axis of Evil or those harboring terrorist organizations, 
illustrates the state-centric view of U.S. foreign policy and security in the post-9/11 era. 
Although both Iran and Iraq had a strong grip on social control within their societies, governance 
gaps also remain in authoritarian regimes.  The West assumed that Iran and Iraq must have 
known about these groups, as authoritarian regimes often do, and must have been willingly 
harbored them.  However, no border is completely secure and Tawhid and Jihad and other al 
Qaeda affiliates were able to pass Iranian border security with fraudulent German documents 
obtained in October 2001 from the German affiliated cells (Steinberg 2013) and subsequently 
hide in apartments within Iran between late 2001 and February 2002 because of one specific 
contact in Iran (Bergen 2011). 
The notorious Afghan warlord, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, was living in exile in Iran and 
provided Zarqawi and some of his Jordanian fighters safe haven in Iran after the fall of the 
Taliban’s regime in December 2001 (Bergen 2011).  Hekmatyar was one of the most prominent 
mujahedeen leaders during the Soviet-Afghan war and his fundamentalist Hezb-e-Islami Pashtun 
Sunni militia was later responsible for the Afghan civil war in the early 1990s that thousands.  
He briefly served as Prime Minister of Afghanistan (1993-1994, 1996) but his militia fell out of 
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favor with other Afghan tribal leaders over the massive killings in Afghanistan.  His brutality 
consequently led to the Taliban’s rise to power in 1996. Hekmatyar lost his state sponsorship 
from Pakistan, who turned on him in favor of the Taliban, so he turned to Iran for exile (BBC 
2010).  
Although Iranian officials were fully aware that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar lived in Iran since 
1996, his resurgence of political activity was allegedly unknown to Iranian officials until early 
2002, when he began threatening to overthrow the Karzai regime from within Iran. Hekmatyar 
had been living in quiet Iranian exile for several years, but when the Taliban fell in Afghanistan 
his fortunes changed and he seemed to showed interest in seizing the opportunity. The Iranian 
regime allowed him to live in Iran (1996-2002) as a “wild card” to counter the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan, but he became too much of a liability when he sought to undermine the 
international coalition’s war in Afghanistan. The Iranians promptly expelled Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar in February 2002, where he transitioned back to his role as Afghan warlord (BBC 
2010).183   
The Iranian regime worked closely with the U.S. from 2001 until 2003 by collecting 
intelligence, photocopying hundreds of passports, and expelling hundreds of al Qaeda operatives 
and Sunni militants crossing from Afghanistan to Iraq.  In recent years, several former U.S. 
intelligence and Bush administration officials have noted that Iran’s support instrumental in the 
War on Terror’s Afghan theatre, and the limits placed on this cooperation between the U.S. and 
Iran were from the Bush administration, not Tehran (CBS 2008).  The expulsion of Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar in February 2002 indicated that Iran was cooperating in the War on Terror.  
                                                 
183 His expulsion ultimately led to much bigger problems for the coalition effort in Afghanistan.  Within a few years 
Hekmatyar regained his role as Afghan warlord fighting the intervention, possibly providing protection for Osama 
bin Laden’s escape from Afghanistan to Pakistan, and attempting to kill President Hamid Karzai in 2008 (BBC 
2010).  Hekmatyar remained a prominent Afghan warlord in late 2014. 
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Moreover, Iran’s place in the Axis of Evil rhetoric was short-lived because Gulbuddin’s 
expulsion forced Zarqawi and his two dozen or so Tawhid and Jihad fighters to relocate 
throughout the first half of 2002.  During the February 2002 to June 2002 time frame Zarqawi’s 
group is believed to have made their way across Iran and into northern Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon 
(Kirdar 2011). 
 By entering Iraq in mid-2002 Zarqawi’s Tawhid and Jihad finally sealed Saddam 
Hussein’s fate in the Axis of Evil.  Zarqawi met with Mullah Krekar, the official leader of Ansar 
al Islam in Iraq in mid-2002 (Bergen 2011).  Mullah Krekar had been leading Ansar al Islam 
from exile in Norway since the 1990s.  After Norwegian officials learned of his 2002 Iraq trip 
and he was given a deportation order in 2003, but the order has never been implemented for fear 
that Mullah Krekar will be tortured and executed (Gregory 2008).184  
Nonetheless, the two groups established a formal tie in the summer of 2002 and Ansar al 
Islam provided safe haven in the mountainous region they held along the Iranian border in 
northern Iraq (Bergen 2011).  This was perfect timing for Zarqawi as he and his few dozen 
fighters settled into their node in Iraq months ahead of the inevitable U.S. invasion.  Although 
the initial agreement between Ansar al Islam and Tawhid and Jihad seemed to be limited to 
Tawhid and Jihad helping protect Ansar al Islam’s territory against the U.S. invasion (Bergen 
2011), Zarqawi immediately began recruiting Sunni fighters throughout the northern half of Iraq 
under an anti-American nationalist message (Kirdar 2011).  In Tawhid and Jihad’s first official 
act of terrorism, on October 28, 2002 Zarqawi instructed Tawhid associates in Jordan to 
assassinate Laurence Foley, the director of USAID, outside his Amman home (START 2013).  
                                                 
184 Mullah Krekar continues to live in Norway and inspire jihad through hate speech.  He was arrested for 
threatening to kill the Norwegian Prime Minister.  In January 15, 2015 he was released from prison and sent to live 
in a remote refugee village (Taylor 2015). 
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 Saddam Hussein politically survived the 1991 war against the international coalition after 
his ill-conceived decision to invade Kuwait, the subsequent 1991 domestic uprisings in the north 
and south, the international sanctions of the early 1990s, and the last-ditch effort strafing by the 
U.S. and Britain in 1998, but his regime could not survive the post-9/11 gathering storm clouds 
(Migdal 2013).  Already armed with intelligence on Saddam’s weapons programs (based on 
intelligence from a single Iraqi refugee who wanted asylum granted in Germany) and Saddam’s 
typical non-compliance with international demands, the knowledge that Zarqawi was in Iraq in 
late 2002, provided the single missing link to connect Saddam Hussein’s regime to al Qaeda in 
Colin Powell’s February 2003 U.N. Security Council address (Teslik 2006).   
 Critical Juncture: U.S. Intervention and a Rallying Cry for Jihad 
 A key turning point in the presence of terrorist organizations in Iraq was the result of the 
U.S. led invasion on March 20, 2003.  Tawhid al Jihad’s established node in northern Iraq laid 
the groundwork for the Sunni-based extremist movement that burst onto the political scene in 
2003.  Within years, Iraq was a hub in the transnational terrorist movement. Iraqi nationalists and 
Islamic fundamentalists from across the region came from Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and 
Kuwait were unified in the fight against the West on Muslim soil (Steinberg 2013). Between late 
2002 and 2003 Iraq quickly transformed from harboring a few hundred Ansar al Islam terrorists 
with some connections to the global transnational movement (beginning in 2001-2002), to 
Tawhid and Jihad and its successor groups inviting and organizing thousands of fighters 
(Crenshaw 2015). 
 8.4 State-Society Interactions: Transnational Terrorist Hub in Iraq 
For Ansar al Islam, the American led invasion threatened its established its pre-existing 
node in northern Iraq as American forces fought alongside the secular Kurdish forces that had 
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sought to contain them since 1999.  The United States was aware of Ansar al Islam’s connection 
to the wider Islamic transnational movement since early 2002, so the elimination of this safe 
haven was a top priority in the 2003 invasion (Mendenhall 2003).  
By March 2003, Ansar al Islam was suspected of being close to 700 strong (Mendenhall 
2003), which was actually a combination of Ansar al Islam and Tawhid al Jihad.  The two groups 
remained distinct but collectively built a terrorist hub. Beginning in the first weeks of the 2003 
invasion (March 20-March 30), the militia of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), along with 
other Kurdish secular forces, began a full assault on Ansar al Islam’s hub in the mountainous 
region near Tawela with U.S. air support.  The United States fired at least 50 Tomahawk missiles 
into the region destroying the “massive terrorist facility.”  However, the body count after the 10 
day stand-off only matched about 10% of the suspected 700 fighters (Mendenhall 2003).   
In the villages of Biyara and Tawela, the local populations told Kurdish militias that 
hundreds of Arabs from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinian territories had traveled 
through the during the previous 18 months (late 2001 to March 2003) and imposed a strict 
Taliban-style sharia law on the villagers (Mendenhall 2003).  This time frame coincides with 
Tawhid and Jihad fighters fleeing Afghanistan and the subsequent expulsion from Iran.  
However, the Kurdish forces were unable to locate any of the Ansar al Islam terrorists who had 
previously attempted to govern the local population.  The U.S. suspected some had dispersed to 
neighboring Iran or south toward Baghdad, but that the group had been “finished.” Thus, the 
Kurdish militias and the U.S. officially declared victory over Ansar al Islam on March 30, 2003 
(Mendenhall 2003).  Because the vast majority of “Ansar al Islam” was actually Zarqawi’s 
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Tawhid and Jihad, the latter group had moved south toward Baghdad where Saddam’s army and 
Iraqis were fighting a ground war against the invasion.185  
Many of the various insurgent groups that emerged after the 2003 invasion were not tied 
to the al Qaeda movement or even particularly inspired by it.  Instead, the vast majority were 
dedicated to the nationalist aim of expelling the Western presence.  Zarqawi’s strategy was 
facilitated by existing historical cleavages from Ottoman, British, and Baathist rule, but 
specifically aided by the de-Baathification policy after Saddam’s regime fell.   
U.S. policymakers commonly use the Hitler analogy and policymakers since 1991 
believed Saddam Hussein was comparable to Hitler.  Thus, de-Baathification was reminiscent of 
1940s de-Nazification in Germany but produced an opposite outcome because Iraqi and German 
societies’ historical interactions with the state were vastly different (Krebs and Lobasz 2009).  
The rejection of all former Baath Party members in the new Iraqi armed forces created anxiety 
for Sunnis whose status quo in society was dramatically shaken (P. Miller 2013).  By most 
accounts one of the most detrimental decisions to the short and long-term stabilization of Iraq 
was the decision in May 2003 by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), specifically U.S. 
diplomat Paul Bremer, to fire all Iraqi government employees, including teachers and civil 
engineers, followed by the disbanding of the Iraqi Army and security forces (Marten 2013).   
The personal wealth of high-ranking Baathists allowed them to flee Iraq and resettle in 
Jordan (Amos 2010), but de-Baathification left at least 250,000 of Saddam Hussein’s former 
security services unemployed, armed, and angry. These individuals and their sympathizers made 
up the Iraqi insurgency rather than Tawhid and Jihad or al Qaeda Iraq (Kirdar 2011), but many 
                                                 
185 Tawhid and Jihad had no reported terrorist attacks until August 2003 (START 2013), as Tawhid fighters were 
lost among the thousands of Iraqi military and dozens of insurgent groups fighting the U.S. led invasion. 
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insurgents later merged with more extremist factions as a survival strategy (START 2008; 
Marten 2013; Crenshaw 2015).    
Tribal leaders from Anbar province tried to reach out to the Coalition Provisional 
Authority from August 2003 until February 2004, offering to work as security contractors or 
defend government buildings and highways, but the CPA would not allow it. Moreover, the CPA 
did not want American soldiers working too closely with the local societal strongmen on the 
ground because they had been labeled “terrorists” by policymakers in Washington (Marten 2013, 
158).186  A range of terrorist and insurgent groups both nationalist/domestic and internationally-
backed emerged during and after the 2003 invasion.  Some were focused on nationalist goals to 
expel Americans as well as foreign fighters, some were opportunistic criminal gangs187, and 






                                                 
186 According to CIA Director George Tenet, the CIA, State Department, and National Security Council all wanted 
to bring tribal sheiks into the governmental process, but Paul Bremer and Vice President Dick Cheney vetoed the 
action (Marten 2012, 152). 
 
187 Examples of small groups with unclear political goals and no known terrorist group affiliation.  These groups 
were considered small (less than 100), may have been aliases for larger groups, typically only targeted American 
troops, and may have only sought ransom money during the height of the violence in 2004 to 2006 include: Ali bin 
Abu Talib Jihad Organization; Swords of Righteousness Brigades; Protectors of Islam Brigade; Iraqi Revenge 
Brigades; Ansar al Jihad; Abu Bakr al-Siddiq Fundamentalist Brigades; Iraqi Legitimate Resistance; Islamic 
Resistance Brigades; Brigades of Martyr Ahmed Yassin; Holders of the Black Banners; Brigades of the Victorious 
Lion of God/Usd Allah; Karbala Brigades (START 2008; Jones and Libicki 2008; Council on Foreign Relations 
2008; Crenshaw 2015). 
 
188 In addition to numerous insurgent and terror groups, the separatist terror group Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), 
which had safe haven in Iraq during the Baathist regime, continued to operate in Iraq.  In 2005, the PKK was 
renamed Kongra-Gel and the armed wing of the party was named Kurdistan Freedom Hawks. 
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Table 8.3 Key Shi’ite Insurgent and Domestic Terror Groups after 2003 
  
Organization Years of 
Operation 
Objective Size Affiliation 
Mahdi Army 







Thousands Hezbollah, Iran, Shi’ia 


























Appears to be linked to al-Sadr 
Shi’ia linked groups 
Abu al Abbas August 
2004 
Anti-British forces 
in southern Iraq 
Less than 20 
members 
Shi’ia. Likely an alias or affiliation 
of Mahdi Army 
Kidnapped British journalist in 
Basra. 







1,000-5,000 Iranian Quds support, Mahdi Army 
militarized wing 
Likely reinstated to fight ISIS in 
Iraq 
Promised Day Brigade 










Iranian backed Shiite militia, 
termed “special group” by the 
U.S., Led by Sadr tribal leader 
Passive support and working 
relationship with Shiite 
government under al Maliki 




Table 8.4 Key Sunni Insurgent and Domestic Terror Groups after 2003 
Organization Years of 
Operation 







assisting US anti-al 
Qaeda efforts. 
Thousands Affiliated with 1920 Revolutionary 
Brigade. Al Ahwal is splinter group of 
Islamic Army. Originally anti-
American. Joined U.S. effort in 2006-











Fought against al Qaeda, member of 








Nationalist Less than 
100 
Thought to have fought alongside Iraqi 











Arab Sunni. Possibly pro Saddam 
regime. Thought to target AQI and now 
ISIS. Joined Jihad and Reform front in 
2007, left in 2008. 



















talks for moderation 
after 2007. 
Hundreds Sunni/Salafist. Ties to Baath Party. 
Affiliated/shared members with Ansar 
al Islam until 2007. In 2007 thought to 
have split with Ansar al Islam over 
AI’s ties to AQI. Aligned with Jihad 















Moderate Sufi, Sunni ideology. 
Transitioned to political activity after 
2011. 
Sources: START (2008); Jones and Libicki (2008); Crenshaw (2015); Council on Foreign Relations (2008) 
 
The fog of the first few years of war made it very difficult to determine the objectives of 
each of the groups but also gave Zarqawi a false sense of support.  Zarqawi’s plan for Iraq 
included three different strategies, which created a great deal of chaos in the initial years of the 
Iraq War.   
First, beginning in August 2003 Tawhid and Jihad began a string of targeted bombings 
and attacks on humanitarian aid services and workers, U.S. coalition partners, and Iraqis who 
joined the new Iraqi police and military.  Tawhid and Jihad (later Al Qaeda Iraq) terrorized 
Sunni tribes who did not actively support Islamic fundamentalist goals (Kirdar 2011; Biddle, 
Friedman, Shapiro 2012; START 2013; Crenshaw 2015).  In early 2004, the first Sunni tribal 
leaders reached out to U.S. forces for protection and assistance against Tawhid and Jihad.   
The leaders of the large and well-organized Albu Nimr tribe, which stretched through 
Anbar province into Baghdad asked the American commanders for protection and offered 
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assistance in the fight against Tawhid and al Qaeda. The U.S. provided the Albu Nimr tribe with 
a dozen Special Forces troops in exchange for members of the Albu Nimr tribe joining the Iraqi 
police and security forces. With the U.S. soldiers tied down in Fallujah during this time, the 
inadequacy of security for Albu Nimr made them vulnerable to attacks from AQI. Al Qaeda Iraq 
specifically sought out the Albu Nimr tribe in mid to late 2004 killing many of them for 
cooperating with American forces.  Thus, the Albu Nimr alliance with the U.S. collapsed 
(Biddle, Friedman, Shapiro 2012).  Zarqawi’s strategy led to some success as the U.N., 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Oxfam pulled out of Iraq (Bergen 2011) and 
Sunni tribal militias were unable to match Tawhid and Jihad’s brutal force (Biddle, Friedman, 
Shapiro 2012).   
Zarqawi’s second goal was to unify the splintered Sunni insurgency against the U.S. 
coalition was a main focus from 2004-2006 but this was generally unsuccessful.  The first battle 
of Fallujah in March-April 2004, united many Sunni insurgents against Americans as hundreds 
of Sunni insurgents and civilians were killed (Bergen 2011).  Meanwhile, between January and 
October 2004 Tawhid and Jihad conducted approximately 40 terrorist attacks and beheadings, 
killing hundreds, many Shiite civilians (START 2013).  Zarqawi gained both international 
condemnation and praise for personally beheading Jewish American Nicholas Berg with a 
machete on May 11, 2004.  The beheading went viral and was viewed millions of times on social 
media (Bergen 2011), but Zarqawi’s influence began to wane.   
These attacks distinguished the popular goals of the nationalist Iraqi insurgency from the 
extremist Islamic radicals that were seeking to steal the spotlight.  In 2004, Zarqawi’s Tawhid 
and Jihad began experiencing push-back from Iraqis due to the number of foreign fighters in the 
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group, many of which came from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Syria.  Furthermore, 
Tawhid and Jihad targeted Shia holy sites, which the majority of Iraqi Muslims did not support.   
The attacks against Shia holy sites and civilians were part of Zarqawi’s third goal of 
inciting a civil war between Sunnis and Shiites.   Zarqawi hoped that targeting of Shia holy sites 
would lead to retaliatory attacks against Sunnis and strengthen the Sunni resolve. A large number 
of Shiite and Sunni insurgent groups formed throughout 2003-2005 in response to growing 
mistrust (START 2008). Sunnis also boycotted the 2005 elections which led to a Shia dominated 
government and additional sectarian violence (Bergen 2011).  Between 2005 and 2006 the Mahdi 
Army, a Shia militia, coalesced and grew its base as a result of Zarqawi’s sectarian agitation, 
which ultimately led to the mass killings of Sunnis (START 2008; Crenshaw 2015).   





Objective  Size Affiliation 
Tawhid and Jihad 
(Iraq) 
Al Qaeda in Iraq; 
al Qaeda in the 














Abu al-Zarqawi established in 1999 in 
Jordan/Afghanistan (less than 100 members), 
refused AQ merger in 2000. Merged with Al 











Suspected offshoot of Ansar Al-Sunnah 
Army, Mujahedeen Shura Council. Likely 
merged with AQI. 








200-600 AQAP sent fighters to Iraq to assist AQI 
from 2003-2006, unknown after Zarqawi's 












Mujahedeen Shura Council member as of 
2006. 
Targeted co-ed Iraqi university and 










Joined Mujahedeen Shura Council in January 
2006, splinter of Islamic Army of Iraq 
US forces caught most top leadership 
December 2005 










Sunni. Anti- Shi’ia. Ties to al Zarqawi’s 
Tawhid and Jihad/al Qaeda in Iraq. Operated 
in Basra. Possibly affiliated with 
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Mujahedeen Shura Council. 




Religious 100s (Iraq 
and Jordan) 
Merged with or part of Al Qaeda Land of 














1000s Umbrella organization for terror groups. 
Portions became Islamic State. Groups part 
of MSC: al Ahwal Brigades, Islamic Jihad 
Brigades, al Guhruba Brigades, Saraya Ansar 
al-Tawhid, Ahl al Sunna Wa al Jammah, 
Jayish al Taifa al Mansura 
Al Nusra Front 










Sunni, Salafist. Funnel weapons and fighters 
to Syria in support of Al Qaeda.  Originally 
cooperated with ISIS/ISIL, rival since 2013. 















Splinter group of AQI named Islamic State 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Islamic State Levant 
(ISIL). Split with AQ in April 2013 and 
declared Caliphate in 2014. AQ and Al 
Nusra Front are critical of Islamic State. 
Sources: START (2008); Jones and Libicki (2008); Crenshaw (2015); Council on Foreign Relations (2008); Berman 
(2009) 
 
Although Iraqi society has a history of sectarian tension, it does not have a history of 
violent sectarian war as Lebanon or some other Muslim societies do.  Iraqi Sunni and Shias share 
beliefs in the key tenants of Islam but are also united in their fears of extremism (Pew Research 
Center 2013).  In fact, as Tawhid and Jihad’s ally Ansar al Islam regrouped after the US-Kurdish 
assault in March 2003, a splinter group named Ansar al Sunnah formed in May 2003 as a result 
of members rejecting Ansar al Islam’s support for Tawhid and Jihad’s attacks against Shia 
civilians (Crenshaw 2015).   
Zarqawi’s misunderstanding of Iraqi society’s support for his brand of extremism 
appeared through the growing competition for members from the operational ally Ansar al 
Islam/Sunnah.  Ansar al Islam/Sunnah tapped into the Iraqi societal base that had grown critical 
of al Qaeda’s targeting and large proportion of foreign fighters.  A cleavage emerged throughout 
2004 between al Qaeda and Ansar al Islam/Sunnah, although they generally remained 
operationally united against the U.S. led intervention (Crenshaw 2015).  In short, Iraqi society 
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rejected the imported non-state fighters just as it rejected British intervention in the 1920s and 
the U.S. led coalition in 2003.   
Zarqawi struggled throughout 2004 to unify the various Sunni groups under one umbrella 
organization, so he decided to make his Tawhid and Jihad organization officially part of al 
Qaeda. On October 20, 2004 Zarqawi was named emir of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) or al Qaeda in 
the Land of the Two Rivers (Teslik 2006; START 2008).  His attacks on Shiites throughout 2004 
united the Shiite militias to join the U.S. coalition forces in the November 2004 battle of Fallujah 
against the Sunni insurgency and AQI, which was a devastating defeat for Sunnis.  Fallujah II in 
2004 was another loss in Zarqawi’s attempt to unify the Sunni insurgency with al Qaeda in Iraq 
(Bergen 2011; Kirdar 2011).   
Defying the advice of al Qaeda central command and the lack of Iraqi support for AQI’s 
targeting tactics of Shiites, innocent Muslims, and Sunni tribes, Zarqawi doubled down on his 
strategy of inciting sectarian violence throughout 2005.  In the summer of 2005, al Qaeda 
central’s spiritual leader Ayman al Zawahiri praised Zarqawi’s successes in Iraq but stressed that 
popular support, both in Iraq and globally, remained a concern (Teslik 2006; Kirdar 2011), 
If we are in agreement that the victory of Islam and the establishment of a caliphate in the manner 
of the Prophet will not be achieved except through jihad against the apostate rulers and their 
removal, then this goal will not be accomplished by the mujahed movement while it is cut off 
from public support, even if the Jihadist movement pursues the method of sudden overthrow. This 
is because such an overthrow would not take place without some minimum of popular support 
and some condition of public discontent which offers the mujahed movement what it needs in 
terms of capabilities in the quickest fashion. Additionally, if the Jihadist movement were obliged 
to pursue other methods, such as a popular war of jihad or a popular intifadah, then popular 
support would be a decisive factor between victory and defeat.  
 
Zarqawi was unable to rebound from the loss of support, as he made no attempt to change 
AQI’s strategy to match societal attitudes.  In the spring of 2005 the Albu Nimr tribe and the 
Albu Mahal Sunni tribe, attempted to regroup and formed the Hamza Brigade to defend their 
territory against AQI.  Again, the American forces could not provide the requested assistance to 
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the Hamza Brigade. By September 2005, AQI had badly beaten the tribal alliance.   Months later 
the American forces attempted to revive the Hamza Brigade by training 60 of its fighters under 
the group “Desert Protectors.” The Desert Protectors recruited another 1,000 Sunnis for local 
protection, but the recruits were only interested in protecting their respective local populations.  
When American military leaders insisted the Desert Protectors be deployed to other parts of Iraq, 
one-third of the fighters resigned and the group ultimately fell apart (Biddle, Friedman, Shapiro 
2012).   
Another alliance of seventeen tribal leaders formed “The Anbar People’s Council” in 
November 2005. The group comprised of many of the nationalist 1920s Revolutionary Brigades 
members who turned against al Qaeda.  The U.S.-led coalition enjoyed the new police and 
security recruits, but did not protect the leadership of the group.  By January 2006, Zarqawi’s 
organization killed nearly 100 members of the group, including half of its tribal elders, and the 
organization collapsed (Biddle, Friedman, Shapiro 2012). 
On February 22, 2006 AQI carried out another attack to incite civil war by bombing one 
of the holiest Shia shrines in the world, the Golden Mosque in Samarra (Bergen 2011).  This 
ignited a Shiite backlash from Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army and also invited the Quds 
Brigades from Iran into the fight.  Al Sadr’s family lineage of Shia power brokers provided him 
some legitimacy but Zarqawi’s attacks provided an opportunity to conduct a full assault on 
Sunnis in Baghdad from his stronghold in the Shiite slums of Sadr City (Bruno 2008). The 
various Shiite militias, mostly under Muqtada al Sadr’s command, carried out an ethnic 
cleansing campaign throughout Baghdad in 2006. The U.S. coalition was also experiencing a 
record level of troop deaths as a result of al Sadr’s Mahdi Army forces throughout the 
surrounding Baghdad region (Biddle, Friedman, Shapiro 2012).  The sectarian violence in Iraq 
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reached its peak in mid-2006 (Bruno 2008).  Al Sadr’s militias, particularly with Iranian support, 
became a formidable opponent for Sunni tribal leaders, the U.S. coalition, as well as al Qaeda in 
Iraq (START 2008; Crenshaw 2015; Biddle, Friedman, Shapiro 2012). The Mahdi Army’s rise 
achieved Zarqawi’s intended goal of sectarian violence but failed to unite all of the various Sunni 
insurgents with al Qaeda.   
Al Qaeda in Iraq was not popular in 2006. Not only did AQI usurp the economic 
networks of the Sunni insurgency and societal strongmen by taking control of businesses and 
informal smuggling routes, the fighters took private homes to use as safe houses, and kidnapped 
and raped (or “married”) Iraqi women (Marten 2012).  Moreover, Sunnis were dying, 
increasingly turning to the U.S. military for support, and armed Shia militias were taking over 
Baghdad.  
In January, the Sunni umbrella organization Mujahedeen Shura Council was formed but 
was only comprised AQI and five smaller groups (Crenshaw 2015). Al Qaeda in Iraq’s leader 
Musab Abu al-Zarqawi was killed on June 8, 2006 by a targeted U.S. airstrike at a safe house 
north of Baghdad (Teslik 2006) and the Mujahedeen Shura Council disbanded within months.  
Zarqawi’s death significant weakened Al Qaeda in Iraq.  The competing group Ansar al 
Islam/Sunnah vied for members under the same Salafist ideology, which had little support in 
mainstream Iraqi society, but did have more credibility as a homegrown organization.  After 
Zarqawi’s death, AQI attempted to rebrand as a nationalist force under the name Islamic State of 
Iraq in October 2006.  However, this did not increase the group’s likeability as Iraqis believed 
the group was still comprised of too many foreign fighters (Crenshaw 2015).  
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In May 2007 Ansar al Sunnah189 and other moderate Sunni groups formed an anti-al 
Qaeda umbrella organization, The Jihad and Reformation Front. The organization was comprised 
of groups that had previously challenged al Qaeda, including Ansar al Sunnah (the moderate 
splinter of Ansar al Islam), the Islamic Army in Iraq (tied to the 1920s Revolutionary Brigades), 
and the Mujahedeen Army.  The groups’ unification under the Jihad and Reformation Front was 
the first effort to moderate the Ansar al Islam/Sunnah’s religious stance but this ultimately led to 
some in-fighting190 (Gregory 2008).  
The formation of Jihad and Reformation Front marked a turning point in Iraqi society’s 
ability to effectively counter transnational terrorism.  The 2007 Sunni Awakening, referred to as 
Sahwa (the Arabic word for Awakening), unified the tribal militias and former Baathist 
nationalist insurgents to expel al Qaeda in Iraq alongside the U.S. military. The U.S. military was 
able to facilitate cooperation between local power brokers in 2007 due to the surge of 30,000 
additional American troops (Marten 2012; Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012).  The troop 
surge provided the stabilization force that allowed American commanders to view the insurgency 
not as a cohesive movement but rather a large contingent of moderate religious nationalists that 
far outnumbered the 1,500 to 3,000 al Qaeda inspired terrorists (Crenshaw 2015).   
By 2008, the tribal leaders in eight Iraqi provinces joined and were collectively referred 
to as the Sons of Iraq.  The relationship between the Sons of Iraq and the U.S. hinged on the 
cooperation of the Shiite dominated government, which feared that the strategy would create 
“warlords.” However, warlords already existed in Iraq (Tripp 2007; Marten 2012). 
                                                 
189 The more militant members of the group reformed Ansar al Islam in late 2007 (Gregory 2008). 
 
190 These groups espoused an anti-American ideology based on nationalism, but the former Ansar al Islam members 
continued to focus on religious principles.  Some members of the Jihad and Reformation Front felt disenfranchised 
by the nationalistic goals and the moderation of radical Islam, thus, some members ultimately splintered from the 
rest of the Reformation groups.  Ansar al Islam remained radical and is thought to have formally affiliated with Al 
Qaeda central’s Al Qaeda Kurdish Battalions (Crenshaw 2015) 
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From 2007-2010 the Sons of Iraq chose to work with United States’ forces and the Iraqi 
state instead of al Qaeda, building a force of over 90,000 fighters (Peterson 2014).  The Sons of 
Iraq received payments of $300 a month in exchange for loyalty and a cease-fire (Biddle, 
Friedman, and Shapiro 2012).  Ultimately this coalition provided the manpower for the U.S. 
military victory in Fallujah in 2007 and beyond.  Over the next three years, the U.S. forces, Iraqi 
government, and the Sons of Iraq were on pace to begin stabilizing Iraq’s security situation. 
Whether it was the Sunni Awakening or the troop surge that mattered most has been a 
topic of considerable debate (Biddle, Friedman, Shapiro 2012). Nonetheless, what happened in 
Iraq from late 2006 until late 2010 was considered a success.  However, other factors are often 
overlooked in the simplified Sahwa vs. U.S. troop surge debate. On the issue of payment and 
recruitment of the Sons of Iraq, too little attention is paid to the death of Zarqawi in June 2006 as 
a contributing factor to Sons of Iraq force.  Not only does his death coincide with the 
Awakening, AQI did pay their Iraqi affiliates $100 to plant roadside bombs or kill American 
soldiers (Kirdar 2011) so at least a portion of the enormous force the Americans and Sunni 
strongmen built was also an employment opportunity as AQI’s leadership was in flux and 
weakened from June 2006 to 2011.   
Zarqawi’s death also contributed to a level of stability that allowed a cease-fire to be 
established with the Shiite Mahdi Army, the main force wreaking havoc on Iraq in 2006-2007 
(Biddle, Friedman, Shapiro 2012).  Zarqawi’s personal strategy of inciting the sectarian violence 
was a tremendous destabilizing factor for Iraqi security.  When these sectarian attacks slowed, 
the Mahdi Army lost its focus and began in-fighting (Bruno 2008). It is also important to note 
that Zarqawi’s strategy was not Al Qaeda Central Command’s strategy, so his replacement did 
not follow it.  Much attention is given to the Sunnis turning against Zarqawi, but the violence 
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also tamed in 2006 because the great sectarian agitator was dead.  Furthermore, many of the 
foreign fighters from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), another Al Qaeda franchise, 
seemed to be personally loyal to Zarqawi as it becomes unclear how much AQAP was even 
involved in Iraq after his death. The flow of fighters did slow considerably (to 40-50 per month) 
when the surge and Sahwa were at its peak and other foreign fighters were leaving.  After 
Zarqawi’s death, AQI was not as dominated by foreign fighters but was mixed with Iraqis, for 
the first time since 2004 (Crenshaw 2015).  In short, Zarqawi’s death and the instability of AQI 
was an important catalyst for the success of the Sahwa and the American troop surge, which 
ultimately brought stability to Iraq for a few years. 
With the relative calm and seemingly burgeoning democracy in Iraq between 2008 and 
2010, the American forces began handing over authority to Prime Minister al Maliki’s 
government as it prepared the U.S. troop drawdown.  The Sahwa agreement provided a roadmap 
for sectarian integration into the Iraqi security forces, employment opportunities, and to 
generally keep the Sunnis safe from retribution for working with the Americans. When al 
Maliki’s government began administering the Sons of Iraq payments in 2010 the Shiite 
dominated government defaulted on agreements with Sahwa and were accused of attacking 
Sunni strongmen perceived as threats (Peterson 2014).  The Sons of Iraq accused the Iraqi 
government of giving the small group of Shiite Sons of Iraq the top jobs in government to boost 
the employment transition numbers, while the government offered the Sunnis jobs as janitors and 
trash collectors (Marten 2012).   
Al Maliki believed that the Sunnis would use their unifying power to retake Baghdad, 
which the Iraqi Shiite population controlled for the first time (Marten 2012).  Maliki turned a 
blind eye to the Al Sadr inspired Shiite death squads that attacked Sunnis after the Americans 
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left, thus, the only external protective force the Sunnis had was the resurgent al Qaeda force in 
Iraq (Von Drehle 2015).  In effect, the Americans had brokered a power-sharing deal with the 
Sons of Iraq that was not accepted by the Iraqi government and the coalition fell apart in 2011.  
The Shiite government lost any legitimacy it had achieved through the Sahwa and Sunnis 
pursued a new survival strategy in Iraq.  
By late 2010 it became apparent that some of these Sons of Iraq were helping terrorist or 
insurgent elements and participating in criminal activities (Marten 2012).  Anti- al Maliki 
sentiment and the American withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011 allowed Al Qaeda to 
resurge throughout 2011 and 2012 under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s leadership in Iraq and Syria.  
Some former Sons of Iraq found employment through AQI’s arms and fighter smuggling 
organization, Al Nusra Front, and Baghdadi’s strength grew exponentially in Syria and Iraq. 
Baghdadi’s brutality and tactics closely resembled Abu Zarqawi’s Tawhid and Jihad, thus, 
Baghdadi was criticized by Al Qaeda central command and the splinter Al Nusra Front.  As 
Baghdadi grew his fighting force and captured territory in Syria and Iraq in 2012 and 2013 he 
officially broke from Al Qaeda in April 2013 and named his organization The Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL).  After greater territorial gains and 
recruitment, in June 2014 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared himself the leader of a new Islamic 
Caliphate and renamed the organization and its territorial holdings The Islamic State (Von 
Drehle 2015). 
The only fighting force that stood in the way of ISIS between 2013 and 2014 was the 
Kurdish peshmerga forces that have sought to contain Islamists since the 1990s.191  Militias have 
                                                 
191 The Kurdish militias provided cover in northwestern Iraq for fleeing ethnic Kurdish Yazidis sought by ISIS. 
Yazidi beliefs are a blend of Islamic, Christian, and Zoroastrianism, so they not considered directly Abrahamic and 
are considered “devil worshippers” by both al Qaeda and ISIS. Yazidis may have predated Islam but are thought to 
have originated in the 11th century through an Ummayyad sheikh. Yazidis faced previous genocidal attempts during 
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protected tens of thousands of Yazidis and Christian Iraqis that fled the Nineveh plains of 
northwestern Iraq for safety in the Kurdish stronghold in Irbil. For the first time in nearly two 
thousand years, Christians are virtually non-existent in Mosul (Logan 2015). The religious 
persecution and widespread human devastation brought to Iraq between 2013 and 2015 is 
perhaps only comparable to Genghis Khan’s grandson Hulagu’s rampage in medieval Baghdad 
(Evans and Salman 2014). Consequently, the human rights violations far exceed any under 
Saddam Hussein’s Baathist rule. 
Although most tribal and religious leaders feel threatened by the rise of the Islamic State, 
only Kurdish militias and Shiite tribal leaders are unified and committed to their removal.  Sunni 
societal strongmen and former Sahwa must determine the best “survival strategy” given two bad 
options: passively supporting a brutal terrorist group willing to overthrow the current Iraqi 
regime or supporting the counterterrorism efforts of the same Iraqi regime that betrayed them 
(Peterson 2014).     
 8.5 Summary and Discussion 
Iraq presents a case for how state-societal interactions can lead to acceptance or rejection 
of terrorist elements within its borders.  The evolving state-society interactions from 1960 to 
2014 lends support for two of the hypotheses presented in Chapter 3.  Full Baathist control in 
Iraq presents a clear case for a strong state and a weak society from 1968 until 1991.  Between 
1992 and 2003 Saddam Hussein’s strength was limited in areas of the country but generally 
remained strong vis-à-vis society. Strong states with weak societies, or pyramidal polities, are 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Ottoman Empire’s reign and hundreds were killed in 2007 in northwestern Iraq. While nearly 70,000 fled toward 
Europe and deep into Kurdish territory, hundreds were killed (Jalabi 2014).  Thousands of Christians in Mosul and 
the Nineveh plains region were afforded slightly more leeway from ISIS fighters and given the option to pay taxes 
or convert to Islam in order to avoid being killed.  Christian homes were ransacked and young Christian girls taken 
as “wives” if their families could not meet ISIS’s extortion demands (Evans and Salman 2014; Logan 2015).  As 
many as 200,000 Christians may be internally displaced from their homes in northwestern Iraq and Christian 
property marked with an “N” for Nasrani or Nazerene has been commandeered by ISIS (Logan 2015).   
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more likely to host terrorist sanctuary nodes rather than hubs because the strength of the state can 
challenge the formation of a hub. 
The Baathist party consolidated its power throughout the 1970s to ensure society could 
be weakened and controlled.  Saddam Hussein had tapped into his societal base of support first 
in the 1970s and again in the 1990s as the state’s power was weakened.  In the 1980s, Saddam 
Hussein also turned to state sponsorship of terrorist organizations to outsource forms of social 
control and foreign policy.  However, Saddam Hussein’s domestic power became more 
complicated in the late 1980s after the Iran-Iraq war and his survival depended on strengthening 
bonds with societal strongmen.  Saddam Hussein was able to fill social control gaps through 
brokering loyalty arrangements and elevating the power of societal strongmen throughout the 
1990s.  When some societal strongmen in the north and south violated their loyalties to the 
regime in 1991, Saddam retaliated against the uprisings.  This illustrated the Iraqi state’s 
penetrative capacity to quickly eliminate challenges to the state’s authority but it also made clear 
that the regime’s firm grip was weakening in vulnerable areas of the country.  
As many authoritarian leaders do, Saddam Hussein vigilantly and violently pursued all 
perceived threats to his regime’s power. A series of constraints placed upon the regime 
eventually led to the transnational terrorist node that appeared in northern Iraq in 2002.  First, the 
IMK’s formation in 1987 ultimately led to the splintering of radical offshoots between 1999 and 
2000.  Second, the transnational force of Islamic fundamentalist thought, spread through the 
mujahedeen in the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989), and radical thinkers such as Ayman al 
Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden, Abu Qatada, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and Mustab al Zarqawi 
after 1989, inspired the IMK’s splintering.  Third, massive refugee flows from northern Iraq in 
1991 and subsequent resettlement back to Kurdish Iraq by 2000 facilitated the spread of radical 
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thought from Europe and Afghanistan. Finally, these societal changes combined with the 
northern Iraqi “safe haven” provided by the West (1991-2003) left the Iraqi security apparatus 
unable to penetrate much of its own territory. This created a perfect storm for the emergence of 
radical Islam in northern Iraq. 
In effect, the Western humanitarian safe haven created a weak, Kurdish para-state within 
a weakening Iraqi state in the 1990s.  Moreover, the decision of the Kurdish Regional 
Government to concede power in 1998 to the minority Islamic political party (IMK) for 
simplicity and peace in Kurdish politics was a critical error.  At the micro-level, Kurdish 
northern Iraq was a weak para- state with a strong society.  This seemingly small concession for 
the sake of expediency grew like a cancer from 1999 to 2002, when Ansar al Islam allowed 
Tawhid and Jihad to share its safe haven.  Like a bad house guest, Tawhid and Jihad invited 
several hundred extremists to a territorial enclave in mountainous northeastern Iraq and formed a 
hub that began to spread throughout Iraq in late 2002 and early 2003.  
The Iraqi Kurdish experience sheds light on the micro-level importance of understanding 
these interactions.  The Kurds in northern Iraq have never shown a penchant for extremist 
Islamic thought. The Sunni Kurds have co-existed with the tens of thousands of Christians that 
have lived in northern Iraq for centuries.  Without the U.S. intervention in 2003, Tawhid and 
Jihad, would have most likely been rejected by Saddam Hussein and the Arab Sunni societal 
strongmen.  Instead, U.S. intervention in 2003 completely destroyed the Iraqi security apparatus 
and local tribal militias to fend for themselves. The nationalist insurgent groups that formed as a 




This presents support for the third hypothesis presented in Chapter 3 that weak states with 
strong societies are most likely to be terrorist sanctuary hubs.  In the absence of state authority, if 
societal strongmen elect to support terrorist organizations a substantial terrorist base may be 
formed.  Once invited, it is very difficult for the societal actors to expel terrorist groups because 
they lack the military capabilities of the state.  Ultimately, the Kurdish militias could only 
attempt to contain, not eliminate, this terrorist sanctuary. Saddam Hussein, on the other hand, 
could have eliminated this threat with the full resources of the Iraqi state’s highly capable 
security apparatus.  In late 2002 Saddam Hussein was focused on responding to the international 
community’s demands regarding weapons inspections and the threat of invasion.  Meanwhile, 
the gathering storm clouds allowed Zarqawi and a few dozen of his men to travel south toward 
Baghdad recruiting anti-American fighters for the inevitable invasion (see Migdal 2013).  
Iraqi state-society interactions shifted significantly after 2003.  If Saddam Hussein had 
not elevated the power and militia strength of tribal sheikhs in the 1990s, Iraq could have 
become anarchic.  The underlying strong societal structure provided some governing authority in 
the absence of state capacity and legitimacy after 2003 and ultimately provided the organization 
for the U.S. led Sons of Iraq program. 
The societal tensions were easy to exploit due to the Coalition Provisional Authorities de-
Baathification policies. Tawhid and Jihad simply latched onto the post-Baathist Sunni grievances 
throughout Iraq.   From 2003 to 2006 the coalition forces’ operations pushed the nationalists and 
Islamists to cooperate against them through the de-Baathification of Iraq’s security forces.  
Former Baath members who were politically secular had little in common with Islamic inspired 
terror.  Iraqi society had been a secular Muslim society for many decades, listening to music, 
smoking cigarettes, and even drinking alcohol, so when AQI began cutting off fingers for 
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smoking and imposing strict dress codes, AQI became a bigger threat to Iraq’s status quo than 
the Americans (Marten 2012).  Thus, Tawhid and Jihad and subsequently AQI’s ability to 
operate in Iraq was quickly weakened when the U.S. presented a new survival strategy for Iraqi 
Sunni Arabs to unite.  Although the Iraqi state was very weak during the height of the Sahwa 
(2007-2010), the strength of the Sons of Iraq societal coalition was able to push AQI to the far 
reaches of Iraq’s territory and expel many foreign fighters.   
This “Sunni Awakening” was neither a societal epiphany nor the brainchild of U.S. 
military leaders in 2006-2007.  Many of the Sunni tribal leaders were “awakened” as early as 
2004 and attempted to align with the U.S.-led coalition, but military leaders on the ground in Iraq 
were constrained by a lack of resources and U.S. policymakers in Washington. The key 
difference between 2004 and 2007 was that the U.S. military had sufficient troop levels to assist 
the unified local leaders against al Qaeda in Iraq (Marten 2012; Biddle, Friedman, Shapiro 
2012).   
As early as 2008, the al-Maliki government sought to demoralize Sunni society by 
creatively administering the Sons of Iraq employment agreement to elevate Shia social and 
employment status through the best job placement while weakening Sunnis through the lowest 
status positions in society.  After American forces withdrew from Iraq in December 2011, Sunnis 
came under attack from Shiite militias, the Iraqi government stopped making the promised 
payments to the tens of thousands of Sons of Iraq, and the Iraqi government began arresting them 
in mass (Marten 2012).  
Prime Minister al Maliki attempted to tap into his Shi’ite base and right the wrongs of the 
Sunni dominated reign in Iraq under Baathist control, but al Maliki did not have Saddam 
Hussein’s grip on social control or an effective security apparatus to counter the fallout from his 
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bold decisions.  In effect, the Iraqi government failed the legitimacy test from Sunni society and 
societal actors stopped countering al Qaeda inspired terrorist.  At any given time between 2003 
and 2010, estimates put Ansar al Islam, Tawhid and Jihad, and Al Qaeda’s presence around 
1,500-3,000, but now an estimated 25,000-30,000 Islamic State fighters are in Iraq, Syria, and 
throughout the world (Crenshaw 2015; Von Drehle 2015).   
The al-Maliki regime and subsequent Shi’ite al-Abadi regime have given little reason for 
the Sunni Arabs to defend the Iraqi state’s territory.  Thus, the Iraqi government is left with a 
weak state security apparatus that is unable to penetrate Sunni tribal area strongholds where the 
Islamic State operates.  While the vast majority of Iraq’s Sunni Arab population is fearful of the 
Islamic State and remain opposed to religious persecution and the Islamic State’s revisionist 
beliefs, they feel less threatened by Islamic State fighters than they do the Iraqi state.  “There 
was less than meets the eye to the dazzling blitzkrieg that brought ISIS to the world’s attention” 
in 2014.  It “raced through northwestern Iraq to the outskirts of Baghdad not because they were 
an unstoppable military force but because no one wanted to stop them.  In city after city, they 






Democratic Republic of Congo Chapter 9 - 
 9.1 Introduction 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a critical case for the study of terrorist 
sanctuaries because the state consistently fits the criteria of the failed state-terrorist sanctuary 
proposition, but terrorist organizations have been noticeably absent.  State failure, an unregulated 
economy, repression, conflict, and a large beleaguered population, are all assumed to invite 
terrorist organizations to establish sanctuary.  Civil wars are almost always related to the 
incidence of terrorist sanctuaries (Rotberg 2002, 2004; Newman 2007; Coggins 2014), yet, the 
Congolese experience presents a negative case for this assertion.  High ethnic fractionalization 
and diverse religious beliefs192 within society offer an opportunity for transnational terrorist 
organizations to establish sanctuary.  The geographic features such as vast territory, porous 
borders, mountainous terrain, and tropical forests are also believed to be conducive to terrorist 
sanctuaries because the state cannot effectively monitor society’s activities.  Thus, studying 
societal actors and their interactions with the state are critical to understanding the absence of 
terrorist sanctuaries in the DRC. 
The state-society interaction in the DRC is representative of what sets some weak or 
failed states apart from others.  Without a clearly articulated power structure in society that 
results from a long history of civil war, anarchy emerges.  Weak states with weak societies, or 
anarchical polities, are exploited by multiple competing domestic and cross-border rebel groups, 
which leave no societal space for terrorist organizations to operate.  Terrorist organizations have 
                                                 
192 Congolese society is comprised of over 300 ethnic groups and a range of religions including Catholicism, 
Protestantism, Islam, and traditional indigenous beliefs (CIA 2014; Pew Research Center 2013). Patrick (2011) 
asserts that Islamic terrorist elements likely do not operate in the Congo because it is non-Muslim.  However, 
approximately 10% of the population practices Islam, which is more than numerous other societies where 
fundamentalist Islamic nodes have been established. 
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little desire to operate in these environments because without an established power structure in 
society, the group cannot be supported or protected.   
Similar to the turbulent history of political structures throughout the developing world, 
state-society interactions in present-day DRC are influenced by a number of historical forces. 
Specifically for the DRC, Belgian colonial rule, the post-independence Congo Crisis (1960-
1965), Mobutu Sese Seko’s three decade reign (1965-1997), and near constant civil war, have 
left the state and society in disarray.  
First, this chapter will detail the background of state-society interactions since the 
colonial period.  The second section will explain the rise of the left-wing communist movement 
and its subsequent collapse. Finally, this chapter explains state-society interactions during 
Mobutu Sese Seko’s reign and the subsequent anarchic environment.  A summary and discussion 
of the constraints anarchical environments place on a terrorist organization’s ability to establish 
sanctuary follows.  
 9.2 State-Society Interactions 
 Present-day Democratic Republic of Congo’s formal political history began on July 1 
1885 after the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) signatories granted Belgian King Leopold II 
control over the territory (Kisangani 2012).  The DRC’s history is distinct from others in Africa 
in that it was administered by Belgian company rule for the first two decades prior to becoming a 
Belgian colony.  The Congo Free State was the personal holding of King Leopold II of Belgium 
who outsourced the governance of the Congo to concessionary companies for the extraction of 
the Congo’s resources. The company rule model of colonial governance differed from British 
indirect rule or French direct rule in its brutality and resembled a forced labor camp where the 
Congolese built infrastructure and harvested rubber (Derrick 2008; Khapoya 1990). In part, this 
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brutality and the international criticism it received led to the formal Belgian colonization of the 
Congo Free State on November 15, 1908 (Kisangani 2012; Khapoya 1990).   
Over the next fifty years, society’s organizational structure was reshaped by a centralized 
administrative system.  Reforms to administrative districts were established that restored some 
traditional authority through chieftaincies, who facilitated local control.  However, the local 
control was based less on the legitimacy of the local strongmen to govern the population through 
historical legacy than on the level of loyalty the strongmen showed to the Belgian colonial 
administrators (Kisangani 2012).  Between 1910 and 1933 the chieftaincies were integrated into 
the Belgian administrative structure in an attempt to weaken the societal structure (Nzongola-
Ntalaja 2002; Kisangani 2012).   
The most pronounced divide and rule strategy involved the Belgian centralized system 
creating numerous small, localized political groupings that did not follow traditional ethnic lines. 
Hundreds of ethnic clans were grouped together and then divided along arbitrary tribal and 
territorial lines.  The formalization of this ethnic or tribal structure allowed the colonial 
administrators to elevate the groups that did not challenge its authority. Urbanization also 
diffused the traditional ethnic lines and created conflict among new social groups in urban areas, 
but the isolation of polarized groups in urban areas elevated the importance of ethnicity. This 
legacy ultimately created ethnic and social class cleavages that became intertwined with politics 
(Kisangani 1997).  
The structure that maintained the Belgian colony did not resemble a participatory state-
society interaction.  Throughout Belgian rule, the administration remained authoritarian in nature 
and only included societal leaders in the power structure when it benefited overall social control.  
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The only redeeming quality of Belgian rule during this time was the education system, operated 
by the Roman Catholic Church, which was able to provide an education that produced basic 
literacy (Khapoya 1990).  The first university was not opened to Congolese until 1954 
(Kisangani 2012) but few were educated beyond high school.   
The exclusive nature of Belgian administrative rule also kept Congolese from gaining 
policy experience beyond the positions of colonial administrative clerks. The maintenance of a 
society without professional experience and formal education was a strategy for social control 
and consequently the Congo was not prepared for independence (Khapoya 1990).  Belgian 
administrators were not motivated to prepare the country or the people for independence because 
colonial rule was considered an indefinite relationship (Schraeder 2000).  
The Belgians maintained control over the population until 1958 when the Congolese 
began to demand independence, which prompted the first indication from the Belgians that they 
planned to leave (Schraeder 2000).  A transition from colonial rule to independence was 
essentially non-existent.  The Belgian colonial administrators lost control over the bureaucratic 
apparatus and the military much sooner than they expected (Khapoya 1990).   
The tumultuous chain of events began with two multi-party elections held in mid-March 
1960 to elect Parliament and on May 22, 1960 to select the President and Prime Minister. The 
introduction of democracy in the Congo was complicated due to the ethnic, tribal, and class lines 
solidified decades prior.  Multiparty democracy allowed dozens of ethnically based political 
parties to emerge, although two political parties, the National Congolese Movement and National 
Party of Progress were able to stand out amongst the others at the national level.  No political 
party received a clear majority in the lower house in the May 1960 elections, so Joseph 
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Kasavubu was made President and Patrice Lumumba became Prime Minister through a 
legislative compromise (Kisangani 1997; Kisangani 2010). 
The Congo Crisis refers to the period from 1960 to 1965 after Congo received 
independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960.  The coalition government was short lived. 
Lumumba and Kasavubu disagreed on foreign policy, specifically the role Belgians should play 
after independence (Kalb 1982).  Patrice Lumumba was inspired by the African nationalist 
movement, led by Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana193 (Nwaubani 2001). President 
Kasavubu believed Belgians should play a more prominent role in the transition (Kalb 1982).  
A series of forces culminated in the Belgians’ loss of power.  A mass nationalist 
movement and a military mutiny promoted Belgian military intervention, which established the 
West as a target of discontent.  To further complicate matters, the uranium-rich Congo emerged 
onto the world scene at the height of the Cold War (Kalb 1982).   
The first domestic rebellion began on July 11, 1960 in South Katanga.  The secessionist 
movement, coupled with the removal of Belgian forces, prompted a U.N. intervention.  Over the 
next two weeks, thousands of U.N. troops moved into the Congo (Kisangani 2012). On August 8, 
1960, the second secessionist movement began in the diamond rich South Kasai province, 
followed by the third insurrection in North Katanga on September 5, 1960. The unrest prompted 
Prime Minister Lumumba to reach out to the Soviet Union for military assistance (Kisangani 
2012).   This decision ultimately sealed Lumumba’s fate because it supported the United States’ 
suspicion that he was a communist sympathizer (Kalb 1982).  
By September 1960, President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba’s disagreement 
over the Katanga secession strategy led to each attempting to fire the other.  President Kasavubu 
                                                 
193 Ghana was the first African nation to expel its colonial powers in 1957. 
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replaced Prime Minister Lumumba on September 8, 1960 with Joseph Ileo supported by a new 
alliance between Colonel Joseph Mobutu and President Kasavubu.  President Kasavubu took the 
United States’ advice in firing Colonel Mobutu’s superior officer on September 13, 1960.  On 
September 14, 1960, Joseph Mobutu used his new power as chief of staff of the Army to initiate 
a military coup to neutralize Patrice Lumumba’s power within government (Kalb 1982).   
Over the next four months, Lumumba attempted to reinvigorate his political popularity, 
based in Stanleyville (now Kisangani), but was jailed, released, and ultimately killed on January 
17, 1961 (Kalb 1982).  The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had a plan to assassinate Patrice 
Lumumba, as described in the 1975 U.S. Church Committee Report194 (U.S. Congress, 1975), 
but the assassination was a collaborative effort between Belgian and U.S. intelligence with the 
help of some Congolese who were paid by Western intelligence.  The shots that killed Patrice 
Lumumba were ultimately fired by a Belgian officer (DeWitte, Wright and Fenby, 2001; BBC 
2005). After Lumumba’s assassination, Mobutu handed civilian control back to President 
Kasavubu in February 1961 and Mobutu remained in charge of the army (Banks, et al. 2008). 
Between February 1961 and January 1963 the Katanga insurrection continued in addition 
to the Northwestern South Kasai insurrection that began on October 1, 1962.  The Congolese 
government responded by creating 21 provinces in April 1962 to facilitate local autonomy in 
governance.  U.N. troops began withdrawing in early 1964 and left the Congo in June 1964.  The 
Congo state faced its first test without a large contingency of foreign interveners, but rejection of 
                                                 
194 The specific Church Committee Report is titled “Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.” The 
Church Committee concluded that Lumumba was killed by pro-Mobutu forces.  However, between 1999 and 2001 
new information and a November 2001 Belgian inquiry determined Belgian and American intelligence were at least 
complicit in the murder of Lumumba.  In February 2002, the Belgian government made its first official apology for 




the state’s authority persisted. As the U.N. withdrew forces a rebellion broke out in Kwilu in 
early January 1964, followed by one in the east in April 1964 (Kisangani 2012).   
The Congo’s failure to transform to a socialist African nation, inspired by Ghana’s 
Kwame Nkrumah, and vocalized in post-colonial politics through the first Prime Minister Patrice 
Lumumba, is often attributed to Western interference in Congolese affairs.  Patrice Lumumba’s 
inspirational rise to power and his subsequent assassination transformed his legacy to a social 
revolutionary martyr, whose murder jettisoned the hope for the Congo nation-state.  The Congo’s 
abrupt independence from brutal Belgian rule produced through a domestic uprising and the 
popular leftist African nationalism movement, appeared to be the perfect storm for a leftist 
revolution in the Congo.  Not only did the Cold War superpowers view it this way, but Cuba and 
Che Guevara found no reason the Congo should not be ground zero for the communist revolution 
in Africa. The Congo’s political and economic situation had all the markings of a society hungry 
for revolution.  
The last time the Congolese were united toward a common political goal was in the years 
prior to independence from colonial rule. Patrice Lumumba’s populist nationalist message, 
which coincided well with left-wing revolutionary thought, gained fervor across the country 
between 1958 and 1960 through the Mouvement National Congolais (National Congolese 
Movement) political party (Kalb 1982).  At the same time the African Solidarity Party emerged 
and gained popularity in the rural areas, although the popularity may have been a result of 
unrealistic campaign promises such as providing jobs for everyone, improved schools throughout 
the rural areas at no cost, and increased wages for every person (Kisangani 2012).   
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 9.3 State-Society Interactions: Left-wing Terrorist Nodes 
The Congolese achieved independence in 1960 but life quickly got worse. Between 1960 
and 1966 the state-society interaction is considered a weak state and weak society or anarchical 
polity. As resource and agriculture production rapidly declined from 1962 to 1963, the masses 
responded through a “nationalist call to arms in late 1963” (Kisangani 2012, 74).  Lumumba’s 
message continued to resonate after his death, but Lumumbist politicians were isolated and 
pushed from power.  President Kasavubu’s indefinite suspension of the parliament on September 
29, 1963 was a catalyst for an armed left-wing uprising (Ndikumana and Emizet 2003; 
Nzongola-Ntalaja 2011).   
The “second independence” called for the end of the pro-Western leadership of the 
“neocolonial” state.  The left-wing movement included peasants, workers, the urban 
unemployed, students, and lower civil servants.  The mass following organized alongside 
Lumumba’s former lieutenants as they regrouped in neighboring Congo- Brazzaville (across the 
river from the Kinshasa) in October 1963 under the name National Liberation Council (CNL) 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja 2011). 
The goal of the left-wing movement was to remove Kasavubu’s government from power. 
From its sanctuary in Congo-Brazzaville the group began launching terrorist attacks on 
government installations in Kinshasa, the capital city.  However, training camps began to emerge 
in late 1963 in the Kwilu province led by Pierre Mulele, which ultimately led to an open 
nationalist/separatist rebellion in 1964, followed soon after by a left-wing inspired movement in 
the eastern portion of the country. 
These left-wing movements tapped into the late Patrice Lumumba’s populist message but 
were decidedly more communist in their public rhetoric.  However, the left-wing armed 
movement that emerged was ideologically fractured (Villafana 2011; Kisangani 2012).  Some 
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soldiers and the movement’s leaders generally followed leftist ideology but as the quantity of 
troops grew, the quality of ideological fighters decreased.  Many of these men were inspired by 
leftist ideology as they hoped it could bring prosperity to the Eastern Congo in the absence of the 
state’s provision of public goods. The youth bulge in the country also provided a large portion of 
young men (and child soldiers), who ideally had the political will and physical ability to fight 
(Villafana 2011; Kisangani 2012). 
Three noteworthy political figures emerged in the Marxist-Maoist inspired movement in 
the Congo. First, Pierre Mulele, was considered the most prominent leader of the Kwilu based 
left-wing movement.  Mulele served under Patrice Lumumba in government and spent time in 
China receiving guerilla training and securing direct support for the communist movement 
(Guevara, Camiller 2000).  Mulele was a follower of Marxist-Maoist ideology and attempted to 
build an ideologically consistent movement through indoctrination training for the Kwilu 
rebellion (Kisangani 2012). While the Kwilu node was more dedicated to the left-wing ideology 
it was also closer to Kinshasa (the capital) and more vulnerable to frequent attacks from 
government troops (Villafana 2011). The fighters were closely aligned with the late Lumumba’s 
nationalist left-leaning Mouvement National Congolais195 (MNC) political party. However, 
Mulele’s group of Simba fighters were particularly unique for the use of dawa or witchcraft to 
protect them from bullets. The cohesiveness within the movement was a result of the cult-like 
rituals as much as communist ideology (Kisangani 2012).  Although Mulele’s movement was 
more ideologically driven, he was largely unknown in the Eastern front, where the left-wing 
movement was ideologically fragmented (Guevara, Camiller 2000). 
                                                 
195 Also referred to as the National Congolese Movement. 
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The second rebellion leader was Gaston Soumialot, who was the main recruiter and 
leader of the left-wing movement in the Eastern Congo. Soumialot was also supported by China 
(Guevara, Camiller 2000) and recruited Congolese exiles from across the border in Burundi. His 
first node was in Bujumbura, Burundi in February 1964 until he established success throughout 
the north and central portions of eastern Congo. The Eastern front possessed a strategic 
advantage as the Eastern Congo region was approximately 900 miles from the capital. The 
Eastern fighters were also divided by ethnic lines, which was not consistent with Lumumba’s 
beliefs (Villafana 2011).   
Third, Laurent Kabila, was a young, articulate, educated politician.  Kabila established a 
hub of fighters in Fizi, near the shores of Lake Tanganyika on the Tanzanian border in 
southeastern Congo in June 1964.  Tanzania was strategically important to the Eastern Congo, as 
the 1964 left-wing revolution in Zanzibar provided a logistical base of support between Cuba and 
Che Guevara and his fighters in the Congo (Guevara, Camiller 2000).   
  Che Guevara, an Argentinian-born doctor turned left-wing revolutionary, sought to root 
out the injustices caused by “Yankee imperialism” throughout the world.  Guevara had been 
successful in spreading communist inspired guerilla warfare and terrorist tactics in Latin 
America and particularly in the Cuban revolution. Thus, Guevara had the state-sponsored 
financial support of Fidel Castro in Cuba to overcome logistical challenges (Guevara, Camiller 
2000). 
In January 1965, Castro recruited a number of black Cubans and trained them in three 
camps in Cuba in preparation for the Congo revolution. The group landed in Tanzania on April 
19, 1965 and established a logistical node in Dar es Salaam, facilitated by the Cuban diplomatic 
contingency.  This node allowed money, communications, and a flow of weapons to the 
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Congolese revolution.  On April 22, 1965 Che Guevara and a contingent of approximately 100 
Cuban fighters arrived in the Congo, without knowledge of the terrain, culture, or language196 to 
facilitate the violent communist revolution (Guevara, Camiller 2000).  
Prior to the arrival of Guevara and his contingent of fighters, the left-wing movement and 
Lumumba’s former base of support in Stanleyville (now Kisangani) had gained momentum and a 
significant portion of the Congolese territory throughout 1964 (Guevara, Camiller 2000; 
Kisangani 2012).  During the summer of 1964 Gaston Soumilot’s fighters gained Uvira (May 
15), Fizi (May 18) and ultimately controlled the entire Sud-Kivu province.  In June, they 
captured the city of Kalemie.  Soumilot’s Simba movement achieved its greatest military success 
when it took the city of Kisangani on August 5, 1964 with the help of Chinese military advisors 
headquartered in Burundi and Congo-Brazzaville (Villafana 2011).    
On September 5, 1964, communist revolutionaries declared a new government named 
“The People’s Republic of Congo” (Ndikumana and Emizet 2003). Cuba, the Soviet Union, and 
China promptly recognized it as the legitimate government.  Soumilot’s group of fighters and 
witchdoctors initiated a reign of terror, killing thousands of civil servants, perceived Westernized 
Africans, and those wearing glasses (Villafana 2011). 
Despite these successes, Guevara and his men witnessed the communist revolution’s 
rapid demise throughout 1965.  In Che Guevara’s view, the failure of the left wing movement in 
the Congo had less to do with Mobutu’s U.S. backed military strength, than it did the in-fighting, 
corruption, and ineptitude of the alleged communist revolutionaries in the Eastern Congo 
(Guevara, Camiller 2000). 
                                                 
196 According to Camiller (2000), Che Guevara’s group purchased a Swahili dictionary on the drive from Tanzania 
to the Congo, randomly assigning themselves numbers.  Che gave himself the name “tatu,” which confused the 
Congolese fighters because they were not sure why the #3 was the person giving the military orders. 
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Che Guevara’s points of contact in the southeastern Congo near the Tanzanian border 
were Laurent Kabila and Gaston Soumialot.  In the beginning, Kabila and Soumialot were 
committed to the movement (Villafana 2011), but in Che’s view they became opportunists who 
enjoyed the cash flow from Cuba and partying in Dar es Salaam [Tanzania] more than fighting 
injustice and despair in Congo.  Between 1964 and 1966, frequent defeats by Mobutu’s U.S. - 
backed army caused morale problems.  The fighters Kabila and Soumialot organized were 
undisciplined, frequently deserted in large numbers when conflict broke out and practiced a 
range of unconventional mystical beliefs (Guevara, Camiller 2000).   
Throughout 1965 the movement self-destructed as it lost societal support by raping and 
pillaging the population and resources, lacked cohesion among the three fronts’ leaders, and its 
leadership became increasingly corrupt.  As Che Guevara wrote to Fidel Castro on October 5, 
1965 (Guevara, Camiller 2000, 125),  
I can assure you that were it not for me, this fine dream would have collapsed with 
catastrophe all around…there is no real lack of arms here-indeed there are too many 
armed men; what is lacking are soldiers….in the rest of the country there are bands living 
in the forest, not connected to one another; they lost everything without a fight, as they 
lost Stanleyville without a fight. More serious than this, however, is the way in which the 
groups in this area [Eastern Congo] relate to one another. The dissentions between Kabila 
and Coumialot are becoming more serious all the time, and are used as a pretext to keep 
handing towns over without a fight…The fact is that they shamelessly ran away, ditching 
in the open a 75mm recoilless gun and two 82 mortars; all the men assigned to these 
weapons have disappeared, and now they are asking me for Cubans to get them 
back…You have to be really well tempered to put up with the things that happen here.  
Numbers are not what matters; we can’t liberate by ourselves a country that does not 
want to fight; you’ve got to create a fighting spirit and look for soldiers with the torch of 
Diogenes and the patience of Job…Don’t make the mistake again of dishing out money 
like that; for they [Kabila and Coumialot] cling to me when they feel hard up and 
certainly won’t pay me any attention if the money is free flowing. 
 
The fighters’ had a propensity to truly terrorize the population it was supposedly trying to 
deliver a better life. Left-wing terrorist movements throughout the world were typically violent, 
but the level of violence toward the civilian population in the Congo was extreme.  The mass 
272 
 
killings of 30,000-40,000 intellectuals, political opponents or Western sympathizers, and mass 
rapes throughout the country did not compel the population to support the movement.197 Rather, 
it further deteriorated social structures and traumatized the masses (Kisangani 2012).   
The failure of the left-wing movement in the Congo has, rightfully so, been cast as a 
proxy conflict for influence during the Cold War.  The U.S. wanted to keep “the bears out of the 
Congo caviar”198 (Kalb 1982, 7) while Chairman Mao advised the Soviets, “if we can take the 
Congo, we can take the whole of Africa” (Lefever 1970, 108).  However, U.S. support for 
Mobutu is not the sole reason the communist movement failed.  The left-wing ideology had mass 
appeal in Congolese society, but the brutality of the communist movement in the Eastern Congo 
between 1964 and 1965 did not correspond to Congolese society’s interpretation of Lumumba’s 
populist message. As a result, the movement lost legitimacy. Thus, Congolese society became 
more concerned with day-to-day survival after a tumultuous five years after independence than 
joining a transnational movement implanted from Cuba (see Coggins 2014).   
Che Guevara, on the other hand, casts blame on the lack of structure in Congolese society 
that made revolution particularly challenging,   
How should one describe the level of development of these tribes?  It is clear that each 
sub-region depends a lot on particular historical and social conditions. I think there are 
features of primitive communism among the nomadic groups and traces of slavery in the 
way women are treated…as a domestic animal.  Feudalism, may be seen in northern parts 
of the region, but not here, where there is no landed property. Capitalism does not 
dominate the picture but operates in superficial forms, through small traders who 
establish themselves on the periphery” (222). ”It is important to note that all these groups 
have very little to do with one another: they rarely obey any orders from above, and their 
vision hardly extends beyond their own particular enclave” (228).  Ideas must offer a 
down to earth image of major changes that can be, if not actually felt, then clearly 
imagined by the population.  For all this, the ideal goal would be a party with a really 
                                                 
197 Additionally, government supported forces killed approximately 15,000 during the 1964-1966 time frame. 
 




national basis and real prestige among the masses. Such a party does not exist in the 
Congo (240). 
 
This perspective highlights the constraints transnational movements encounter in 
anarchical environments.  Che Guevara pleaded with Castro and the global communist 
movement to cut off support for the Congo because the actions of the revolutionary “leaders” 
risked destroying the global movement as a whole. Rather than fight to the death for a revolution 
that lacked organization or political will, Guevara and his men left the Congo on November 20, 
1965 (Guevara, Camiller 2000).   
 9.4 State-Society Interactions after the Congo Crisis 
Joseph Mobutu seized power in the Congo through a coup on November 24, 1965 and 
declared the “Second Republic” (Banks, et al. 2008). The remnants of the left-wing movement 
were defeated by the U.S. backed Mobutu forces by mid-1966 (Kisangani 2012).  Following the 
collapse of the left-wing rebellions in 1966, Kisangani (2012) notes that “the rural areas were 
deprived of both administrative and traditional authorities. It was a Hobbesian world in search of 
a Leviathan to impose order and rule of law” (88).   
Immediately upon seizing power, Mobutu began a concerted effort to construct state 
institutions. He possessed political skill in building ever-changing coalitions to consolidate 
power and brutally eliminating contests to the state’s authority.  Mobutu also embraced the 
popularity of Lumumba as a national hero and began Africanizing the Congo in a concerted 
nation-building effort.   
When faced with criticism from any particular group during the consolidation of power 
(1966-1977), Mobutu created policies to neutralize his opponents. For example, when the 
Catholic religious leaders in the Congo challenged expanding authoritarianism in the Congo 
from 1965-1971, the regime nationalized Catholic schools and regulated seminaries through the 
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single-party structure (Kisangani 2000).  Catholic religious leaders have traditionally provided 
the only collective, legitimate societal voice in the Congo, so their limitation weakened society.  
By the 1970s Mobutu had constructed state institutions and strong, modernized 
military.199 Mobutu’s military facilitated the Zairian nation-building project by including young 
Congolese into the military culture and initiating societal reforms through force (Kisangani 
2000).  
Between 1971 and 1974 Mobutu undertook an effort to re-create Congolese society 
through the “authenticity campaign.” He changed his name from “Joseph Desire Mobutu” to 
“Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu waza Banga”200 (French 1997).  Mobutu transformed society 
in a number of ways. First, he renamed the Congo “Zaire” in 1971 and banned Western business 
attire in favor of customary African clothing.  Second, individuals, including all unborn babies, 
were considered “Mobutists” under the single-party system. Third, Mobutu banned “Christian” 
names in favor of African ones (Kisangani 2000). These policies created a sense of African 
nationalism distinct to Congolese society. 
Mobutu’s relationship with the military began to present challenges to his regime’s 
security after 1975. At times he struggled to maintain loyalty within the military, which resulted 
in purges, changes to leadership, and promotion of specific ethnic groups that could provide 
loyal eyes watching for a potential revolt (Kisangani 2000). 
The economic situation in Congo also began to decline after 1975 as a result of economic 
shocks and inflation. The state accrued debt and Mobutu agreed to austerity measures and a 
                                                 
199 The Belgian Congo’s Force Publique military had integrated the heterogeneous society, although Congolese 
leadership was restricted to non-commissioned officer roles (Jackson 1982). 
 
200 Depending on the interpretation, this either means “the rooster who watches over the hens” or "the all-powerful 
warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, will go from conquest to conquest leaving fire in 
his wake.” Most follow the latter interpretation (French 1997). 
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structural adjustment program between 1983 and 1986, which ultimately reduced the delivery of 
public goods (Trefon, Saskia, and Smis 2002).  During this period, Mobutu also acquired 
personal wealth by stealing from the country’s resources and Zaire became a “kleptocracy” 
(Bueno de Mesquita, et al 2003).  These actions prompted a precipitous decline in the legitimacy 
of the state. Society also developed its own economic survival strategies, which were permitted 
by Mobutu (Trefon, Saskia, and Smis 2002). Formal regulation of the economy deteriorated and 
the population in the Eastern half of the Congo developed economic relationships with 
neighboring countries, rather than Kinshasa (Gros 1996). 
Mobutu remained in power because he was able to sustain a patrimonial system or 
“working relationship” with societal strongmen that could produce a sense of order in an 
enormously difficult geography.  In short, Mobutu’s authoritarian rule in Zaire propped up some 
societal actors and neutralized others through ad hoc policies determined by the situation on the 
ground at the moment.  Societal groups (ethnic groups, religious leaders, traditional/local 
governing structures) were unable to maintain a consistent structure to challenge the state, as 
societal groupings could have the rug pulled out from under their authority at any time. This 
produced a weak society that was unable to collectively organize, which helps to explain his 
seemingly erratic policies (Gros 1996; Reno 1998).   
Aside from the patrimonial system, Mobutu maintained control of Zaire through one-
party military rule, which provided security against some internal rebellions between 1965 and 
1996 (Kisangani 2012).  Between 1963 and 1996, the Congolese military doubled in size from 
25,000 to 50,000 (Kisangani 2000). The military minimized intrastate war and was able to expel 
external threats through military force, but the military rule was also brutal in its own rite. 
Furthermore, through the 1990s the Zairian military often did not receive pay due to the grossly 
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mismanaged economic policies that led to a largely worthless currency. Thus, the military’s form 
of payment came through ransacking money and goods from the population (Gros 1996; 
Kisangani 2012). 
In effect, Mobutu constructed a “phantom state,” which differs from anarchy (Gros 
1996). The state existed through a semblance of order produced by the dictator and his 
strongmen. In the early 1990s, “Centralized authority did not exist [in Zaire] except to insure 
Mobutu’s personal security and to keep ambitious political rivals from eclipsing the man in the 
leopard-skin cap” (Gros 1996, 459).   
Societal pressure from 1990 to 1993 did present a political challenge to the regime, but 
Mobutu effectively adapted to remain in power. In response to pro-democracy sentiment, in 1990 
Mobutu announced the end to the one-party system and allowed an amendment to the 
constitution that permitted at least two additional political parties.  By this action, Mobutu gave 
the people of Zaire hope for a new liberalized system, and declared it the “Third Republic” 
(Banks et al. 2008).  Through the early 1990s, hundreds of political parties were formed. 
However, Mobutu sustained power through this facade of democratic reforms because his 
loyalists created numerous political parties to diffuse society’s ability to organize (Kisangani 
2012). 
The left-wing communist leader Laurent Kabila re-emerged in 1996 and staged an armed 
revolt against the cancer-stricken Mobutu. The Anti-Mobutu revolt between October 1996 and 
May 1997 killed 237,000 people and internally displaced 100,000, but succeeded in 
overthrowing Mobutu’s regime on May 17, 1997 (Kisangani 2012, 2). However, Kabila’s 
legitimacy was immediately challenged and sparked a string of subsequent brutal civil wars.  
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Laurent Kabila resorted to authoritarian measures, just as Mobutu had, to manage 
challenges to his power. Furthermore, he alienated the Mai (rebel) factions who helped him 
finally gain power in 1997, which caused great domestic turmoil (Kisangani 2012).  The Mai 
revolt between September 1997 and July 1998 was the first of several intra-state conflicts. This 
was immediately followed by the deadliest civil war in the Congo’s history. The Anti-Kabila 
revolt from August 1998 until December 2002, led to the deaths of between 3.2 and 4.2 million 
Congolese and the war internally displaced nearly 1.5 million more (Kisangani 2012, 2). This 
revolt ultimately led to Kabila’s assassination in January 2001 (Jeffries 2001). In the backdrop of 
the Anti-Kabila revolt, the Hema-Lundu war from June 1999 until July 2005 killed an additional 
65,000 to 75,000 Congolese and internally displaced 42,000 more (Kisangani 2012, 2).   
Laurent Kabila’s son, Joseph, a former commander of child soldiers during the Anti-
Mobutu revolt, succeeded his father in 2001 within days of Laurent Kabila’s assassination.  The 
transition toward democracy has been a perilous one from the earliest stages. Congolese leaders 
after Mobutu have been unsuccessful in building coalitions to gain legitimacy or capacity and 
have failed to deliver public goods to the population.  The Congo has a rich history of multiple 
actors challenging the state, but in the absence of repressive authoritarian rule and the presence 
of an emerging democracy, society has redefined its survival strategy.   
The Mobutuist system of patrimonial exploitation has largely remained intact (Trefon, 
Saskia, and Smis 2002). Mobutu was not the only participant in the kleptocracy that grew 
throughout the 1980s. Instead, he traded the Congo’s resources for a level of social control and 
loyalty, but created an economic system that abandons the idea of state penetration and 
extraction for the purpose of collective public goods.   Diamond, gold, and timber smugglers 
have comprised a large portion of the informal economy, as society has developed a variety of 
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economic survival strategies.  In the absence of a functioning bureaucracy, smugglers are not 
challenged by tax collectors or an efficient judicial system (Trefon, Saskia and Smis 2002).  
Thus, individuals who benefit from this system, which became conventional in the 1980s, have 
an interest in maintaining the status quo. 
Although this system closely resembles the assumed ideal terrorist sanctuary or financing 
scheme, in order to maintain the status quo, individuals who operate within the DRC’s informal 
economic system have not been inclined to work alongside transnational terrorist networks. 
Actors in the criminal or informal economy do not need new players in the system as they use 
established smuggling routes and the formal economic structures of neighboring countries to 
transfer goods to the global market (Patrick 2011).   
The rejection of both centralized state authority and transnational terrorist ideological 
movements is best understood through the historical experience of state-society interactions.  Of 
the 336 ethnic groups in society, none have risen to a status greater than the micro-level in order 
to produce a level of social order (Kisangani 2012).  While other societies have embraced 
terrorist organizations in the absence of state control as a survival strategy, the Congolese people 
have not.  Instead, the last century has taught society that the best survival strategy is to reject 
both the state and outside influence. In short, society’s philosophy became Debrouillez Vous, 
“Fend for Yourself!”  (Kisangani and Bobb 2010, 31). 
 9.5 Summary and Discussion 
Congolese state-society interactions have experienced a number of changes since the 
1950s. In the years leading up to independence from colonial rule, Congolese society united to 
demand independence from Belgium between 1958 and 1960, but the violence and dispersed 
rebellions during the Congo Crisis weakened society.  Leftist social democratic ideals and 
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nationalism had mass appeal in society from 1960 until 1964, but this did not translate to a united 
communist movement.  
The left-wing communist movement was not ideologically consistent and drew fighters 
with a range of grievances toward the post-independent state, which were not motivated by 
communist ideals. The communist movement was able to establish a node near the capital 
Kinshasa between 1963 and 1966, facilitated by sanctuary in neighboring Congo-Brazzaville and 
state sponsorship from China. Meanwhile, the Eastern front of the communist movement 
established a hub of fighters in Fizi from 1964 to 1965 to facilitate the state sponsorship of Cuba 
with weapons, fighters, and money flowing through Tanzania and Burundi.  
The communist movement was failing by late 1965 as Mobutu’s U.S.-backed army 
countered it with force and it lost societal support. The movement altered Lumumba’s moderate 
vision and ultimately failed to sustain support due to the widespread brutality against the civilian 
population.  In effect, it truly terrorized society, particularly in the eastern portion of the country. 
Aside from destroying nationalist sentiment, the violent pillage of the left-wing revolution also 
killed thousands of intellectuals and civil servants, who provided the best hope for building an 
effective state apparatus based on social democratic principles. 
In 1965, Mobutu rose to power and began a three decade reign with an authoritarian state 
that weakened social structures through policies and force. From 1966 until 1977, Mobutu 
constructed state institutions and a nationalist identity in Congo (Zaire). This period represents a 
strong state and weak society but is a negative case for the presence of terrorist sanctuaries. 
When the state’s power began to weaken between 1977 and 1996, society did not effectively 
unite to gain power.  The strong state and weak society interaction was maintained despite 
societal challenges from rebel leaders and democratic reform advocates between 1990 and 1996. 
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These challenges did not result in meaningful reform, but Laurent Kabila’s anti-Mobutu 
rebellion was ultimately successful in removing the Mobutu regime, which collapsed the state.  
Neither the state nor society has been able to establish social control in the DRC since 
1996. The DRC represents a weak state and weak society interaction (anarchical polity) and is a 
negative case for terrorist sanctuaries. Despite high ethnic and religious fractionalization and 
very low state capacity, transnational terrorist movements have not operated within the DRC 
because the security environment is too anarchic to benefit external organizations. 
Unlike other highly fractionalized societies, societal groups are not clearly organized 
alongside a weak state.  Instead, many dispersed societal groupings that reject the state’s 
authority vie for power against one another through armed conflict. The Congo’s societal groups 
are divided across hundreds of ethnic and religious lines and distributed throughout rebellions 
competing for territorial control and the maintenance of the economic status quo. Thus, this 
environment is considered unlikely to host terrorist sanctuaries.   
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, war is the rule instead of the exception (Kisangani 
2012). The case of state-society interactions in DRC highlights a weakness in extant literature 
regarding the logical decision-making process terrorist organizations use when choosing 
sanctuaries. The analysis presented in this chapter provides support for the hypotheses that weak 
states with weak societies (anarchical polity) are less likely to host terrorist sanctuaries.  The 
anarchical polity from 1960 until 1965 resulted in Che Guevara’s trained guerilla fighters 
abandoning the communist movement after seven months, although the societal challenges of 
this chaotic environment were evident within weeks of the Cuban contingency’s arrival.  The 
weak state and weak society interaction re-emerged in 1996, thus, terrorist organizations would 
face the same societal constraints. 
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With regards to state failure and transnational terrorist sanctuaries, Patrick (2011) notes 
that, “weaker is not better” because “where anarchy prevails, terrorist organizations must spend 
precious resources, energy, and time ensuring their own protection- or obtaining it from others. 
The security of the group itself becomes questionable when the threat of outside intervention is 
compounded by additional logistical challenges” (93). 
Without a strong, well-defined societal structure, terrorist organizations have difficulty 
befriending potential allies, which are critical to establishing sanctuary. Terrorist organizations 
make these calculations by identifying society’s structure and realizing that anarchical polities 
risk squandering resources, as al Qaeda explicitly determined by evaluating Somalia’s anarchical 
environment in the 1990s (Menkhaus 2007). Furthermore, for any strongmen or warlords able to 
operate within an anarchical environment, terrorist organizations present a threat to the 
established status quo.  Although the DRC possesses numerous opportunities for terrorist groups, 
the constraints far outweigh opportunities.  The anarchic environment in the Eastern Congo 
would present the greatest challenge for terrorist organizations to establish safe haven.  In short, 
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Conclusion Chapter 10 - 
The physical locations that terrorists use to coordinate planning and training for the 
organization’s goals are a critical element of a terrorist group’s survivability. This dissertation 
sought to explain the presence of terrorist sanctuaries and to ascertain the differences between 
sanctuaries and the states and societies that harbor them. Chapter 2 provides a review of the 
literature on terrorist sanctuaries. The theoretical understanding of terrorist sanctuaries has 
generally focused on the idea that weak or failed states are closely associated with the presence 
of transnational terrorist sanctuaries because weak state capacity can be exploited to facilitate the 
logistical and financial needs of terrorist organizations.  Recent literature has challenged this 
assumption based on the absence of terrorist sanctuaries in some weak or failing states and the 
presence of terrorist sanctuaries in strong states.  The analysis presented in the preceding 
chapters sheds light on a number of weaknesses in the study of terrorist sanctuaries that have 
produced mixed findings and an overgeneralization of where terrorist organizations base their 
operations.   
First, this dissertation contributes to a more precise understanding of transnational 
terrorist networks’ operational capabilities and distinguishes between sanctuaries using 
Sageman’s (2008) hubs and nodes approach.  The analysis above illustrates that hubs provide 
valuable ideological, planning, and training functions that, if eliminated, can drastically limit an 
organization’s capacity and survivability.  Nodes, on the other hand, can provide logistical and 
financial support to hubs or allow small groups of inspired individuals to operate independently 
from hubs.   
Second, this dissertation also argues that scholars and policymakers place too much 
emphasis on the role of the state in providing security, at the expense of understanding the role of 
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societal actors.  Societal strongmen or local power brokers have authority to accept or reject 
terrorist groups within their areas of control, thus, state-society interactions provide a better 
understanding of the characteristics terrorist groups consider when choosing bases of operations.   
By adapting Migdal’s (1988) classic “state in society” approach to the study of terrorist 
sanctuaries, states are considered a primary actor in a web-like structure of social actors. The 
conceptualization of state strength in this approach is based on the ability of the state to penetrate 
and extract from society, which deviates from extant literature that relies on macro-level 
indicators of wealth or the presence or absence of civil conflict to explain state capacity.  
Following Migdal’s approach, strong societies tend to be those with higher levels of ethnic and 
religious fractionalization, as these particular cleavages produce legitimate social actors and 
formidable opposition to the state. State capabilities to counter terrorist sanctuaries within 
territorial boundaries cannot be understood without accounting for the relationships social actors 
have with one another and with the state. 
Thus, chapter 3 expands upon Migdal’s (1988) three state-society interaction typologies 
to include a fourth typology, strong state-strong society (polyarchical polity) interaction.  The 
typologies correspond to four hypotheses that seek to explain the likelihood of terrorist 
sanctuaries. Accordingly, terrorist sanctuaries, are more likely in strong states with weak 
societies and weak states within strong societies, but they are less likely in strong states within 
strong societies and in weak states and weak societies. Chapters 4 through 9 test the four 
hypotheses using quantitative and qualitative methodologies. 
Chapter 4 uses a cross-sectional time series design of 151 countries from 1970 to 2012 to 
test the four hypotheses. The quantitative analysis finds some support for each of these 
hypotheses.  The findings indicate that state capacity plays an important role in challenging the 
284 
 
presence of terrorist sanctuaries, but the results also support the argument that state-society 
interactions matter.  Strong states within strong societies provide a higher level of social control 
that reduces the presence of terrorist sanctuaries. In contrast, strong states with weak societies are 
more likely to host terrorist nodes. The finding concerning weak states with weak societies also 
challenges the failed state-terrorist sanctuary proposition and lends support to the argument that 
some weak states are less desirable than others to establish sanctuary.  
Several control variables also provide insight into the environments terrorist 
organizations may seek to base operations. State sponsorship of terrorist organizations remains a 
critical element in the presence of sanctuaries, but as this is increasingly less common, terrorist 
organizations have pursued new strategies. Nodes are more often established in highly populated, 
less democratic countries prone to civil war.  Hubs also benefit from civil war, but are also 
established in countries with lower population density and mountainous terrain and higher levels 
of democracy. 
Chapter 5 presents the qualitative methodology used to analyze four cases in Chapters 6 
through 9.  A major drawback in the study of terrorist sanctuaries is the prevalence of 
confirmatory case studies that present extreme cases of terrorist sanctuary hubs in weak or failing 
states.  Without a structured comparative approach with variation between operational capacities 
of hubs and nodes, little attention has been given to building a generalizable understanding of 
sanctuaries beyond state-centric indicators.  This dissertation uses structured, focused 
comparison and historical process tracing based on the critical antecedents and critical juncture 
framework (Slater and Simmons 2010) to analyze the three positive cases (U.S., Germany, Iraq) 
and one negative case (Democratic Republic of Congo).   These methods allow a careful analysis 
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of the interactions between societal actors and between societal actors and the state, which 
highlight specific events and points in time to be emphasized for future comparative studies.  
Chapter 6 details the within case analysis of the U.S. as a weak state with strong society 
and a strong state with a strong society. Although the U.S. has stronger infrastructure than many 
weak states, until September 11, 2001 the interaction is best understood as a diffused polity or 
weak state and strong society.  Quantitative penetrative and extractive indicators support this 
argument, as the U.S. is relatively weak in domestic capacity compared to other developed 
countries, but possesses high societal fractionalization. The qualitative analysis details how the 
historical legacy of Constitutional protections and powerful social actors limit the state’s reach in 
a variety of ways.  Between 1970 and 2002 the U.S. hosted a number of terrorist hubs and nodes 
that supported transnational terrorist movements.   
Due to the legacy of contentious race relations within American society, the state faced 
the greatest challenge in countering the right-wing movement’s ideological hub and activities.  
The 1993 World Trade Center bombing had little impact on the state’s capacity because society 
grew hostile and suspicious of the state after Ruby Ridge and Waco. The 1995 Oklahoma City 
bombing was a critical antecedent that allowed the state to gain some penetrative capacity, but it 
also gave momentum to civil rights interest groups that pursued right-wing violence through civil 
litigation. The state remained weak in its ability to counter terrorist sanctuaries and money 
laundering on U.S. soil due to the strength of civil liberties groups and business interests until the 
weeks after September 11, 2001. The passage of the PATRIOT Act and subsequent 
counterterrorism policies marks a critical juncture that allowed the state to dramatically increase 
its reach and reorganize the security apparatus to counter terrorist sanctuaries more effectively.  
Additionally, the state has engaged minority interest groups and protected Muslims and other 
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minorities from right-wing violence through the passage of the 2009 hate crime law. From 2002 
until 2014 the U.S. represents a strong state-strong society interaction, or a polyarchical polity.  
However, as Chapter 3 points out, this interaction is typically not maintained.   
The state’s penetrative capacity remains relatively weaker than others in quantitative 
measures but qualitatively increased domestic security capacity.  Thus, the hypothesis that strong 
states and strong societies can reject terrorist sanctuaries is qualitatively supported.  The security 
apparatus remains more centralized and effective than it was prior to 9/11, but the state’s 
domestic reach has been constrained by Congress and the Supreme Court through challenges 
waged by civil liberties interest groups.  The unraveling of some PATRIOT Act provisions in 
2015 can be viewed as evidence that the state-society interaction in the U.S. is returning to its 
traditional weak state-strong society interaction.  
Chapter 7 provides an analysis of Germany’s state-society interactions and the presence 
of terrorist nodes from left-wing, right-wing, and fundamentalist religious groups.  Although the 
German state’s security apparatus after World War II was designed to be decentralized, the 
German state has swiftly addressed security weaknesses since the 1970s, despite criticism from 
society.  The German state-society interaction is best explained as a pyramidal polity because 
society lacks the organization to challenge the rule-making authority of the state.  Moreover, 
German society has generally acquiesced power to the state’s extension of authority through the 
democratic process.  In comparison, the methods the German state used to increase capacity to 
counter left-wing and right-wing terrorism limited civil liberties in ways that would not be 
possible in the U.S., due to Constitutional protections and the strength of societal organizations. 
The critical antecedent to the establishment of several nodes was population and ethnic and 
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religious demographic changes as a result of German reunification, the fall of the Soviet Union, 
and thousands of refugees from the Bosnian war and Kurdish Iraq.   
Since the 1990s, the isolated, parallel immigrant society has pursued employment in the 
informal or criminal economy due to poor education and employment opportunities.  The 
underground economy and societal isolation facilitated the development of clandestine nodes for 
Islamic terrorist organizations.  Because the state had little interaction with the 10% Muslim 
immigrant portion of society, German security failed to acknowledge the possibility of 
transnational terror nodes within the country.   After 9/11 the state quickly increased domestic 
security capabilities, often at the expense of further alienating the minority Muslim immigrant 
population who lack a political voice.  Germany’s strong state capacity and weak society has 
increasingly harbored only nodes, which supports the quantitative analysis. 
Chapter 8 traces the complex processes that ultimately led to the establishment of the 
Islamic State in Iraq. Quantitative indicators suggest that the Iraqi state was relatively strong 
until 1994 at which point it gradually declined, while society was also strong. In qualitative 
terms, the Iraqi state was strong vis-a-vis society until the 2003 invasion due to authoritarian 
measures that limited societal strength, but the regime was forced to rely on societal strongmen 
to bolster its reach throughout the 1990s. Taken together, the Iraqi state appears to have 
fluctuated between a strong state-strong society interaction and strong state-weak society 
interaction throughout Saddam Hussein’s reign. Saddam Hussein’s elevation of societal strength 
provided a basis for some social control when the regime collapsed and the state failed in 2003. 
Saddam Hussein sponsored terrorist organizations as a foreign policy strategy, but the 
Baathist regime also rejected fundamentalist religious ideologies and controlled the spread of it 
in Iraq.  The Western powers’ no-fly zone in Kurdish Iraq after 1991 was a critical antecedent to 
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the establishment of a transnational terrorist node. Fundamentalist Islamic beliefs flourished in 
Kurdish Iraq throughout the 1990s and ultimately provided Zarqawi’s Tawhid and Jihad safe 
haven in 2002.  The 2003 U.S. led intervention and the fall of Saddam Hussein was a critical 
juncture that allowed the establishment of an al Qaeda hub.  Although the Iraqi state has been 
exceptionally weak since 2003, society provides a semblance of order.  Sunni tribal leaders were 
ultimately able to counter al Qaeda between 2007 and 2010 with the U.S. military through the 
Sons of Iraq agreement, but this progress was subsequently squandered in 2011 by the Shi’ite 
dominated Iraqi government.  Therefore, the weak state-strong society interaction presents 
support for the quantitative findings. 
Chapter 9 provides an account of the negative case of terrorist sanctuaries in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.  The DRC received independence from brutal Belgian colonial 
rule after a unified nationalist challenge from society between 1958 and 1960, but society has 
been unable to collectively unite since independence.  The Congo Crisis (1960-1965) rebellions 
and secessionist movements rejected the state’s legitimacy but failed to unify toward a common 
political goal.  The left-wing communist movement from 1963 until 1965 faced a number of 
challenges, both external and self-imposed that limited its ability to survive but was ultimately 
countered by Mobutu’s consolidation of power.  Between 1965 and 1977 Mobutu built state 
institutions alongside a nation building strategy. The strength of the state weakened throughout 
the 1980s, and political pressure to democratize began to cripple the regime throughout the early 
1990s. From 1965 until 1996 Congolese society was weakened through the force of authoritarian 
rule.  However, any semblance of state capacity collapsed alongside Mobutu’s regime between 
1996 and 1997. Since 1996, the DRC is considered an anarchical polity.   
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Quantitative measures suggest that Congolese society was strong, but decades of 
authoritarian rule and a particularly violent decade of civil war that killed and displaced millions 
between 1996 and 2006 drastically altered the social structure.  This discrepancy between 
quantitative and qualitative indicators highlights the importance of micro-level analysis. 
Although the state has very weak capacity to penetrate or regulate economic or social behavior, 
the numerous armed rebel groups in the Eastern Congo and weak infrastructure present even 
greater challenges to the security of a terrorist organization.  Congolese society is considered 
weak because it lacks structure and organization, thus, terrorist organizations would have 
difficulty navigating the environment and finding or maintaining potential allies. This anarchical 
state-society interaction in the Democratic Republic of Congo provides support for the 
hypothesis that terrorist sanctuaries are unlikely.  
 10.1 Implications for Policymakers 
Several findings in this dissertation have policy implications. Minimizing state 
sponsorship of terrorism remains an important endeavor to deny sanctuary hubs. However, the 
organizational structure of terrorist organizations is fluid and policies should reflect a better 
understanding of the establishment of nodes for a comprehensive denial of sanctuary strategy.  
Policymakers have traditionally viewed transnational terrorist threats as most commonly 
originating from failing states, but the quantitative and qualitative analysis lends support to the 
idea that strong states are also vulnerable to terrorist organizations establishing sanctuaries.  
Thus, the traditional conceptualization of state weakness and state strength is flawed.  State 
weakness should not be understood strictly through macro-level development indicators for 
poverty, democracy, or civil war, but rather the capacity of the state to penetrate society and 
regulate social behavior in order to provide security. This is only one aspect of understanding 
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terrorist sanctuaries. Strong states in weak societies are often the host of terrorist nodes, so 
understanding this interaction is critical.  
State-society interactions provide a more comprehensive framework for understanding 
the constraints and opportunities for a terrorist organization’s ability to establish sanctuary. 
In short, terrorist sanctuaries can be established in both strong and weak states because an 
organization’s ability to operate depends on the structure and strength of society as well.  The 
ideal structure to challenge the presence of terrorist sanctuaries is to increase the strength of 
society, while maintaining strong state capacity.   
The U.S. strong state-strong society interaction after September 11th provides a 
framework for strengthening state capacity by constructing a more efficient security apparatus.  
Society has supported counter-terrorism with vigilance since 9/11 and has been generally 
supportive of the increased state capacity. However, security apparatus overreach risks alienating 
the relationship between the state and societal actors, so the state must maintain societal 
acceptance while increasing security capacity. 
The example of German state-society interactions indicates that in weak societies a 
portion of the population may lack a political voice.  Therefore, strong democratic states must 
provide minority populations an outlet to express political grievances either through increasing 
access to voting or facilitating the formation of and dialogue with interest groups.  State contact 
with isolated societal groups can ultimately lead to more inclusive social, political, and economic 
policies to minimize grievances, but dialogue is also critical to building a level of trust and 
reciprocity for counter terrorism. Societal actors are commonly the first alert system for 
uncovering terrorist sanctuaries, but mutual trust and respect must be established.   
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The strong state and weak society interaction is also important in understanding 
authoritarian regimes. As regime collapses in Iraq and as a result of the Arab Spring have 
illustrated, when authoritarian regimes that have weakened society through force are removed 
from power, terrorist organizations are presented an opportunity that was previously constrained 
by state reach. Fundamentalist religious movements are considered dangerous for authoritarian 
regimes because they are difficult to contain. This is the antithesis of a controlled society in 
which dictators depend, thus, authoritarian leaders use brutal measures to counter them.  While 
democratization and strengthening civil liberties are noble pursuits, they can also limit the state’s 
ability to counter terrorist organizations. Thus, the weakening of state power in authoritarian 
regimes by the international community should be pursued cautiously.  
Iraq illustrates the catastrophic consequences of weakening and abruptly failing a state 
that was vulnerable to transnational terrorist sanctuaries, as well as the potential for widespread 
human rights abuses by terrorist organizations, that can be even more devastating than an 
authoritarian regime.  Iraqi society provides a critical case for understanding the role societal 
strongmen can play in rejecting or accepting terrorist sanctuaries. The state-society dynamic in 
Iraq is complex, but society is not an anarchy overran by Islamic State (ISIL/ISIS) extremists 
who cannot be stopped. Instead, since 2011 al Qaeda and subsequently the Islamic State became 
the fighting force for Sunni Arab status in Iraqi society.  Many tribal leaders and former Sons of 
Iraq believe that passively accepting ISIL/ISIS is a more viable survival strategy than working 
alongside the Shi’ite dominated government.  
Without a Sunni fighting force to challenge the Islamic State, it will not be stopped. 
Furthermore, without the state’s willingness to abandon sectarian policies in favor of 
strengthening legitimacy through inclusive policies and the protection of all Iraqis, it will not be 
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stopped. “The marginalization and resentment felt in the Sunni dominated areas of Iraq is 
real….And as long as it continues, ISIS will have a home” (Von Drehle 2015, 28). 
 10.2 Prospects for Future Research  
The findings in this dissertation provide a framework for future comparative case studies 
and large N analyses.  A number of negative cases on the state weakness spectrum should be 
examined through the state-society interaction model to determine the range of societal structures 
and how society may react to terrorist organizations.  Moreover, the presence of terrorist 
sanctuary nodes in strong states within weak societies should also be examined through 
structured comparative case studies to determine why nodes are more common in this 
environment and how the political structure may facilitate their presence.   
The dataset compiled for this dissertation allows a range of future studies on terrorist 
sanctuaries to be conducted.  The statistical results in this analysis provide a promising future 
research agenda for understanding the differences between hubs and nodes. Subsequent large N 
analyses can provide a better understanding of the impact denial or dispersion of sanctuary has 
on organizational survival.  The relationship between democratic societies or democratizing 
polities and sanctuaries, both hubs and nodes, deserves more attention. As the field of terrorism 
advances and more data becomes available on a range of social, political, and economic 
indicators, the findings in this dissertation can be strengthened with an additional understanding 
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 Transnational Terrorist Organizations 
Terrorist Organizations with aims/goals inspired by a transnational terrorist movement (Left 
Wing/Communist-Socialist, Religious/fundamentalist Islamic inspired, Right Wing/white 
supremacist/fundamentalist Christian inspired, Environmental).  
Action Directe 
Al Fuqara 
Al Gama’a al Islamiyya (GAI) 
Alianca Libertadora Nacional 
Al Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI) 
Al Qaeda 
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
Al Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
Al Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers, Al Qaeda Iraq (successor to 
Tawhid and Jihad) 




Battalion of the Martyr Abdullah Azzam 
Che Guevara Brigade 
DHKP/C (Dev Sol) 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) 
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) 
Hammerskin Nation/Aryan Nations/Neo Nazi 
Hezbollah 
Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) 
Islamic Movement Uzbekistan 
Japanese Red Army 
Jemmah Islamiya (JI) 
Kakurokyo 
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group 
National Liberation Army 
Nestor Paz Zamora Commission 
Red Army Faction (successor group to Baader-Meinhof) 
Red Brigades 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
Sandinistas 
Shining Path 
Takfir wa Hijra 
Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG) 
VAR Palmares 
Weather Underground Organization 
329 
 
Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade 
Abu Nayaf al-Afghani 
Aden Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA) 
Al-Ahwal Brigades 
Alex Boncayao Brigade 
Ansar al-Islam/Ansar al-Sunnah Army 
Armed Forces of National Resistance 
Black Star 
Bolivian Guerilla Movement (MGB) 
Chukakuha 
Cinchoneros Popular Liberation Movement 
Comite Argentino de Lucha Anti Imperialisto 
Communist Combatant Cells 
Communist Party of India-Maoist 
Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist 
Conscientious Arsonists 
Cooperative of Handmade Fire and Related Items 
De Fes 
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) 
Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front/FARN 
First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO) 
Francs Tireurs 
Front for Defenders of Islam 
Group of Popular Combatants 
Guevarista Revolutionary Army (ERG) 
International Revolutionary Action Group (GARI) 
International Solidarity 
Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS) 
Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front 
Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade 
Islamic Jihad Group Uzbekistan 
Islamic Liberation Organization 
Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh 
Jaish al-Taifa al-Mansoura 
Jamatul Mujahedin Bangladesh 
Janashakti 
Kabataang Makabayan (KM) 
Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) 
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) 
Maoist Communist Center (MCC) 
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction 





Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front 
Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades (Red Eagles) 
May 19 Communist Order 
Montoneros 
Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras 
Movement of the Revolutionary Left 
Mujahideen KOMPAK 
New People’s Army 
New Red Brigades/Communist Combatant Party 
Nusantara Islamic Jihad Forces 
Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
Peace Conquerors 
Pedro Leone Arboleda Movement 
People’s Liberation Forces (El Salvador) 
People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FRAP) 
People’s Revolutionary Army (Argentina) 
People’s Revolutionary Organization 
People’s War Group (PWG) 
Popular Forces of April 25 
Popular Liberation Army 
Popular Revolutionary Vanguard 
Proletarian Nuclei for Communism 
Purbo Banglar Communist Party (PBCP) 
Rajah Solaiman Movement 
Rebolusyonaryong Hukbong Bayan (RHB) 
Red Flag 
Popular Armed Forces of the People (FARP) 
Revolutionary Front for Communism 
Revolutionary Nuclei 
Revolutionary Movement October 8 
Revolutionary Organization 17 November  
Revolutionary People’s Struggle, Revolutionary Nuclei 
Revolutionary Struggle 
Revolutionary Worker Clandestine Union of the People Party 
Salafia Jihadia 
Salafist Group for Call and Combat 
Shurafa ul-Urdun 
Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) 
Tawhid and Jihad (later AQI) 





Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement 
Turkish People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) (THKP-C) 
Yemen Islamic Jihad (precursor to Aden Abyan Islamic Army) 





People’s Liberation Organization Tamil Eelam 




Al Shabaab, Al Hijra 
Ansar al Sharia/Tunisia 
National Socialist Underground 




























Appendix B - Relative Political Capacity 
 Figure B. 1 Extractive Capacity Equations 
 
